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ABSTRACT
For thousands of years, navies have been used primarily for military purposes; battling
against opposing naval forces, protecting trade and supporting land forces. They have
other roles, which have evolved over time, and are now commonly categorized as the
diplomatic and constabulary functions of navies. The diplomatic function relies on the
ability of navies to operate freely at sea and to exert influence through their presence.
The constabulary function of navies involves law enforcement at sea and relates to the
protection of borders, natural resources and the marine environment.
Not all navies have become equally involved in the constabulary function. For some
smaller navies it marks the limit of their capability, while for others it is only a very
small part of their total responsibility. For example, the United States Navy undertakes
relatively few constabulary functions; leaving most to the United States Coast Guard
which has been established specifically for law enforcement duties. On the other hand,
the Royal Navy has played a larger role in the constabulary function, alongside several
civilian law enforcement agencies.
This thesis examines Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea, from the time of
Federation until the end of 2012, and what it has meant for the Royal Australian Navy.
The examination covers the nature and evolution of the law enforcement challenges,
noting that illegal immigration and resources protection have been recurring issues
from the beginning. In considering government responses to illegal activities at sea the
thesis identifies the slow, tentative and relatively informal approach that characterized
action until the extension of resource zones, and the arrival of large numbers of asylum
seekers by boat, demanded a more effective approach. The thesis also tracks the
evolution of supporting legislation, from an early trickle to a growing flood, reflecting
the increasing internationalization and complexity of law enforcement at sea.
Despite the longstanding involvement of navies in the constabulary function the Royal
Australian Navy was slow to engage in it, with wars, funding restrictions and
government ambivalence contributing factors. This thesis demonstrates, however, that
since the Navy took on the constabulary function, formally from 1967, it has become
integral to the Navy’s operations. Furthermore, the constabulary function has had
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profound impacts on the Navy’s force structure, basing, people and public image, not
all of which have been to the Navy’s advantage.
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CHAPTER ONE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROYAL
AUSTRALIAN NAVY
This thesis will examine Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea, the policymaking and practical solutions it has considered and implemented and the legislative
arrangements that have supported them. It will also examine the implications for the
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) of its growing involvement in the law enforcement
function, especially in recent years. In its examination the thesis will focus on the
period from Australian Federation in 1901 to the end of 2012. The thesis will conclude
that the changing nature and growing importance of law enforcement at sea have
demanded an ever-increasing, more formalized and permanent commitment from
governments. It will also conclude that the implications for the RAN have been
profound and far-reaching.
Australia is an island trading nation with a vast coastline and equally extensive
offshore territory and resource zones. Its coincident exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
and fishing zone extend for around 10 million square kilometres (sq km).1 The
Australian continental shelf, in places extends up to 350 nautical miles (nm) includes
an area of 2.56 million sq km beyond the 200 nm EEZ and continental shelf limit.2
Within these zones Australia enjoys certain rights and responsibilities which have
significant impacts on the national economy. These rights and responsibilities are laid
out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).3 Briefly, they are
to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the waters and
seabed.4

Because of these rights and responsibilities, Australia has developed significant
maritime industries. They include fishing and aquaculture, the fifth most valuable

Geosciences Australia, Oceans and Seas, <http://www.ga.gov.au/education/geosciencebasics/dimensions/oceans-and-seas.html> (24 October 2013)
2 Attorney General, Explanatory Statement, Seas and Submerged Lands (Continental Shelf)
Proclamation 2012, 24 May 2012, <www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/...76...> (24 October 2013).
3 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United
Nations, New York, 1983, p. 18. See in particular Article 56.
4 See Article 56 of The Law of the Sea, p. 18 for full details.
1

1

rural industry, worth some $A2.23 billion per annum.5 They also include the offshore
oil and gas industries. Nationally, both industries are significant although the oil
industry cannot satisfy domestic demand. The expanding natural gas industry has
significant export contracts with both Japan and China.6

Recent experience has demonstrated that the oceans’ living resources are in many cases
now severely depleted.7 This has led to attempts to regulate the harvesting of these
resources and to counter attempts to take them illegally. History has shown that the
sea can be used to the disadvantage of coastal states, through explicitly or implicitly
illegal

activities.

These

include

illegal

people

movement,

drug

running,

environmentally damaging activities and quarantine infractions. Each of these issues
has provided recent regulatory challenges for Australia.8

These challenges have generated an appreciation of the need for regulatory
frameworks and the associated policing mechanisms, to manage the ‘health’ of the sea,
to ensure continuity of the living resources, to prevent illegal activity and to provide a
balance among the needs of all the users of the sea and the needs of the States which
border it; where those needs differ. For this thesis, the combination of regulatory
framework and policing mechanisms will be said to comprise Australia’s approach to
law enforcement at sea. The Navy’s involvement in this policing comprises its
constabulary function which will be examined in greater detail below and in Chapter
Two.

Approaches to law enforcement at sea can range from an all-encompassing coast guard
with full law enforcement powers and operational capability, to combinations of
several organizations, including navies, each playing different parts in the overall task.

The figure is for the financial year 2010-11. Australian Government Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, Australian Fisheries Statistics 2011, December 2012, p. 1,
<http://data.daff.gov.au/bus/data/warehouse/9aam.../> (24 October 2013).
6 Australian Government, Department of Industry, Australian liquefied natural gas,
<http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/upstream_petroleum/lng/Pages/index.aspx> (24 October
2013).
7 Kjellrun Hiis, Belinda Cleelend and Douglas Clyde Wilson, Fisheries Depletion and Collapse,
International Risk Governance Council, Geneva, 2009, p. 1, < http://irgc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Fisheries> (24 October 2013).
8 Australian Government, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Protecting our
borders. http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page5799.asp (24 October 2013).
5
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As Australia’s offshore law enforcement task has grown in recent years, with some
elements becoming politically sensitive, there has been debate as to how best the task
can be tackled.

One aspect of the debate concerns the increasing part played in law enforcement at sea
by the RAN and the implications of this for the Navy. The nature and extent of the law
enforcement task remain unpredictable and have impacted on RAN operations,
training, patrol boat basing, personnel and reputation.
REGULATION OF THE SEA
Prior to the relatively recent series of United Nations (UN)-sponsored Law of the Sea
Conferences, regulation of maritime issues gradually evolved, in the Western tradition,
from the British Admiralty Courts. Through their decisions, the uses and practices of
laws of the sea were substantially developed by the mid-17th century.9 The approach of
these Courts is neatly summarized in this 1689 quote from Sir Charles Hedges, one of
the courts’ eminent judges:
The Court of Admiralty is a Court of Justice, and the judge who is sworn to
administer it is as much obliged to observe the laws of nations as the Judges of
the Courts of Westminster are bound to proceed according to the statutes of
common law.10
The first serious attempt to codify the principles of the international law of the sea
came in the Declaration of Paris in 1856. It laid down the rules for the abolition of
privateering, the immunity of neutral goods and the effectiveness of blockade.11
Subsequently, the Hague Conference of 1907 and the London Declaration of 1909
codified the rules of naval warfare. Further work was done on international maritime
law between the two World Wars, including by the Hague Conference of 1930 which
drafted a convention on the status of the territorial sea, but without being able to agree
on its limits.12
John, C. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, 6th ed., (1967) rpt., Longmans Green and
Co., London, 1968, p. 10.
10 Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, p. 11.
11 Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, p. 20.
12 R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed., Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1999, pp. 14-15.
9
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Following the Second World War and the establishment of the UN, an International
Law Commission sought topics for codification and settled on, inter alia, legal regimes
of the high seas and territorial waters.13 A report on these issues was approved for
submission to the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea at the UN’s Geneva session in
July 1956. Conferences in 1958 and 1960 failed to reach agreement on some important
issues, such as the limits of the territorial sea and fisheries limits.14 Eventually,
however, the third UN Conference of the Law of the Sea, which began in 1973, adopted
a convention in 1982.15 The LOSC was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 and
it came into force on 16 November 1994.16

The LOSC established several regimes including a 12 nm territorial sea, methods for
distinguishing between territorial waters and internal waters, and recognized the
traditional right of innocent passage. It also introduced the concept of transit passage
(more liberal than innocent passage) and importantly, that of archipelagic waters and
the associated archipelagic sea lanes passage.17

Beyond territorial waters, the Convention allowed for EEZs extending to 200nm from
the baselines, to allow coastal States to gain economic benefit from resources further
offshore.18 It also mandated that neighbouring land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged States must be allowed access to resources not exploited by the coastal
State.19 As stipulated in Article 58 of the LOSC, within EEZs all States, subject to the
provisions of the Convention, enjoy freedoms of navigation and overflight, and of the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other related lawful uses of the sea.20

Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, p. 22.
Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, p. 15.
15 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, p. 16.
16 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, p. 22.
17 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. xxv.
18 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 5557, pp. 18-19.
19 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 58,
p. 19.
20 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 58,
p. 19.
13
14
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The LOSC also considered globally important issues such as ecology and environment.
It established general principles governing the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution throughout the marine environment.21 The Convention further established
the specific rights and duties of States for the realization of their environmental and
ecological goals.22 Additionally, the Convention included provisions to foster the
development and transfer of marine technology and to encourage the conduct of
marine research.23

Outside the EEZ, activities on the surface and in the water column are generally
governed by the provisions for the freedom of the high seas.24 Activities on the sea-bed
and in the subsoil of the continental shelf may come under coastal state jurisdiction in
specific cases. However, the LOSC also set out the principles and regulations for the
sea-bed and ocean floor beyond these limits.25 It also gave regulatory power for this
area to the International Sea-Bed Authority.26

The LOSC obliges parties to resolve disputes peacefully and provides a variety of
methods for achieving this. There is a compulsory element to the dispute resolution
process, but States may take their dispute to either the International Court of Justice,
arbitration, or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.27

Alongside the international legal framework for regulation of the oceans is the
supporting legislation enacted by States to protect and promote their own interests. In
Australia most of the relevant legislation exists at the Commonwealth level and reflects
the number of government departments or other authorities involved – 10 according to
the Customs Service annual report.28 It includes legislation which empowers the
Defence Force for law enforcement at sea; including the Fisheries Management Act 1991,
United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 1924, pp. 70-1.
22 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 1946, pp. 70-1.
23 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. xxvii.
24 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. xxv.
25 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. xxvi.
26 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. xxvi.
27 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. xxvii.
28 Australian Government, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Report
2011-2012, Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, p. 4. The reference lists nine authorities; the tenth
being Customs itself.
21
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the Customs Act 1901 and the Crimes Act 1914. It also includes border security
legislation such as the Migration Act 1958 and the Border Protection Legislation
Amendment and Fisheries Legislation Amendment Acts of 1999, together with subsequent
amendments to them. The development of the legal framework from the time of
Federation will be discussed in chapters four to seven below.

POLICING THE REGULATIONS
Nations have taken varied approaches to maintaining good order at sea. For centuries
Britain has used the Royal Navy (RN) for constabulary work, not least to ensure the
advancement of Britain’s interests. Today, Britain still uses the Navy to carry out its
offshore policing tasks, now under the legal framework of the LOSC. The latest edition
of British Maritime Doctrine lists three major forms of application of maritime power;
one of which is ‘constabulary’ or ‘policing’.29 Many other countries have taken the
same approach; using their navies for both war-fighting and constabulary tasks. Others
have given the constabulary tasks to dedicated coast guards.

Ken Booth in his 1977 book, Navies and Foreign Policy, provided a convincing rationale
for the involvement of navies in the constabulary function. He identified three
functions of navies; military, diplomatic and policing.30 He also nominated the three
functions as elements of a trinity, in which the unifying principle is the use of the sea.31
Depending on the size of the navy, these functions can be expanded. The military
function can involve balance of power and force projection roles, while the diplomatic
function can include negotiation, manipulation and prestige roles. The policing or
constabulary32 function can involve nation-building and coast guard roles. Booth also
illustrated this proposition with the three functions as sides of a triangle - the military
function forming the base. This accorded with his contention that the military function

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, British Maritime Doctrine, Ministry of Defence, August 2011, p.
2-7.
30 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, London, 1977, p. 15.
31 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 15.
32 The term ‘constabulary’ is used in the RAN’s adaptation of Booth’s trinity of naval functions.
It will be used throughout this thesis. See Sea Power Centre-Australia, Australian Maritime
Doctrine, Defence Publishing Services, Canberra, 2000. p. 57.
29
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was ultimately the essential one, because ‘… the essence of navies is their military
character’.33

Although the military function is acknowledged as the essential function of navies, the
constabulary function has long been a major responsibility for many navies. It can be
both internally and externally focussed and is mainly concerned with extending
sovereignty over the coastal State’s maritime frontiers and sovereign rights in resource
zones. Booth further expands the description by establishing two categories of activity,
each with a number of sub-tasks. These are; coast guard responsibilities involving
sovereignty, resource enjoyment and maintenance of good order; and nation-building,
involving contributions to internal stability and to internal development.34
Since the end of the Second World War the constabulary or protective task in territorial
waters has gained importance, especially because of new and expanding avenues of
economic exploitation of the sea.35 In the 1980s, as the negotiations over the law of the
sea continued, national jurisdiction was expected to creep outwards, enclosing more of
the high seas.36 Where such pressures still exist, they have the potential to extend the
constabulary role of navies.
Nevertheless, policing of the immediate coastal zone has always been an important if
usually undramatic role for naval forces. For many navies it remains the overriding
task.37 Similarly, the future of many navies will depend on their carrying out
constabulary functions in those waters over which they claim national jurisdiction.38
Sovereignty, good order at sea and resource enjoyment are the primary concerns of
constabulary operations.

Notwithstanding the historical record, policing offshore zones also has a very
contemporary aspect. These zones have grown in importance in recent years. As

Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16.
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 17.
35 Lawrence Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy, Praeger for the Institute for Strategic Studies,
New York, 1967, p. 123.
36 Geoffrey Till, with Craig Symonds, Bryan Ranft et. al., Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age,
2nd. ed., St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1984, p. 207.
37 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 265.
38 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 266.
33
34
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Geoffrey Till noted some 30 years ago, they have come to be seen as a new source of
food, energy and raw materials.39 More recently, the constabulary role has seen navies
involved in defending national positions on oil and gas extraction and on access to fish
stocks. Clashes have occurred in the South China Sea, notably since 1974.40 These have
been caused primarily by tensions over the establishment or maintenance of a physical
presence on islands and reefs, to take advantage of territorial and consequent resource
claims. From 2010 there have been eruptions of tension between Japan and China in
the East China Sea and between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.41
These have involved contested rights to oil, gas and fishing resources.

Australia has been subjected to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) foreign
fishing activities, both in northern waters and in the Southern Ocean. Those in
northern waters have involved mainly Indonesian fishing craft, often engaged in
traditional fishing. More recently, these activities have become both more commercial
in nature and likely to involve international criminal organizations.42 IUU fishing in the
Southern Ocean has involved commercial operators from several countries and poses
particular difficulties because of the distance of the fishing grounds from the
Australian mainland.43

In several regions seaborne asylum seekers have become a significant if episodic
problem. They continue to be a problem between North Africa and the southern
European coast.44 They have been a problem for Australia since the late 1970s, when

Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 203.
James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia: A comparative study, Routledge,
Abingdon, Oxon, 2013, p. 192.
41 Patrick M. Cronin, Flashpoints: The Way Forward in the East and South China Seas, Centre for
New American Security, Washington, D.C., 28 March 2013, p. 2.
42 Greg McLean, ‘Chinese mafia funding illegal fishermen’, Northern Territory News, 14 June
2005, p. 1. The article claimed that the Australian Federal Police was gathering intelligence on
Chinese organized crime syndicates which were believed to be funding illegal fishermen.
43 Two countries that have been involved are Uruguay and Honduras and their efforts have
prompted a strong Australian response. See, for example, Australian Customs Service and
Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Enforcement Operations in the Southern Ocean,
August 2005.
44 Konye Obaji Ori, ‘Immigration: Italy seeks asylum overhaul’, The Africa Report,
<http://www.theafricareport.com/International/immigration-italy-seeks-asylumoverhaul.html> (24 October 2013).
39
40
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Vietnamese asylum seekers or ‘boat people’45 began appearing off the northern
Australian coast.46 They were followed by Cambodian and Chinese refugees in the
1980s and 1990s.47 Beginning in 1999, however, there was a shift in the pattern, with
much larger numbers of asylum seekers arriving by boat. These tended to be from
Central Asia and the Middle East rather than from Southeast and East Asia.48 At the
time of writing, asylum seekers, primarily from Southwest and South Asia,49 continue
trying to reach Australia by boat, despite Government efforts to stop the traffic.

Wherever such asylum seekers have appeared navies and coast guards have been
engaged in trying to apprehend them, save them from unseaworthy and sometimes
foundering craft and in some cases dissuade them from continuing to their intended
destinations. In Australia, the RAN commitment has at times involved two or three
frigates, one amphibious ship, one survey ship and up to six patrol boats; together with
Sea King helicopters and Air Force P3 aircraft.50 The effort has also involved
Coastwatch aircraft, Customs patrol boats and some vessels under civilian contract.51

Another emerging issue with potential ramifications for maritime constabulary
functions is the tendency for coastal States to restrict the activities of foreign flag naval
vessels in their EEZs. Certain Asia-Pacific coastal States appear to be particularly active

‘Boat people’ was a term used informally for the first arrivals from Southeast Asia in the late
1970s. This thesis will use the terms ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘irregular maritime arrival’ which have
had official status at least until the time of writing at the end of 2012.
46 Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976, Department of
Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 5 January 2011, p. 1.
47 Lieutenant Commander D.J. Chessum, RNZN, ‘The Impact of International Conventions on
Efforts to Address People Smuggling into Australia’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol.
28, No. 1, Autumn 2002, p. 9.
48 Chessum, ‘People Smuggling into Australia’, p. 9.
49 Janet Phillips, Background Note: Asylum Seekers and refugees: What are the facts? Parliament of
Australia, Parliamentary Library, 11 February 2013, p. 11.
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/HGNW6/pdf> (24 October
2013)
50 David Stevens, ‘To disrupt, deter and deny: sealing Australia’s maritime borders’, in Bruce A.
Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds., Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and counter-strategies,
1805-2005, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2006, p. 229.
51 Australian Government, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Customs and
Border Protection Marine Unit Maritime Operations Support Branch,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page5503.asp> (25 October 2013) and Minister Media
Release: New Coastwatch fleet takes to the skies, Thursday 28 March 2008,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/site/content10172.asp.> (25 October 2013).
45
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in this matter.52 The implication for Australia and for the RAN, is that if other States
succeed in having limits placed on such activities in EEZs (limits beyond those now
specified in the LOSC) then Australia may feel obliged to impose its own set of
restrictions. This would inevitably increase the law enforcement burden on maritime
forces, potentially resulting in a greater involvement by the RAN’s surface combatant
force.

The sheer variety of issues, together with their inherent complexity and political
impact will cause coastal States to consider how best to manage the ‘offshore estate’. In
many coastal States the task is complicated by the number of government authorities
involved in it. For example, Till, writing in the 1980s, noted that there were 40 agencies
with overlapping maritime responsibilities in the United States of America (USA)
while the United Kingdom (UK) has over 20 such organizations.53

The situation in Australia is also complex, with federal, state and local government
authorities sharing responsibilities. At the federal level, there are no fewer than 10
government departments and authorities involved. These include several discrete
authorities with specific responsibilities; such as the Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forests (DAFF) Biosecurity and the Australian Fisheries Management
Authority (AFMA). They also include the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs
and Trade.54 The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement and the associated
legislation, which give the various states jurisdiction over waters from the baselines
out to three nautical miles, exacerbates the problems.55

Moritaka Hayashi, ‘Military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ: definition of key
terms’, in Marine Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2005, pp. 126 and 131.
53 Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 203.
54 As at 2012, the complete list of Commonwealth authorities is: Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service, Australian Crime Commission, Australian Federal Police, AttorneyGeneral’s Department, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests (including
Biosecurity), Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of
Immigration and Citizenship, Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and
Tertiary Education, and the Office of Transport Security in the Department of Infrastructure and
Transport. See, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Report 2011-2012, p.
4.
55 Stuart Kaye, ‘Federal-State Relations Offshore’, in Doug MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood, eds.,
Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects, Wollongong Papers on Maritime
Policy No. 9, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, NSW, 1997. p. 230.
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THE PRACTICALITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA
There have been expressions of concern that law enforcement at sea may absorb
resources which would be better dedicated to navies’ military functions and that the
constabulary functions should be left to coast guards.56 Some maritime nations have
chosen to give the responsibility to dedicated coast guards. The USA is perhaps the
best example in some respects, in that its coast guard has cooperated with the Navy for
many years, in wartime and peacetime operations.57

The US Coast Guard evolved from the Revenue Cutter Service established in 1790, the
Lighthouse Service, the Steamboat Inspection Service, the Bureau of Navigation and
the Lifesaving Service.58 Law enforcement, safety of life at sea and environmental
protection remain central responsibilities, while the organization also remains an
armed force of the USA.59 The Coast Guard is the lead US federal government agency
for maritime homeland security, for responses requiring civil authorities.

Thus, while the US Coast Guard has primary responsibility for law enforcement at sea,
other law enforcement agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection, cooperate to
achieve this. Similarly, the United States Navy (USN) assists the Coast Guard in its
homeland security task.60 The US Coast Guard comprises 43 000 men and women, 42
cutters, a large number of patrol craft and a fleet of 211 fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters.61 That an organization of this magnitude operates with several other
agencies to meet its responsibilities, testifies to the complexity and scale of the
maritime security task confronting the USA.

Much smaller countries have also opted for a coast guard in addition to a navy.
Malaysia passed legislation to establish the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency

Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 207.
A Center for Naval Analyses powerpoint presentation covering the Coast Guard’s relationship with the
U.S. Navy, 1970-2009, <http://www.uscg.mil/history/h_militaryindex.asp> (26 October 2013).
58 U.S. Coast Guard: A Historical Overview, <www. uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history> (28 October 2013).
59 U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., 2002. p. 9.
60 U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, p. 12.
61 United States Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Aircraft, Boats and Cutters,
<http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/#cutters> (26 October 2013).
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in June 2004.62

The Agency became operational in March 2005, taking over law

enforcement in Malaysia’s territorial sea and EEZ. It also manages search and rescue,
pollution control and anti-piracy and drug trafficking operations on the high seas.63

According to Sam Bateman, the impetus for establishing the agency came from within
the Royal Malaysian Navy, which considered the constabulary tasks a waste of
resources and time for complex warships and their heavily committed crews.64
Currently, the Agency operates a fleet of 84 small and medium sized vessels, two fixedwing aircraft and three helicopters.65

The extent to which the Royal Malaysian Navy will retain any residual responsibilities
for offshore law enforcement or related tasks is unclear. The reasons given for
establishing the Maritime Enforcement Agency suggest, however, that the Navy will
not be keen to remain involved.66 Conversely, any navy would find difficulty in
ignoring maritime activities inimical to its national interests, simply because the law
enforcement responsibility belonged to another organization.

For several countries, including Ireland, a single organization acts as both navy and
coast guard. The Irish Naval Service, which comprises eight ocean going patrol vessels,
has homeland security as its primary role.67 This involves deterrence of and resistance
to aggression, EEZ surveillance and the upholding of neutrality. Its coast guard
functions include fishery protection, drugs interdiction, maritime safety and pollution
control.68 This approach is consistent with that articulated by Ken Booth.69

Sam Bateman, ‘Regional Coast Guards–A Growing Contribution to Maritime Order and
Security’, a paper delivered at the International Conference on Maritime Security Challenges in
the Asia-Pacific Region in the post 9/11 Era, held in Victoria, British Columbia, 5-7 May 2005,
p. 12.
63 Bateman, ‘Regional Coast Guards–A Growing Contribution to Maritime Order and Security’,
p. 12.
64 Bateman, ‘Regional Coast Guards–A Growing Contribution to Maritime Order and Security,
p. 12.
65 James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 2013, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 2013, pp. 318-9.
66 Sam Bateman, ‘regional navies and coastguards: striking a balance between “lawships” and
warships’, in Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, eds., Naval Modernisation in South-east Asia: Nature,
causes and consequences’, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 2013, pp. 253-4.
67 Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 2013, p. 146.
68 ‘The Irish Defence Forces–Naval Service’, < http://www.military.ie/navalservice/organisation/roles-of-the-naval-service/> (2 December 2013).
69 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, London, 1977, pp. 15-17.
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THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AT SEA
A variation of the Irish approach and a similar adherence to Booth’s proposition has
proven to be attractive to other navies, including Australia’s. The RAN includes a
derivative of the trinity of naval functions in its keystone statement on doctrine,
Australian Maritime Doctrine.70

It describes the constabulary role as comprising;

environmental and resource management, peace operations, maritime barrier
operations, sanctions and embargoes, defence force aid to civil authorities, counterpiracy operations, and search and rescue operations.71

Australia’s Navy retains primary responsibility for the offshore constabulary function,
with the RAN’s patrol boat dedicating 3 000 patrol boat days per year to it.72 The Navy
is supported by the patrol craft of the Australian Customs and Border Protection
Marine Unit73 and by surveillance aircraft of the Coastwatch organization74 and of the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), to a lesser extent.75 Navy patrol boats also carry
officers of other law enforcement bodies depending on the nature of their operations.
These can include Federal Police officers and officers from Customs, Fisheries and
Biosecurity authorities.

Other elements of the RAN also become involved in the constabulary function.
Destroyers and frigates controversially have been called on to undertake patrol or
response operations against suspected asylum seekers in the northwest approaches to
Australia.76 A major operation against asylum seekers, Operation Relex, began in
70Sea

Power Centre-Australia, Australian Maritime Doctrine-RAN Doctrine 1, Defence Publishing
Services, Canberra, 2000, pp. 113-20.
71 Australian Maritime Doctrine-RAN Doctrine 1, pp. 113-20.
72 Semaphore, Welcome to the Armidale Class, February 2006, http://www.navy.gov.au/mediaroom/publications/semaphore-february-2006-0 (28 October 2013).
73 Customs and Border Protection Marine Unit: Maritime Operations Support Branch,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page5503.asp> (28 October 2013).
74Australian Government, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, ‘Minister media
release: New Coastwatch fleet takes to the skies’, 27 March 2008,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/site/content10172.asp> (28 October 2013).
75 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2011-2012, Part 1,
<http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/11-12/dar/dar_1112_1.pdf> (28 October 2013).
76 There are several references to these activities in Australia’s Navy Annual 2001. See, for
example, Lieutenant Geoffrey McGinley, ‘Life Down South’, in Lieutenant Laura Bulloch, et. al.,
eds., Australia’s Navy Annual 2001, Fine-Line Publishing Pty. Ltd., Jerrabombera, NSW, pp. 40-
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September 2001 and was superseded by Operation Resolute on 17 July 2006.77 At its
peak, it involved patrol boats, surface combatants, amphibious ships and hydrographic
survey vessels. Their use reflects the extent of the task and the inability of the patrol
boat force to cope with it, both numerically and in individual capability. For all vessels
but the patrol boats, the activity was a diversion from their primary tasks.

That the military function is still considered essential for navies inevitably creates the
potential for dispute about the priority to be given to the other functions. These
disputes are essentially peacetime matters; when diplomatic and constabulary
activities are more likely to confront navies. They also remain alive no matter how
important or extensive the constabulary tasking may be. Such disputes concern the
allocation of financial resources, training opportunities and of ships to lower priority
tasks.

Navies naturally should concentrate on their essential or primary function and should
see any diversion from that as liable to impact on their capacity to carry out that
function. This view applies more to the constabulary function than it does to the
diplomatic, because the former is more likely to impact directly on the availability of
warships for the primary function, and because the latter often involves training and
exercises with other navies.78 Conversely, the constabulary function, on the other hand,
is more likely to interfere with the continuous training programs that prepare ships
and their crews for their primary function.

The dispute is sometimes extended by arguing that the constabulary function is not a
true navy function, but one that belongs to coast guards. This argument has been

44. See also, Maritime Headquarters, ‘Operations 2001-2002’, in Bulloch, et. al., eds., Australia’s
Navy Annual 2001, p. 13. See also Stevens, ‘To disrupt, deter and deny: sealing Australia’s
maritime borders’, in Elleman and Paine, eds., Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and
counter-strategies, 1805-2005, p. 231.
77 Operation Resolute incorporated several other operations devoted to countering illegal fishing
and smuggling, as well as Operation Relex. Navy, Resolute,
<http://www.navy.gov.au/operations-and-exercises/resolute> (28 October 2013).
78 Lieutenant Lauren Rago, ‘Triton Centenary draws to a close’, Navy Daily, 18 October 2013,
<http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Oct2013/Fleet/537/Triton-Centenary-draws-to-aclose.htm#.Um24LZq4bmQ> (28 October 2013).
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pressed by the Labor Party in Australia since 200179 and has some support within other
elements of the community.80 An examination of history, however, suggests that
constabulary tasks have been an integral part of naval operations for centuries. They
occupied the RN for centuries and were a significant feature of its 19th century
operations, including countering the slave trade off the west and east coasts of Africa.81
Sporadically for many years, they have also been a feature of RAN operations almost
since its inception; involving fisheries and anti-illegal immigration patrols as early as
1911.82

Tensions between constabulary and other roles currently remain quite high, with the
almost unprecedentedly high demand for RAN ships to meet government tasking over
the last decade or more. This has seen Australian warships engaged in high-end warfighting in two Persian Gulf wars, enforcement of UN sanctions (blockade operations)
against Iraq, undertaking power projection operations in East Timor, extended patrols
to prevent incursions by illegal immigrants, disaster relief operations in Indonesia, and
peace operations in Tonga and the Solomon Islands.83 The extensive and long-standing
patrols of the Australian Fisheries Zone (AFZ) have also continued uninterrupted
throughout this time.

The RAN is now acquiring new and highly capable sea control destroyers and
amphibious landing ships significantly larger than those previously operated by the
Navy. Coincidentally, there is a debate about the nature of the future security
environment and its likely effect on naval operations and force structure. The extent to
which global terrorism might develop a maritime dimension in Southeast Asian and
Southwest Pacific waters is a significant element of this debate. The existence of
terrorist groups within Southeast Asian nations demands vigilance – given the wealth
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Insiders, 11 November 2001,
<http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/content/2001/s413703.htm> (28 October 2013).
80 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, ‘Dedicated body will anchor command’, The Australian, 20
December 2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/dedicated-body-will-anchorcommand/story-e6frg6zo-1111115155920> (28 October 2013).
81 Roger Morris, ‘Endeavour, Discovery and Idealism, 1760-1895’, in J. R. Hill, ed., The Oxford
Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 244 and 249.
82 Bob Nicholls, Statesmen and Sailors: Australian Maritime Defence 1870-1920, Standard
Publishing House, Rozelle, NSW, 1995, p. 188.
83 See Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations 1990-2005, Sea Power Centre-Australia,
Canberra, 2005, pp. 7, 43, 50, 53, and 61, and Navy, HMAS Kanimbla II,
<http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-kanimbla-ii> (28 October 2013).
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of opportunities for terrorist activities in regional seas and the potential for significant
human and economic loss as a result.

Constabulary tasks may impact on other naval operations, especially on those of the
RAN. Several aspects of national maritime responsibility have received more attention
in recent years. They include the marine environment, marine resource protection and
management and maritime border protection in respect of customs, immigration and
quarantine regulations. They also include implementation of the International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and Australia’s involvement in the US–sponsored
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s announcement on 15 December 2004 of the
establishment of new law enforcement at sea arrangements emphasized the continuing
and growing importance of maritime security to Australia.84 The announcement
followed a review of offshore maritime security which focussed on the oil and gas
platforms on the northwest shelf of Western Australia. The review reflected growing
industry concern as to the adequacy of existing security and resulted in the creation of
new arrangements to monitor shipping approaching Australian waters.85

The new arrangements included the establishment of a Joint Offshore Protection
Command, led by the Navy Rear Admiral who was the Director General of
Coastwatch. The new arrangement cemented the role of the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) and of the RAN especially, in law enforcement at sea. In October 2006, the
organization was renamed the Border Protection Command, while retaining the same
command arrangements.86 Subsequently in December 2008, and following the election
of a Labor Government, the Australian Customs Service was renamed the Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service, with overall responsibility for responding to
maritime people smuggling.87 The command arrangements remained unaltered and

Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, PM Transcripts:
Strengthening Offshore Maritime Security, PM Howard, John, 15 December 2004,
<http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=21554> (28 October 2013).
85 PM Transcripts: Strengthening Offshore Maritime Security, PM Howard, John, 15 December 2004,
86 Border Protection Command–History Overview, < http://bpc.gov.au/site/page5792.asp> (11
January 2013).
87 Border Protection Command–History Overview, < http://bpc.gov.au/site/page5792.asp> (11
January 2013).
84

16

the organization involved several other government authorities with law enforcement
at sea responsibilities.88

For the future, although the exact nature of the maritime security environment cannot
be clear, the existing and emerging issues identified above suggest growing
importance for regulatory activities associated with constabulary functions at sea. If so,
Australia will inevitably confront some choices in dealing with them. These include the
extent to which the Navy remains committed to them and the implications of that
commitment, the possibility of establishing a dedicated law enforcement organization
(possibly incorporating or led by a coast guard) and the extent to which military
activities at sea become part of an integrated national security apparatus. These issues
were highlighted in the November 2007 Australian election, with Labor promising the
formation of a Department of Homeland Security and a coast guard.89 Although
neither organization emerged from Labor’s election win, the potential for further
organizational change remains.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE LITERATURE
This subject has only quite recently gained widespread political and public attention,
so very little was written about Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea until
about 30 years ago. Furthermore, much of the literature is specialized and is aimed at
an audience already familiar with the subject. There are two major strands to this
literature; official government studies, reports and policy statements, and Australian
academic studies and proposals.
Official Literature
The official literature comprises parliamentary debates, government examinations of
the coastal surveillance needs, parliamentary studies of the existing programs and
departmental and other policy statements. These official documents include a
Australian Government, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, About Customs
and Border Protection, <http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page4222.asp> (29 October 2013).
89 Australian Labor Party, National Platform and Constitution 2007, pp. 248, 255 and 256,
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/partypol/1024541/> (29 October
2013).
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succession of audit reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of the various
approaches to law enforcement at sea.

Law enforcement at sea has been the subject of parliamentary debate since Federation,
yet until now there has been no systematic examination of these debates and their
influence on law enforcement.90 Formal government reporting was almost non-existent
for many years after Federation and in the early years documents such as the Official
Commonwealth Year Books, and the annual Government Resident’s Reports on the Northern
Territory were amongst the only sources of the very limited information about law
enforcement at sea issues.91 Admiral Jellicoe’s 1919 Naval Defence Report on the Naval
Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia made some reference to the potential
constabulary or policing role for the RAN in peacetime, although the report
concentrated on the Navy’s military defence roles and needs.92

By the 1930s official reports began to appear sporadically. For example, the Auditor
General’s annual report on receipts and expenditure in 1934 detailed Customs’ seizures
of illicit goods and successful prosecutions.93 But, it was only from the 1970s that
official inquiries and regular reporting became commonplace. The most prominent
theme in this literature is the number of reviews of various kinds which examined the
coastal surveillance aspect of law enforcement at sea.

The Commonwealth Government’s first review of coastal surveillance, by the Standing
Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Coastal Surveillance, was delayed from 1979
until a much revised completion date of 31 December 1981,94 because of difficulties in

See, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the House of Representatives, Vol. IV, 6 September
1901, p. 4631, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the Senate, Vol. IV, 4 September 1901, p.
4415; Quarantine Act 1908, The Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the
Session of 1907-08, Government Printer, Victoria, 1908, p. 24. .
91 Government Resident’s Report on the Northern Territory, 1908, Palmerston, NT, 1908, p. 10.
92 Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, Naval Defence Report on the Naval Mission to the
Commonwealth of Australia: Appendix 1, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1919, p. 37.
93 ‘Annual Report of the Auditor General upon the Treasurer’s Receipts and Expenditure during
the year ended 30th June 1934’, pp. 64-5, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Papers
Presented to Parliament 1934-5-6-7, Vol. II, Government Printer, Canberra, pp. 2434-5. No
publication date listed but presumed to be 1937.
94 Derek Woolner, Australian Coastal Surveillance: A History and Commentary, Basic Paper No. 3
1984, Department of the Parliamentary Library, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, Canberra, 1984. pp. 3-9.
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establishing aerial surveillance contracts with several general aviation companies or
small airlines.95

The newly elected Labor Government announced a review of coastal surveillance on 9
May 1983, to be conducted by the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Kim
Beazley and reporting in April 1984.96 The Beazley Report provided a distinctive and
comprehensive treatment of threats and risks; specifically quarantine, fisheries,
customs, immigration, environment and conservation and offshore oil and gas
installations.97

The approach to law enforcement at sea was also questioned around this time by two
reports into drug smuggling in Australia; the Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into
Drugs (The Williams Report) of 1980 and the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug
Trafficking (The Stewart Report) of 1983.98 Nevertheless, the recommendations of these
inquiries were not readily accepted by the dedicated coastal surveillance reviews.99

Parliament’s appetite for reviews of coastal surveillance remained strong through the
1980s. The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure enquired
into the implementation of the Beazley Report recommendations in 1986 and in 1988
the Labor Government commissioned Mr Hugh Hudson to conduct a further review of
coastal surveillance. The Hudson Review took account of the recommendations of the
Beazley Report and of the 1986 Parliamentary review known as Footprints in the Sand.100
Similarly the 1988 Hudson Review Report, Northern Approaches: A Report on the
Administration and Management of Civil Coastal Surveillance in Northern Australia,
Woolner, Australian Coastal Surveillance: A History and Commentary, Basic Paper No. 3 1984, pp.
3-9.
96 Woolner, Australian Coastal Surveillance: A History and Commentary, Basic Paper No. 3 1984, p.
12.
97 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, The Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra,
1984. pp. 3-2 to 3-19.
98 Parliament of Australia, Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry,
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Lib
rary/Browse_by_Topic/law/royalcommissions#1977> (30 October 2013).
99Woolner, Australian Coastal Surveillance: A History and Commentary, Basic Paper No. 3 1984, p.
14.
100 Hugh Hudson, Northern Approaches: A Report on the Administration and Management of Civil
Coastal Surveillance in Northern Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service, for the
Department of Transport and Communications, Canberra, 1988. p. 8.
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identified the full range of risks and threats and noted also that the probability of their
arising varied greatly.101

The 1990s saw increases in the level of some offshore activity and a consequent slew of
additional reviews. Some of these were notable for responding to specific maritime
security incidents.102 These were followed by the Report of the Prime Minister’s Coastal
Surveillance Task Force in July 1999, which resulted in additional funding for coastal
surveillance with a special focus on intelligence.103

More recently, the Australian National Audit Office has reported several times on
aspects of Customs performance, beginning with a performance audit of the Australian
Customs Service Coastwatch organization in 2000.104 The Audit Office report focused
on

coordination,

surveillance

and

response,

and

corporate

governance

of

Coastwatch.105 This was a broad scope, but it was conducted very much in response to
growing Government concern at the arrival of increasing numbers of asylum seeker
vessels.106

The Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit reported on a review
of Coastwatch in 2001.107 This was a comprehensive statutory response to the Audit
Office report in 2000. Apart from reviewing Coastwatch and the challenges confronting
the organization, the Report also canvassed alternatives to the current approach to
maritime border security.108 Like many previous reports, it focused primarily on the
Hudson, Northern Approaches: A Report on the Administration and Management of Civil Coastal
Surveillance in Northern Australia, p. 18.
102 Australian Customs Service, Report on investigation into arrival of suspect irregular entry vessel
(SIEV) into Montague Sound, Australian Customs Service, Canberra, 1992. See also, Alan
Heggen, AVM, RAAF (Ret.), Independent Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Arrival of
suspected Illegal Entry Vessels Near Cairns, North Queensland and Nambucca Heads, New South Wales
March/April 1999, Canberra, 30 April 1999. The report is referred to in, Derek Woolner, The
Developing Policy Pressures in Australian Coastal Surveillance, Department of the Parliamentary
Library, Research paper No. 20, 2000-01, 6 February 2001.
103 M.W. Moore-Wilton, Report of the Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force, July 1999, p.
ii.
104 Australian National Audit Office, Auditor-General Report No. 38 1999-2000: Performance Audit,
Coastwatch, Australian Customs Service, Canberra, 6 April 2000.
105 Coastwatch: Australian Customs Service, Audit Report No. 38 of 1999-2000, p. 14.
106 Coastwatch: Australian Customs Service, Audit Report No. 38 of 1999-2000, p. 14.
107 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and
Audit, Report 384: Review of Coastwatch, Canberra, August 2001.
108 Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of Coastwatch: Report 384,
p. ix.
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challenges then confronting Coastwatch; illegal people movement, illegal fishing and
suspect illegal flights in Australian airspace.109

In 2004 the Audit Office reported on the performance of the Customs National
Maritime Unit, with recommendations for improvement in matters such as intelligence
gathering and training.110 Later in 2011, the focus shifted to the Customs and Border
Protection Service risk management approach to processing sea and air cargo
consignments.111 Once again these efficiency reviews, and their reports, were aimed at
specific elements of the law enforcement regime.

A more far-reaching review of law enforcement at sea was Prime Minister Howard’s
Task Force on Offshore Maritime Security in 2004, which examined the security needs
of the offshore oil and gas industry on the north-west shelf. As the Task Force Report
was classified, publicly available information on it is limited to media releases and
reports and examination of them. Nevertheless, the report led to the formation of the
Joint Offshore Protection Command, forerunner of the current arrangements.112

Other examples of specific purpose reviews included the 2008 Beale Review, One
Biosecurity-A Working Partnership, which identified significant shortcomings in
quarantine procedures, following an outbreak of equine flu.113 Similarly, in 2012 a
review led by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, produced the Expert Panel on Asylum
Seekers: Summary of Recommendations.114 The Panel’s report, which was accepted entirely
by the Government, sought to overcome the divisive politics associated with the
continuing influx of asylum seekers.
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The Parliamentary Library continues to produce papers on aspects of law enforcement
at sea, primarily for the benefit of members and senators but also available to the
public. These have included, The Developing Policy Pressure in Australian Coastal
Surveillance, in the lead-up to the election of 2001 and Asylum seekers and refugees: what
are the facts? which was updated early in 2013.115

In addition to the Parliamentary literature, Defence and the Navy, in particular,
generate documentation relating directly or otherwise to law enforcement at sea. The
Defence Annual Reports, especially more recently, provide only very general information
on RAN operational activity. Although they are produced in ‘coffee table book’ style
the Navy Annuals produced from the mid-1990s and the two editions of Patrolling the
Line, in 2002 and 2003, give real insight into the operational aspects of law enforcement
as practised by the RAN. Additionally, the fortnightly internal newspaper, Navy News,
frequently carries stories about law enforcement operations and the people involved in
them. None of these sources provide detailed analyses of the operational tasks or how
well they are being carried out.

Academic and Professional Literature
There is a limited body of academic and other professional literature dealing with law
enforcement at sea. Virtually all of it is quite recent; reflecting the growth in public
interest as a result of well publicized incursions by asylum seekers and the ongoing
and sometimes almost bizarre responses to illegal fishing activities.

Most of the recent literature comes from a very few sources, including the RAN Sea
Power Centre,116 the University of Wollongong’s Australian National Centre for Ocean
Resources and Security117 and the now defunct Australian Defence Studies Centre at
the Australian Defence Force Academy. The literature is notable for the breadth of its
coverage of contemporary issues. Whereas the government reports have responded to
specific shortcomings in existing programs the academic literature has endured no
such restriction.

Phillips, Asylum seekers and refugees: what are the facts?
This centre was formerly known as the RAN Maritime Studies Program.
117 This Centre was formerly known as the Centre for Maritime Policy.
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Charles Haultain’s 1971 memoir of his time commanding a patrol boat operating from
Darwin in the 1930s, Watch off Arnhem Land, is a unique, if personal, view of the
embryonic nature of law enforcement at sea operations then.118 Myra Willards’s History
of the White Australia Policy to 1920119 and Geoffrey Sawer’s Australian Federal Politics and
Law 1901-1929120 are two of the few other books that relate to the early period, even
though they do not deal with operational aspects of law enforcement. David Day’s two
volume history of the Customs Service, from the time of white settlement, provides
useful information on the development of some of the laws and on aspects of their
enforcement.121

The more recent publications include sets of conference papers, such as Policing
Australia’s Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects in 1997.122 Topics covered include
threats, political and operational issues, legal considerations and future directions. This
volume also compares how several other countries conduct law enforcement at sea.
Many of the issues raised in this volume are repeated in the later volume, Protecting
Australia’s Maritime Borders: The MV Tampa and Beyond123 suggesting that at least some
problems had not been attended to in the intervening five years.

Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: The MV Tampa and Beyond comprises papers
from a conference held in Canberra in 2002. Some papers examine issues such as the
then fragmented approach to law enforcement,124 the legislative implications of ADF

C.T.G. Haultain, Watch off Arnhem Land, Roebuck Society Publication No. 4, Canberra, 1971.
Myra Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne, 1923.
120 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne, 1956.
121 David Day, Smugglers and Sailors: The Customs History of Australia 1788-1901, Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1988, and Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of
Australia From 1901, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1996.
122 Doug MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood, eds., Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones: Problems and
Prospects, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 9, Centre for Maritime Policy, University
of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 1997.
123 Martin Tsamenyi and Chris Rahman, eds., Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: The MV
Tampa and Beyond, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 13, Centre for Maritime Policy,
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW., 2003.
124 Derek Woolner, ‘Australia’s Maritime Border Protection Regime’, in Tsamenyi and Rahman,
eds., Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders, p. 26.
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involvement in law enforcement at sea and a separate coast guard.125 Others deal with
the costs of law enforcement, the difficulty of identifying those costs and the possible
costs of an independent coast guard. The proposals for a dedicated coast guard in both
volumes are from the same author, who admits that his proposals are not intended to
be definitive.

Other recent writings on law enforcement at sea include David Marr’s and Marian
Wilkinson’s Dark Victory,126 and Frank Brennan’s Tampering with Asylum: A Universal
Humanitarian Problem,127 both of which examined aspects of the controversial handling
of asylum seekers around the time of the 2001 Federal election.

The two professional journals which pay most attention to maritime border security
are Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs,128 the journal of the Australian Centre
for Maritime Studies and the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. Both journals range
broadly over maritime affairs; the Naval Institute journal understandably focussing
primarily on naval topics. In recent years it has, however, covered law enforcement at
sea issues including the ISPS Code,129 and the proposition of an Australian Coast
Guard.130 Maritime Studies has also dealt with the ISPS Code,131 environmental issues
like ballast water132 and border protection.133

Commodore Warwick Gately, RAN, and Lieutenant Commander Cameron Moore, RAN,
‘Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: Operational Aspects’, and Commander Bruce
McLennan, RNZN, ‘ Maritime Border Protection and the Royal Australian Navy: Threat or
Opportunity?’ in Tsmenyi and Rahman, eds., Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders, pp. 26 and
117.
126 David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2003.
127 Frank Brennan, Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of
Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Qld., 2003.
128 This journal was formerly entitled Maritime Studies.
129 Lieutenant Graeme Hale, RAN, “Does the ISPS Code address post-9/11 security threats?”
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, No. 116, Autumn 2005, pp. 13-18.
130 See Professor Stephen Martin, ‘The evolution of Labor’s policy on an Australian Coast
Guard’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, No. 114, Spring 2004, pp. 7-9, and Lieutenant
Commander Cameron Moore, ‘Legal Issues Surrounding an Australian Coastguard’, Journal of
the Australian Naval Institute, Vol. 28, No. 2, Winter 2002, pp. 6-11.
131 Captain Peter Heathcote, ‘An Explanation of the New Measures for Maritime Security
Aboard ships and in Port Facilities’, in Maritime Studies, No. 137, July/August 2004, pp. 13-21.
132 Geoff Rigby, ‘Ballast Water Treatment Technology: Choosing the Best Options’, Maritime
Studies, No. 135, March/April 2004, pp. 22-29.
133 Hugh Smith, ‘Border Protection and the Limits of Obedience’, Maritime Studies, No. 134,
January/February 2004, pp. 21-24.
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Several Australian law journals have also published papers on aspects of law
enforcement at sea. These include the University of New South Wales Law Journal, the
Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal and the Melbourne International Law
Journal. Topics covered have included legal regimes, resources protection and asylum
seekers.

This examination of the literature associated with Australia’s approach to law
enforcement at sea is representative; encompassing several of the most important
government studies of the subject and including work by those academics with
acknowledged expertise. Two striking issues emerge. First, despite the wealth of
government reviews conducted and academic writing produced over recent years,
there is as yet no common approach to the provision of law enforcement at sea for
Australia. In fact, Labor went to the 2013 election promoting a coast guard to be
operated by the Australian Federal Police.134

Second, none of the reviews or the academic writing have been definitive. The reviews
for the most part have examined only the coastal surveillance aspect of border security
or have responded to individual failings in it. The academic writing is more
comprehensive in its coverage, but has not produced the thorough and detailed
analysis of the entire subject, with credible costings, that would enable clear judgments
to be made on how best to enforce the law at sea.

No previous examination of law enforcement at sea in Australia has provided an in
depth historical appreciation of how the task has evolved, how the legislative
framework has evolved in parallel and the often glacial progress towards the current
federated organizational approach to the task. Nor has any previous study illustrated
the gradual engagement of the Navy in the task to the point where it is now a
permanent, substantial and occasionally all-consuming part of daily operations.

134SBS

News, ‘ALP Coastguard policy relaunched’,
<http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2004/06/30/alp-coastguard-policy-relaunched> (1
November 2013).
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METHODS AND SOURCES
This thesis is an empirical and primarily qualitative study of an important Australian
national security issue and will examine the political, legal and operational, aspects of
it. It is a study of the means by which law enforcement at sea is provided in Australia,
with the ultimate objective of identifying the growth of the Navy’s involvement in the
task and its implications. Such a study is long overdue because of the growing
importance of the various elements of law enforcement at sea, because of continuing
disagreement as to how best to provide it and because of its now considerable impact
on many elements of the Navy.

The thesis is therefore an examination of public policy which will consider the
influences that ultimately generate the solutions to political problems. It is a complex
study in that several Commonwealth Government Departments play significant and
intersecting roles and because the nature and extent of these roles have evolved over
time.135

Sources used include Parliamentary debates, official government reports, studies and
reviews, Coalition and Labor Party policy statements, academic studies, professional
journals and discussions with current and past academics and officials. There are limits
to the utility of each of these sources. Official government sources may be constrained
in some instances by security classification demands and by the need to meet political
and operational ends.

Party policy statements are sometimes subject to substantial change before
implementation and they too can be prepared for political as much as for operational
reasons. While the academic studies cover some aspects of this subject, there is no
academic study of the entire subject. Similarly, while there is a lot of professional
writing on individual aspects of law enforcement at sea, not all of it is definitive. This
applies especially to those writings which canvass the possibility of a dedicated
Australian coast guard – and thus the withdrawal of the Navy from the task.
An example of the changing roles is the Beazley Review of 1984 recommendation that the
coastal surveillance task should be the responsibility of the Australian Federal Police. This
arrangement was subsequently overturned by the 1988 Hudson Review. Nevertheless, the
Australian Federal Police retain an important role in maritime border security.
135
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CHAPTER STRUCTURE
Chapter two examines the history of law enforcement at sea - or the constabulary
function - and identifies the role of navies and coast guards. It refers to the work of
several eminent maritime strategists in determining the historically accepted roles of
navies. It then defines the maritime constabulary function and in doing so, clarifies the
connections between oceans governance, law enforcement at sea and coastal
surveillance; all terms which tend to be used without sufficient discrimination. The
chapter concludes with an exposition of the historical growth of the constabulary
function and establishes that it has been an important role for navies for centuries.

Chapter three provides a contemporary framework for the subsequent examination of
the Navy’s role in the constabulary function. It identifies the elements of the function,
which include anti-piracy operations, border, resource and environmental protection.
It also evaluates developments likely to impact on the task and argues that the nature
of the task is changing and that the task is growing in importance and complexity. As
examples, the chapter refers to counter-terrorism related activities and those related to
countering weapons of mass destruction.

Chapters four to seven analyse chronologically the Australian approach to law
enforcement at sea from Federation in 1901. Each of the chapters follows a common
four-step method, which involves identifying the nature of the law enforcement
challenges, identifying the solutions selected by governments, explaining the
legislative outcomes associated with the solutions and determining the implications for
the Navy of its involvement in the constabulary function. The chapter break points
have been selected to coincide with significant events in the development of Australia’s
approach to law enforcement at sea. Thus Chapter Four ends with the 1975 High Court
decision on offshore jurisdiction; Chapter Five ends in 1988, coinciding with the end of
the first set of government reviews of coastal surveillance, and Chapter Six ends in
2001 with the events which led to the politicization of the response to irregular
maritime arrivals. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the examination at the end of 2012,
the time of writing.
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Chapter Four begins with a historical review of Colonial Navies’ engagement in the
constabulary function before Federation. The chapter then examines the issues in three
discrete periods; 1901 to 1918, 1919 to 1945 and 1946 to 1975. The chapter covers the
period immediately after Federation, in which illegal immigration and foreign fishing
and the Government’s lack of capacity to manage them were the main issues. Analysis
of the period between the wars highlights ongoing illegal fishing and pearling
activities, together with the emergence of interest in the marine environment. It also
demonstrates the initial halting and ineffective attempts to counter these activities. The
final section covers the period in which the declaration of resource zones demanded a
more formal response from government, together with the beginning of a permanent
RAN commitment to the constabulary function.

Chapter Five, covering 1979-1988, maintains the focus on resources protection, but also
includes the appearance of boats carrying asylum seekers and the government
response to the influx. This period also saw the simultaneous emergence of
environmental, quarantine and drug smuggling challenges, thus complicating law
enforcement. This chapter also examines the succession of reviews of coastal
surveillance operations and the organizational and other changes proposed by them, as
governments initiated a comprehensive approach to law enforcement at sea. One
element of this approach was the beginning of a permanent and often very significant
commitment to the task by the Navy.

The period from 1989-2001 is explored in Chapter Six and encompasses continuing law
enforcement at sea challenges created by the need to protect marine resources with a
new focus on the Southern Ocean, together with a continuation of the flow of asylum
seekers. Chapter six identifies the growth of resources assigned to law enforcement at
sea, the development of ever more complex legislation to deal with problems and the
realization that better surveillance and patrol forces were needed to manage the
extensive range of law enforcement issues. This chapter also illustrates the implications
for the Navy of a task that at times demanded the commitment of a significant part of
the surface fleet.

Chapter seven covers the final period, from 2002 to the end of 2012, during which
asylum seekers, resources protection, the marine environment and quarantine made
28

the greatest law enforcement demands on governments. It was also a period in which
asylum seekers became a partisan political issue and in which the associated policies,
practice and legislation were often controversial. The chapter discusses the further
significant organizational change experienced by the authorities responsible for law
enforcement at sea. Most significantly, chapter seven identifies the very substantial
stresses placed on the Navy in meeting the demands of law enforcement while also
committed to several other operations.

The final chapter draws conclusions from the arguments presented in the earlier
chapters. These relate to the nature of law enforcement at sea in Australia and the
manner in which it has been approached since Federation. In particular, this chapter
identifies the growing involvement of the Navy in the task and the implications for the
Navy of its now substantial commitment.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FUNCTIONS OF NAVIES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the generally accepted roles for navies, to establish that the
constabulary function, providing good order at sea,1 is a legitimate function of navies.
Establishing the legitimacy of the task will provide a solid foundation for examining
the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) current and future role in law enforcement at sea.

Proponents of navies have argued that seapower has generated three great ‘gifts’. They
were acquiring colonies, dominating trade and becoming prosperous; helping to keep
the acquired colonial possessions and maritime trade, and a decisive way in which to
prevail in conflict.2 Martin claims this has been possible because ‘… seapower is a
means for bringing power to bear on distant places and freedom of movement by sea is
a principle by which the powerful may have access to the weak. No such rights to
movement through the airspace over territorial waters have ever been conceded.’3

This general view of the benefits of seapower was supported by Admiral A.T. Mahan,
the late 19th and early 20th century American naval historian and strategist. His writing
reflected the importance of previous colonial powers, and the still active European
search for new colonial possessions. Mahan argued that the key to much of history is to
be found in production of goods and the consequent maritime trade, the shipping
which enabled the trade and the colonies which facilitated both the trade and its
protection.4 Mahan further stated that it was the peaceful commerce and shipping ‘…

Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Frank Cass Publishers, London,
2004, p. 310. The term ‘good order at sea’ is one used by Till, and others, which encompasses
the constabulary function.
2 Geoffrey Till with Craig Symonds, Bryan Ranft et. al., Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, 2nd
ed., St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1984, pp. 2-3.
3 L. W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy, Praeger for the Institute for Strategic Studies, New
York, 1967, p. 22.
4 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History 1600-1783, Hill and Wang, New York, 1985. p.
25.
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from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs and on which it
securely rests.’5

By their activities, the navies of the great trading states enabled this commerce to be
carried on in peacetime and in war. In the case of the British Empire, the Royal Navy
(RN) contested, gained and for long periods maintained ‘command of the sea.’ This
concept, today more often referred to as ‘sea control,’ meant little more than being able
to use the sea for one’s own purposes and preventing an adversary from using it.6 For
much of modern history, the work of navies has comprised the gaining and
maintaining of sea control, enabling the sea to be used for various purposes. Recently,
there has been a growing acceptance that sea control is a relative concept, limited in
place and time.7

Much has changed since Mahan wrote and influenced political and military leaders a
century ago. Colonies, for example, are mostly relegated to history. Furthermore, since
the end of the Second World War there have been few conflicts involving the
acquisition of territory. Nevertheless, the demand for seaborne trade has continued to
rise and this is expected to continue.8 Protection of maritime trade continues to be a
raison d’être for many navies, even if the nature of the threat to it continues to change.
Thus, the recent rise of large scale violent piracy off west and east Africa and to a lesser
extent in Southeast Asian waters, has drawn several of the world’s navies into counterpiracy operations.9 Maritime terrorism has also become a threat, both to trade and to
warships themselves, because of their iconic flag status.10

Contemporary writers including Geoffrey Till, point to a range of additional tasks for
navies. These include protecting maritime resources, exercising jurisdiction and

Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History 1600-1783, p. 25.
Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 149.
7 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 150-52. Till notes that sea control may
also be limited by extent of use, strategic consequence and necessity.
8 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 100. He quotes the UK Chamber of
Shipping assessment that global shipping will double in ton-miles over the next one or two
decades.
9 Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the
Modern World, Hurst and Company, London, 2009, pp. 118, 102, and 85-6.
10 Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern
World, p. 200.
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maintaining order in times of peace.11 Many of these tasks have demanded activities
other than those associated traditionally with war-fighting.12 In 2004, Till noted that
navies now operate in a vastly different strategic environment and face entirely
different problems, as well as all of the old familiar ones.13 This has implications for
what navies do and how they do it.

BOOTH’S TRINITY OF NAVAL FUNCTIONS
In 1977, Ken Booth provided one of the most quoted and most useful descriptions of
the functions of navies. It is founded on an assessment of the need for States to use the
sea. Booth argued that there are three major reasons for this need; the passage of goods
or people, the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes or for use against
targets on land or at sea, and the exploitation of resources in or under the sea.14 These
are contemporary equivalents of Mahan’s approach to seapower, with the introduction
of resource exploitation reflecting technological developments relating to fishing and
to oil and gas extraction.

For Booth the functions of navies can be seen as a ‘trinity’; that is, a three in one. The
trinity is defined by the three characteristic modes of action by which navies achieve
their purposes; military, diplomatic, and policing - or constabulary.15 The unifying idea
of this trinity is ‘the use of the sea’ the concept which encompasses each of the
functions. There are several subordinate functions within each of the three primary
functions: these are shown in a development of Booth’s work at Figure 2-1.16 Booth
emphasized that the ‘trinity’ was not to be considered a practical model, because most
navies will neither need nor want to be capable of all of the subordinate functions
listed. Indeed, some so-called token navies will be incapable of all three major
functions.

Till. Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 17.
Till. Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 17.
13 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 26.
14 K. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, London, 1977, p. 15.
15 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 15.
16 This figure is a more detailed representation of that in Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16 and can
be found in Sea Power Centre-Australia, Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1, Sea
Power Centre-Australia, Canberra 2010, p. 100.
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Figure 2-1: RAN Development of Booth’s Trinity of Naval Functions
That point is well articulated by Eric Grove in his 1990 book The Future of Seapower17
which provides a typology of navies graded according to their level of capability.
Reproduced in brief form here, it illustrates how the nature of force employment
changes with capability level, how some navies are optimized for the constabulary
function and how some are capable of nothing more than the constabulary function.

17

Eric Grove, The Future of Seapower, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD., 1990, pp. 236-241.
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Grove’s Typology of Navies

Major Global Force Projection Navy - Complete. This is a navy capable of
carrying out all the military roles of a naval force on a global scale. Currently,
only the USN qualifies for this description.
Major Global Force Projection Navy – Partial. This is a navy with all the
characteristics of the USN but without that navy’s capacity to exercise sea
control and power projection far from its shores. The Soviet Navy, prior to the
end of the Cold War was the only navy in this category.
Medium Global Force Projection Navy. This is a navy capable of mounting one
major out of area operation, together with high-level naval operations closer to
home. The RN and French Navies are the only two such navies at present.
Medium Regional Force Projection Navy. A navy in this category can project
force into the adjoining ocean basin. There are several such navies. They
include the navies of India, Australia, Japan and now China.
Adjacent Force Projection Navy. Any navy in this category has the ability to
project force well offshore. North Atlantic Treaty Organization navies, such as
those of Portugal and Greece fit the description, along with the navies of Chile
and Peru.
Offshore Territorial Defence Navy. This is a navy quite capable of defensive
and constabulary operations up to about 200nm from its shores. It is essentially
a coastal navy, such as those of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, as well as those
of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Inshore Territorial Defence Navy. This describes a navy capable of inshore
combat operations as well as undertaking constabulary duties. Several of the
Persian Gulf navies fit the category.
Constabulary Navy. This category includes navies that are not intended to
fight, but to act purely in the constabulary role. Countries such as the USA,
Canada and Japan have such forces in addition to their navies and in many
cases they are termed coast guards. Countries such as Burma, Sri Lanka and
Ireland have navies which are capable of little beyond constabulary tasks-even
if they are called navies.
Token Navy. Some of the world’s smaller and weaker states have navies which
amount to little more than some formal organizational structure and a few
coastal craft. These are the token navies and at best they carry out limited
constabulary functions.
Table 2-1: Grove’s Typology of Navies
34

For individual countries each of the ‘elements of the trinity’ can have varying degrees
of importance. This will depend on the nature of their maritime interests and of their
capacity (financial, technical and human) to support these interests. Nevertheless, the
defining function of navies is the military one. The threat or use of force gives meaning
to the other modes of action.18 It provides them with credibility in the eyes of all those
at whom the actions or activities of navies are aimed.

THE MILITARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES
The military function of navies is based on the concept of ‘command of the sea’, that is
the freedom to use the sea for a nation’s own purposes as and when desired. The
concept has sometimes appeared to have an absolute quality,19 but both Mahan and
Corbett clearly acknowledged that it could only be a relative attribute – in Corbett’s
words, a ‘working command’.20 Till notes that the relativities include time, place,
extent of use, strategic consequence and necessity.21
Sea Control and Sea Denial
Thus, the concept of command of the sea has given way to the more limited one of ‘sea
control’. This term acknowledges the impact of aircraft, submarines and mines on the
ability of naval forces to operate freely. Furthermore, currently sea control is sought for
limited periods, primarily to project power at sea or over the shore and to sustain
forces employed overseas.22 This point was emphasized by Corbett, who noted in 1907
that one of the three functions of the fleet was to further or hinder military operations
ashore.23

Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16.
Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 150.
20 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 150.
21 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 150-1.
22 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 118.
23 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Longman,
Green and Co., London, 1907, p. 6.
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Sea control is associated with another concept, sea denial, which involves preventing
an opponent from using an area of the sea for his purposes.24 It can be an alternative to
sea control in that some countries, on some occasions, may not need to use the sea
themselves. Another interesting feature of sea denial, not common with sea control, is
that it can in some circumstances be attained without the use of naval forces. That is,
air forces, or even suitably equipped and located land forces, can achieve sea denial.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, United States Navy (USN) in a seminal article in 1974,
argued that there were four objectives for which the United States of America (USA)
should seek sea control or sea denial. They were to ensure industrial supplies, to
reinforce or resupply military forces engaged overseas, to provide wartime economic
and military supplies to allies, and to provide safety for naval forces in the projection
of power ashore.25

Historically, there have been three ways of achieving command of the sea or sea
control; decisive battle, blockade and use of the fleet-in-being concept.26 Decisive battle
has been the preferred option because it can be the fastest and surest means of
achieving the object. Blockade, much favoured in the 18th and 19th centuries, has
become less popular because of the emergence of threats such as submarines, aircraft
and mines and because it takes time to produce results. Blockade is however, still a
favoured option for certain peacetime sanctions operations. The fleet-in-being concept
involves an inferior force contesting a superior force and by attrition or diversion of the
superior force, creating the opportunity for itself of gaining sea control.27

The military function of navies can be examined from both wartime and peacetime
perspectives; noting that often at sea, the boundary between the two states can be
graduated rather than clearly defined. As the aim of gaining sea control is to exercise it
in some way, during conflict navies will generally aim to project power or force, either

Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 158.
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’, Naval War College Review,
Volume XXVI, Number 5, March/April 1974, p. 8.
26 Till. Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 132.
27 www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data> (26 June 2004). The US Department of Defense
defines the term fleet-in-being as a fleet (or force) that avoids decisive action, which because of
its strength and location, causes or necessitates counter-concentrations and reduces the number
of opposing units available for operations elsewhere.
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at sea or against objectives on land. As shown by Booth, this can be done in conflicts of
varying complexity and intensity; from general war, through conventional war, limited
war and what he termed guerrilla war.28 In referring to guerrilla war, Booth also noted
the potential for terrorism at sea. He acknowledged fear of it, with respect to the North
Sea oil fields for example, but noted that there had been no instances of it at the time of
writing.29

Peacetime Tasks
Booth also identified a range of peacetime tasks associated with the military function of
navies, which are broadly enough stated to have remained valid. These are strategic
nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence and defence, extended deterrence and
defence and international order.30 Ballistic missile-fitted submarines remain the
primary naval means of providing strategic nuclear deterrence and for some analysts
strategic deterrence is more accurately seen as a national military task than a
specifically naval one. Till for example, in 2004, paid the strategic nuclear deterrence
function very little attention, compared with that given to conventional deterrence.31

The extent to which conventional deterrence is a naval function will depend on a
nation's maritime interests and its capacity and determination to protect them. This
will involve potential adversaries having to consider carefully the ramifications of
engaging in a ‘shooting war’. 32 The concept of extended deterrence applies to navies of
nations with security responsibilities to others, or to navies needing access in distant
waters. A decline in the utility of warships for this purpose, noted by Booth,33 appears
to have been arrested in more recent times. Till’s reference to the USN Seventh Fleet’s
deployment in Taiwanese waters during 1996 provides one effective example of this.34

Maintenance of international order at sea by navies takes various forms. It can involve
navies dealing with illegal activities such as piracy, and it can involve them in asserting
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 224.
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 235.
30 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 224.
31 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 292-98.
32 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 244.
33 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 244.
34 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 294.
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rights at sea, such as the USN’s Freedom of Navigation program which began in 1979.35
In reality, there is a quite high degree of order at sea, which allows for significant
asymmetries between national merchant and fishing fleets and their navies.36 Thus,
nations with large merchant or fishing fleets do not necessarily need proportionally
large navies. The existence of relative order at sea also allows many merchant flags to
fly without the direct support of navies. Nevertheless, maintenance of ‘good order’ at
sea cannot be taken for granted, as threats such as piracy and transnational crime
emerge from time to time and need to be countered.37 Many aspects of maintaining
good order at sea can also reside within the constabulary function of navies, thus
reinforcing the earlier point that the boundary between peacetime and conflict at sea
can be graduated.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SEAPOWER
The capabilities or characteristics needed by navies to carry out their functions depend
on the interest which their supporting nations have in using the sea. As illustrated
above, the world’s navies encompass a vast range of capabilities, reflecting national
maritime interests and capacity to pursue and protect them. In assessing the impact of
the law of the sea on these characteristics, Booth asserted that for countries ‘… satisfied
with using their navies for constabulary functions and non-acquisitive purposes in
regional seas… their warships have no need to fear for future employment’.38 Booth
has summarized the main assets of warships in terms of their versatility,
controllability, mobility, projection ability, access potential, symbolism and endurance,
as explained in the following paragraphs.

Warships, singly or together, can perform a range of social, humanitarian or political
tasks as well as military ones. There can also be a subtlety in how warships change
from one role to another: the change may even be imperceptible to outside observers.
Furthermore, warships are capable of conducting several roles simultaneously. These
characteristics give warships versatility.
US Annual Defense Report 1995, Appendix 1: Freedom of Navigation.
<www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr95/toc.html> (17 March 2006).
36 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 248.
37 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 333-34.
38 Ken Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, George, Allen and Unwin, London, 1985, p. 190.
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One of a warship’s greatest assets is the capacity to escalate in or withdraw from any
situation, that is controllability. A warship’s potential for escalation or withdrawal can
be applied gradually and stopped at any point. Much if not all of this activity can take
place in an international environment, the high seas or exclusive economic zones (EEZ)
removing at least some of the associated risk.

Through their inherent mobility, warships can move easily, relatively quickly and
usually independently in response to events, at a distance or close by. Often they will
be the only forces that offer governments military options, with armies or air forces
unable to be deployed or inappropriate to the mission.

Warships’ size makes them ‘… efficient bulk carriers of their own firepower, troops,
tanks, aircraft, landing craft…’.39 The combination of firepower, mobility and carrying
capacity can make warships the only means of applying military power at a distance
and gives them projection ability.

Although the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) of 1982 reduced some of the
traditional freedoms of the seas,40 the movement of military forces across the sea
remains simpler than it is by land or air. Consequently, as Booth argues ‘ ... a country
with a navy is potentially a neighbour to all countries with coasts.’41 Thus, navies have
access potential.
That warships are recognized as ‘ … small mobile pieces of national sovereignty…’42 is
perhaps the most important of their characteristics. There is no ambiguity as to
nationality and they provide, when necessary, visible symbolism of their nation’s
military and technological capability.

Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 34.
The six traditional high seas freedoms listed in Article 87 of the Law of the Sea Convention
are; navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial
islands and other installations, fishing and scientific research. See United Nations, The Law of the
Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 87, United Nations, New York, 1983,
p. 31. Some limitations on those freedoms are described in R. R., Churchill, and A. V. Lowe, The
Law of the Sea, 3rd. ed., Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1999, pp. 205-208.
41 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 34
42 Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy, p. 138.
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Warships can operate at great distances from bases and can remain in an area of
interest for considerable periods, thus displaying great endurance. Depending on the
circumstances, their presence in an area can be very visible or out of sight–over the
horizon. Booth has noted that in the diplomatic function ‘political visibility’ is usually
more important than actual visibility.43

THE MILITARY UTILITY OF NAVIES
Grove argues that, ‘Navies would have a part to play in all forms of future war, total
and limited, nuclear and conventional.’44 He also states that navies are at their most
relevant in conventional hostilities. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the
expected character of conventional conflict at sea has changed. There is now much
more focus on littoral operations involving the projection of power ashore than on
fleet-on-fleet encounters. This began in the early 1990s with the publication of the
USN’s doctrinal publications, From the Sea45 and Forward…From the Sea.46

This major change in operational focus, which assumes the possession of sea control,
has been adopted by other navies, including the RAN, within the Australian Defence
Force’s (ADF) emerging joint expeditionary operations concept.47 The ADF cannot
always assume it will enjoy sea control, but, when operating in coalitions, especially
with the USN, sea control is less likely to be challenged.

Changing Utility
In the 1970s Booth argued that the utility of navies’ ‘interventions from the sea’ had
been decreasing because of the growing self-defence capabilities of third-world navies.
Much has changed since then, with enough quite striking examples of the use of
seapower to warrant refuting Booth’s argument. Even before the end of the Cold War,
Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, p. 147.
Grove, The Future of Seapower, p. 199.
45 The Hon. Sean O’ Keefe, Admiral Frank Kelso II, USN, and General C.E Mundy,
USMC,…From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC., 1992.
46 The Hon John H. Dalton, Admiral J.M. Boorda, USN, and General Carl E. Mundy, USMC,
Forward…From the Sea, The Department of the Navy, Washington, DC., 1994.
47 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, Canberra 2005, p.
26.
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the United Kingdom (UK) discovered that only seapower, including embarked air
power, could enable the retaking of the Falkland Islands.48

Seapower also played a

major military role in the 1991 War against Iraq49 and even greater parts in the 2001
War against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan50 and the 2003 War against Iraq.51 Also,
in a reversion to an age old function the United Nations (UN)-sponsored naval
coalition forces conducted an extended blockade of the Iraqi coast from 1991 until the
end of the 2003 Iraq War.52

Even so, to be effective seapower must appear to be credible. Therefore, subtlety in its
use can be as important as brute force. This was apparent in North Korea’s dismissive
response to the USN’s major deployment subsequent to the taking of the USS Pueblo.53
Timeliness was also a significant element of the credibility issue in this case and the
delayed deployment of even an overwhelming force appeared to reflect impotence.54
On a much smaller scale, and locally, the presence of a task group of nine naval vessels
off Dili, before troops began landing in East Timor on 20 September 1999, provided a
clear indication to Indonesian military authorities that the Australian-led coalition was
serious in its purpose. That naval force was indeed credible.55
The blockade of Iraq and the peace enforcement operation in East Timor, highlight
another characteristic of seapower and the military utility of navies; the use of navies in
circumstances short of war and in circumstances in which graduated force needs to be
applied. They also reflect a significantly changed strategic environment, in which all of
Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 195-6.
Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 180.
50 Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan and Amnerica’s New Way of War, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, MD., 2003, p. 159.
51 Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History,
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA., 2003, p. 71.
52 James Goldrick, ‘Maritime Sanctions Enforcement against Iraq, 1990-2003’, in Bruce Elleman
and S.C.M. Paine, eds., Naval Blockades and Seapower–Strategies and counter-strategies, 1805-2005,
Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2006,. p. 201.
53 The USS Pueblo was an intelligence gathering ship which in 1968 was captured by North
Korean forces just outside North Korean territorial waters. The ship was apparently ill-prepared
for its mission and unprotected by other USN forces. Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First
Century, p. 285.
54 James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, Macmillan, London, 1985, p. 41.
55 David Stevens, ‘The Combined Naval Role in East Timor’, in Gary E. Weir and Sandra J.
Doyle, eds., You Cannot Surge Trust: Combined Naval Operations of the Royal Australian Navy,
Canadian Navy, and United States Navy, 1991-2003, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.,
2013, p. 123.
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the old familiar problems are joined by a set of entirely new ones.56 It is also an
environment in which the tempo of operational activities for many navies has risen
dramatically.57
RAN Operational Environment
A RAN study of its operations from 1990 to March 200558 reflects this new
environment. Firstly it identifies a total of 376 separate operations within the period,
with the years 2003 and 2004 the busiest completed years since 1990. Secondly, it shows
that the vast majority of operations have been diplomatic or constabulary in nature.
Even so, the small number of purely military operations must be balanced by the
recognition that ‘… they have involved numerous, highly capable units for prolonged
periods at lengthy distances from Australia.’59 These include some 30 separate
deployments of single or multi-ship task units to the Persian Gulf. Table 2-2 below
illustrates the numbers and pattern of recent operations.
Figures like these have caused some analysts to question whether naval operations in
major wars can remain the guiding principle for future naval preparation and
development, if such wars are becoming less frequent.60 Grove, for example, writing in
1990, asked whether high-end conflict capabilities may become less important.61 Till, in
1982 noted that States need at least some ships optimized for operations in support of
the law, or for maintenance of claims under the law, rather than for war-fighting. He
also noted that there appeared to be too much attention paid to the latter role,
especially by medium power navies.62 Yet, according to Booth, that is the primary role

Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 26. While Till does not specify the new
problems, they would include the complexity and ambiguity of the LOSC, maritime terrorism
and, mass irregular people movement.
57 Sea Power Centre-Australia, Semaphore: A First Analysis of RAN Operations, 1990-2005,
Canberra, Department of Defence, January 2006, p. 1.
58 Vanessa Bendle, David Griffin and Peter Laurence, eds., Sea Power Centre-Australia, Database
of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, Working Paper No. 18, Canberra, Department of
Defence, 2005.
59 Sea Power Centre-Australia, Semaphore: A First Analysis of RAN Operations, 1990-2005, p. 1.
60 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 26.
61 Grove, The Future of Seapower, p. 235.
62 Till. Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 174.
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of navies and thus there should be no surprise that, especially in the face of resource
constraints, medium power navies should concentrate in that way.63
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Jan-Mar 2005
Totals (376)

Military Ops
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
2
0
0
6

Constabulary Ops
30
15
12
8
12
13
10
22
13
14
9
15
5
25
27
2
232

Diplomatic Ops
17
10
9
8
8
9
3
12
10
6
6
7
6
12
10
5
139

Table 2-2: RAN Maritime Operations 1990-March 200564
The Impact of the LOSC
A primary cause of the changed strategic environment has been the growing
importance of international law at sea, both as a source of and a regulator of conflict.65
For example, although the LOSC of 1982 imposed no interference on military activities,
there was a sense that in the longer term, growing territoriality among the coastal
states could be expressed in demands for greater control over foreign shipping,
including naval vessels, in their own ‘backyards’.66 This has certainly come to pass as
two recent examples can attest. In March 2001 a US Naval Service hydrographic ship,
the Bowditch, was forced to cease surveying activities in China’s EEZ while the same

Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16.
Sea Power Centre-Australia, Semaphore: A First Analysis of RAN Operations, 1990-2005, p. 1.
65 Till. Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 174.
66 Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, p. 139.
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ship and Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Scott were separately subject to protest by India for
similar activities not long before that.67 There have been further more recent incidents
of the same kind in the South China Sea.68

The consequences of such attempts to limit foreign naval activity are not yet entirely
clear. Booth suggested that there might be a growing reluctance to deploy warships on
‘marginal issues’ but conversely, navies could decide to continue to exercise their
rights under the LOSC, with the associated potential for confrontation or conflict.
Indeed, Cable argues that low level conflict at sea must be regarded as probable.69

More importantly, Cable suggested in 1985 that all maritime conflicts for the previous
37 years had remained limited.70 Whether or not that remains the case in future, his
point is that conflict at sea is inherently more controllable than it is on the land or in the
air. Civilians, except for the crews of merchant ships, are unlikely to be involved in it.
Warships can pose a threat without engaging in a single warlike act and they can
operate, if necessary, without infringing on territorial rights.71 Furthermore, maritime
power is so flexible that it is inevitably the tool of choice when circumstances permit,
for a government intending the threat or use of limited force.72

This changed strategic environment, bringing with it a concentration on operations
other than war, and the flexibility and adaptability of navies in contributing to these
operations, led one commentator to suggest that although navies are built for war, their
greatest utility may be in peace.73 They have the capacity to deter, exert influence and
pressure through diplomatic activities and to uphold the body of international law and
regulations.74 This judgment leads to a consideration of the diplomatic function of
navies.

Kwa Chong Guan, ‘Strategy: A View from Southeast Asia’, in Jack McCaffrie, ed., Positioning
Navies for the Future: Challenge and Response, Sydney, Halstead Press, 2006, p. 66.
68 Captain Raoul Pedrozo, USN, ‘Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident’, Naval
War College Review, Summer 2009, Vol. 62, No. 3, p. 101.
69 Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 44.
70 Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 48.
71 Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 48.
72 Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 49.
73 Grove, The Future of Seapower, p. 187.
74 Grove, The Future of Seapower, p. 187.
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THE DIPLOMATIC FUNCTION OF NAVIES
What the Diplomatic Function Is

The diplomatic function has been examined by many writers on naval strategy, Corbett
being one of the earliest. In acknowledging that war is a political act, he noted that the
first function of the fleet was to support or to obstruct diplomatic effort.75 Because he
was writing at the beginning of the 20th century, Corbett had as his model the still preeminent RN. Booth devoted a significant section of Navies and Foreign Policy to the topic
and argued that diplomacy was one of the three main functions of navies.76 Likewise,
James Cable devoted an entire book to naval diplomacy with Gunboat Diplomacy 19191979 which includes a detailed chronology of 20th century examples of the function.77
Most recently, Till devoted a section of his book Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First
Century to naval diplomacy, including its application to naval coalition-building.78
Edward Luttwak in the 1970s argued that in the 19th century, the RN’s supremacy was
such that a single frigate could represent the power of the RN and the will of the UK
Government.79 Yet, as Booth shows, power and influence can be measured only
crudely and the capacity to mobilize naval capability is not the same as having power
or influence. Ambiguity, one of the most important attributes of naval forces may also
contribute to the lack of a clear distinction between power and influence.80

What enables navies to succeed in the diplomatic function is their continuing freedom
to operate in vast ocean areas including the high seas of the world, the EEZs of coastal
states and while undertaking innocent or straits transit passage within national
waters.81 This enables governments to dispatch their naval forces for a variety of
purposes in support of the diplomatic function, all of which can be categorized under
Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 47.
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 26-49.
77 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979, 2nd. ed., St Martin’s Press, New York, 1981. The
chronology can be found at pages 193-258.
78 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 271-309.
79 Edward N., Luttwak, The Political Uses of Seapower, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
MD., 1974, p. 30.
80 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 27.
81 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 58, p.
19, Article 19, pp. 6-7; and Article 38, p. 12.
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the description of ‘presence’. Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, has argued that the
presence mission is the use of naval forces short of war, to achieve political objectives.82
He also noted that presence has two broad objectives; to deter actions inimical to the
state and to encourage actions that are in the interest of the state. Consequently the
diplomatic function of navies involves two kinds of naval deployment, preventative
and reactive. The first initiates a show of presence in peacetime, while the second
responds to a crisis.83

While the presence mission is the most visible and most usual form of the diplomatic
function, the function can also be realized in other ways. These include the sale on
generous terms or the gifting of ships, the attachment of naval advisors to another
country’s navy, or humanitarian operations such as mine clearing or disaster relief.84
Similarly, while the presence mission itself can involve warships operating off another
State’s coast, it can also have a more benign appearance. Ship visits to foreign ports are
an example, with the potential for such issues as crew behaviour, ship appearance and
the entertaining of local dignitaries to influence political leadership.85

Although Booth’s trinity of naval functions appears to provide neat divisions among
the three categories, in reality the division is less than precise. As Grove notes, the line
between diplomatic and military operations can be particularly difficult to discern.86
Booth provides a partial explanation for this, in pointing to the relative subtlety with
which a warship changes from being a ‘… dance-band platform to a haven for
refugees, to a gun–platform for shore bombardment’.87 Till also acknowledges the
‘fuzzy boundaries’ and the ability of warships to be engaged simultaneously in
different activities.88

Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’, p. 14.
Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’, p. 14.
84 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 44.
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Why the Diplomatic Function is Important
The importance of the diplomatic function to navies is exemplified in the time they
spend in non-warlike operations or activities. Grove very succinctly suggested that
navies are built for war, but have their main utility in peacetime, through deterrence
and diplomatic activities.89 He argued further that navies may now be configured
primarily for peace and that presence at a distance, with a finely calculated capacity to
apply force, may become the essence of naval power. Hence surface ships could
become more important than ever.90

Soviet Navy Admiral Sergei Gorshkov strongly reinforced this position. He argued
that the unique claim for navies was that in peacetime only they could further the
State’s policies, by showing strength and achievement far beyond the State’s borders.91
While his claim may have been self-serving, it was probably no more so than those
made many years before by the USN’s Admiral Mahan. Both officers were intent on
their respective navies growing more powerful. As Till notes, Gorshkov had an ally in
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, his USN counterpart, who claimed there was a 95 per cent
chance that the most likely future use of naval forces would be in the presence role.92

The specific characteristics of navies that lead to this flexibility and utility are
longstanding. James Cable quotes the British Foreign Office in 1907. ‘The opportune
presence of a British ship of war may avert a disaster which can only be remedied later
at much inconvenience and considerable sacrifice’.93 The failure of Britain to maintain
a credible naval presence in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands in 1982 and the
subsequent war with Argentina indicates that the Foreign Office judgment remains
valid, if not always heeded.

All navies can take advantage of the diplomatic function.94 Smaller navies will be
limited in the extent to which they can apply it and in the options available to pursue

Grove, The Future of Seapower, p. 187.
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it, but in their local domains, they may still be effective. Hence, naval diplomacy has
become a preoccupation of maritime strategists, an important declared function of
navies and a justification for having them.95
What the Diplomatic Function Enables
Given the inherent flexibility of naval forces, there can be many outcomes from the
application of naval diplomacy. Booth has provided a lengthy and illuminating list. He
argues that there are three main policy objectives, each with its own subsidiary
objectives, associated with the diplomatic function.96

The first of these objectives is negotiation from strength. Its subsidiary objectives
include reassuring and strengthening allies and friendly governments threatened by
internal challenges or external attack; signalling business as usual in a crisis; improving
bargaining strength; and threatening force from the sea to support policy.

The second main objective is manipulation and its subsidiary objectives; manipulation
of bargaining positions within alliances, demonstration of support for or gaining access
to countries, build up of foreign navies and creation of proxy threats, and provision of
standing demonstrations of naval power in distant waters.

Prestige is the third main policy objective. Its subsidiary objectives include providing
psychological reassurance for the home country, providing a favourable image of one’s
country, and projecting an image of impressive naval force.97

In Booth’s view the best example of negotiation from strength is what used to be called
‘gunboat diplomacy’, which was practised frequently during the 19th and early 20th
centuries. One notable mid-20th century example is the primarily naval British response
to Iraqi threats against Kuwait in June 1961. The deployment of a strong naval force,
including embarked Royal Marines, defused the situation very quickly.98

Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 275
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Booth identifies Soviet Navy activities in the 1960s and 1970s as an example of
manipulation. The Navy was used to gain political advantage in a range of countries,
especially in the Middle East and Africa – but not always to lasting effect.99

Prestige remains an important element of naval diplomacy but is now less frequently
associated with displays of naval power. Today, multi-ship task groups or even
individual warships are usually the most frequent practitioners. For an example of the
ongoing importance of naval diplomacy and prestige, it is hard to surpass then
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s statement:
A strong naval force reflects a nation’s dignity, thus (by having one) we can
gain the respect of other countries in the world.100
Because influence is neither easily measured nor easily acquired and retained, the
impact of actions can be misjudged. For example, in the Soviet Union’s relations with
Egypt in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the associated request for naval basing
rights, ‘Soviet naval needs resulted in greater Soviet vulnerability to Egypt than Soviet
naval strength produced Soviet influence over Egypt’.101

How Naval Diplomacy Works
The essence of naval diplomacy is presence, defined in Australian Maritime Doctrine as
‘… the operation of naval forces in areas of strategic significance that are intended to
convey an interest’.102 Presence is not in itself a threat of force, but a demonstration of
capability used to reassure, to impress and to warn. Consequently, presence is seen as
being valuable for what it makes possible. It can be a first step to a wide range of
methods by which maritime force can achieve foreign policy objectives.

103

Presence

can also be routine and continuous or periodic and it can be provided by anything
from a single ship to a major task force. Presence is also associated primarily with
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Century, p. 277.
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peacetime activities, but cannot have any significant effect without the possibility of a
transition to conflict.104

Despite being one of the most widely accepted elements of navies’ operations, the
concept of presence is difficult to analyse, in the sense of determining the associated
benefits. Conversely, the costs are easier to determine, making the operations
sometimes hard to justify to political leaders.105

Peacetime presence activities are varied, including ‘flag-showing’ operations and
providing assistance to friendly navies. Yet presence also has a less benign aspect,
which maritime strategists describe with various euphemisms. Luttwak, for example,
writes about various forms of suasion,106 while Till mentions coercion, which in his
terms can involve deterrence and compellence.107 But, just as the benign forms of
presence aim to influence others so too the less benign aspect aims to impact on or
manipulate the political calculations of others. Consequently, force size, shape and
tactics are very important for success.108 Figure 2-2 below illustrates the components of
naval diplomacy and their connections.109
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Figure 2-2: The Components of Naval Diplomacy
The use of naval deployments to compel or deter is widespread. Luttwak in 1974 noted
that the USN had done so some 70 times since the end of the Second World War, at all
levels of intensity and all over the world.110 Argentina’s naval invasion of the Falkland
Islands in 1982 and the RN-led response are other examples of the use of naval force to
compel, although Argentina was unsuccessful. Highlighting the difficulty in assessing
the success of presence missions to compel or deter, Luttwak also differentiated
between active and latent suasion. He claimed that naval forces use active suasion in a
deliberate attempt to evoke a specific response from another state; whereas in the case
of latent suasion, the response to a deployment may be undirected and thus possibly
unintended.111

One specific form of compellence or deterrence is blockade or interception operations,
both of which aim to stop or limit movement of shipping. Naval blockade has a long
history, especially when used as a wartime expedient. Its use in peacetime has also
been widespread if not especially successful. The RN’s Beira patrol off the east coast of
Africa from 1966 until 1975 was limited by the readiness of international shipping to
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ignore it.112 The more recent UN sponsored interception operations aimed at illegal
Iraqi oil traffic were circumvented by Iraq’s ability to use land routes. Nevertheless, an
advantage of blockade operations in peacetime is that while they may be seen as
potentially provocative, they may also be non-belligerent and difficult to counter
without escalating to violence.113

Why Naval Diplomacy Does Not Always Work
Warships are particularly suited to the diplomatic function because of their defining
characteristics, which also determine their effectiveness in carrying out their other
functions. But the diplomatic function of navies is the most problematic. The effects of
its application tend to be indirect and depend on the reactions and understanding of
leaders or rulers who may not have any appreciation of naval or maritime strategy.114
So, an attempt at influence-building with one nation can also have a coercive impact on
another.115

There will be occasions when the display of naval might has an unexpected impact. An
example of this was the German Navy fleet review in Kiel during 1904, which left
British observers feeling uneasy as much as impressed.116 A more recent example is the
USN deployment of the United States Ship (USS) Enterprise and Task Force 74 to the
Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. As a show of strength by the proPakistan United States it failed, not least because events in East Pakistan had already
passed the stage at which any American intervention would have mattered.117
Furthermore all foreign nationals had already been evacuated from East Pakistan,
thereby removing another potential purpose for the task force deployment.118
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There is no guarantee that the signal sent is the signal received and the potential for
misjudgment is increased with the growing tendency for ships’ capabilities to be less
visible than was the case when ‘main armament’ was clearly the big guns. Today,
sensors can be just as important and be in action without any visible sign from the
ship.

The potential for uncertainty and unpredictability is heightened by the ambiguity
inherent in coercive instruments being used in apparently non-coercive roles.119
Ultimately there is the prospect of miscalculation in both the application of and
response to naval diplomacy, which could at worst lead to unwanted conflict.

Furthermore, the application of naval diplomacy tends to be indirect and slow. While
warships are mobile and relatively independent they are also relatively slow,
especially when compared with aircraft. Consequently, unless they are already in
position or an immediate response is not needed, warships may not be able to exercise
the presence that generates influence. Neither can there be any guarantee that effects
created will have long term impact. The failure of Soviet naval assistance to the
Indonesian Navy in the 1960s to develop lasting ties with that country is an example of
such difficulty.120 Furthermore, influence is not easily measured and even if the
outcome desired by the presence of warships is achieved, there is no sure way of
determining that it was achieved by that demonstration of presence.121 Finally, the
influence generated by the presence of warships may not always achieve the objective
unaided. As Booth noted, warships rarely have the quality of looming menace across a
border associated with armies.122 This is a double-edged sword. The need on occasion
to depend on other actions beyond the presence of warships also adds to the difficulty
of assessing the impact of the measures being taken.
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THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES AND ITS IMPORTANCE
The Legal Basis
The basis of the constabulary function is that States enjoy sovereignty over their
territorial waters which may extend up to 12nm and sovereign rights over the
resources, living and non-living in their EEZs which can extend to 200nm from the
baselines. In some cases, sovereign rights extend to 350 nm; the outer limit of the
continental shelf.123 These EEZ and continental shelf sovereign rights are currently
enjoyed by at least 166 States, while there are 51 with claims over the continental shelf
extensions to 350nm.124

Within their territorial seas, while States enjoy full sovereignty, under the terms of the
LOSC they also permit the right of innocent passage to international shipping. Such
passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State and so long as it is continuous and expeditious.125

Immediately

beyond the territorial sea, to a maximum of 24 nm from the baselines, in what is
termed the contiguous zone, coastal States may exercise the controls necessary to
prevent infringement of their customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within their territory or territorial seas. They may also punish
infringements of these laws and regulations committed within their territory or
territorial seas.126 Coastal States’ efforts to ensure their sovereign rights are maintained
is a vital element of the constabulary function of navies.

In their EEZs, coastal States have sovereign rights for the exploration, exploitation,
conservation and management of living and non-living natural resources in the waters,

United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 76
and 77, pp. 27-8.
124 See, States Parties, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
<http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=137> (7 November 2013), and Bernard H. Oxman, The
Rights of States to Establish Maritime Zones Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 8 June 2010, < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/oceansday10_oxman.pdf>
(7 November 2013).
125 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 1719. p. 6.
126 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 33.
p. 11.
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seabed and sub-soil. They also have jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations,
structures, marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment.127 Where coastal States claim extended continental shelves, up to 350nm
from their nominated baselines, they also have sovereign rights for exploring and
exploiting the living and non-living natural resources of the seabed and sub-soil in the
areas claimed.128 These resources include sedentary living organisms which are either
immobile on or under the seabed, or can move only when in contact with the seabed or
sub-soil.129 Protection of these rights is another major element of the constabulary
function.
Marine Resources and the Constabulary Function
The importance of the constabulary function lies primarily in the growing importance
of the sea to humanity, the increasing ability to harvest its resources and the recent
extensions to maritime boundaries which have placed a large proportion of the
resources under the control of coastal States. Three billion people gain some 20 per cent
of their animal protein from the sea, in the form of fish and other seafood.130
Furthermore, the global fish catch has quintupled since 1950 although catches are
declining, with wild catch expected to have been 90 million tonnes in 2012, down four
per cent from the 94 million tonne record in 1996.131 Current harvesting capacity far
exceeds biological sustainability of fish stocks. The growing gap between demand and
supply of fish and seafood has already led to many clashes at sea.

The three so called ‘Cod Wars’ between Iceland and the UK (1958-61, 1972-73 and 197576) exemplified problems in the Atlantic Ocean fisheries.132 Disputes involving Japan,

United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 56.
p. 18.
128 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 77,
p. 28.
129 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 77,
p. 28.
130 J. Matthew Roney, Eco-Economy Indicators: Fish Catch, Earth Policy Institute, 19 November
2012, < http://www.earth-policy.org/indicators/C55/fish_catch_2012> (7 November 2013).
131 Roney, Eco-Economy Indicators: Fish Catch, < http://www.earthpolicy.org/indicators/C55/fish_catch_2012> (7 November 2013).
132 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 312. See also, Ministry of Defence
(Navy). The Cod War: Naval Operations off Iceland in Support of the British Fishing Industry,
London, 1990, p. ix.
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the Koreas and Russia have typified the tensions in East Asian waters and in Southeast
Asian waters there have been recent clashes involving Thai fishers and their
neighbours.133 Australia has also been involved in fisheries disputes. For example, the
Uruguyan registered Viarsa I was detected allegedly fishing illegally in Australian
waters in the Southern Ocean. With assistance from South Africa, the vessel was
boarded after a 3 900 nm chase into the South Atlantic Ocean.134 In recent years there
has been an ongoing battle to repel the efforts of hundreds of mainly Indonesian
fishing vessels in northern waters.135 The largest haul of Indonesian illegal fishers was
367 boats in the financial year 2005-06. By 2012 the number of apprehended boats had
reduced to seven.136

Early in the 21st century access to oil and gas reserves is becoming increasingly
important as global demand for these energy sources threatens to outstrip supply.
With about one third of world reserves of oil and gas located under the sea, there is
growing commercial interest in exploiting it, even in water depths of up to 3,000m.137
The vast majority of these offshore sources will be in coastal State territorial waters or
EEZs, will be subject to a range of threats and will require protection by naval forces.

The South China Sea has seen disputes relating to contested rights to oil, gas and fish
dating back at least to the 1970s. The disputes are founded on unresolved territorial
disputes and have led to naval clashes.138 These clashes were examples of the
constabulary function of the navies involved, as the related operations were conducted
in support of sovereign rights claimed in waters where maritime boundaries were not
agreed.
Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 312-13.
Australian Government, Australian Customs Service and Australian Fisheries Management
Authority, Enforcement Operations in the Southern Ocean, Canberra, May 2006. Of interest, the
crew were subsequently acquitted in a Federal Court case in Perth. See, ‘$30m suit as fishers
acquitted’, The Australian, 7 November 2005, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au> (7 November
2005).
135 See for example, ‘Dangerous territory’, Adelaide Advertiser, 12 April 2006, p. 23, ‘Customs
operation targets illegal fishing’, Sunday Canberra Times, 9 April 2006, p. 33, and ‘Operation
Breakwater’, Western Cape Bulletin, 13 April 2006, p. 5.
136 ‘Australian Fisheries Management Burns Illegal Fishing Boats, NT News, 23 October 2013, in
LCDR Graham Norman, RANR, ed., RAN MTO Newsletter, 28 October 2013, p. 3.
137 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 311.
138 Leszek Buszynski and Christopher Roberts, eds., The South China Sea and Australia’s Regional
Security Environment, National Security College Occasional Paper No. 5, Australian National
University, Canberra, 5 September 2013, pp. 4 and 6.
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Locally, Australia’s Joint Offshore Protection Command was established on 30 March
2005, following a Prime Ministerial review of the security of the northwest shelf oil and
gas platforms in the latter part of 2004.139 In this case, terrorism was the presumed
threat, although navigation safety may also have been a consideration. This was the
case with the Bass Strait Oil Rig Patrols in the early 1980s.140

Australian naval forces were involved in protection of Iraqi oil and gas platforms from
insurgent attacks in the aftermath of the 2003 Gulf War. On the face of it, this appears
to have been a constabulary operation. In this thesis however, for simplicity, such
international operations will not be examined as part of the constabulary function.

Defining the Constabulary Function
In this thesis constabulary operations are defined as those conducted by a coastal State
for law enforcement at sea. Thus, the RAN’s capstone doctrine, Australian Maritime
Doctrine, defines constabulary operations as those which, ‘… function within the
framework of domestic law and Australia’s international law obligations and hence the
amount of force that can be applied must be strictly within the mandate given’.141

The position taken in this thesis differs from that of the RAN in one significant respect.
The RAN includes within the scope of constabulary operations, activities that in this
thesis are defined as diplomatic or military operations.

These include peace

operations, namely; peacekeeping, peace enforcement, embargoes and sanctions and
peace building. These are operations which would take place in support of another

‘Boost for maritime counter-terrorism protection’, joint news release by Senator the Hon
Robert Hill, Minister for Defence and Senator the Hon Chris Ellison, Minister for Justice and
Customs, 30 March 2005. <www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/justiceministerHome.nsf> on 22 May
2006. As from 23 October 2006, the Joint Offshore Protection Command was renamed Border
Protection Command. There was no change in the pre-existing command and control
arrangements. Department of Defence, Defgram No. 597/2006 Designation Of Border Protection
Command, signed by Air Chief Marshal A.G. Houston, Chief of the Defence Force, 30 October
2006.
140 The writer participated in the aerial patrols of the oil rigs for several months in 1981 and
1982.
141 Sea Power Centre-Australia, Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1, 2nd ed.,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2010, p. 113.
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State or States, rather than in support of domestic or international laws governing
Australia’s law enforcement at sea responsibilities.

The RN uses a similar if more extensive definition to that of the RAN, for what it terms
the ‘constabulary application’.
Constabulary Application. The use of military forces to uphold a national or
international law, mandate or regime in a manner in which minimum violence
is only used in enforcement as a last resort and after evidence of a breach or
intent to defy has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The level and
type of violence that is permitted will frequently be specified in the law,
mandate or regime that is being enforced. Also called policing.142
This approach to the constabulary function is consistent with Booth’s, if perhaps a little
narrower. Booth divided the function into coast guard and nation-building
responsibilities, with the latter involving contributions to maintaining internal
stability.143 Booth admitted that navies do not contribute extensively to such
operations. This thesis takes the view that naval contributions to maintaining internal
stability are policing operations and while they are mainly land-based, the naval
contributions are part of the constabulary function. The RN takes the same view,
considering that, for example, patrols of the Northern Ireland coast to counter terrorist
activity constituted constabulary operations.144

There is sometimes no clear distinction between the constabulary function and the
military and diplomatic ones. This may be most pronounced when an operation moves
from being one function to another. Booth and Till both acknowledge this point, with
Booth noting that there is some artificiality in the classification of the functions,
especially in peacetime as one operation can serve more than one objective.145 Till’s
point is that the maintenance of good order at sea demands operations varying from
law enforcement to the defence of security.146

BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine, 3rd ed., The Stationery Office, London, 2004, pp. 248-9.
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 16.
144 BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine, 3rd ed., p. 63.
145 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 17.
146 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 342.
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An example of an operation which reflected Till’s spectrum of force was the element of
Australia’s Operation Relex mounted to combat illegal immigration off the northwest
coast in August 2001. On 26 August 2001 the motor vessel (MV) Tampa rescued 438
intended asylum seekers from an unseaworthy craft and after some disputes with the
asylum seekers, determined to land them at Christmas Island, which is Australian
territory.147 The Australian Government refused to allow the Tampa to enter Australian
territorial waters and when it began to do so, used naval craft to enable special forces
troops to board the ship, too late however to prevent its entry.148

While the Tampa remained outside Australian territorial waters and showed no signs of
entering, then it merited nothing more than surveillance by Defence and Coastwatch
forces. When the Tampa appeared set to enter territorial waters the use of special forces
was one option open to the Australian Government, which could also, for example,
have fired shots across the ship’s bows. The method selected may have represented the
most effective one available; the least use of military force and the least threat of harm
to the ship’s crew and the asylum seekers.

Highlighting the difficulty of establishing a consistent approach to this issue, however,
the Australian Government has recently authorized the Navy to open fire in certain
circumstances when confronted by illegal fishing activities in the EEZ.149 The decision
was made in response to increasingly aggressive actions on the part of illegal fishers.
The changed rules of engagement permit the Navy to disable fishing vessels by firing
at the rudder or engines. The previous rules of engagement allowed only for warning
shots to be fired across the bows of vessels attempting to avoid apprehension.

Although his definition of the constabulary function is not comprehensive, Rear
Admiral J.R. Hill provides support for the position taken in this thesis. He noted that
the rights and responsibilities of a state in the waters off its coast ‘… can usefully be

Stuart Kaye, ‘Tampering with Border Protection: The Legal and Policy Implications of the
Voyage of the MV Tampa’, in Martin Tsamenyi and Chris Rahman, eds., Protecting Australia’s
Borders: MV Tampa and Beyond, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong,
Wollongong, 2002, p. 60.
148 Kaye, ‘Tampering with Border Protection: The Legal and Policy Implications of the Voyage
of the MV Tampa’, p. 61.
149 Sarah Miles, ‘Navy granted power to shoot at illegal fishers’, The Age, 7 December 2006. p. 5.
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divided into sovereignty, good order and resource enjoyment’.150 He also noted that
sovereignty applies only to the territorial sea and that preservation of good order there
is both a right and a responsibility.151 His argument supports the position taken by the
Australian Government over the MV Tampa.

The Niue Treaty entered into force on 20 May 1993 and has been ratified by several
South Pacific states, including Australia. This treaty, inter alia allows that a Party to it ‘
… may permit another party to extend its fisheries surveillance and law enforcement
activities to the territorial sea and archipelagic waters of that party’.152 This represents
an important extension of the constabulary function, by which one state may provide
one element of the constabulary function for another. In this case, the primary reason
for the Treaty is to enable the small island States to cooperate for the protection of their
very extensive EEZs.153

The Niue Treaty has encouraged the development of subsidiary arrangements for
closer cooperation among the parties. Multilateral Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreements
are being developed to enable States parties to cooperate more fully. Thus seven Forum
Fisheries Agency member States have signed a Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement
aimed at improving collaboration in monitoring control and surveillance of the
region’s shared fisheries resources.154

Experience has shown that navies engaged in the constabulary function are not always
involved in all aspects of the function. This is especially true of the RAN, for two
reasons. Firstly, one of the traditional tasks associated with the constabulary function,
counter-piracy operations, has never materialized to any extent in the waters around
Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
MD., 1986, p. 99.
151 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, p. 99.
152 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and law Enforcement in the South
Pacific Region, Article VI. <http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/acre/Niue.txt.html> (18 May
2007).
153 New Zealand House of Representatives, International treaty examination of the Treaty on
Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region: Report of the
Primary Production Committee, undated, <http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000002575>
(26 March 2014).
154 ‘Samoa signs the Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement (NTSA)’, Savali, 12 July 2013,
<http://www.savalinews.com/2013/07/12/samoa-signs-the-niue-treaty-subsidiaryagreement-ntsa/> (8 November 2013).
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Australia.155 Secondly, the RAN is better placed to deal with issues such as marine
resources protection and inflows of asylum seekers arriving by sea, than with others
such as environmental and quarantine protection. Quarantine problems in particular
are mostly dealt with at air and sea ports of entry. Experience has also shown that
marine resources protection and interception of asylum seekers have been the aspects
of the constabulary function that have demanded most attention from governments.
Consequently, the RAN’s constabulary function focus has been overwhelmingly on
these two issues, especially since 1967 when the Attack class patrol boats entered
service.

Yet, the RAN is involved in other aspects of the constabulary function, most notably
assisting Customs authorities with counter-drug smuggling operations and assisting
biosecurity authorities with the quarantine implications of unauthorized landings on
remote parts of the Australian coast. Similarly, the RAN undertakes occasional work
for environmental management authorities such as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
Authority. These constabulary activities are, however, relatively infrequent.

Despite the fact that in protecting Australia’s offshore estate the RAN does not fully
engage in all aspects of the constabulary function, all aspects of the function relating to
Australia’s offshore estate will be examined in this thesis. This will provide a complete
picture of the development of the threats to good order at sea as they have affected
Australia. It will also provide an appreciation of the magnitude of the entire law
enforcement function and the extent to which it is actually prosecuted at sea.
Additionally, it will provide a clear exposition of the mostly gradual expansion of the
Navy’s involvement in the constabulary function and the extent of the Navy’s
contribution to the overall task.

Other Challenges for the Constabulary Function
Protection of the marine environment is another important element of the constabulary
function. According to Davis we have ‘… treated the seas as a gigantic planetary waste

As noted above examination of the constabulary function in this thesis is limited to law
enforcement operations in and around Australia’s EEZ. The RAN has conducted counter-piracy
operations off the Horn of Africa.
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bin…’.156 The problems associated with pollution of the seas are not confined to coastal
waters, but importantly apply also to oceanic waters. Still limited research has pointed
to levels of some dangerous pollutants, including heavy metals, being present in both
coastal and oceanic waters, although usually in higher levels in the coastal waters.157

Jacques Cousteau determined that in the 20 years up to the 1980s marine pollution
reduced the intensity of sea life by 30 to 50 percent. Cousteau has attributed this loss
primarily to coastal discharge, ocean dumping or spillage, accidents and seabed
mining.158 Writing more recently, Till, referring to the 1995 UN Independent
Commission on the World’s Oceans, noted the increasing pressures on the oceans
produced by growing populations, jurisdictional problems, over exploitation and
widespread ignorance. He also noted the potential for disorder which could follow
collapse of the marine environment.159

The extension of national maritime responsibilities associated with the LOSC has
enabled some remedial effort to be mounted against marine pollution in coastal waters.
The growing realization of the fundamental importance of the state of the oceans to
humanity will in time see these efforts extended beyond present territorial sea and
contiguous zone boundaries. Clearly the main source of marine pollution remains
discharges from land-based sources and in that sense, especially, protection of the
marine environment is one element of the constabulary function of navies which will
remain limited.

Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 gives the matter very little coverage, apart
from noting its growing importance.160 Responsibility for marine environmental
management and the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and other
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, lies with the Australian Maritime Safety

W. Jackson Davis, ‘The Need for a New Ocean Governance System’, in Jon M. Van Dyke,
Durwood Zaelke and Grant Hewison, eds., Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century: Oceans
Governance and Environmental Harmony, Island Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 148.
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Authority.161 Thus, the Navy, apart from ensuring its own compliance with
environmental legislation, has little more than an incidental involvement in the marine
environmental aspects of the constabulary function.

There are other maritime activities, legal and illegal, which engage navies in their
constabulary function. These include piracy and sea robbery, the carriage of dangerous
or noxious substances and the smuggling of drugs or other illegal material. For
example, Australia’s Navy, and Army brought the North Korean owned freighter Pong
Su into Sydney in April 2003 after the ship attempted to reach international waters
having unloaded heroin off the Victorian coast.162

Deterring and managing inflows of seaborne asylum seekers is yet another activity
which continues to be countered by navies and coast guards around the world, and
which continues to be a sensitive issue for Australia. For the first decade of the 21 st
century and beyond, the RAN has been involved in operations to manage the flow of
asylum seekers, primarily from Indonesian ports, to the Australian coast and offshore
islands.163

Finally, two quite recent manifestations of illegal activities at sea have the potential to
engage navies to an increasing extent. The first is the threat of proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction by sea, which has led to the institution of the Proliferation Security
Initiative, mentioned above. The second is maritime terrorism, with some occurrences
in the Gulf of Aden and in the Philippines in 2000, 2002 and 2004 leading authorities to
fear the potential for more such attacks in the future.164

Australian Government, Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Environment,
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/> (9 November 2013).
162 See, ABC Foreign Correspondent, ‘North Korea – Pong Su’, broadcast on 27 July 2004.
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163 Bendle, Griffin and Laurence, eds., Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005:
Working Paper No. 18, pp. 44, 46 and 50. See also, Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Boat
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Some of these threats, like piracy, are contemporary manifestations of age-old risks of
doing business at sea. Others, like the illegal transport of weapons of mass destruction
and maritime terrorism, are products of this age and because they are not present only
within waters under coastal state jurisdiction, offer new and distinct challenges for
navies in their resolution. The potential for these threats to create significant challenges
for states against which they may be directed is illustrated by the claim that the global
international trade in illegal drugs is valued at $US 30-50 billion per year.165

Recent Australian experience with both illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing and asylum seekers has shown that naval and all other available resources can
be inadequate at times. Numbers of vessels engaged in the illegal pursuits, geographic
spread of the activities, the time span over which they occur and conflicting
operational demands all contribute to this demand for law enforcement resources.

There is another maritime activity which some navies, including the RAN, categorize
as part of the constabulary function; search and rescue at sea. It is not included within
the constabulary function for the purposes of this thesis, because it is not primarily a
law enforcement activity, but a humanitarian one. Many countries have formal
organizations other than navies established specifically to deal with this task. The USA
has the Coast Guard, while Australia has Australian Search and Rescue, within the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority. Australian Search and Rescue manages and
coordinates search and rescue operations, bringing in naval and other defence assets,
together with other suitable civilian resources. Additionally, as detailed in the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, Chapter Five and July 2006 Amendment, there is a
general obligation for ships’ masters to assist those in distress at sea.166 The SAR
Convention, to which Australia is also a party, ensures cooperation among
neighbouring countries, so that wherever an accident occurs at sea a rescue operation
can be mounted.167

Edward Gresser, ‘World Drug Trade: $50bn’? Progressive Economy, 14 August 2013,
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How and why the Constabulary Function Works
Since the entry into force of the LOSC in 1994 and especially the extended maritime
jurisdiction regimes it enabled, all coastal States seek to maintain good order at sea, at
least within their territorial seas. At a minimum, they need some patrol craft to do
this.168 At the other end of the spectrum, the USA has established a Coast Guard larger
than the navies of all but very few other states, to manage its constabulary duties and
to ensure good order at sea. Often it does this in cooperation with the USN, which like
many other navies, performs military, diplomatic and constabulary functions.
Generally navies, or coast guards, have accepted the constabulary function as a
legitimate part of their activities - for coast guards usually their primary activities.

In considering the environmental aspect of good order at sea, the 1998 Advisory
Committee on the Protection of the Seas, in Stockholm, sought to ‘ … encourage States
to use the capacity of their military and intelligence organizations towards
environmental security in partnership with their civilian counterparts.’169 The
committee recognized that navies have intrinsic skills and experience to apply to that
particular function, including the capacity to contribute to pollution prevention and
clean-up. This can include preventing the disposal of obsolete equipment from
becoming a pollution problem itself.170 Increasingly, navies are coming under pressure
to ensure that their training activities involving the use of sonars do not cause distress
to marine mammals and other creatures.

Navies also have skills and experience that apply equally to other elements of the
constabulary function. In many instances, navies will be the only national
organizations with these skills and experience. Others, such as Customs and Fisheries
will lack some of the qualities of navies; seagoing vessels, comprehensive intelligence
systems, a variety of sensors and weapons systems, boarding parties capable of

Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, p. 196.
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opposed boardings, for example. But they will have powers of arrest under a variety of
laws. In many cases, these organizations will combine to achieve the desired results. 171

To be effective in the constabulary function, navies firstly need to know what is
occurring in their sovereign waters and in those waters over which they enjoy
sovereign rights. This can be taken to include knowledge of movements on, above and
under the water as well as knowledge of the maritime environment itself. Navies also
need to be able to apply force and while sometimes only minimum force will be
needed, there should be an inherent capacity to increase the level of force if
circumstances demand it. For example, there was an instance in 1995 in which the
Philippine Navy was unable to respond adequately to Chinese provocation over the
disputed Mischief Reef.172

For navies, being able to apply force can also involve

knowing when not to use it. Navies must be able to stop a ship without destroying it
and must be able to communicate with others on the seas and not just resort to force.173
Consequently, navies may also need to act as mediators between, for instance, nongovernment organizations such as Greenpeace and whaling fleets.

To carry out the constabulary function effectively, navies also need to be ‘network
enabled’. Essentially this means that they should have access to and share relevant
intelligence and other information, in real time whenever possible. This will enable
navies to respond quickly to threats of any kind, or preferably to prevent them from
emerging. Usually, this capability will relate more to complex or extensive threats,
such as international maritime terrorism and major illegal fishing activities. It must
also be combined with a good working knowledge of international law on the part of
those operating naval vessels in the constabulary function.

Navies also need sound strategic planning capabilities and plans, requirements of
which the US Coast Guard was found wanting on the 11th of September 2001.174 These
plans must then also translate into effectiveness at the operational and tactical levels.
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One essential element of this planning is improved integration between military and
civilian agencies with responsibilities for aspects of the constabulary function. This
applies both nationally and internationally. For example, the British approach, involves
the RN, Royal Air Force and Royal National Lifeboat Institution and with civilian
agencies having most enforcement functions, is ‘federated’ rather than integrated’.175
Till states that it ‘ … looks untidy and should not work, but oddly seems to most of the
time.’176 He described Australia’s approach as a tidier version of the British; with
Coastwatch the coordinating organization, having access to service providers like the
RAN and clients such as Fisheries, Customs and Immigration.177 Australia’s approach
today is even tidier, with the Border Protection Command a multi-agency organization
using assets assigned by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and the
Department of Defence.178

The operational effectiveness of navies in the constabulary function will therefore also
reside in suitably equipped ships which have very good sea-keeping ability and
endurance and on suitably trained and experienced personnel. Detection and
apprehension are the keys to effective regulation on the oceans.179
The Constabulary Function - for Navies or Coast Guards
Yet, despite the fact that the constabulary function is an acknowledged element of
Booth’s trinity of naval roles and is accepted as such by navies around the world, there
is some dispute as to whether it is a legitimate role for navies. This has flourished
because of the growing importance of the constabulary function and associated
increasing popularity of coast guards. It also stems from the fear among certain navies
that constabulary work will limit their ability to remain operationally ready to meet
their traditional threats at sea.
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Even as long ago as the early 1970s, the increasing economic importance of coastal
zones and their expansion, led many to believe that offshore maritime policing would
become a more important task for navies. Both Canada and Britain reoriented their
navies to an extent in response to this development.180 There is also an argument that
the future of many navies depend on carrying out coast guard functions in the waters
over which they claim national jurisdiction.

Some countries prefer using navies rather than coast guards for constabulary work.
This has been brought about through the capacity of warships and their helicopters to
operate over long ranges, their comprehensively trained crews, capacity for conducting
boardings and experience in using minimum levels of force to achieve objectives. There
is also the appreciation that warships ‘… create an impression’.181 As well, while their
surface combatants may be more complex and costly than ships purpose-built for the
constabulary function, they are as a result more flexible and more adaptable to a
variety of roles.

Another important reality is that many navies are in fact coast guards in all but name.
This applies especially to smaller navies; the Irish Navy being a useful example. It has
eight offshore and coastal patrol craft, with guns their only armament. Apart from
navigation and search radars, the ships carry none of the sensors or other weapons
systems associated with warships. Similarly, the Irish Navy has eight helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft for maritime patrol and search and rescue. None is armed.182 Along
with other forces like it, this navy is optimized for the constabulary function and could
not participate in contemporary maritime warfare.

Forty three per cent of navies listed in Table 2-3 (52 of the total of 124) are capable of
nothing more than constabulary functions, while there are in addition some 82 coast
guards also limited to constabulary functions or token status. Another 32 per cent of
navies (40 in total) are capable of some defensive combat capability and only 25 per

Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 265.
Robin Warner, ‘Jurisdictional issues for navies involved in multilateral regimes beyond
national jurisdiction’, in David Wilson and Dick Sherwood, eds. Oceans Governance and Maritime
Strategy, Allen and Unwin, Sydney 2000, p. 186.
182 Information taken from the online version of Janes Fighting Ships, accessed via the Defence
Intranet on 25 May 2006.
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cent of navies (32 in total) are capable of projecting naval power significantly beyond
national maritime boundaries. Noteworthy too, only 64 countries have both navies
and coast guards. This represents just 31 per cent of the total number of countries with
either navies or coast guards. It suggests that no matter what function they are
optimized for, most navies of the world must become involved in the constabulary
function – if it is to be carried out at all.

Organization Type183

Number184 Percentage of total navies or coast
guards
Force Projection Navies
32
25%
Territorial Defence Navies
40
32%
Constabulary Navies
24
20%
Token Navies
28
23%
Total Number of Navies
124
Constabulary Coast Guards
65
79%
Token Coast Guards
17
21%
Total Number of Coast Guards
82
Countries with both Navies and
64
31% of total countries with navies or
Coast Guards
coast guards
Table 2-3: Navies and Coast Guards by Capability
By contrast, a significant number of navies consider the constabulary function to be
ancillary to the military function - the ‘real’ job - and the associated training for warfighting, maintaining embargoes and supporting land forces.185 Additionally, navies in
this position sometimes argue that their warships are wasted on constabulary tasks;
being far more complex and costly than the tasks demand. This latter point is valid and
must be considered in parallel with military commitments that may limit the
availability of warships for the constabulary tasks. Additionally, there can be

The grouping is an amalgamation of the typology developed by Eric Grove and detailed
earlier in the chapter.
184 The Eric Grove typologies were applied to all of the navies and coast guards listed in James
Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 2013, Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 2013.
185 Warner, ‘Jurisdictional issues for navies involved in multilateral regimes beyond national
jurisdiction’, p. 186.
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constitutional problems associated with enforcing national legislation against own flag
vessels.186

Yet even for these navies, the reality is that they spend a far greater proportion of their
time at peace than at war. Consequently, they are likely to spend a greater proportion
of their time engaged in or available for constabulary tasks than in military tasks. This
is very well reflected in a quote from Admiral Humphrey Smith RN in the 19th century,
when the Royal Navy dominated maritime affairs worldwide. He noted:
‘… I don’t think we ever thought very much about War with a big W. We
looked on the Navy more as a world Police force than a warlike institution. We
considered that our job was to safeguard law and order throughout the world –
safeguard civilization, put out fires on shore, and act as a guide philosopher
and friend to the merchant ships of all nations.’187
Much the same point was made by Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, the RAN Chief of the
Navy, in his keynote address to the RAN’s Seapower 2004 Conference. He said, inter
alia:
‘… If I were willing to risk another prediction, it would be that the Navy will in
future become even more closely involved in maintaining and enforcing good
order at sea. From time to time an ill-informed commentator will remark that
the Navy finds constabulary operations ‘distasteful’, and that they are
incompatible with our war-fighting functions. I totally reject these
allegations.’188
Undoubtedly, there will remain a strong imperative for navies to maintain their
traditional functions; those associated with manifestations of state power.189 But, even
those navies that consider the constabulary function to be a secondary one will be
increasingly unable to ignore it. As Vice Admiral Ritchie acknowledged, the RAN
recognizes this and welcomes it. The USN, the biggest and most capable navy in the
world also devotes considerable effort to the constabulary task, despite the presence of
the US Coast Guard, itself larger than the navies of most nations. This effort has been
Warner, ‘Jurisdictional issues for navies involved in multilateral regimes beyond national
jurisdiction ’, p. 186.
187 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 359.
188 Chris Ritchie, Vice Admiral RAN, ‘Positioning Our Navy for the Future’, in McCaffrie, ed.
Positioning Navies for the Future, p. 22.
189 Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 367.
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formalized within the National Fleet Policy, which aims to allow ‘… an effective twoway flow of capability to meet both expeditionary and domestic security
imperatives…’.190

Ultimately the constabulary task is one for both navies and coast guards. It is a raison
d’être for all coast guards and for many smaller navies. For bigger navies it is a task of
varying importance, which will always compete for attention with the traditional
military and diplomatic functions. Inevitably, as the importance of the constabulary
task continues to grow and as it attracts significant political attention even the biggest
of navies are being compelled to take it seriously.

190

Deepwater News January 2004, <www.uscg.mil/deepwater> (13 June 2006).
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES
Introduction
Today the constabulary function of navies is well established and accepted, if not
always popular.1 The doctrine publications of both the Royal Navy (RN)2 and the
Royal Australian Navy (RAN)3 deal with it comprehensively, and it has its modern
foundation in both domestic and international law. The constabulary function today is
not the responsibility only of navies. Notably, since the 17th century other organizations
have become involved. They include coast guards, customs and quarantine services
and fisheries management authorities.

There were three significant focal points for early maritime activity; the Indian Ocean,
Southeast Asia and Mediterranean Europe. Maritime activity began in the Indian
Ocean as early as 3000 BCE, with trade involving India, the Red Sea and the Arabian
coast.4 Within Southeast Asia in the third millennium BCE, rice, salt and fish were the
main trading cargoes.5 In Mediterranean Europe the Cretans began maritime activity at
about 2500 BCE.6 It included fishing, piracy and barter trade,7 primarily for luxury
goods rather than commodities.8

Tom Hyland, ‘Morale overboard’, Sunday Age, 22 July 2007, p. 13. The story related substantial
morale problems among the RAN ships’ crews involved in the long-running operations against
illegal immigrants attempting to land in Australia.
2 BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine, 3rd ed., The Stationery Office, London, 2004, pp. 21-2, 48, 63,
68, 132 and 187.
3 Sea Power Centre-Australia, RAN Doctrine 1, Australian Maritime Doctrine, , Defence Publishing
Service, Canberra, 2000, pp. 55, 56, and 65-9.
4 R.P. Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The
Hague, 1982, p. 10.
5 Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A History of the People and the Sea, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 22.
6 Chester G. Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, Oxford University Press, New
York, NY. 1989, p. 5.
7 Fik Meijer, A History of Seafaring in the Classical World, St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1986,
p. 1.
8 Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 5.
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Naval activity came later. In the Mediterranean, for example, Pharaoh Thutmose III,
who ruled Egypt from 1479 BC to 1425 BCE mounted frequent invasions of Palestine
and Syria, often sending his troops by sea to avoid long marches.9 There is also
evidence of minor raids on the Asia Minor coast by Minoans from the second
millennium BCE.10

11

Indian Ocean naval activity emerged later still, in the time of

Emperor Chandragupta Maurya (321 to 291 BCE). He created a Board of Admiralty12
with an associated Naval Department. This was headed by a Superintendent of Ships,
who controlled ships in harbour and in maritime zones,13 including waters in which
the ruler had certain rights, as well as the high seas.14

The constabulary function of navies emerged in response to a need for good order at
sea. Countering piracy was the first recorded constabulary task, with evidence of
piracy existing from around 2000 BCE, as a mostly minor influence on trade.15 To the
present day, there have been three other major constabulary tasks; resource protection,
border protection including fiscal regulation and environmental protection. The extent
to which navies have been and are involved in each of the four tasks varies greatly.

Navies have been responsible for the maintenance of good order at sea for millenia.
Despite the appearance of specialist organizations such as customs and coast guards,
navies around the world remain either wholly or partly responsible for the
constabulary function. British and United States (US) experience will be the main focus
of this chapter, because of their global importance at different times, and because of the
different ways in which they have responded to the constabulary task. Further, the RN
provided significant support for the development of the RAN, especially in the first
half of the 20th century, while in recent times the RAN has looked to the United States
Navy (USN) for its doctrinal lead.

Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 9.
Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 11.
11 Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 12.
12 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 12.
13 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 12.
14 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 13.
15 Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, pp. 11-12.
9
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PIRACY
Introduction
International law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) defines piracy
as any illegal act of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by
the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, on the high seas or in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, and directed against another ship or aircraft or
against persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft.16 The LOSC also requires
all States to cooperate fully in repressing piracy.17 These positions were codified first in
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.18 Historically, piracy has been more loosely
defined as unlawful activity at sea involving the use or threat of violence.19 At times up
to the Middle Ages, piracy was legitimate, before becoming a reviled criminal activity
by the 15th century.20

Today, many of the illegal acts committed against ships occur within territorial waters;
for example those in parts of the Strait of Malacca. Because these illegal acts are not
committed on the high seas, they are not legally defined as piracy, even though they
resemble piracy in every other respect. These acts are considered to be armed robbery
at sea.

Early Times
Piracy appeared soon after the seas were first used for commercial purposes and has
waxed and waned, responding to variations in trading activity and to the capacity of
navies to counter it. Some of the earliest recorded instances of piracy, from 2500 BCE,
occurred in the Mediterranean Sea, but did not significantly interfere with Cretan
United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 101,
United Nations, New York, 1983, p. 34.
17 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 100,
p. 33.
18 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, Articles 14 and 15.
<http://www.intfish.net/treaties/genevahs.htm> ( 22 June 2008).
19 Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the
Modern World, Hurst & Company, London, 2009, p. 7.
20 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries,Pirates and Sovereigns, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ., 1994, p. 23 and pp. 107-8.
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trading activities.21 The Phoenicians, the next major group to employ seapower in the
Mediterranean, circa 2000 BCE to 300 BCE, founded the colony of Rhodes, which
policed Mediterranean maritime trade.22 Rhodes repeatedly fought pirates on its own
account and supported Rome in countering piracy.23 By the end of the fourth century
BCE, several navies in the Mediterranean were protecting commerce.24 In the second
century BCE, Rhodes was still using its navy to suppress piracy, even when the Roman
navy failed to do so; piracy then being a useful source of slaves for Rome.25

That Rome’s attitude changed is clear from a Roman piracy law, remnants of which
were excavated at Delphi and dated about 100 BCE. The law stated inter alia that ‘ …
the citizens of Rome…may be able to sail the seas in safety and obtain justice…’.26 It
also noted that:
the ranking consul…shall make clear also that it is just that they (the Kings in
Cyprus, Egypt and Cyrene) see to it that no pirates set out from their kingdom,
land or territories, and that no officials or commanders appointed by them
harbours (sic) the pirates under their protection.27
Late in the second century BCE, Rome allowed its navy to atrophy, leading to one of
the worst outbreaks of piracy in classical times.28 29 Rome subsequently rebuilt its naval
forces to protect its food supplies.30 Over three months in 67 BCE, Rome’s navy, led by
Gnaeus Pompey, cleared the Mediterranean of pirates.31 Rome’s standing navy

Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 12.
Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 11.
23 Ellen Churchill Semple, ‘Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea’ in Geographical Review, Vol. 2,
No. 2, August 1916, pp. 142-43.
24 W.L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics and Ship Design from
Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.) Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD., 1964, p. 263.
25 Napthali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold, eds., Roman Civilization: Selected Readings-The Republic
and Augustan Age, Vol. 1, 3rd ed., Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1990, p. 348.
26 Lewis and Reinhold, eds., Roman Civilization: Selected Readings–The Republic and the Augustan
Age, p. 348.
27 Lewis and Reinhold, eds., Roman Civilization: Selected Readings–The Republic and the Augustan
Age, Vol. 1, 3rd ed., p. 349.
28 Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 61.
29 Semple, ‘Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea’, Geographical Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 135. A
notable feature of Mediterranean piracy, even to the 19th century, was its capacity to regenerate
in the absence of the political control exercised by naval forces.
30Chester G. Starr Jr, The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C.–A.D. 324, Greenwood Press, Westport CT.,
1941, rpt. 1979, p. 62.
31 Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 63.
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achieved long-term suppression of piracy until the third century CE.32 As Rodgers
noted, ‘… For over 350 years after Actium33…the fleets served only for the maintenance
of good order at sea and the protection of commerce’.34 This Roman experience
demonstrates an early direct link between the work of navies and good order at sea. To
provide safe passage against early piracy in the Mediterranean, shipping was
encouraged to follow specific narrow sea routes.35 Similar restriction remains a feature
of contemporary counter-piracy efforts, with the establishment of the Internationally
Recommended Transit Corridor off the Horn of Africa a current example.36

With Rome’s defeat by Constantine in CE 324 Roman naval power almost disappeared.
Coincidentally, piracy became widespread in the North Sea. First it involved the
Chauci people, then in the third century CE the Franks and Saxons.37 Later, Saxon
pirate activity expanded to include raids against the English coast. This activity was
countered in the sixth century by Frankish naval power which sometimes was strong
enough to act against the piracy on the English side of the Channel.38

The Middle Ages
Navies responded to subsequent outbreaks of piracy. Viking piracy appeared suddenly
in the North Sea in the 790s39 and Muslim pirates from Spain and North Africa were
overcome by a Frankish naval force in the Balearic Islands in 799.40 At about the same
time, Venetian ships helped the Frankish fleet to counter Slav piracy in the Adriatic.41
Venice developed seapower largely to combat piracy.42 Separately, Charlemagne

Starr, The Influence of Seapower on Ancient History, p. 74.
This refers to the battle of Actium in 31 BCE, in which Rome defeated Egypt. E.B. Potter, ed.,
Seapower–A Naval History, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD., 1981, p. 6.
34 VADM William Ledyard Rodgers, USN (Rtd), Naval Warfare Under Oars 4th to 16th Centuries–A
Study of Strategy, Tactics and Ship Design, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD., 1947, p. 3.
35 Semple, ‘Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea’ Geographical Review, p. 135.
36 Combined Maritime Forces–CTF 151: Counter-piracy, <www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf151-counter-piracy> (2 March 2013).
37 The Chauci were the most prominent of the early Germanic seafarers and inhabited the North
Sea coast. See John Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon
Activity, Routledge, London, 1991. p. 7.
38 Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Activity, p. 86.
39 Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Activity, p. 109.
40 Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Activity, p. 110.
41 Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Activity, p. 112.
42 Semple, ‘Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea’ Geographical Review, p. 145.
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ordered the building of a fleet to protect the mouth of the River Rhone from pirates.
Professional coast guards were also evident at that time.43 Clearly, piracy was a
problem which demanded an official response, mostly in the form of naval forces.

Maritime trade was possible between India and Babylon as early as 3000 BCE,44 while
the monsoons allowed trade between India and Southeast Asia as early as 600 BCE.45
This trade was accompanied by a system of regulation, exerting control over fisheries
and suppressing piracy.46 From the fifth to the 13th centuries CE, naval stations were
established along the Southeast Asian coastline to China for several Indian states,
providing safe haven for China-bound ships.47 Then, as now, when piracy was a
problem merchant ships normally sailed in convoy and carried soldiers for their
defence.48

In both the Mediterranean and in Asian seas, from a very early time, serious attempts
were made to impose regulations relating to the conduct of trade. These regulations
and the attempts to enforce them were very early examples of constabulary tasks at sea
and of using navies for law enforcement.

From the time of Henry I (1100-1135) after the Norman conquest, the kings of England
rarely felt the need to maintain expensive warfleets.49 There were, nevertheless, some
constabulary-like activities, such as the fleet assembled in 1136 by King Stephen (11351154) to tackle piracy around the Isle of Wight.50 By 1339, England had a ‘Sea Guard’
which was a coastal militia raised from all districts within 18 miles of the coast and
entrusted to the Keepers or Wardens of each county.51 This was an early indication that
not only navies would be responsible for good order at sea. There was also ambiguity
Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Activity, pp. 1189. The reference does not make clear whether these coast guards were land forces or seagoing
forces. In either case, however, they would have had a policing function.
44 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 10.
45 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 12.
46 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, pp. 12-13.
47 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, pp. 17.
48 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 18.
49 David Loades, England’s Maritime Empire Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690, Longman,
Harlow, England, 2000, p. 2.
50 N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, Volume One 660-1649,
Harper Collins, London, 1997, p. 40.
51 Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, Volume One 660-1649, p. 136.
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in the role of navies. Rose pointed out that in the early part of the 15th century English
naval activity ‘ … seems to have been confined to a form of semi-official piracy’.52 As
an example, a notorious pirate barge, the Mackerel of Fowey, was owned by Henry VI’s
(1422-1461) Admiral of England, the Duke of Exeter.53 Rose added that at the time,
piracy was in fact a part of low-level naval warfare.54

Despite the ambiguity, the need for a navy was recognized. Sir John Fortescue wrote in
‘The Governance of England’ in 1476 that:

…yet it shall be that the king have always some fleet upon the sea, for
repressing of rovers, saving of our own merchants, our fishers, and the dwellers
on our coast.55

The Age of Exploration
In 1552, the RN56 provided a squadron for the ‘Narrow Seas’57 inter alia to protect
merchant ships subject to pirate attacks and the fishing fleet sailing to the
Newfoundland banks.58 Concurrently, royal ships conducted regular operations
against pirates in the Channel and the North and Irish Seas. In one particular incident
in July 1556, ships of Queen Mary I (1553-1558) captured or destroyed the greater part
of a substantial pirate fleet manned by French corsairs and English exiles.59 Those
actions which took place in waters claimed by England were constabulary operations.

The 16th century Mediterranean pirates extended their activities into the Atlantic and
eventually reached England in 1631. The English response involved the notion of a
British Empire to control the coasts and waters north to the Orkneys and to the northSusan Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 82.
Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, Volume One 660-1649, p. 149.
54 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500, p. 83.
55 Loades, England’s Maritime Empire Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690, p. 15.
56 The Admiralty was established formally in the years 1545-6. Loades, England’s Maritime
Empire Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690, p. 43.
57 The ‘narrow seas’ were those over which the English Kings claimed sovereignty and were the
English Channel and the southern North Sea. Peter Kemp, The Oxford Companion to Ships and the
Sea, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, p. 573.
58 Loades, England’s Maritime Empire Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690, p. 63.
59 David Loades, ‘From the King’s Ships to the Royal Navy’, in J. R. Hill, ed. The Oxford
Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp 30 and 38.
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east seaboard of North America. It also included maintaining a ‘Petty Navy Royal’ to
protect the realm against invasion, protect merchant ships against piracy and to
dissuade foreign embargoes. The Navy was financed by a tax on all foreign fishing in
English waters.60

During the first half of the 17th century, Dunkirkers, Dutch and Moor pirates were
active in the English Channel. In 1627 Dunkirkers carried off five Ipswich-based ships
and their crews and the townspeople of King’s Lynn complained of their inability to
maintain the Icelandic fishery because of pirates.61 Because Charles I (1625-1649) failed
to maintain a fleet that could ensure sovereignty of the sea and defend the coast, in
1632 Yarmouth fishermen, among others, refused to go to sea because of the pirate
threat.62

With finance a constant problem, Charles eventually introduced the so-called ‘shipmoney’ fleets in May 1635,63 principally to secure the narrow seas from ‘ … men-ofwar, pirates and sea rovers and picaroons that interrupt the trade…’.64 Nevertheless,
until late in the 17th century the Barbary pirates continued to operate in British waters,
taking thousands from the West Country into slavery.65 These pirates had operated on
the North African coast since the seventh century and continued to do so until they
were finally curbed following the French conquest of Algiers in 1830.66

In the 1690s, English piracy flourished in North American waters, under the cover of
privateering against the French. New York gained a reputation as a centre of piracy.67
The RN responded and by the late 1720s had completely eradicated piracy in those
waters.68 The RN constabulary-related presence was also needed to support a very
Loades, England’s Maritime Empire Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690, pp. 111-12.
T. W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, William Blackwood and Son, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 247.
62 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 248.
63 ‘Ship money’ was a levy on the English counties to finance the building and maintenance of
the Navy. It was treated as a payment for service rather than as a tax and went directly to the
Treasurer of the Navy, not to the Exchequer. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of
Britain, Volume One 660-1649, p. 382.
64 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 260.
65 Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, Volume One 660-1649, p. 384.
66 Semple, ‘Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea’ Geographical Review, pp. 149-50.
67 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, Penguin,
Allen Lane, London, 2004, p. 162.
68 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, p. 232.
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poor performance by British Customs officers in North America.69 The Caribbean Sea
was also a centre of piracy against the Spanish trade in the 17th century.70

The constabulary tasks of the RN diminished during the intensely warlike 18th
century.71 A navy’s capacity for constabulary work during wartime diminished
markedly, because of the demands of more important military tasking. Conversely,
depending on the nature and scale of the conflict, the constabulary task can reduce as
illegal activities become more difficult to carry out. Nevertheless, the inability of a navy
to respond to constabulary tasking during a conflict adds to the argument for coast
guards dedicated to the constabulary task in war or peace.

Towards the end of the 18th century, constabulary operations were needed in the newly
independent United States of America (USA). The US Revenue Cutter Service, within
the Department of the Treasury,72 was to collect tariffs and tonnage duties associated
with maritime trade; the only taxes collected in the first five years under the US
Constitution.73 From the outset, the Revenue Cutter Service dealt with more than
revenue collection74 and has always had a dual character; acting when needed as an
adjunct to the USN.

After the French declaration of war against Britain on 1 February 1793 the USA
declared its neutrality. France ignored this and sent privateers from Charleston and
Philadelphia to seize British and Spanish prizes - often within three miles of the
American coast. At the time, the Revenue Cutter Service operated the only armed ships
in US Government Service but was unable to prevent the French activities.75 Thus, the
Irving H. King, George Washington’s Coast Guard, Origins of the U.S. Revenue Service 1789-1801,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1978, pp. 107-8.
70 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, p. 62.
71 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 21. Confirmation of Fulton’s point can be gained by
reference to chapters 11, 15-18, 21-23, 28 and 30 of Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval
History of Britain, 1649-1815.
72 Irving H. King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789 - 1865, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1989, pp. 2 and 5.
73 King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789 - 1865, p. 29.
74 On 12 April 1792 the Treasury Department was given authority to fix and maintain floating
aids to navigation, a responsibility which was handled in part by the Collector of Customs and
thus by the Revenue Cutter Service–which also undertook charting of coastal waters. Irving H.
King, George Washington’s Coast Guard, Origins of the U.S. Revenue Service 1789-1801, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD., 1978, pp. 112-4.
75 King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789 - 1865, pp. 20-1.
69

80

USA began with an organization other than the navy conducting law enforcement
operations at sea.76 The USN also had a dual character, especially in its early years. Yet,
the Navy was not comfortable with constabulary tasking; a diversion from its primary
peacetime task of preparing for war. Similarly the Revenue Cutter Service entered the
19th century with its primary role of collecting revenue, but with other challenges.

Piracy in the Gulf of Mexico, centred on New Orleans continued, despite the efforts of
the Revenue Cutter Service, into the War of 1812.77 In 1818, the Baltimore Collector of
Customs asked for a bigger cutter, or a USN vessel, to deal with the smuggling in
Chesapeake Bay. He indicated a preference for a cutter ‘ … as the service is not relished
by the officers of the Navy…’.78 This theme emerges at times, both with navies that do
constabulary work infrequently and with those for whom it is a permanent task.
Whatever the nature of the constabulary work, it is seen as a distraction from the need
to train for the primary military function. Yet the USN was again drawn in to assist the
Revenue Cutter Service, with President Monroe’s direction in 1819 that it protect US
commerce and punish piracy, and with the establishment in 1822 of a West Indies
Squadron to counter piracy and smuggling.79

The RN re-engaged in anti-piracy work during the 19th century, specifically in Asian
waters. Operations began in the Strait of Malacca in 183480 and continued to the
1870s.81 Operations were conducted in waters around the British Straits Settlements to
establish good order at sea. In 1843 Borneo was included in an attempt to eradicate
piracy at its source.82 From the 1840s to the 1860s the RN also conducted anti-piracy
operations in Chinese waters, notably around Hong Kong.83 As Hong Kong was a

The United States Navy did not formally come into existence until 1793, when it was
authorized in response to the capture of 11 merchantmen by Barbary pirates in the Autumn of
that year–the latest of several such incidents. Robert Greenhalgh Albion, ed. Rowena Reed,
Makers of Naval Policy 1789-1947, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1980, p. 181.
77 King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789- 1865, p. 46.
78 King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789 - 1865, p. 66.
79 King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789 - 1865, p. 65.
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Crown Colony84 Britain took responsibility for security and those anti-piracy
operations in Hong Kong waters became constabulary tasks.85 With respect to the socalled ‘treaty ports’ British warships were ‘ … employed at those ports as a maritime
police…and (were) practically unavailable for any other service on the station’.86

Modern Times
Little was written about piracy from the late 19th century until after the Second World
War, suggesting that the incidence of piracy was not high. The Harvard Law School
confirmed that in a report on piracy for the League of Nations in 1932, which noted
that:
… large scale piracy disappeared long ago and any piracy of any sort on or over
the high sea(s) is sporadic except in limited areas bordered by states without
the naval forces to combat it.87
Piracy reappeared after the Second World War, with for example, the RN conducting
small-scale anti-piracy operations near Aden late in 1953.88 In a speech on ‘The Role of
the Royal Navy’ in January 1954, Admiral the Earl Mountbatten, Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean, also referred to the RN’s policing role. It was secondary to the RN’s
main effort at that time; remaining relevant in the emerging world order, in which
Britain’s role was declining.89 The 1958 Defence White Paper failed to mention the
constabulary function as an RN role, beyond a very general statement on ‘the
maintenance of peace and security’.90
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Piracy also re-emerged in the 1960s, in the waters off the British Protectorate of Brunei
and elsewhere in Asian waters.91 This piracy was associated with de-colonization and
unevenly growing economies, and the opportunities for piracy they presented.92
Initially small scale and non-violent, by the 1980s violence had increased93 and the
Strait of Malacca became a major piracy focal point. Between 1981 and 1987, one third
of all piracy attacks in the world occurred in the Strait.94 In July 2005, Lloyd’s Joint War
Committee declared the Strait of Malacca, along with 20 other places, a war risk
because of piracy.95

Piracy has also spread to West Africa, beginning in the 1980s, with large gangs
operating against container traffic.96 Since then the focus of activity has spread from the
Niger Delta to encompass a much broader area, with oil trade most at risk.97 Most
recently, piracy has emerged in East African waters, mainly off Somalia. Between
March and November 2005, for example, 32 vessels were attacked off the Somali
coast.98 Somali piracy differs from the Southeast Asian variety in that much occurs far
offshore, as in the case of the cruise ship Seabourn Spirit, attacked 100nm off the coast in
November 2005.99 Piracy off the Horn of Africa, including holding ships and their
crews for ransom, generated a strong multi-national naval response, which has largely
succeeded and remained in place at the end of 2012.100 In other regions, piracy remains
mainly a coastal phenomenon.101
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The naval response to piracy over the last half century has varied. In Southeast Asia
most navies remain limited in operational and seagoing capability. Some lack the
desire to engage pirates, who are often better armed.102 Nevertheless, the scale of
Southeast Asian piracy and international pressure to act, have generated cooperation
among the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Beginning in July 2004,
Operation Malsindo introduced coordinated patrols of the Strait of Malacca, though
with little early impact.103 The operation has since evolved into the Malacca Straits
Security Initiative, involving surface and air patrolling.104 While there had been a
reduction in piracy in the Strait of Malacca from 2005,105 it emerged again in Southeast
Asian waters more recently.106

The East African story is less happy. Somalia is currently a barely functioning state,
with minimal capacity for offshore security. Its navy was founded in 1965 with Soviet
help, as a coastal and inshore patrol force.107 Reflecting the wretched state of the
country, the Navy has not been operational since 1991.108 In November 2006, however,
the Somali Transitional Federal Government awarded a $US50m two-year contract to a
US company, Topcat Marine Security.109 In return, the company was to create a small
Somali coast guard to help fight piracy, but in an environment in which the company’s
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own security could not be guaranteed.110 The USN and other navies have also become
involved in anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast.111
OCEAN RESOURCE PROTECTION
Introduction
The sea has long been a source of food112 and from about 300 BC, the resources
protection task for navies appeared in the form of fisheries protection in Indian
waters.113 Since then, fisheries protection has been a constabulary task throughout the
world’s oceans. In the 20th century, the resource protection task has grown to include
protection of oil and gas platforms and associated facilities.114 The value of these
resources and increasingly their scarcity, caused coastal states to claim ownership of
offshore resources and to husband them. Before maritime zones, such as territorial
seas, became generally accepted115 these claims depended entirely on the ability of
States to defend them. In this respect, Selden noted that coastal fish stocks were not
inexhaustible and that the coastal State had first call on them.116

Even when fish were plentiful, they were considered valuable. This meant that naval
forces were involved in protecting local fishing grounds from foreign fishing.117 More
recently, other organizations, such as coast-guards, have become involved. The need
for resource protection has not been as well documented historically as the need to
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counter piracy. This is partly because fish stocks were plentiful in early times, when
world population was much lower and the demand for fish accordingly lower.118
Today the need for offshore resource protection is broader and of greater economic
significance. Fish stocks are under threat in many of the world’s oceans, both from
increasing demand and the growing capacity to harvest fish stocks.119 The nature of the
resource protection task has also changed, with the development of offshore oil and
gas fields. In this case the predominant threats are believed to be terrorism or other
armed attack against installations, and poor navigation by shipping with the potential
for collision with installations.120

Fisheries Protection – Early Experience
Unsurprisingly, much of the relevant history is quite recent. For example, in 15 th
century northern Europe, despite the plentiful fish stocks, protection of local fisheries
became a problem. Rodger suggests that in 1481, an English fisheries protection
squadron was formed to guard East Anglian fishermen against Scottish raids.121 He
also notes that for centuries Scots kings had imposed fees on foreign fishers for fishing
licenses.122

A survey of the RN’s capabilities in 1559 led to a plan for 24 warships and two
pinnaces, based on the provision of coastal defence and the protection of commerce
and fisheries.123 The local waters element of fisheries protection would have been
constabulary work. The Navy was financed by taxing all foreign fishing in English
waters. The imposition of this tax illustrates the extent of foreign fishing in English
waters, and the corresponding need to have in the Navy a means of enforcing the tax.
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In 1609 James proclaimed fisheries along the British and Irish coasts in which
unlicensed foreign fishing was prohibited.124 This was aimed at the Dutch herring
fishery and presaged a long-running and often acrimonious dispute which eventually
led to war. It can also be seen as the real beginning of British pretensions to command
of the sea.125 At this time, the Dutch fishing industry was much bigger than the English
one and operated close inshore on the English and Scottish coasts. The Dutch industry
earned about £1 million per year and employed some half a million people.126

Early in the 17th century, pirates operating in English waters made life difficult for local
fishermen, such that in the early 1630s Yarmouth fishermen, among others, refused to
go to sea.127 For some time there was little effective naval response. Eventually Charles
I introduced the so-called ‘ship money’ fleets in 1635. The logic was that all ships
attacked in the narrow seas could seek the King’s protection; enabling him to extend
the concept of the sovereignty of the sea. The fleets also conducted anti-tobacco
smuggling patrols for the customs organization.128 Characteristically for the period,
when the first ‘ship money’ fleet Admiral, the Earl of Lindsey, asked for a
determination of the King’s seas, he was told that they were ‘all round’.129 Such
vagueness contributed to the first ‘ship money’ fleet achieving little.

At the end of 1635 the second ‘ship money’ fleet was established with 24 ships to guard
the narrow seas, and 10 ships in reserve. Reputed to be the most powerful English fleet
yet, one of its duties was to suppress unlicensed fishing on British coasts.130 The
appearance of this fleet coincided with the publication of John Selden’s Mare Clausum
in December 1635. The fleet, under the Earl of Northumberland, succeeded in imposing
licenses on Dutch herring fishermen, although with Dutch reservations. Dutch men-ofwar were sent to protect their fishermen but did not perform very well.131 By the time
the third ‘ship money’ fleet assembled in April and May 1637, Charles was less certain
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about their use. His desire to enforce sovereignty claims, conflicted with his desire to
avoid outright conflict with the Dutch and French.132

Subsequent ‘ship money’ fleets in 1637 and 1638 achieved little, with the 1637 fleet
failing to issue licenses to a large Dutch fishing fleet when confronted by 23 Dutch
men-of-war. By contrast, the 1638 fleet intercepted shipments of arms bound from
Rotterdam and Bremen to Scotland.133 Nevertheless, the Dutch continued to fish off the
English coast, and increasingly Charles was no longer sovereign of even his own seas.

Cromwell applied similar rules to Dutch fishermen, requiring, for example, that their
ships submit to visit and search and that their fishing boats take licenses for operations
in English waters. On 26 June 1652, Blake, with about 60 ships, was sent to Scottish
waters to stop the Dutch herring fishery and intercept homebound East-Indiamen.
Although he dealt severely with the escorting warships, many of the herring busses 134
reached Holland – to return in 1653 with additional escorts.135

The First English-Dutch War, which began in 1652, was fought mainly over striking the
flag in English waters and English rights to visit and search at sea. There was also an
underlying element of commercial rivalry focused on the North Sea herring fishery.136
After the restoration, Charles II (1660-1685) tried unsuccessfully, to insist on licenses
for foreign fishing in English waters.137 Thus, not all constabulary operations were
successful and political imperatives could prevent effective naval constabulary action.

At the end of the 18th century in the newly independent USA, development of the USN
reacted to a perceived need for constabulary operations. In 1798, with France attacking
American commerce, Secretary of War McHenry asked Congress how the government
could ‘ … preserve character abroad, esteem for the Government at home, safety to our
sea property and protection to our territory and sovereignty’? He recommended
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adding 26 ships to the Navy ‘ … to serve as convoys, (and) protect our fisheries, coasts
and harbours’.138 Later, in 1807, Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith asked Congress to
fund an additional 188 gunboats, some to be kept in reserve. Those in active service
were to be ‘a police force to maintain order and discourage insults by visiting
warships.’139

Resource Protection – Legal Limits
In the 19th century, while the RN was engaged in anti-slavery work off the African
coast, there was constabulary work closer to home. Some of it was done by the Coast
Guard formed in January 1822. During the 1840s, the Coast Guard with 76 cutters
undertook fishery protection tasks off the Scottish coast.140 Thus, despite its great
overall strength, the RN did not monopolize constabulary work and while the Coast
Guard concentrated on customs-related work the RN assisted in other operations.

Renewed moves in the 19th century extended control of coastal waters to protect
fisheries. In 1824 and 1827, for example, the Dutch government decreed that their
fishermen could not operate within six miles of the British coast.

141

Subsequently, an

1839 British-French Treaty established a limit of three miles from the British coast for
French fishermen.142 Through the 1892 North Sea Convention, seven European
countries accepted a three mile limit for fishing off the British coast.143 In the mid- 19th
century, the Russian Navy applied the three mile limit from the shores of RussianAmerica (now Alaska) and in parts of the Pacific-Russian coast.144 Broader fishing
zones were sought by some coastal states, primarily because developments in fishing
technology allowed longer voyages. With a fishing fleet about seven times larger than
that of all other countries combined, Britain strongly favoured narrow fishing zones.145
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These developments preceded greater activity in the 20th century as the demand for
fish grew, along with the desire to protect ‘national’ fishing grounds. Consequently,
navies and coast guards became more involved in regulating foreign fishing craft
operating in their waters. Early in the 20th century, for example the US Coast Guard
continued a broad range of constabulary operations, including the protection of marine
species.146 More significantly, the beginning of offshore oil exploitation in 1947,147
together with growing threats to coastal fisheries by distant water fishing states,
caused disputes between coastal states protecting their economic interests with wider
zones and the maritime powers trying to maintain the status quo.148

Fishery protection became a low key task for the RN after the Second World War. It
began with reconstitution of the Fisheries Protection Squadron, initially with just a few
frigates and smaller vessels. The frigates protected British trawlers fishing off Norway
and Iceland, where ‘rights’ were sometimes disputed.149 In 1958, for example, Iceland
declared a 12 mile fishing zone,150 and the British responded by sending RN ships to
protect its trawlers operating in that zone. The British claimed that the Icelandic action
interfered with freedom of the seas.151 This, the first of the ‘Cod Wars’ lasted over a
year, before Britain conceded many of Iceland’s claims.

Britain extended its exclusive fishing zone to 12 miles in September 1964, thereby
increasing pressure on the Fishery Protection Squadron. Subsequently, the second and
third ‘Cod Wars’ erupted in 1973 and 1975-6 and saw RN frigates and destroyers being
roughly treated by Icelandic gunboats, and British fishing rights being further
eroded.152 The sturdily built Icelandic Coast Guard gunboats were better able to
withstand physical encounters and the RN warships were severely constrained in the
Irving H. King, The Coast Guard Expands 1865-1915: New Roles, New Frontiers, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1996, p. 150.
147 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, Simon and Schuster, New
York, NY., 1991, p. 429.
148 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 232
149 Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War Two, p. 330.
150 This was subsequently extended to 200 miles in mid-1975. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British
Naval Policy Since World War Two, p. 332.
151 J. R. Hill, ‘The Realities of Medium Maritime Power, 1946 to the Present’, in Hill, ed., The
Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, p. 390.
152 Hill, ‘The Realities of Medium Maritime Power, 1946 to the Present,’ in Hill, ed., The Oxford
Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, p. 393.
146

90

use of main armament.153 Britain responded by declaring a 200 mile fishing zone in
December 1976 and introduced several new offshore patrol vessels.154

The ‘Cod Wars’ involved constabulary operations by the Icelandic forces and military
operations by the RN and highlighted the advantage held by the ‘home’ side in
defending sovereign rights against maritime states with tightly constrained rules of
engagement. Rules of engagement were the key to these struggles, as the RN would
have prevailed if allowed less constrained use of force.

Hill maintains that experiences such as the Cod Wars illustrated that maintaining good
order at sea was facing increasing complexity; including sophisticated international
fishing efforts, the beginnings of the exploitation of undersea oil and gas, control of
ship-sourced pollution from tanker accidents and gun-running associated with Irish
Republican Army operations in Northern Ireland.155 He also noted that these problems
occupied many of the RN’s ‘small ships’ and led to the misemployment of large
ones.156 At the beginning of the 21st century the RAN also had to use major surface
combatants for constabulary tasks, leading to some criticism of the inefficient use of
highly trained crews and expensive ships for policing tasks.157 Yet, the RAN leadership
at the time acknowledged that constabulary work was an intrinsic element of the
Navy’s role.158 In the Cod Wars, however, whatever ships Britain assigned to the task
would not have brought success, without the political will to overcome forcibly the
Icelandic Coast Guard.

A dramatic worsening of Britain’s economic position in the mid-1970s led to
substantial public spending cuts, which included the Services. Cuts to the RN’s
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support and ammunition stocks impacted on readiness at a time when protection of
the ‘offshore estate’ was becoming more important.159 Major oil and gas fields were
opening up in the North Sea and fisheries were increasingly under national control.
Even with a long history of RN involvement, offshore protective duties had never been
central concerns.160

Although that remains the case, the RN still contributes significantly to Britain’s
offshore constabulary task.161 For example, the Fishery Protection Squadron comprises
10 vessels, operates throughout the British EEZ and in recent years has conducted
annually around 1,500 boardings of foreign fishing vessels.162 The Squadron is also
involved in protection of the North Sea oil and gas platforms and is supplemented for
local and offshore protective operations by the Gibraltar and Cyprus Squadrons.163 The
Squadron also patrols the Falklands Islands fishing zone.164

The USA experienced challenges with the growth of the fishery conservation task
through the 1960s. It involved the Coast Guard countering the expanding efforts of
Japanese and Russian fishing fleets in Alaskan waters, and patrolling in the Florida
Straits against illegal Cuban fishing.165 The latter task grew with the extension of US
fishing jurisdiction to 12 miles in October 1966.166 Military readiness was also tested,
with the Coast Guard Commandant of that time successfully arguing for the service to
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participate in the Vietnam War: both smaller patrol craft and the large cutters
deployed. Despite the heightened security situation in the US following the September
2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard also deployed for military tasking in Operation
Enduring Freedom against Iraq.167

These instances of the US Coast Guard undertaking military operations are
revealing.168 The nation with the world’s largest and most capable navy has on several
occasions in the last half century called on its coast guard to assist with foreign military
operations.169 Yet, the US Coast Guard, the largest and most capable in the world and
larger than many navies, has also called on the USN to assist with constabulary
operations in the distant and recent past.170 For the constabulary function, even the
largest and most capable coast guard still needs naval assistance, and in turn the US
Coast Guard cannot always avoid involvement in military operations. Consequently,
where navies exist alongside coast guards, they cannot expect entirely to avoid
constabulary work.

Resources Protection – Under the Law of the Sea Convention
The offshore protection task expanded significantly with the introduction of the 1982
LOSC, which provided inter alia a comprehensive regime of maritime zones and

YN 1 Thomas Heavey, USCGR, ‘A report from Iraq’, in Coast Guard Reservist Magazine, Vol.,
L, No. 3, May-June 2003. <www.uscg.mil/history/OIF_USCGR_Article.html> (6 February
2008).
168 In saying that, there is a need to recognize that the Coast Guard does have mandated military
responsibilities, through a 1995 agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and
Transportation which allocated the Coast Guard five specific national defence missions. Coast
Guard Publication 1- U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian, Washington DC., 1 January
2002, p. 12.
169 Military operations in which the Coast Guard has participated since 1975 include; Grenada in
1983, Panama in 1989, The Gulf War in 1990-91, Kosovo in 1999 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003. ‘The Coast Guard at War’, Coast Guard History, U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office,
Washington, DC., 2007. <http://www.uscg.mil/history/> (7 February 2008).
170 The first such occasion was the use of the USN in 1808 to assist the Revenue Cutter Service in
maintaining an embargo against US merchant ships trading internationally. King, The Coast
Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789-1865, p. 46. More recently, during the 1980s the
USN contributed E-2C early warning aircraft, S-3 and P-3 patrol aircraft and surface ship
patrols on both coasts, to assist with drug interdiction. Charles M Fuss Jr., Sea of Grass: The
Maritime Drug War 1970-1990, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD., 1996, p. 175. These
patrols are still taking place. ‘USS Rentz Arrives in 4th Fleet to Conduct Counter Drug
Operations and UNITAS’, America’s Navy, 7 August 2013,
<http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75826> (13 December 2013).
167

93

associated regulations. The LOSC established the EEZ, an area beyond and adjacent to
the territorial sea and extending no more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines
used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea.171 Within its EEZ a coastal state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superadjacent to the
sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil.172

Within the EEZ, a coastal state must determine the allowable catch of the living
resources and must ensure that over-exploitation of these resources does not endanger
stocks. Coastal states must also promote optimum use of the living resources in the
EEZ and where they cannot harvest the entire allowable catch they must give other
states access to the surplus.173 Where nationals of other states fish in an EEZ they must
comply with the relevant laws and regulations of the coastal state.174

The need to protect maritime resources is gaining global acceptance. In 1995, for
example, the Chinese Premier, Li Peng, declared that the Chinese Army had to
strengthen its air and naval capabilities to ‘ … safeguard the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the motherland and our maritime rights and interests’.175 This statement
reflected the robust approach that China has taken towards its maritime claims in the
South China Sea. In 1992, China announced formal claims to both the Spratly and
Paracel Islands and to all sea-bed resources lying in adjacent areas of the South China
Sea.176 Then, in addition to awarding drilling concessions to Western firms off the
Vietnamese coast, China deployed its navy to protect their operations.177

These activities occurred in contested waters; various parts of the South China Sea
being claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, and virtually
all of it by China.178 Chinese activities have also led to significant disagreements and
United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. 18.
United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. 18.
173 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pp. 20-1.
174 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. 21.
175 Michael T, Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, Metropolitan Books
Henry Holt and Co., New York, NY, 2001, p. 11.
176 Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, p. 116.
177 Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, p. 123.
178 Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, pp. 118-9. Hanns J. Buchholz, Law of
the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1987, p. 30.
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minor naval clashes as claimants have tried to establish or maintain their sovereign
rights.179 Despite the importance of oil and gas, most armed clashes in the South China
Sea have involved the pursuit of illegal fishing activities.180 Responding to similar
difficulties in the Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam and Thailand reached an agreement,
signed in June 1999, to mount joint naval patrols against illegal fishing.181

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea especially, continue to be the focus of
maritime boundary disputes made more prominent because of competition for access
to oil, gas and fish. The common factor in disputes is China’s extensive but not clearly
articulated claim to the South China Sea and its islands and reefs, based on the ‘nine
dash line’ map.182 There is also evidence of recent escalation in Chinese pressure since
Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012.

183

Vietnam and the Philippines have expressed the strongest opposition to China’s
claims, but neither has been able to counter China’s growing use of coastguard-like
forces to enforce its claims.184

In East Asia the quest for offshore resources and the uncertainty over maritime
boundaries has led to increasing involvement by regional navies in constabulary work
and to growing tensions, especially between China and Japan in the East China Sea.185
Table 3-1 below outlines numerical changes to nine East Asian navies and coast guards
over the last two decades. The figures are limited to vessels capable of open ocean
operations - no smaller than corvettes - and thus defence of EEZ sovereign rights. All of
the forces have experienced some force structure growth, primarily in frigate and
corvette strength, reflecting an increasing interest in maritime security.

Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, pp. 125-6. This example refers to
the dispute between China and the Philippines over Mischief Reef in 1995–which has yet to be
resolved.
180 Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, pp. 122-3.
181 ‘Asia Pacific, In Brief–Thailand, Vietnam to Launch Patrols’, in Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol.,
029, Issue 023, 10 June 1998,:
<http://intranet.defence.gov.au/jrl/janes/jdw98/jdw98/jdw01950.htm> (21 September 2005).
182 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, ‘The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status,
Implications’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, No. 1, January 2013, p. 98.
183 Alexander Nicoll, ed., Strategic Survey 2013: The Annual Review of World Affairs, Routledge,
Abingdon, Oxon, 2013, p. 356.
184 Nicoll, ed., Strategic Survey 2013: The Annual Review of World Affairs, p. 357.
185 Nicoll, ed., Strategic Survey 2013: The Annual Review of World Affairs, pp. 322-3.
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Country

Year
1989/90

2012

51

76

17

30

43
34

32
60

4

14

-

3

6

12

9
31

8
46

26
4

4
73

9

30

CHINA
Destroyers/Frigates
INDONESIA
Frigates/Corvettes
JAPAN
Cruisers/Destroyers
Frigates/Corvettes
MALAYSIA
Frigates/Corvettes
PHILIPPINES
Frigates/Corvettes
SINGAPORE
Frigates/Corvettes
SOUTH KOREA
Cruisers/Destroyers
Frigates/Corvettes
TAIWAN
Cruisers/Destroyers
Frigates/Corvettes
VIETNAM
Frigates/Corvettes

Table 3-1: A Comparison of East Asian Surface Combatants186
Coast guards and a range of other marine policing forces have emerged in East Asia.
As non-naval organizations, their employment relieves navies from some or all of the
constabulary function, and may limit the potential for conflict. Their capabilities vary
greatly, from port security to offshore patrolling and most of them comprise a mix of
small and large patrol craft, as well as more capable offshore patrol vessels. Table 3-2
illustrates the strength, in 2012, of the various inshore patrol forces in each of the nine
countries listed in Table 3-1 above.

The information in the tables is taken from; Captain Richard Sharpe RN, ed., Jane’s Fighting
Ships 1989-90, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 1989 and Commodore Stephen
Saunders RN, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey,
2005. See also, James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 2013, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2013,
pp. 286-337.
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Country
Patrol Craft Strength
China
582
Indonesia
173
Japan
362
Malaysia
84
Philippines
61
Singapore
99
South Korea
50
Taiwan
136
Vietnam
32
Table 3-2: East Asian Coast Guard and Marine Police Forces187
Reflecting the rising importance of both living and non-living maritime resources and
the need to secure them, Russia published a new military doctrine in April 2000.
Among the functions allotted to the Navy, was ‘ … creation of the conditions for the
security of economic activity and the protection of the Russian Federation’s national
interests in the territorial sea, on the continental shelf and in the exclusive (offshore)
economic zone of the Russian Federation and on the high seas’.188

The Pacific Ocean provides an excellent example of resource protection involving
navies or other maritime forces. The Western and Central Pacific Ocean supports the
largest tuna fishery in the world; some 60 per cent of the total annual catch.189 Most
fishing is done by distant water fishing nations, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
and the USA and most of the catch is being taken in national zones.190

Many Pacific island States had no capacity to monitor fishing in their extensive EEZs
until the provision of patrol boats under the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat project.
Under this project 22 patrol boats were provided to 12 States from 1987 to 1997.191 They
are operated by agencies including the navies of Fiji and Papua New Guinea and the

Hackett, ed., The Military Balance 2013, pp. 286-333.
Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, p. 11.
189 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forests, <http://www.daff.gov.au/fisheries/international/wcpfc> (17 October 2013).
190 Satish Chand, Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: Management and Cooperation in the Western
and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries, School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National
University, Canberra, 2003, p. 3. <https://crawford.anu.edu/pdf/staff/satish_chand> (17
October 2013).
191 Anthony Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation,
Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National
University, Canberra, 1994, p. 15.
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police forces of the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. In many cases they are the only
surveillance and enforcement capacity available to the Pacific island states and are
used extensively to counter illegal fishing, violation of fishing license conditions and to
monitor catch reporting.192 For most of the States operating the Pacific Patrol Boats,
resource protection is their major security challenge.

Since 2008 the US Coast Guard has instituted bilateral ‘shiprider’ programs with nine
Pacific Island Countries. The programs enable enforcement officials of the Pacific
Island Countries to embark in Coast Guard cutters for patrols of their EEZs and to
enforce their laws in those zones. In 2011, over 40 boardings were conducted, with 82
per cent of the fishing vessels found to be compliant with their licence conditions.193

MARITIME BORDER PROTECTION
Introduction
Protecting a nation’s maritime borders presents different challenges to protecting land
borders. In the latter case sovereignty is always an issue but with maritime borders
both sovereign rights and sovereignty can be challenged. Challenges to sovereign
rights occur outside territorial waters, within the EEZ and within the continental shelf
extension. They can be manifested in various ways, including piracy and illegal
fishing194 as well as violations of quarantine regulations, illegal people and cargo
movement, smuggling and terrorism.

Border Protection - Early Experience
Some of the earliest recorded examples of border protection in support of fiscal
regulation involved the Roman Navy. In the 1st and 2nd centuries CE the Roman
Empire had squadrons based in several locations; some of them involved in
constabulary operations. The Alexandria squadron, for example, enforced the strict

Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, p. 35.
U.S. Coast Guard Partnering in Oceania, <https://community.apan.org> (22 October 2013).
194 Piracy and illegal fishing have been covered separately in the chapter because historically
they have been the most significant constabulary tasks.
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regulations of that port and the other Nile exits.195 A separate force, the potamophylacia,
exercised police and fiscal supervision and levied tolls over the Nile and other
waterways.196

Extending into the 3rd century CE, Roman naval squadrons operated along the Danube
and Rhine rivers, performing border protection and assisting fiscal agencies by
collecting tolls.197 The Danube squadron may also have controlled navigation on the
river and excluded the barbarians from it.198 Anand claims that a maritime customs
service existed in China from the 8th century CE and suggests similar arrangements
may have existed in Indian and Southeast Asian waters in the 7th century CE.199

Much later in England, officers were appointed by Henry III (1216-1272) and other
monarchs as warders, keepers and guardians of the sea and coasts and as governors
and captains of the Navy - Admirals from the 13th century.200 In that era, there is little
evidence to show whether England prohibited navigation or fishing or imposed dues
and conditions for the privilege of doing so; whereas other States like Venice and
Denmark did so.201 By 1275, England and the Continent were engaging in a significant
wool trade which attracted customs dues.202 While the Navy had a role in ensuring
such dues were paid, by late in the 14th century its decay under the rule of Edward III
(1327-1377) meant that England was unable to exercise good order at sea.203

Border protection - anti-smuggling operations
Although the ‘ship-money’ fleets undertook constabulary work for the customs
organization, specifically to prevent tobacco smuggling, the Navy did not retain sole
responsibility for matters such as combating illicit trade. The first mention of Customs’
‘smacks’ or small craft, came in 1661, with the reported seizure of mercury and other

Starr, Jr., The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. – A.D. 324 p. 112.
Starr, Jr., The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. – A.D. 324, pp. 112-13.
197 Starr, Jr., The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. – A.D. 324, pp. 124-5.
198 Starr, Jr., The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. – A.D. 324 , p. 137.
199 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, pp. 20-1.
200 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 31.
201 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 33.
202 Loades, England’s Maritime Empire Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690, p. 15.
203 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 33.
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medicinally-related drugs.204 By 1685 there were 10 such smacks operating from at least
nine ports, including London, Dover and Southampton. There was also an excise
service with its own craft, which remained separate from the Customs until 1809.205 In
the 1690s there was an increase in import duties of all kinds to finance William III’s
wars against France.206

Then and later, there was a direct relationship between the level of duties and the level
of smuggling. An Act of Parliament was passed in 1696 directing the RN to provide
eight frigates and sloops to challenge wool smugglers.207 This was the first recorded
official RN cooperation with Customs to prevent smuggling.208 The emergence of the
Customs craft was an acknowledgment that aspects of the constabulary function, such
as revenue collection, were best allocated to a dedicated organization.

The Wool Act 1698 led to creation of a ‘Landguard’ supplementing the work of the socalled ‘Waterguard’, because of mounting concerns over illicit activities at sea.209 From
August of that year, for the first time, revenue cutters were deployed to cover the
entire English and Welsh coasts. This marked the true foundation of the Revenue
Cutter Service in Britain, with its 21 cutters and a new centralized administration.210 In
a reaction that has more recent echoes, some politicians doubted the value of the
Service and argued that the Navy should be responsible for the work. Because the
Navy was chronically short of people, also like today, in 1702 all of the customs sloop
crews were to be transferred to the RN; but it was only partly implemented.211 The
resulting situation formalized the existence in Britain of at least two organizations with
offshore constabulary responsibilities; the RN and the coast guard-like Revenue Cutter
Service.

Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 11.
Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 16. The date
shown in the book is 1909, but later reference confirms that it should have been 1809.
206 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 20.
207 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 20.
208 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 20.
209 The ‘Landguard’ comprised about 50 officers located on the south coast and tasked with
monitoring the movement on land of wool clips. It was supported by a re-established
‘Waterguard’ based on seven south coast ports. Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the
War Against Smuggling, pp. 20-1.
210 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 23.
211 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 24.
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Further attempts by the British to assert sovereign rights at sea included the Hovering
Acts passed in 1736 and later. These Acts allowed for the seizure of vessels destined for
British ports and carrying specified cargoes, at distances of up to four, eight and in one
case, 100 leagues.212 The Acts were repealed in 1876 because of a fear that a 12 nautical
mile customs zone might become a territorial sea too wide to patrol.213 That apart, the
constabulary tasks of the RN became less important during the 18th century which was
a period of almost constant naval wars.214

Reliance on a navy for constabulary tasks has the attendant drawback that during
wartime, the navy will be focused on combat-related operational matters. The need for
the constabulary task and especially the revenue raising element, may remain or even
increase in importance in wartime, but the capacity to meet the task will diminish.

The years 1720 to 1820 were possibly the zenith of smuggling in Britain and a period
when the authorities appeared sometimes to lose control.215 For example, in 1734,
54,000 lbs of tea and 123,000 gallons of brandy were seized on the Sussex, Kent and
Essex coasts - perhaps one fifth of the amounts successfully landed.216 The tension
between the needs of the RN during war and the need to control illicit maritime
activities continued to emerge. In 1744, there were 24 Revenue Cutter Service vessels
around the British coast and many of them were transferred temporarily to the RN.
Those not transferred were mainly quarantine vessels, because of the fear of a plague
outbreak.217

By the late 18th century the revenue services had expanded their forces and graduated
to newer and bigger craft, although they were still smaller and less well armed than the
smugglers.218 By 1783, the Excise Service had six cutters and by 1790 the Customs

A league, at sea, is generally taken to be three nautical miles; more accurately it is 3.18
nautical miles. Kemp, ed., The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, p. 472.
213 Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, p. 141.
214 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, p. 21. Confirmation of Fulton’s point can be gained by
reference to chapters 11, 15-18, 21-23, 28 and 30 of Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval
History of Britain, 1649-1815.
215 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 37.
216 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 38.
217 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, pp. 50-1.
218 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, pp. 67-8.
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Service219 had 40 vessels and an associated £42,000 annual maintenance liability.220 At
this time, Scotland had its own Customs and Excise Services with several vessels, while
the Irish Revenue Board had its own vessels for customs and excise duties. Yet naval
vessels continued to be seconded to anti-smuggling duties, especially in peacetime.
Nevertheless, there was an assessment in 1779 that almost four million gallons of
brandy and five or six million pounds of tea were being smuggled into Britain each
year.221

Relations between the RN and the Customs Service were sometimes poor and there
was particular resentment at the ‘pressing’ of Customs personnel into the Navy.222
Similarly, Customs and Excise men often disputed the right to search apprehended
vessels, But, despite their combined efforts, in the last two decades of the 18th century
smugglers had become so dominant they could supply regular orders for goods.223
Much of the blame fell on ‘lazy cutter officers’ but the real cause was the high level of
duties that made smuggling so attractive.224 This issue and the reform of the archaically
managed Customs Service were taken up in the early decades of the 19th century.225

The reports of a Select Committee in 1789 formed the basis of anti-smuggling policy for
the next 40 years. Among the outcomes were a reduction in the duty on tea and an
increase in the area under jurisdiction at sea from two to four leagues.226 Customs also
ceased its long-standing practice of engaging vessels under contract, such that by 1789
the Service comprised 30 vessels, all directly controlled by the Customs Board. The
Napoleonic wars, beginning in 1793 once again saw the Revenue Services lose many
good men to the RN. Many of the cutters also helped the Navy in patrolling and
carrying dispatches.227 This demonstrates that in wartime, however necessary

By way of clarification, Customs and Excise remained separate organizations until 1909 and
their seagoing elements were known as the ‘Waterguard.’ Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue
Service and the War Against Smuggling, pp. 8 and 16.
220 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, pp. 53-4.
221 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 75.
222 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 56.
223 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 69.
224 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 71.
225 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 71.
226 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 77.
227 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, pp. 94 and 96.
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constabulary tasks are, they will be subject to overriding military priorities, even where
dedicated constabulary organizations exist.

From 1810, reorganizations put the revenue services on a different footing which
significantly curbed the smuggling trade. In 1810, the Customs and Excise Services
were combined and called the Preventive Waterguard.228 Shortly after the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, the Treasury put the Waterguard under the command of a senior
naval officer and transferred the cutters to Admiralty control.229 This was accompanied
by yet another reorganization, leading to a more professional service, but one that
lacked the previous espirit de corps. One reason for this was the ambivalence with which
junior naval officers approached duty in the cutters.230

There was still dissatisfaction with the Waterguard performance, including a perceived
lack of coordinated effort and overall strategy.231 The Prince Regent appointed a
committee which recommended returning the Preventive Waterguard to Customs
control, but with the Admiralty directing the nomination and promotion of all
personnel. The committee also led to the formal establishment of the Coast Guard on
15 January 1822, effectively as an adjunct to the RN.232 The impact was immediate. In
its first year, the Coast Guard seized over one million gallons of spirits, over 22 million
pounds of tea and over 11 million pounds of tobacco.233 Uncertainty over navigation
and boundaries were major impediments to gaining convictions against smugglers;
seizure of goods and vessels notwithstanding.234

Border Protection – Anti-slaving Operations
The RN’s constabulary work took another turn early in the 19th century, with the
enactment on 25 March 1807, of legislation abolishing the slave trade. Previously,

Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 104. The
amalgamation came after a decree in 1809. The term Waterguard continued to be used until
1972.
229 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 106.
230 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 108.
231 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 125.
232 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, pp. 125-6.
233 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 127.
234 Smith, King’s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War Against Smuggling, p. 129.
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British ships had carried a large proportion of the slaves from Africa to the Americas.235
At sea enforcing abolition was compromised because only the ships of countries
supporting the British could be boarded, and even they were not always obliging.
After 1822 a boarding party only had to find ‘clear and undeniable proof that slaves
had been on board’ but that was often contested in court.236 The RN itself considered
this work to be ‘ … its most unrewarding, tedious, unhealthy and strenuous task,.. .’237
Disease led to the death of over one quarter of the West African Squadron in 1829.238

Over the first 40 years of the RN’s anti-slaving work only about one eighth of the slaves
were freed, amidst criticism of the cost and effectiveness of the Navy’s African
Squadron efforts. Nevertheless, many slaves were freed in the 1830s, with the numbers
increasing from 1,487 in 1832 to 5,992 in 1836.239 By 1850 the trade had largely ceased
on the west coast of Africa, while the close of the American Civil War ended the trade
from southern Africa.240 A difficult situation on the east coast of Africa, with slaving
dhows often outrunning the Squadron’s sailing vessels, meant that slaving was not
fully curbed there before 1890.241

These anti-slaving operations were effectively constabulary operations. The earliest
were off the east coast of Africa under Captain William Owen. He attempted to
establish a British Protectorate over Mombasa in 1823, but was repudiated by his
government.242 Nevertheless, Owen succeeded in maintaining naval supervision of
Mombasa for two years, during which he left a small garrison in the town and worked

Roger Morris, ‘Endeavour, Discovery and Idealism, 1760 – 1895’, Hill, ed. The Oxford
Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, p. 242.
236 Morris, ‘Endeavour, Discovery and Idealism, 1760 – 1895’, Hill, ed. The Oxford Illustrated
History of the Royal Navy, p. 242.
237 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, MacMillan Press, London, 1976,
rev.ed. 1983, p. 165.
238 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 165.
239 Letter from Rear Admiral Sir Patrick Campbell, Commander-in-Chief Cape of Good Hope
Station to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 28 th of April 1838, in Hattendorf, Knight,. Pearsall,
Rodger and Till, eds., British Naval Documents 1204-1960, p. 626.
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against the slave trade.243 Arguably, Owen was attempting to uphold the 1807 British
Anti-Slavery Laws in waters adjacent to a territory at least nominally under British
protection. Furthermore, the local sultan and some 2,000 British-Indian merchants in
the region relied on British naval protection through the 1830s and 1840s.244

While the operations were not supporting British laws in or near British waters, they
were conducted in support of British laws, where British jurisdiction was exercised and
where there was British support for local rulers. The difficulty in categorizing the
operations is also aggravated by the nature of the British colonizing process. As
Preston noted, for most of the 19th century ‘ … the British Empire was predominantly
an “informal” empire, an empire of influence rather than government’.245

Border Protection – 19th and 20th Century Problems
Constabulary work continued closer to Britain. During the 1840s the Coast Guard had
marked success against smugglers. Success had its own cost, with increasing operating
costs and diminishing smuggling resulting in about one third of the cutters paying off
after 1849. The Coast Guard suffered more losses with the transfer of about 3 000 men
to the Navy at the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854.246 The war highlighted the
RN’s failure adequately to man the Fleet for war and resulted in the Navy
recommending the takeover of the Coast Guard, partly to provide a naval reserve.247
Over Customs Board objections this happened in October 1856, leaving Customs with
virtually no vessels. In the same year Britain, on signing the Declaration of Paris,
agreed to forego its ‘maritime right’ to stop and seize goods in neutral vessels in time
of war.248 Signatories to that agreement also determined to end all forms of statesponsored privateering or seizure of merchant vessels for profit.249

Howell, The Royal Navy and the Slave Trade, p. 8.
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The size and operational scope of the Coast Guard were trimmed in the years prior to
1879 and 1905. The extent of the second of these cuts, which closed 35 stations and left
only six cutters in service, caused concern within the Customs Board.250 There is a
parallel here with the Australian experience in the 1970s and 1980s, when surveillance
and patrol operations increased with the appearance of a ‘threat’, but were reduced as
the threat was countered.251 Both countries seem to have preferred reacting to a threat
than the more expensive option of threat prevention.

By the outbreak of the First World War, the Coast Guard was again a considerable
force and breaking with an unhappy tradition, it took no direct part in this war.
Predictably, it was subject to another review in 1922, which recommended that the
Customs and Excise Board establish its own coast-watching service. The new Coast
Preventive Force would support the Waterguard and carry out the revenue protection
task.252

Although large scale smuggling was minimal by the 1930s, concern grew over the lack
of a substantial maritime presence along the British coast. Smuggling increased greatly
after the Second World War, with high taxes and duties, and rationing spurring the
entrepreneurial spirit. Tobacco, alcohol and nylon stockings were the most favoured
goods and many ex-military personnel engaged in the trade. Neither the Coast
Preventive Service nor the Waterguard could cope and in response, the latter
organization grew by about 50 per cent over the five years to 1950.253

Simultaneously and amidst post-Second World War cutbacks, the RN maintained one
or two frigates in the Persian Gulf to counter ‘ … slavers and other disturbers of law
and order’.254 The RN was also involved in preventing illegal Jewish immigration into
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Palestine from mid-1946 to mid-1948.255 This was a constabulary task because of
Britain’s responsibility for the mandated territory of Palestine at the time.256

Smuggling continued to prosper through the 1950s, involving large commercial
quantities of goods. In 1959 over 400 vessels were challenged inside the three mile
limit, of which 29 were seized. In the 1960s cigarette smuggling remained rife on the
English south coast and in the 1970s, for the first time in hundreds of years, drugs
began to appear, along with illegal migrants.257 This trend has been maintained,
although the traditional smuggled goods - tobacco and alcohol - remain part of the
trade.258

The RN’s smaller ships, notably the Hong Kong Squadron, became involved in
stemming the large outflow of illegal migrants from China in the 1970s. The extent of
the outflow threatened to destabilize the territory and the use of fast ‘snakeboats’
posed a challenge to the local naval force. This squadron remained in place after the
withdrawal from east of Suez, specifically for policing duties.259

Today, the RN still conducts constabulary operations, mostly using specialized vessels
and mine countermeasures vessels. Ships of the Fisheries Protection Squadron operate
under contract to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and other
ships patrol Northern Ireland waters to counter terrorism.260 Evidence of the level of
Fisheries Protection Squadron activity is clear from the 1486 boardings conducted in
2010-11 and the associated 496 infringements issued.261

Border Protection–the American Experience
In 1797, when trouble began with France, Congress directed the US Revenue Cutter
Service to stop US citizens from privateering against ships of friendly nations, to
Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War Two, pp. 155-6.
Palestine Facts: British Mandate – Mandate Ends, Accessed at
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defend the nation’s coast and to repel attacks on American commerce in American
waters.262 These directions also led to the generation of a new fleet for the Revenue
Cutter Service.263 In 1798 with the French attacking American commerce, Secretary of
War McHenry recommended to Congress that the USN strength be increased by 26
ships for coastal protection.264

By the end of the quasi-war with France in 1800 the Revenue Cutter Service roles had
expanded considerably. They included prevention of smuggling and protecting public
health through quarantine regulation enforcement. After 1794 the Revenue Cutter
Service also became involved in preventing the export of slaves.265

By the end of the Second Seminole War in 1842266 the revenue being collected by the
Revenue Cutter Service had dropped enough for Congress to question the Service’s
value. Abolition was considered, along with USN assumption of the role, partly
because Revenue Cutter Service funding was controlled by the Secretary of the
Treasury and not Congress.267 The move failed, with counter-arguments that revenue
collection was not Navy business. Both the USA and Britain determined, therefore, that
revenue collection was best conducted by a dedicated service, other than the Navy.

The Revenue Cutter Service tried to prevent slave trading before the American Civil
War. The anti-slavery laws made this complicated, for example by requiring the
Revenue Cutter Service to return runaway slaves to their masters.268 Its effectiveness
was further reduced, with some Revenue Cutter Service masters owning slaves
themselves, some local authorities being uncooperative and some states having no
anti-slavery laws.269
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In 1882 the Secretary of the Navy, William Chandler, noted the naval character of the
Revenue Cutter Service and asked that USN officers be employed in it. He had too few
ships at the time and thought the experience would be valuable for the officers.270
Furthermore, he argued that the Revenue Cutter Service should become part of the
USN, except for the small harbour cutters, which could remain with the Treasury
Department.271 The Head of the Revenue Marine Bureau deflected this attack on
Revenue Cutter Service autonomy but another attempt in 1899 was supported by the
Revenue Cutter Service officers who wanted the better pay of the naval officers. Other
efforts in 1891, 1892 and 1902 were successfully resisted by Treasury Secretary
Foster.272

In the 1880s, the Revenue Cutter Service engaged in sanitary coastal patrols to prevent
the introduction of cholera and yellow fever.273 By contrast, the 1890s were marked by
serious problems with illegal Chinese immigration and opium smuggling on the west
coast.274 On the east coast the Revenue Cutter Service patrolled off Florida, enforcing
US neutrality in the dispute between Cuba and Spain, with Cuban sympathizers trying
to support the island.275
The US Coast Guard came into being on 30 January 1915 as an amalgamation of the
Revenue Cutter Service and the Life-Saving Service.276 Operations in the first decade of
the 20th century included immigration and quarantine patrols, supporting neutrality
laws, prevention of smuggling, suppression of mutinies and the maintenance of
military skills for cooperation with the USN in wartime.277 With the end of the First
World War, the Coast Guard sought immediate release from USN authority but was
frustrated by Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels. He believed that vessels of all
government agencies should be under USN control and saw retention of the Coast
Guard as the first step in achieving this. A Bill to this effect was introduced to Congress
King, The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Service 1789 - 1865, pp. 54-5.
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in January 1919.278 Congress elected to return the Coast Guard to Treasury control; thus
beginning a long struggle. Many Coast Guard officers actually supported some form of
amalgamation with the Navy, because of the expectation of better conditions and
vessels.

During the 1920s the Coast Guard also experienced a significant expansion to cope
with the smuggling which followed the introduction of the prohibition of the
manufacture, sale, import and export of alcohol after 16 January 1920. Nevertheless,
the Coast Guard did not immediately become explicitly responsible for this task.279 On
assuming formal responsibility it assigned forces for the task, with normal Coast
Guard duties becoming secondary responsibilities. To assist the authorities, Congress
mandated that ships violating the laws of the USA anywhere within 12 miles of the
coast might be boarded, searched, arrested and forfeited.280 This was not acceptable to
other States and a 1924 convention with Britain confirmed the three mile territorial
waters limit, but with the rider that boarding and search would be permitted within
one hour’s steaming of the American coast.281 There was legislative progress with the
1936 enactment of a law giving the Coast Guard authority to board, inspect and if
necessary seize US vessels on the high seas in defence of US laws.282
By the outbreak of the Second World War, the Coast Guard had become a significant
organization with a breadth of responsibilities, within both US and international
waters. Smuggling of both alcohol and narcotics remained active and counteroperations frequently engaged Coast Guard cutters and aircraft. By contrast there is
little mention of USN involvement in such tasks to that point, either in the Coast Guard
or USN histories.283
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The Korean War, beginning in 1950, exposed an issue that would return several times
for the Coast Guard. There was no declaration of war and so transfer of the Coast
Guard to the USN needed a Presidential executive order. This was not forthcoming.284
So the service remained with the Treasury for the duration of the conflict, but carried
out tasks previously agreed with the USN. Effectively the Coast Guard continued its
peacetime tasking, with coherent Coast Guard units. One of these duties was port
security and in an eerie foreshadowing of current times, one of the motivations for
increased port security was the fear that nuclear devices would be brought
surreptitiously into US ports and detonated.285
Border Protection – Counter-drug Operations
The number of Cubans fleeing the Castro regime, often in unseaworthy craft, was
another Coast Guard problem.286 This task expanded with the growth in refugee
numbers and from 1973 the Coast Guard became deeply involved in drug interdiction.
The Drug Enforcement Agency created in 1973, took overall responsibility, supported
by the Coast Guard and Customs. Neither of the latter organizations, however, had
any significant investigative capacity or authority.287 By 1976, the Coast Guard
leadership accepted its growing law enforcement role and associated, but substantial,
role in the maritime interdiction of drugs.288

Drug smuggling and Cuban refugees often overwhelmed the Coast Guard.
Consequently, USN help was provided in various forms after the 1981 amendment to
the Posse Comitatus Act 1878, allowing the US military to assist with civilian law
enforcement.289 In 1978 for example, media reports revealed that USN Ocean
Surveillance Satellite data had enabled the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Coast
Guard to seize 40 drug ships.290 In 1980 the USN provided five amphibious ships, six
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minesweepers and patrol aircraft to help with the refugee exodus from Cuba.291 There
is evidence that the mere presence of USN ships temporarily reduced the drug trade.292
The USN and US Air Force contribution to these operations 293 was formalized in later
years and continues today.294 Beginning in the early 1980s it included the deployment
of Coast Guard tactical law enforcement teams in USN ships. The first USN ship
involved in a drug seizure was the United States Ship (USS) Farragut on 4 June 1982.295
Other USN efforts included the use of A-7 attack aircraft on threatening passes over
suspect vessels, patrols by P-3 aircraft and the use of USS Nimitz carrier battle group
ships and aircraft, also in 1982, while exercising in the Caribbean.296
In October 1984 the Coast Guard and Navy launched joint operation Hat Trick to
counter drug-smuggling. The Navy contribution included a guided missile destroyer, a
guided missile frigate, three fast hydrofoil patrol craft and three P-3 patrol aircraft.297
This partly successful operation concentrated on Gulf of Mexico and local Caribbean
waters, but also went further afield. The Coast Guard-Navy ‘Caribbean Squadron’
formed for this operation continued to function long afterwards.298
Reflecting the seriousness of the drug problem, in late 1985 the War Gaming
Department of the US Naval War College began what became annual anti-drug
smuggling war games.299 By 1985 the USN contribution to drug seizures amounted to
the arrest of 226 smugglers, the seizure of 43 vessels, 962,274 lbs of marijuana and 46
lbs of cocaine.300 Yet, a RAND study noted that in the early 1980s, the USN contribution
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was limited by its inability to assign ships flexibly to counter-drug operations. This
substantially limited Coast Guard cooperation with the Navy.301

Throughout the 1980s, there was little success against the inflow of drugs and Congress
and media pressed for better results. There were calls for greater military involvement,
but this would have impacted on military readiness and therefore contravened the
Posse Comitatus Act Amendment.302 Nevertheless, in 1986 the USN contributions to
interdiction included E-2C airborne early warning and control aircraft, S-3A and P-3
patrol aircraft on both coasts and surface ship patrols with embarked Coast Guard
teams.303 Coast Guard ships and aircraft were the mainstay, supported also by US
Customs aircraft and US Air Force early warning aircraft. This provided more evidence
that even the largest and most capable coast guard in the world can be overwhelmed
by the constabulary task.

Furthermore, when Congress made additional funds available for fast craft to counter
the smugglers’ fast boats and for shore-based radars to detect small craft, the money
went not to the Coast Guard but to Customs, which had none of the experience or
infrastructure to operate or support the equipment.304 One problem was the many,
often conflicting, interests in Congress and the Administration, which led to the
designation of Customs as the lead agency for drug interdiction.305

In the financial year 1989 Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense was
designated unwillingly as the lead agency for ‘ … detection and monitoring of both air
and maritime drug smuggling targets approaching the United States’.306 An outcome of
this decision was the establishment of joint task forces in Key West Florida, Alameda
California and El Paso Texas, to detect and track smuggling targets. The joint task
forces were staffed by all branches of the military and law enforcement agencies.
Whatever the benefits of this move, initially it complicated the command and control

Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford and Jonathan Cave et. al., Sealing the Borders: The Effects of
Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA,
1988, pp. 51-2.
302 Fuss, Jr., Sea of Grass: The Maritime Drug War 1970-1990, p. 89.
303 Fuss, Jr., Sea of Grass: The Maritime Drug War 1970-1990, p. 169.
304 Fuss, Jr., Sea of Grass: The Maritime Drug War 1970-1990, pp. 179-80.
305 Fuss, Jr., Sea of Grass: The Maritime Drug War 1970-1990, p. 206.
306 Fuss, Jr., Sea of Grass: The Maritime Drug War 1970-1990, p. 234.
301

113

arrangements with Defense, Customs, Coast Guard and the long-standing National
Narcotics Border Interception Service each having overlapping responsibilities.307
Coincidentally, seaborne smuggling was giving way to aerial operations.

Counter-drug operations continued through the late 1980s and in one notable incident
in June 1989 two RN ships, HMS Alacrity and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA)
Brambleleaf assisted the US Coast Guard with a seizure off the Mexican coast, even
though the British ships were not assigned to counter-drug operations.308
Congressional pressure again affected organization of the counter-drug efforts, with
abolition of the National Narcotics Border Interception Service in 1989 and
establishment of its ‘drug czar’ the Office of National Drug Control Policy.309 These
actions were overshadowed by the ending of the Cold War and the associated
enormous political changes. They may also have been overshadowed by the belief
within the Coast Guard and Navy that they had ‘ … practically shut down the
marijuana traffic across the Caribbean’.310

Nevertheless, the smugglers adapted to the pressure applied by the US authorities.
One such adaptation was the use by Colombian smugglers of semi-submersibles, first
intercepted in 1993.311 Still by 1994 the USN and Coast Guard reduced substantially the
vessels dedicated to counter-drug operations, and in February of that year, the
Caribbean Squadron was disestablished.312 As in Australia, ‘ … deterrence has an easily
defined cost, but people debate its value’.313 These actions were accompanied by yet
another organizational change, with the joint task forces becoming joint interagency
task forces, including more civilian law enforcement officers. These were placed under
Coast Guard authority, with the Commandant responsible nationally for drug
interdiction.
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Border Protection – Since 11 September 2001
Both the USN and the Coast Guard continue to perform the constabulary function; the
USN decidedly in the supporting role. Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001,
there has been a renewed focus on elements and conduct of the constabulary function.
The demands of homeland security and the ongoing military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq continue to stress both the USN and the Coast Guard.

Several initiatives have been taken by the US in response to the September 2001
attacks. They include: the Container Security Initiative which involves Coast Guard
and Border Protection officers in pre-screening of containers bound for the USA; the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code adopted by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), outlines minimum security standards for ports and
ships above 500 tonnes; the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which aims to combat
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by vessels on the high seas; and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism which offers expedited processing of
cargo for compliance with US-mandated cargo security procedures 314
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Introduction
Environmental concerns and the establishment and enforcement of environmental laws
have been relatively recent additions to the constabulary function. An early example of
environmental protection is provided by the regulations enforced in Sydney during the
first decade of the colony of New South Wales, near the end of the 18th century. Among
the responsibilities of the Naval Office, the forerunner of the Customs service, were
rules which banned the dumping of corpses, stones, gravel, ballast or iron hoops in the
harbour.315
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The sea, as an environment, has been taken for granted for centuries.316 It has been a
critical source of food and medium of transport, yet as recognized only recently, it is
also greatly affected by human activities.317 The 1998 report from the UN’s 1995
Independent Commission on the World Oceans noted a ‘crisis of the oceans’ caused by,
among other things, pollution.318 Till assessed that the growing importance of the seas,
and by implication the growing recognition of it, would likely have significant
implications for navies of the world, including their involvement in the suppression of
maritime crime.319

Environmental Protection – Anti-pollution Operations
Marine pollution has significant acute and chronic effects on the marine environment
and marine life, and it originates at sea and on land. Alien marine species introduced
through the discharge of ships’ ballast water are among the most important sea-based
origins of pollution. One estimate projects that more than 7,000 species are transported
around the world daily in this way and about two million gallons of ballast water
arrive in US waters every hour.320

Oil and other liquid spills from ships are another major sea-based source of marine
pollution. Despite education, there are over 7,000 spills of oil and other hazardous
substances in US waters each year, amounting to some 2.5 million gallons and clean up
efforts costing some $US48 million.321 As ships of many kinds become larger the
environmental impact of such spills is exacerbated. The potential was demonstrated
fully in the 1989 grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaskan waters which released 10.1
million gallons of oil with devastating effect.322 Land-based activity is an even more
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significant source of marine pollution.323 This includes coastal development and the
associated destruction of ecosystems as well as run off of chemicals and other wastes.324

The difficulty of detecting and apprehending those responsible adds to the problem of
maritime environmental degradation.325 It stands to be substantially worsened by the
expected tripling of maritime trade by 2020.326 Damage caused in the US by the zebra
mussel between 1993 and 2003 costing $US3 billion to remediate indicates the problem
that can be created by, for example, the introduction of invasive species in ships’
ballast water.327

More recent figures indicate that globally the damage from all

invasive aquatic species is annually about $100 billion.328

Consequently, there is a growing need to ensure the safety and seaworthiness of ships,
and the portents are poor as marine management practices have not kept pace with
increasing environmental pressures.329 A common problem is the complex maritime
legal regimes, which often involve international, national, regional and local
legislation. The US system, for example, is said to be ‘ … characterized by a confusing
array of laws, regulations and practices at federal, state and local levels, and agencies
that implement and enforce existing systems operate with mandates that often conflict
with each other’.330 No mechanism existed for establishing a common vision and
common objectives and a national marine council was proposed as a solution to US
problems. It subsequently emerged as the National Ocean Council.331
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This initiative marks a move towards an integrated or ‘whole of government’ approach
to marine environmental protection, which is being adopted to varying degrees by
several countries.332 The Soares report noted the lack of effective law enforcement
mechanisms within the international community meant that the maritime security
burden has traditionally fallen on navies and coast guards.333 The report also argued
that involving navies in oceans governance can be controversial, not least because of
the freedom which navies enjoy to operate in the EEZs of foreign countries.334
Some successes have been achieved and States have been advised to use their
intelligence and military authorities for environmental security, in partnership with
civilian authorities who may well have the primary responsibility for protecting the
marine environment. Till acknowledges that navies have a role and that, with coast
guards, they can mediate disputes between sea users - for example, whalers and nongovernment organizations.335

Till also argues that navies can avert or clean up pollution associated with shipping
accidents, and can provide the first response to and command and control of pollution
incidents. He also recommends that navies should themselves avoid being the source
of pollution.336 The Soares report went further, recommending that navy and coast
guard roles be reoriented to enable enforcement of legislation over non-military threats
to maritime security, including ecological aspects. It noted also that navies could do
more through sharing information and the capabilities needed to safeguard
environmental security.337

Despite the growing significance of marine environmental protection, navies have not
yet contributed greatly to it. This is so in Britain and the USA. In Britain, for example,
the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is the ‘competent authority’ for responding to
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pollution from shipping and offshore installations.338 The Agency has in place a
detailed plan including the responsibilities of other government authorities, such as the
Ministry of Defence. Defence is responsible for dealing with ‘ … pollution incidents
from warships and other MOD [Ministry of Defence] ships operated for noncommercial purposes’.339 Operational commitments permitting, Defence (the RN
primarily) is also invited to assist the Maritime and Coastguard Agency on a cost
reimbursement basis.340 Confirming the relatively minor place environmental
protection has in the RN’s tasks, it rates only a brief mention in BR 1806 (3rd edition)
British Maritime Doctrine. The document notes that military assistance to government
departments can include support for pollution control operations.341

There is evidence that British authorities are not content with environmental
management arrangements because of the many responsible authorities, and because
of the legislative complexity. There are some 80 British Acts of Parliament for English
and Welsh coastal management alone.342 Consequently, authorities are seeking to
establish an integrated coastal management regime.343 Defence and the RN especially,
is unlikely to be more involved in new arrangements, simply because the efforts at
integration will meet enough challenges without simultaneously changing levels of
responsibility.

In the USA, maritime environmental protection is one of the five core roles of the Coast
Guard.344 The Coast Guard’s stewardship roles include: ‘Safeguard [ing] U.S. marine
resources, threatened and endangered species, and the ocean from unlawful acts and
Maritime and Coastguard Agency,
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/enquiries/marine/documents/M
CAsubmission.pdf> ( 1 April 2008).
339 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from
Shipping and Offshore Installations–Appendix A. <http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcgaenvironmental/mcga-dops_cp_environmental-co...> (1 April 2008).
340 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from
Shipping and Offshore Installations–Appendix A.
341 BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine, 3rd ed., p. 63
342 Rhoda C. Ballinger, ‘A Sea Change at the Coast’, Jonathan Potts and Hance D. Smith,
Managing Britain’s Marine and Coastal Environment: Towards a Sustainable Future, Routledge,
Abingdon, 2005, p. 189.
343 Ballinger, ‘A Sea Change at the Coast’, Potts and Smith, Managing Britain’s Marine and Coastal
Environment: Towards a Sustainable Future, p. 190
344 Captain Bruce Stubbs, USCG, and Scott C. Truver, PhD., America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding
U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century, Anteon Corporation, Arlington, VA.,
Undated, p. 1.
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environmental degradation.’345 This stewardship includes measures to counter
pollution and the spread of invasive species. In the event of spills or other forms of
pollution, the Coast Guard coordinates responses as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator
for the coastal zone.346

This role has a longer history than might be expected. It dates from the Timber Act 1822
which tasked the Revenue Cutter Service with protecting government timber from
poachers.347 More recently, the Oil Pollution Act 1924 forbade the discharge of oil into
US coastal waters and led to additional tasking for the Coast Guard in monitoring
compliance.348 Still more recently and following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaskan
waters in 1987, the Oil Pollution Act 1990 gave the Coast Guard more oversight powers,
including increased responsibilities for response, inspection and investigation of
breaches of the Act.349 Consequently, the US Coast Guard now has three National
Strike Teams, located on the east, west and Gulf of Mexico coasts, to deal with
hazardous material spills.350

While the Coast Guard has primary responsibility for marine environmental
protection, there are several other federal and state agencies which have jurisdiction
over marine and coastal areas. They include the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, which has responsibility for the marine sanctuary
program, fisheries management and for providing the states with a national
framework for coastal management.351 The Department of Defense is noted as having a
‘ … keen interest in marine area governance…’.352

Allen, The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship, p. 13.
Allen, The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship, p. 14.
347 Stubbs, and Truver, America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S.Maritime Safety and Security in the
21st Century, p. 20.
348 Stubbs, and Truver, America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S.Maritime Safety and Security in the
21st Century, p. 21.
349 Stubbs, and Truver, America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S.Maritime Safety and Security in the
21st Century, p. 21.
350 Stubbs, and Truver, America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S.Maritime Safety and Security in the
21st Century, p. 21.
351 Committee on Marine Area Governance and Management of the National Research Council,
Striking a Balance: Improving Stewardship of Marine Areas, p. 14.
352 Committee on Marine Area Governance and Management, of the National Research Council,
Striking a Balance: Improving Stewardship of Marine Areas, p. 14.
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The USN is very keen, firstly to ensure it continues to enjoy freedom to operate
without serious restrictions caused by environmental protection legislation. Therefore
the USN seeks cooperation from the navies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and NATO Partnership for Peace countries to increase both protection
standards and interoperability.353 The USN also maintains a large oil spill contingency
planning and response capability. The second and associated priority is to ‘ …
demonstrate leadership…as an environmental steward of the oceans…on which we
train’.354 The USN involvement in marine environmental protection concentrates firstly
on avoiding being the source of pollution. The USN does not foresee a significant role
as a regulator of environmental laws, beyond responding to incidents caused by
others.

CONCLUSIONS
The need to provide good order at sea emerged in classical times, initially in response
to sporadic acts of piracy. Where necessary, order was provided by the naval forces of
the day. Over time, the task expanded as resource protection, border protection and
environmental management all emerged as issues demanding regulatory action. The
task of maintaining good order at sea also became more complex, as regulation
increasingly relied on evolving national and international legal systems.

Although ensuring good order at sea began as a task for navies, change in the nature of
the task demanded different responses. This was most evident in the 17th century in
both Britain and in the US, where governments sought to tax aspects of the growing
maritime trade. Collection of revenue was seen to be a task unsuited to navies and
consequently specialized revenue collection organizations were established in both
countries.

RDML James A. Symonds, USN, ‘We are not alone’, Currents, Winter 2007, p. 4.
<http://www.enviro-navair.navy.mil/currents/winter2007/Win07_N45_Outlook.pdf> (12
April 2008).
354 ADML Vern Clark, USN, Vision…Presence…Power: 2005 Guide to U.S. Navy Programs,
Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2005, p. 37,
<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/vision/VIS05> (12 April 2008).
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Subsequently, in both countries, the respective navies and a variety of other
organizations have met the demands of providing good order at sea; a role which has
become known as the constabulary function for navies. How these organizations are
used differs greatly in both countries. In the USA, the Coast Guard has primary
responsibility for the constabulary function, assisted by the USN for specific tasks, such
as countering drug smuggling. The Coast Guard also has a military function and is
called on occasionally to support the USN in military operations. In Britain, the RN has
retained a greater level of responsibility for the constabulary function, but without the
expectation that the civilian organizations will assist in military operations.

In other parts of the world a similarly varied approach is taken to the maintenance of
good order at sea. Combinations of navies, coast guards and marine police units carry
the responsibility, depending on the resources available to individual countries and the
nature and extent of the offshore constabulary task. The continuing involvement of
navies in the maintenance of good order at sea can impact on their readiness to
conduct military operations and in some cases is maintained only reluctantly.

Essentially, even where coast guards or other related organizations and navies co-exist,
navies inevitably retain some level of responsibility for the constabulary function; the
maintenance of good order at sea. Not even the biggest coast guards can always
manage the threats from illegal activity at sea.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES: THE
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE FROM FEDERATION TO 1975
INTRODUCTION
In waters off the Australian coast piracy has never been a major threat. The other
constabulary function tasks have emerged at various times and to differing degrees,
with both resource protection and border protection gaining attention in colonial days
because of the need to protect fisheries, whaling and sealing, and to counter
smuggling. Environmental protection has become a significant constabulary task only
relatively recently.
This chapter examines the development of the constabulary function in Australia from
the time of Federation to December 1975, when the High Court upheld Commonwealth
legal authority over the territorial sea and continental shelf, from the low water mark.1
It will demonstrate that the constabulary function has developed reactively,
responding ad hoc to emerging threats rather than with a policy-driven approach. There
has been a political dimension to the constabulary function over the years. This was
evident in the racist approach to immigration legislation at the time of Federation and
subsequent racist overtones in responses to illegal fishing in northern waters.

The chapter identifies key issues influencing the constabulary function, which has been
seen as a primarily civilian task in Australia, both by government and at times by the
Navy. The impact of these issues on successive governments, including their legislative
responses to developments in the constabulary function will be illustrated. Finally, the
implications of the constabulary function for the Navy will be identified.
The Development of the Constabulary Function
This chapter considers the constabulary function from Federation in 1901, from which
point Australia has had its own national naval force, which became the Royal
1

The period to 2012 will be covered in subsequent chapters.
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Australian Navy (RAN)2 and a national body of legislation. For completeness, the
arrangements made during the 19th century among the former colonies and States will
be introduced. For many years leading up to Federation, the Royal Navy (RN)
maintained a squadron in Australia which undertook some constabulary tasks. Prior to
the establishment of the Australia Station in 1859 RN ships were detached from the
East Indies Station for service in New South Wales, beginning in 1821.3

Before Federation, , Queensland, South Australia and Victoria maintained their own
naval forces.4 They did this because of perceived threats and because the RN ships,
when based in Sydney, rarely showed an interest in the other colonies.5 The limits
placed on the operations of colonial navies meant that these forces were sometimes
tasked with constabulary and other duties.

As Australia became settled and as economic activity grew, maritime security,
including good order at sea, became more important.6 For some years it was also
problematic; a major problem being that until 1856 Britain was the authority on the
Australian coast, and naval matters were reported directly to London.7 The problem
was compounded because before 1859 the RN had had no permanent presence on the
Australian coast. Consequently, the local response to maritime law enforcement was ad
hoc and even legally doubtful.

The status of the colonial naval vessels, especially after the 1859 establishment of the
RN’s Australia Station, and after the proclamation of the 1865 Colonial Naval Defence
The Commonwealth inherited the modest State naval forces at Federation, but the decision to
take full responsibility for the nation’s naval defence was not made until 1910. The Acts of
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the session of 1910, Naval Defence Act
1910, Government Printer, Victoria, 1911, p. 79.
3 John Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821 – 1913,
New South Wales University Press, Kensington, NSW, 1986, p. 13.
4 South Australia, Queensland and Victoria maintained naval forces while Tasmania operated
an anti-smuggling schooner for nine years from 1835. See Colin Jones, Australian Colonial Navies,
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, ACT, 1986, p. 15, Ross Gillett, Australia’s Colonial Navies,
Naval Historical Society of Australia, Garden Island, NSW, 1982, pp. 29, 59 and70.
5 Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821 – 1913, p.
83.
6 For examples of law enforcement and traditional maritime security issues see H.M. Cooper, A
Naval History of South Australia and Other Historical Notes, The Hassell Press, Adelaide, 1950, p.
78 and Jones, Australian Colonial Navies, p. 13.
7 Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821 – 1913, p.
84.
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Act, was contentious. The Act enabled Australian colonies to provide and use their
own warships and crews under prescribed conditions.8 There was, however, tension
between the Imperial defence responsibilities and outlook of the RN Squadron and the
local defence focus of the colonial navies.9 There was little connection or
communication between the tiny colonial navies and the ships of the RN’s Australia
Station. Furthermore, the British Admiralty was very doubtful about the legal status of
these colonial ships.10

The involvement of the Victorian ship Victoria in the Maori Wars led the Admiralty to
declare that colonial ships would only operate outside territorial limits when
commanded by officers holding commissions from the Crown.11 This determination,
and the applicability of the Colonial Naval Defence Act only within the three miles of
territorial waters,12 would make life difficult for the colonial navies in any role. Much
later the limitation on operating outside territorial limits led to the South Australian
ship Protector being specially commissioned as Her Majesty’s Ship for service in China
in 1900.13

Before Federation, the ships of the colonial naval forces were rapidly aging and were
too small for any real blue-water operations.14 Similarly, the other colonial authorities
were not well situated to provide for security offshore. The Western Australian
Customs organization, for example, had no vessel to patrol its coast during the 1880s.15

‘Function VF 63 Defence’, Public Record Office Victoria,
<http://www.access.prov.vic.gov.au/public/component> (3 October 2007).
9 Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821 – 1913, p.
179.
10 Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821 – 1913, p.
177. The doubt expressed applied to Australian waters and beyond.
11 Jones, Australian Colonial Navies, p. 20.
12 Bob Nicholls, ‘Colonial naval forces before federation’, in David Stevens and John Reeve, eds.,
Southern Trident: Strategy, history and the rise of Australian Naval Power, Allen and Unwin, Crows
Nest, NSW, 2001, p. 128.
13 G.L. Macandie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, Government Printer, Sydney, 1949, p.
12.
14 Bob Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers: The defence forces of the Australian colonies 1836 – 1901,
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p. 160.
15 David Day, Smugglers and Sailors: The Customs History of Australia 1788-1901, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988, p. 360.
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Since Federation, the constabulary function in Australia has been defined historically
by three major features. Firstly, the four major tasks associated with the function were
for many years undertaken sporadically and reactively in response to emerging
threats. Secondly, the area of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction16 has not been matched
by the level of resources available to police it. Consequently, there has been an
emphasis on economy of effort with respect to the constabulary function, rather than
threat management or deterrence. Thirdly, the role of the Navy in the constabulary
function emerged relatively slowly before the introduction of the Attack class patrol
boats in 1967.
FROM FEDERATION TO 1918: WHITE AUSTRALIA RULES
Introduction
In this and in succeeding chapters law enforcement at sea and its challenges will be
examined according to the problems each generated for the government of the day.
Examination of border protection, which has been one of the two the most significant
challenges, will include prohibited immigration, customs and quarantine matters.
Resources protection, the other long-standing and more significant law enforcement
challenge, focused initially on a range of fishing activities but expanded later to include
oil and gas platforms. Environmental protection, the third of the major tasks received
little attention in the years immediately after federation, but subsequently has become
significant.
Law Enforcement at Sea
Notwithstanding an occasional report about possible piracy,17 immediately after
Federation the focus was on border protection; prohibited immigration, customs

Australia’s maritime jurisdiction was limited to the 3nm territorial sea until declaration of the
12nm Australian Fishing Zone in 1967 and then declaration of the 200nm Australian Fishing
Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone in 1979. See Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, Vol. 55, 12 May 1967, pp. 2033-4, and Warwick Gullett, Fisheries Law in
Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, NSW, 2008, p. 209.
17 There was a claim by Mr Mahon (Coolgardie, WA) in the House of Representatives on 4 July
1907, that the WA coast was occasionally visited by pirates who captured local pearling boats.
Mr Deakin promised action to prevent it happening but did not specify what that action might
16
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offences and quarantine being the most prominent threats. Preventing prohibited
immigrants from landing was the biggest task confronting the law enforcement
authorities and was considered a powerful motivator for Federation itself.18 Over a
century later managing an influx of asylum seekers by sea is again the major element of
the constabulary function.
The depth of feeling on this issue was apparent during Parliamentary debate in
September 1901, which expressed the fear that ‘We have something like 800 million
Chinese and Japanese within easy distance of Australia, from whom we have to fear
contamination’.19 This sentiment was reinforced in the Senate just two months later,
with commentary that Australia ought to have complete control over entry to the
country and that ‘brute force’ may be needed to achieve it.20 Senator O’Connor (New
South Wales) expressed the prevailing feeling most forcefully:
we ought to have complete control over the admission of foreigners, and ought
never to put ourselves in the position of having an Act upon our statute-book
under which a foreigner coming under a certain description may claim the right
to enter our community without our being able to say him nay.21
Similar sentiments may be more carefully expressed today, but there is no doubt that
the fears still gripping Australians, confronted by asylum seekers arriving in boats, are
long-standing and deep-seated.

Politicians believed they knew that ‘coloureds’ could enter in one of two ways; landing
by ship or by slow infiltration in small numbers, both of which were believed to be
happening.22 Yet, law enforcement authorities had no way of knowing if such
infiltration was occurring or of preventing it. Suggesting the issue was one for

be. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. XXXVI, 4 July 1907, p.
81.
18 Myra Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne, 1923, p. 19.
19 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the House of Representatives, Vol. IV, 6 September 1901,
p. 4631.
20 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the Senate, Vol. VI, 15 November 1901, p. 7349.
21 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the Senate, Vol. VI, 15 November 1901, p. 7349.
22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. IV, 6 September 1901,
pp. 4627-8.
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resolution by the armed forces, Prime Minister Barton pointed out that Australia could
not afford to build a Navy because of the Constitution’s ‘Braddon clause’.23

Another significant issue relating to the constabulary function emerged soon after
Federation. In August 1903, questions were raised about policing of disputes among
pearlers in the north-west or Thursday Island without our own vessels, given that
Australia could not expect the (British) Admiralty to respond.24 Senator O’Connor
suggested that such work was for the police and not for warships.25 Yet there is
evidence that the RN Australian Squadron became involved in constabulary work, if
only once.26

Despite warships of various kinds having been involved in such policing for centuries,
this exchange of views set a tone in Australia that still resonates sometimes. Thus,
despite the historical experience there remains ambivalence over the role of navies in
the constabulary function, at the political level as well as within the RAN itself.27

Fish poaching had long been occurring in Australian territorial waters, especially along
the north-west coast.28 State authorities had recognized over-fishing as a problem,
because as early as 1909 there were reports of waters closed during breeding season or
all year round for stock management.29 Overfishing had become such a problem that
the fishery along the Coburg Peninsula was closed between 1903 and 1905.30 Another
issue that drew attention to the need for more regulation was the suspicion that pearls
This clause (87) of the Australian Constitution determined that for 10 years after the
establishment of the Commonwealth, at least three quarters of Commonwealth revenue derived
from customs duties and excise would be returned to the States. The Australian Constitution,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975, p. 57.
24 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the Senate Vol. XVI, 20 August 1903, p. 3930.
25 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, the Senate Vol. XVI, 20 August 1903, p. 3930.
26 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1911, No. 5 – 1912, McCarron, Bird and
Co., Melbourne, 1911, p. 471.
27 For a recent example of this, see the remarks of the then Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Chris
Ritchie at the 2004 International Seapower Conference in Sydney. He found it necessary to
emphasize the importance of the task in the face of sometimes ill-informed comment. Vice
Admiral Chris Ritchie, ‘Positioning Our Navy for the Future’, Jack McCaffrie, ed., Positioning
Navies for the Future, Halstead Press, Sydney, 2006, p. 22.
28 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1911, No. 5 – 1912, p. 471.
29 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1909, No. 3 - 1910, McCarron, Bird and
Co., Melbourne, 1910, p. 473.
30 David Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1996, p. 67.
23

128

were being exported illegally. The Northern Territory Administration reported that 31
pearling boats had been active in 1907, and 26 in 1908. Yet no pearls were declared
from their activities.31 There was also a fear that the Macassans involved would
facilitate illegal Chinese immigration.32
Smuggling was another border protection issues meriting attention at the time, not
least because of the need to maximize revenue from customs duties and tariffs. This
was acknowledged in the Senate in September 1901, in discussing the need for
Customs officers to have the power to board arriving ships and inspect their cargoes
and stores, to ensure collection of all duties.33 Senator Charleston indicated the
seriousness of the quest for revenue, when he noted that:
The Customs officers seek to prevent ships from selling goods on board, not to
prevent the consumption of ships’ stores by those on board. They wish to be
able to say—"We shall seal up these goods and leave you so much for your own
consumption from day to day whilst you are in port, but we want to protect the
revenue, and we cannot allow you to sell goods on board ship".34
Other concerns included claims of alcohol smuggling in and around New Guinea35 and
smuggling of weapons from Queensland to the Solomon Islands in 1903.36

Not all aspects of the border protection task were legislated for immediately after
Federation, suggesting that issues such as immigration and revenue generation had
highest priority. Quarantine remained in State hands until the passing of the
Quarantine Act 190837 which initiated the first important Federal health service.
Administration of the Act, which concentrated on arriving ships, and associated
persons, goods, animals and plants, was placed within the Department of Trade and
Customs. By 1913, all major human and animal and plant quarantine stations had been

Government Resident’s Report on the Northern Territory, 1908, Palmerston, NT, 1908, p. 10.
Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 67.
33 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. IV, 4 September 1901, p. 4415.
34 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. IV, 4 September 1901, p. 4415.
35 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. XV, 20 August 1903, p. 3931.
36 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. XVII, 8 October 1903, p.
5879.
37 The Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the Session of 190708, Quarantine Act 1908, Government Printer, Victoria, 1908, p. 24.
31
32
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transferred to Commonwealth control.38 Arrangements in Western Australia and
Tasmania saw the Quarantine Act administered by the State Health Departments, with
the Chief Medical Officer acting as Chief Quarantine Officer. In New South Wales,
South Australia and Queensland a Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer administered
the Act and in Victoria the Director of Quarantine administered the Act from the
central office.39

State Agricultural Department officers also acted as Quarantine

Officers for plant and animal inspections.40

Although quarantine did not appear among the highest legislative priorities after
Federation, and while there were no reported major health threats, a swine fever
outbreak in 190141 and a smallpox scare in Sydney in 1913 highlighted potential
problems.42 There was also a growing awareness of the need to expand quarantine
facilities throughout the country. For example, in October 1911 a ship was sent from
northern waters to the Sydney quarantine station, to deal with a smallpox case, because
there was no quarantine station in the north.43
The Government Response
At Federation the new Commonwealth Government was badly placed to undertake the
constabulary function at sea. The existing law enforcement authorities were still Statebased and had limited resources. These organizations included State Customs,
Immigration, Fisheries and Quarantine Departments and Naval Forces.

Commonwealth policy-making and administrative capacity was extremely limited in
the early days; the original government departments comprising only Parliament,
External Affairs, Attorney-General’s, Home Affairs, Treasury, Trade and Customs,

Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1912, No. 6 – 1913, McCarron, Bird and
Co., Melbourne, 1913, p. 1094.
39 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1912, No. 6 – 1913, p. 1095.
40 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901- 1913, No. 7 – 1914, McCarron, Bird and
Co., Melbourne, 1914, p. 970.
41 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. III, 26 July 1901, p. 3148.
42 L. E., Groom, Nation Building in Australia: The Life and Works of Sir Littleton Ernest Groom,
Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney, 1941, p. 106.
43 Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 99. While Day
does not explain the lack of a quarantine station in the north, the then very limited extent of the
Commonwealth government public service is likely to have been the main cause.
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Defence and Post Master General’s.44 Of the civilian departments only Customs had
any water craft; these being inspection boats based in major ports. Their seagoing
capacity had diminished from the situation in the mid-19th century when the NSW
Customs Department had oceangoing vessels.45 By Federation most States had no
Customs boats for harbour or adjacent waters operations and relied on hiring vessels to
inspect arriving and departing ships.46
Following Federation and despite its limitations, the Commonwealth Customs
Department seemed to be the department best placed ‘ … to enforce the laws designed
to protect and promote the security and prosperity of the new nation’.47
Enforcement of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was carried out by Customs officers
on behalf of the External Affairs Department. Customs officers were also empowered
to enforce State laws. This was demonstrated as early as January 1901 with a notice in
the Northern Territory Times and Gazette to the effect that the South Australian Collector
of Customs and his officers (as well as the Northern Territory Government Resident)
could refuse entry to aliens.48
The Commonwealth Appropriation Act 1902 details the funds allocated to
Commonwealth departments for that year, including the Customs Departments in the
various states. These allocations, listed in Table 4-1 below, illustrate starkly the limited
assets available to Customs.

The naval forces available from the pre-Federation State navies were derisory, with
Queensland the only state to allocate funds to support any vessels; HM Ships Gayundah
and Paluma.49 One reason for the poor condition of the State navies was that after 1891
those States with navies (South Australia, Victoria and Queensland) ceased

The Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the session of 1902,
Appropriation Act 1902, Government Printer, Victoria, 1903, p. 259.
45 Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 21.
46 Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 21.
47 Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 4.
48 Northern Territory Times and Gazette, 4 January 1901, p. 4.
49 The Acts of Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the session of 1902,
Appropriation Act 1902, p. 93. Despite the provision of the Defence Act 1903 cited below, the
status of these ships is not clear as the Appropriation Act 1903-04 alludes to HMQS Gayundah
and HMS Paluma. The Acts of Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the
session of 1903, Government Printer, Victoria, 1904, p. 221.
44
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development,50 no doubt anticipating Federation and the transfer of responsibilities to
the Commonwealth. The Defence Act 1903 formalized the status of the State navies by
transferring them to the Commonwealth. ‘The Naval and Military forces existing at the
commencement of the Act shall be deemed to have been raised under this Act’.51
State
NSW
VIC
QLD
SA
WA

Customs Function
Repairs to steam launches
12 boatmen
Repairs and support for steam launches
10 boatmen
12 Cox’ns and boatmen
Semaphore Customs and Harbour Boat
1 Cox’n

Funds
£265
£1 500
£1 656
£1 063
£150

Table 4 – 1: Customs Assets and Funding, 190252
Prime Minister Deakin agreed to institute more rigorous Customs inspections to
counter alleged gun running to the Solomon Islands.53 Deakin’s options were limited,
because of the poor state of the Customs Service and the parlous state of the
Commonwealth Naval Forces. At the time, Customs officers were prevented from
taking leave because of staff shortages.54 The 1,000 or so Customs officers stationed
around the coast were stretched in their efforts to meet the entire protective task, which
also came to include environmental protection, with prevention of native bird exports
an early challenge.55

At that early stage, government had not decided if Australia would build its own navy
or whether it would continue to rely on the RN Squadron, based in Sydney and partly

Robert Hyslop, Australian Naval Administration 1901-1939, The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne,
1973, p. 31.
51 The Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the session of 1903,
Defence Act 1903, Section 34, Government Printer, Victoria, 1904, p. 441 et.seq.
52 The Acts of Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the session of 1902, pp.
260-265, Appropriation Act 1902, pp. 27-32,.
53 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. XVII, 8 October 1903, p.
5879.
54 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. XVII, 14 October 1903, p.
6103.
55 Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 25. See also The
Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1901-1911, Vol. 1, Customs Act 1910,
Government Printer, Melbourne, 1913, p. 191.
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funded by Australia.56 After lengthy debate in the Parliament the matter was resolved,
in the short term, by passing the Naval Agreement Act 1903, allowing for the continued
reliance on the RN Squadron, but at an increased cost of £200,000 per year.57
Debate on the Naval Agreement Bill 1903 at no stage suggested that naval defence
included the constabulary function.58 The very limited personnel strength inherited
from State naval forces precluded the Federal Government from undertaking any naval
function in the early days. The table below reflects the strengths in 1908.

Personnel Status

NSW VIC QLD

SA

TOTAL

Permanent

4

115

52

37

208

Partly Paid

305

232

342

118

997

Table 4-2: Naval Personnel Strength 30 June 190859
In 1910, with a decision having been made to form an Australian Navy, the Naval
Defence Act 1910, left the future employment of the Navy open to interpretation. The
Act noted that ‘The Permanent Naval Forces … shall at all times be liable to be
employed on any naval service…’.60 Without necessarily anticipating the constabulary
function, the Act empowered the Governor General to ‘ … acquire ships… for Naval
defence, or for services auxiliary to Naval Defence … ’.61
The shortage of naval or other vessels meant that there was virtually no capacity to
intercept ships that might bring prohibited immigrants to Australia. The situation at
that time was different to that faced by Australia with successive waves of asylum
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. III, 31 July 1901, p. 3302.
Sir William McMillan (Wentworth) noted that Australia was then paying £125,000 per year for
naval defence.
57 The Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1901-1911, Vol. 1, Naval
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58 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XIV, Senate and House of Representatives, pp. 21262180, 2241-2264 and 2310-2359.
59 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1908, No. 2 – 1909, McCarron, Bird and
Co., Melbourne, 1909, p. 1087.
60 The Acts of Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in the session of 1910, Naval
Defence Act 1910, Section 31, Government Printer, Victoria, 1911, p. 83.
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Defence Act 1910, Section 41-1 (a), p. 85.
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seekers beginning in 1976. At Federation and for years afterwards, the traffic in
prohibited immigrants was carried mostly in commercial ships engaged in legitimate
trade with Australia. For example, in the first three months of 1901, 89 Malays landed
in Western Australia and on 28 August 1901, 51 Afghans landed in Melbourne.62

The fear of Asian immigration remained. In 1914, echoing earlier fears, the Daily
Standard in Brisbane reported illegal immigrants allegedly pouring in through the
north.63 One Member of Parliament, Mr Finlayson (Brisbane) called for a Navy
destroyer to be sent on patrol of northern waters as Customs appeared unable to keep
Asians out of tropical Australia.64 The Government was caught in a quandary.
Politically, it was unpalatable to leave northern shores apparently unguarded, but the
cost of an effective customs barrier across the north was prohibitive.65

During the First World War, the RAN Brigade conducted border protection tasks,
which although military in nature, involved law enforcement. The Brigade conducted
examination services of merchant shipping in all defended ports and manned coastal
patrols using specially commissioned sloops and gunboats.66 These activities could
have led to a peacetime law enforcement role for the Navy immediately after the First
World War as hinted at in the report on Australia’s naval defence presented by
Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa in 1919.67
A ship of the RN Australian Squadron occasionally searched the north coast for fish
poachers, while engaged on other work.68 Equally unusual at the time, Customs
approached the authorities in the Celebes Islands (now Indonesia) to check for illegal
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fishing originating there.69 These were sporadic responses to ongoing problems for
which the Commonwealth had no adequate solution.

Fisheries management and regulation remained a State responsibility for many years.70
Immediately after Federation the domestic fishing industry was poorly developed,
although Malays from Macassar had long been fishing in north-western waters.71 The
need for uniform fisheries legislation was recognized early and by 1914 all the States
were moving towards uniform legislation.72 The pearling industry was subject to a
Royal Commission in 1912, which examined the prospect of removing all Asian labour
from the industry. Ultimately, the Royal Commission determined that nothing was to
be gained from such a move and that ‘White Australia’ was not threatened by the
existing arrangements.73

The Beaches, Fishing Grounds and Sea Routes Protection Act 1932, was the first significant
marine environmental protection legislation.
Legislative Developments
The preoccupation with border protection was manifested initially in two immigrationrelated acts, both of which underlined the strong desire to keep Australia as a home for
white people. These were the first two policy-related bills presented in the
Parliament.74 The desire for a ‘White Australia’ had been a strong motivating factor
towards Federation.75 The first of the Acts was the Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901
which reflected the distaste felt by some in the community over the employment of
Pacific Islanders in the Queensland sugar industry. The Act legislated against the
intake of additional Pacific Islander labour from 31 March 1904 and from the date of
assent, 17 December 1901, legislated against Pacific Islanders working without a
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license.76 It also provided for the deportation of the Pacific Islanders from 31 December
1906.77

The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 reflected the fear of invasion by Asians. The fear
was racially based, as was pointed out by Professor Pearson, who stated that ‘We are
guarding the last part of the world in which the higher races can live and increase
freely for the higher civilization’.78
These fears were catered for in the 1901 legislation which required immigrants to be
able to write a passage of 50 words in a European language directed by an Immigration
or Customs officer.79 Other restrictions in the Act related to criminals, those with
particular diseases, the poor and those indentured on low wages.80 Exemptions
included members of the King’s regular land and sea forces.81 Nevertheless, the
primary function of the Act was to exclude non-Europeans. The Act also allowed for
the expulsion of prohibited immigrants.

Enforcement powers associated with the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 rested with
officers appointed under the Act and Customs officers.82 Police officers from any State
and all officers under the Act also had the power to prevent any prohibited immigrant
from entering Australia.83 There were no specific powers of search in the Act, but
officers could require masters of vessels to muster their crews before sailing.

84

They

could also detain vessels from which prohibited immigrants had entered Australia.85
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By 1905 the 1901 Act needed to be amended, principally because of controversy over
its explicitly racist foundation. Objections were raised in London, as had occurred with
previous State immigration legislation before Federation,86 and in Japan. The Japanese
Government objected to the 1901 legislation, even as it was being debated in
Parliament, because of its racist basis and threatened to stop the Japanese Mail
Steamship Co. trading with Australia.87 It was to appease the Japanese that the
Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 190588 changed the basis of the dictation test
from being a European language to being a ‘prescribed language’. This gave the
examining officer the opportunity to choose a language unfamiliar to the prospective
immigrant. The 1905 Act also introduced some concessions; such as allowing the
temporary entry of Japanese, for the pearling industry, Indian students, merchants and
some others.89 Nevertheless, the reality was that white people would not be subjected
to the dictation test.

The Immigration Restriction Act was changed again in 1908 and 1910, in response to
claims that Asians were illegally entering the country as stowaways. The Immigration
Restriction Act 1908 identified ships’ masters’ responsibilities with respect to
stowaways, who were considered to be prohibited immigrants.90 The Act also
permitted officers to search any vessel in port or within the territorial sea for
stowaways. The Immigration Restriction Act 1910 provided broad powers to stop and
search any vessel, or vehicle, or enter any premises where there was a reasonable
chance of finding prohibited immigrants.91

The only other significant immigration-related legislation before 1918 was the wartime
War Precautions Act 1914 which inter alia, prohibited aliens from landing or embarking
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in the Commonwealth.92 While there was a concentration on keeping certain kinds of
people out of Australia, the supporting legislation did not anticipate that prohibited
immigrants would arrive in any way other than regular merchant shipping.
Consequently, the legislation made no provision for employing the Navy for
enforcement. Admittedly, the paucity of the naval forces at hand and the onset of the
First World War, would have been factors in this decision.

Customs legislation was also a high priority for the Commonwealth Parliament in
1901, although the first Customs legislation, the Customs Act 1901, concerned revenue
generation and collection more than border protection.93 The powers associated with
the Act, which aimed to ensure that all tariffs and duties were paid, were useful in
dealing with other illegal activities. For example the Act allowed for control of all
imported goods and goods on board ships within port limits. Control also included the
right to examine all such goods and the associated right to board ships to do so.94

Although early immigration laws did not provide for at sea enforcement, that was not
the case with the Customs Act. Section 59 directed that arriving ships heave to within
one league of the coast for boarding if so directed by Customs.95 Furthermore,
commanders or officers-in-command of any ship or boat in His Majesty’s Service or in
the service of the Commonwealth or Customs, providing they showed the proper flag
or ensign, had the right to chase a ship and compel it to stop.96 If the chased vessel
ignored lawful signals or directions to stop, it could be fired at or into, to ensure
compliance.97 Section 185, of the Act had definite border protection and constabulary
function connotations, giving officers the power to require a ship hovering within one
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league of the coast to leave within 12 hours.98 The Act’s powers extended to officers of
the Customs Service, police and of His Majesty’s forces.99

The Customs Act 1901, contained provisions for dealing with smuggling.100 These
provisions were extended in the revised Customs Act 1910 which inter alia prohibited
the export of certain flora and fauna101 and enabled any Customs or police officer to
arrest anyone reasonably suspected of smuggling or importing or exporting prohibited
goods.102 This Act in dealing with flora and fauna was the first, admittedly tangential,
attempt at border protection-related environmental legislation. The only other
significant Customs legislation with a constabulary function focus before the end of the
First World War was the Customs Act 1914, which allowed for the wartime
proclamation of the prohibition of the export of any goods.103

Although the need to regulate quarantine as a federal matter was recognised104 it was
1908 before the first legislation appeared. The Quarantine Act 1908 provided for internal
and external quarantine to prevent the spread of human, animal and plant disease.105
The Minister for Trade and Customs assumed responsibility, a factor of the very
limited federal bureaucracy at that time, and the Act was enforced by Quarantine
officers or any other officers appointed under the Act.106 The Act allowed for powers to
be delegated to the States and did not affect the previous operation of State Acts.107
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Under the Act, Quarantine officers were empowered to board any vessel in any port or
place in Australia to conduct quarantine inspection.108 Additionally, officers could have
a vessel stopped for boarding and could, in writing, order into quarantine a vessel
suspected to be infected.109

The initial legislation was followed by the Quarantine Act 1912, which established the
separate federal Quarantine Service.110 This Act and a further amending act, the
Quarantine Act 1915, placed more responsibility on the masters and owners of vessels
to take health precautions and also established detailed restrictions for ships in
quarantine; specifically for the control and eradication of vermin and other pests.111
Implications for the Navy
Successive governments failed to provide enough resources for law enforcement at sea
until the latter part of the 20th century, when the political benefits of providing
deterrent border protection began to outweigh the cost. The call in 1914 for a Navy
destroyer to undertake a constabulary task reflected a Parliamentary expectation that
this was a role for the Navy. It may also have simply suggested that despite its
limitations, only the Navy could possibly have responded.

Yet, there was no evidence of any institutional acceptance that constabulary work
should be a Navy task, or that it was at all important. None of the early Parliamentary
debates mentions it: the sole focus of the naval debate was on the defence of Australia
against naval attack and whether the country could rely on the Imperial Navy for
protection.112 For all of the historical association of navies with the constabulary
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function, Australia’s politicians made no early formal connection between their
strongly expressed desire for border security and the Navy as a provider.
With the keen focus on prohibited immigrants and despite the lack of any means of
interception at sea, the evidence (see Table 4.3 below) suggests that the number of
people refused entry to Australia was small in raw numbers and as a proportion of the
overall intake. It also shows (Column 1) that administration of the dictation test was an
effective way of screening unwanted immigrants and that the intake of primarily
European migrants (Column 2) was substantial, especially in the years before the First
World War.

Year
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917

Persons admitted who
passed the dictation
test113
1
-

Persons admitted
without passing the
dictation test
83,324
94,523
139,020
163,990
140,251
110,701
70,436
59,140
53,036

Persons refused
admission
108
42
83
187
109
54
56
233
13

Table 4-3: Persons Admitted or Refused Admission to the Commonwealth under the Provisions
of the Immigration Restriction Act, 1909-1917.114
Because of the lack of naval or other law enforcement vessels Australia’s border at this
point was not at sea, but in the ports through which foreign ships passed.
Consequently, there was great interest in ensuring that the immigration laws were
upheld. The level of interest might have been described as extreme when Mr
MacDonald (Kennedy) asked Prime Minister Barton about a claim that five coloured

The ‘dictation test’ was introduced in the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 and made more
onerous in the Immigration Restriction Act 1905. It allowed Immigration Officers to test
prospective immigrants in languages unfamiliar to them with the object of excluding them.
114 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1917, No. 11-1918, McCarron, Bird and
Co., Melbourne, 1918, p. 1166.
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men had deserted from one ship and two from another.115 Further interest was
expressed a few years later, when more effective patrolling of the coast, and vessel
inspections, to prevent people and opium smuggling were demanded in Parliament.116
In the following year, 1909, there was a call for ‘ … some sort of patrol on the northwest and northern coast of this country’.117 The request came from Mr Hughes, a future
Prime Minister, who also suggested that the ‘infant fleet’ should be used for this
purpose.118
The need for policing of Australian waters was well understood even if there was no
readily available means of doing so. For example, Senator O’Connor believed that the
police should have responsibility and that it was not a matter for ‘a man-o-war’.119 Yet
naval forces and Customs became involved subsequently. In April 1911 the Gayundah120
sailed from Brisbane to check on illegal trepang (sea cucumber) and pearl fishing. On
25 May the vessel found Dutch schooners anchored at Scott’s Reef off the north-west
coast of Western Australia. After firing a warning shot and boarding the vessels,
Gayundah arrested them and towed them to Broome.121

Nevertheless, in the first decades after Federation the Navy contributed little to the
constabulary function. The poor state of pre-Federation State naval forces and the
involvement of the newly formed RAN in the First World War contributed to this
situation. Disagreement over the extent of Navy involvement, and the embryonic state
of Commonwealth government departments, also exacerbated the situation.
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1918 – 1945: EMBRYONIC EFFORTS
Resources Protection
The near-hysteria attending the fear of illegal immigrants abated after the First World
War, although the issue emerged intermittently before 1945. The most high profile
constabulary task was marine resource protection, associated with the pearl shell and
trepang fishing activities in northern waters. Shortly after the First World War, there
were 16 boats and 83 men working in Northern Territory pearl fisheries, all but two of
the men Japanese and Koepang (then in the Dutch East Indies) natives.122

Long-standing concerns over unreported taking of pearl shell in northern waters
continued through the 1920s, paralleling the varying demand for pearl shell. From 1921
the industry declined because of reducing world prices.123 In 1922-23 only two pearl
shell boats and three trepang boats were still working in Northern Territory waters.124
Recovery began in the late 1920s, with nine pearl shell boats operating in 1927.125

Concerns over illegal activities rose with the recovery of the pearl shell industry. There
was a claim that Malay poachers from the Dutch islands were gathering trepang off the
north-west coast and were illegally treating it ashore on Australian territory.126 Reports
of this and other incidents to the Minister for Trade and Customs had no apparent
effect, and led to claims by Mr Green (Kalgoorlie) that, ‘The north-west coast is
absolutely neglected by Commonwealth departments’.127 With both resource
protection and quarantine interests at stake a regular air service was demanded for the
Kimberley, between Derby and Wyndham, to provide an information gathering
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capacity.128 The expectation that the provision of this kind of surveillance was to be
resolved by civilian authorities is striking.

Little more was heard of the surveillance issue until the 1930s when illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) fishing gained momentum and generated a belated
government response. The attention given to these activities in the 1930s can be
attributed to Japanese involvement and its association with fears of another war. These
fears also manifested themselves in issues beyond IUU fishing.

In August 1930 Mr Nelson, (Northern Territory) spoke in Parliament of reports in the
Melbourne Herald about Malays from Timor poaching pearl shell in northern waters
and that there was ‘ … not a single police patrol boat on the whole of the coast’.129
Almost two years later, the Chief Pearling Officer was reported to have used the motor
vessel (MV) Maroubra to search for contraband pearl shell among the Japanese pearl
fishers; netting six tonnes of pearl shell.130 This ad hoc response was to be replicated
many times over the years before a more comprehensive and deterrence-based
approach was initiated.

The concerns also extended beyond the Northern Territory to northern Queensland
waters.131 The Courier Mail exposed some of the difficulties in an article on 21
September 1934. It noted the State’s responsibilities for enforcing fishing regulations
and some uncertainty about State and Commonwealth jurisdiction over the Great
Barrier Reef.132 While the article also noted that Commonwealth responsibilities were
limited to quarantine, customs and immigration matters, the fears that Japanese might
be landing, especially on the Gulf of Carpentaria coast meant that Commonwealth
involvement could not be ignored.
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Concerns continued to grow, even if they sometimes resulted in spurious claims. For
example, Senator Hardy (New South Wales) reported claims of some 59 Japanese
pearling luggers operating in Torres Strait and accompanied by a naval destroyer in
April 1936.133 The report was dismissed by government and may have been explained
by a sighting a few weeks later of 21 luggers accompanied by a larger mother ship
near Melville Island in the Northern Territory.134

In May 1936, Mr Riordan (Kennedy) led calls for the Navy to respond to the illegal
activities.135 The continuing Japanese presence was the primary cause of such demands.
Yet, growing national apprehension over deteriorating world security may also have
added to the concern felt about the Japanese pearl shell-gathering presence, which in
1938 was described as well-established from Broome to Thursday Island and along the
East coast to Mackay.136 Japanese pearling continued to cause concern in Australia as
late as mid-1940 but, pearling ceased with the outbreak of the war in the Pacific.

Although a secondary issue, whaling began to gain some attention during the mid1930s. Following the 1931 Geneva Convention on Whaling, Australia legislated for
controls in 1935. The aim was to limit the taking of certain types of whales in
Australian waters, beyond territorial waters limits, and including Antarctic waters. The
restrictions applied only to Australian registered whaling ships and ships over which
the Commonwealth otherwise had jurisdiction.137

Predictably, there were questions relating to policing the law, given that Australia had
failed to prevent the illegal taking of pearl shell.138 Australia could not stop whaling in
Antarctic waters either, as the Antarctic Territory claim was still British-based.139
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Marine Environmental Protection
Marine environmental protection began gaining prominence during the interwar years.
Almost immediately after the First World War concerns were expressed in Parliament
about the destruction of seals and penguins around the Tasmanian and Macquarie
Island coasts, with a call by Mr Glynn (Angas) for the Navy to patrol those areas.140
Nevertheless, the issue lapsed and was not referred to again in Parliament. Similar
concerns were aired in 1935 in relation to the Great Barrier Reef, signalling an
awakening of the potential value of the Reef to the nation. The concern related to
uncontrolled exploitation of trochus and bird life throughout the Reef.141

Marine pollution also received some attention between the wars. Not for the last time,
in 1920 the Navy was accused of polluting Sydney harbour with oil and debris.142 The
only other Parliamentary mention of any significant occurrence of marine pollution for
the period related to ship-sourced pollution of Sydney’s ocean beaches in 1938.143
Border Protection
Illegal immigration was not significant in the 1920s and 1930s, although there is
evidence of it. Senator Sir George Pearce noted in 1928 the case of 50 Chinese who had
stowed away in the steam ship (S.S.) Almkerk for a voyage from Rotterdam to Australia
late in 1927. Australian authorities learned of their presence in the ship before it sailed.
The ship’s Master was subsequently fined £100 while the Customs officers involved in
the case shared a reward of £270.144 The main fear during the period may have been
the potential for numbers to increase because of reducing migrant intakes in the US
from southern Europe.145
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Reports of smuggling were limited primarily to passengers attempting to avoid duties
on items of apparel at ports of entry. Details provided in Parliament suggest that it was
a significant issue in the 1920s. Customs statistics for 1927, for example, showed eight
successful prosecutions for goods valued at £2524 and the imposition of 15 fines for
£1303.146 A subsequent report in 1934 confirmed that such activity continued147 and
with the advent of international air travel another avenue opened for the transport of
illicit goods.

Breaches of quarantine were insignificant during the period ending in 1945. Apart from
fears that military personnel returning from the Second World War would bring exotic
diseases,148 the only other major border security concern was the introduction of
international air travel in the 1930s, and the heightened risk associated with faster
travel masking incubation that would become evident on longer sea voyages.149
The Government Response
The current focus on border protection and the Navy contribution to it contrast starkly
with the situation in the period between the two world wars and up to 1945. While
relationships between the Federal and State Governments were still evolving,
inadequate coordination was unsurprising. Additionally, the Federal Government was
more likely to avoid potential overlaps of responsibility than to infringe deliberately on
State responsibilities. The maritime law enforcement resources available to Federal and
State authorities were also limited. Even with those qualifications, the dilatory,
fragmented and essentially inadequate response to illegal activities, reflects poorly on
the governments of the time.

After the First World War there was very little capacity in the north. During 1918
coastal patrols were being conducted with old ships, like Gayundah, which were too
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slow.150 Gayundah was capable of no more than 10 kts and was paid off on 23 August
1918.151 His Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Geranium, a sloop, was the only naval
contribution in the early 1920s. This ship was used primarily for hydrographic survey
in northern waters,152 although there is Parliamentary reference to her conducting
patrols as well.153 The only other craft of note was the Gunemba which was used by
Customs in the 1920s and like Gayundah was slow. Gunemba, which was built for
Customs by the Department of Naval Construction, did not meet specifications, could
not chase smugglers and was put up for sale.154

Authorities today readily accept that surface patrol craft operate most effectively in
response to detections made by aircraft, but that it may not have been appreciated as
well in the 1920s. Consequently, there is no report of Geranium’s Fairey floatplane
being used for aerial reconnaissance. Even if the value of aerial reconnaissance had
been appreciated, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) at the time was unlikely to
have been able to contribute. As noted in Parliament by Senator Hardy (New South
Wales) in November 1932, a 1928 report by Sir John Salmond claimed that the Air
Force was not fit to undertake operations alongside the Army and the Navy.155

Throughout the inter-war years the Commonwealth neglected law enforcement at sea
and the constabulary function, and seemed unable to reconcile the need for action with
resource limits and differing State and Commonwealth legislative responsibilities. For
example, as early as 1924, States’ expressed reluctance to accept a commission to
examine harmonization of the activities of State health departments.156 This illustrates a
tension existing to the present day, although circumstances have forced the two tiers of
government to cooperate on law enforcement at sea.
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Cooperation developed slowly and even in the mid-1930s when concerns were being
aired about IUU fishing in northern waters, the States were not amenable to agreement
with the Commonwealth on fishing laws.157 The problem was that the Commonwealth
had legal powers only in Territory waters and there only out to three nautical miles,
the territorial waters limit. State fisheries legislation covered the waters of each of the
States, but again only out to three nautical miles.158

Slowly and hesitantly the response became more rational. In answer to a plea from the
member for the Northern Territory, Mr Nelson, for a response to ‘ … poachers and
mystery vessels in northern waters … ’ the Assistant Minister for Defence, Mr Francis,
advised the Parliament that in February 1933 a vessel had been sent to Thursday Island
to deal with Customs breaches.159 That a single vessel at Thursday Island dealing with
Customs breaches could be suggested as a realistic response to pearl shell poaching
across the ‘Top End’ reflects both the lack of government capacity to respond and any
real sense of urgency.

The reference to ‘mystery vessels’ was also symptomatic of growing concerns in the
north at government inability to provide any level of security in an increasingly less
benign international environment. Reported but unconfirmed sightings included crew
from a Japanese submarine coming ashore, and an unidentified flying boat over
Darwin, both in March 1933.160 Such reports gained credence from an official report by
the Commanding Officer of HMAS Geranium161 who claimed that he had observed
what could only have been activity designed ‘… to spy out the land’.162 The whole
issue was complicated by additional claims that Japanese pearl fishers were molesting
Aboriginal women. In Parliament, the Minister for Defence indicated that the matter
was being addressed by the Department of the Interior.163
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159 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 138, 9 March 1933, p.
138.
160 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 138, 22 March 1933, p.
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The patrol boat in the Thursday Island area was operated by Customs and arrested and
fined at least one foreign boat near the island in 1933.164 The following year, the
Government considered deploying three fast patrol craft, supplemented by aircraft, in
the north.165 Significantly, the departments assigned responsibility for this activity were
the Department of Trade, Customs and the Department of Interior and not Defence or
the Navy.166 according to Captain Charles Haultain, who commanded Darwin’s first
patrol boat, the Larrakia, the Navy was not especially interested in becoming
involved.167 The Department of the Interior had some responsibility because of the
allegations of Japanese pearl fishers interacting with Aboriginal women. Equally
significant were the ineffectiveness of this response over the next few years and the
lack of any sense of urgency from the authorities involved.

The Labor Government, which fell in January 1932, had committed to providing three
patrol boats to operate near Darwin, Thursday Island and in New Guinea waters.168
The commitment was maintained by the incoming United Australia Party
Government. Parliament was told in March 1935 that the Darwin-based patrol boat
would be ‘very fast’ and would be purchased by the Department of Defence for
operation by the Department of the Interior.169 It was to have a range of 600nm and a
crew of three.

At this point the situation became confused, with the Minister of Trade and Customs
telling Parliament on 22 March 1935 that Defence would patrol the Timor Sea with one
boat (presumably based in Darwin), Customs would operate the boat based in
Thursday Island and Interior (Territories Branch) would operate the third boat. He also
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indicated that the Defence boat was operational.170 Yet, the Minister advised that the
Darwin-based boat would be used primarily for search and rescue of any downed
aircraft on the newly established air route from Timor to Darwin.171

By October 1935 the Government conceded that the search and rescue priority for the
Darwin-based boat meant that a second boat would be needed for offshore patrolling.
When announcing that the patrol craft would be available in Darwin early in 1936 and
be operated by the Department of the Interior for the Department of Civil Aviation, the
Minister for Defence, Mr Parkhill, also announced that Customs would operate a
second Darwin-based boat.172 Yet by March 1936 the first patrol craft had not reached
Darwin. Having been built in England, it spent several weeks in Sydney being
inspected by local boat builders, keen to see whether they could build similar craft – a
45 foot (14m) boat with a range of 1,000nm at 19 mph and a top speed of 26 mph!173 The
boat arrived in Darwin on 20 May 1936,174 four years after it was first mooted and for a
primary purpose which ignored the original reason for procuring the craft.

Although the patrol boat enjoyed early success against illegal Japanese pearling
operations, it suffered significant and ultimately embarrassing mechanical problems.
During a June 1937 patrol the Larrakia arrested two Japanese pearling boats and
brought them to Darwin. Embarrassment arose from the need for the Larrakia to be
towed part of the way by one of the captured boats 175 and eventually from legal action
by the owners of the Japanese boats.176 The legal action was based on claims of
wrongful detention after the Larrakia had fired across the bows of Japanese vessels.177
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This action resulted in the Commonwealth paying £8,000 damages to the Japanese
owners.178

While the Government response to illegal fishing in northern waters was clearly
inadequate, there were other sporadic attempts made to provide surveillance. The use
of the Darwin-based flying doctor’s amphibious aircraft to locate the broken down
Larrakia and that aircraft’s reporting of potentially illegal pearling confirmed the
benefits of aerial surveillance in extended ocean areas.179 Not long before, the Federal
Government formally recognized the potential value of aerial surveillance but realized
that without surface response patrol craft it would be ineffective.180

Thought was given to involving the RAAF in aerial surveillance, through a squadron
to be based in Darwin.181 Consideration was also given to including naval vessels with
the Customs patrol craft. However, the Government believed that such a response
would be provocative.182 Possibly as a compromise, the Government agreed that the
RAAF amphibian operating from HMAS Moresby on survey operations, would notify
Northern Territory authorities of sightings.183 In other areas, the response was equally
haphazard. The Cairns Aquatic Club launch was hired for what was an uneventful
Customs patrol as far as Thursday Island in mid-1936.184

By the late 1930s government attention was drawn to more serious security issues and
the prospect of war. Reflecting the growing unease, press reports encouraged a more
serious approach to security in the north. There were suggestions of declaring special
defence zones and establishing a minor naval base in Darwin.185

Even so, initial

responses to offshore security needs once the war began were little more
comprehensive than what had gone before. At the end of 1939, yachtsmen were acting
as voluntary coastal patrols. By late 1941 the RAN operated requisitioned coastal
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steamers for mine warfare and by early 1942 small craft along the coast were being
requisitioned and destroyed or moved inland.186

Until the Second World War there was no apparent attempt to coordinate efforts to
deal with illegal activities in territorial waters. This seems doubly inadequate given the
relative lack of resources at both levels of government and thus the need to make best
use of those available. The reality was that without some kind of permanent air
surveillance backed by surface patrols State and Federal Governments simply had no
way of knowing what was occurring offshore.
Legislative Outcomes
Comparatively little legislation related to the constabulary function passed between
1918 and 1945, and despite growing concern about IUU fishing in the 1930s,
amendments to the immigration laws predominated, numerically. The likely reasons
for this include the understandable preoccupation with deteriorating national and
global economic conditions from the late 1920s and increasing uneasiness about global
security from the mid-1930s. An inability to resolve difficulties caused by differing
Commonwealth and State legal responsibilities also contributed.
Resources Legislation
While much Parliamentary attention to law enforcement at sea related to resources,
primarily IUU fishing in the north and whaling in the south, the only related
legislation was the Whaling Act 1935187 which inter alia examined Commonwealth and
State legislative responsibilities in waters adjacent to Australia and followed
Australia’s signing of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in
1931.188
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Nevertheless, the 1935 Act took effect only in Australian Antarctic waters189 because
Section 51 (x) of the Constitution allows the Commonwealth to regulate fisheries only
beyond territorial seas and most States were not prepared to cede responsibility for
whaling to the Commonwealth.190 Individual State laws were needed to cover whaling
in territorial waters before the Commonwealth could ratify the International
Convention.

Action was needed to conserve whales at this time because of the introduction of
factory ships, enabling whale catchers to remain at sea, instead of returning to port
with each catch. The Whaling Act 1935 enabled the registration of Australian whalers
and it was policed by placing inspectors on whaling ships during the official whaling
season, initially from 1 December 1935 to 1 March 1936. Officers designated under the
Act were given powers of boarding and of arrest without a warrant.191 Other powers
included exclusion of whaling ships from Australian ports unless licensed by the 1935
Act or so authorized by the government of their flag state.192

The 1935 Act had limited impact on non-Australian whalers, among whom Japan had
not then signed the 1931 International Convention.193 Little has changed in the
intervening 82 years, as Japan continues to catch whales in Antarctic waters. Although
a member of the International Whaling Commission since 1951, Japan continues to
catch whales as part of a scientific research program and is one of only two countries to
do so since a moratorium was declared in 1986.194

Environmental Legislation
The first marine environmental legislation of any substance was passed in 1932: it was
also the only such legislation in the period from 1918 to 1945. The Beaches, Fishing
Grounds and Sea Routes Protection Act 1932 aimed to prevent fishing grounds being
Australia gained control of a large part of previously British controlled Antarctica and
adjacent waters through the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933, Commonwealth
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fouled by sinking obsolete vessels and to protect the shore and especially beaches, from
pollution by garbage deposited at sea. Section 3-1 of the Act prohibited the discharge in
Australian waters of rubbish, ashes or organic refuse, without written permission from
the Director of Quarantine or Chief Quarantine Officer. Section 4-1 of the Act
prohibited the sinking of vessels without like permission.195

Enacting such legislation was one thing: enforcing it was another. A question raised in
Parliament by Mr Jennings (Watson) in December 1938 indicated that the Act was not
being enforced and that ship-sourced pollution was still fouling Sydney’s beaches.196
The apparent lack of action mirrors the reluctance to act against alleged illegal fishing
in northern waters throughout the 1930s and is at least partly accounted for by the
Commonwealth’s limited offshore jurisdiction. Another contributing factor was an
apparent reluctance by the Commonwealth to resolve the legal issues and to take
responsibility for a growing problem.

Immigration Legislation
In the arena of border protection, immigration legislation predominated, with
Immigration Acts passed in 1920, 1924, 1925, 1930, 1932 and 1933. These Acts fine-tuned
the earlier legislation. For example the Immigration Act 1920, extended the definition of
prohibited immigrants to include those with specified health issues, anarchists and
enemy aliens from the First World War.197 Of contemporary interest, the Immigration
Act 1920 exempted Indian students from arbitrary conditions which applied to those
wanting permanent residence but who were deemed unsuitable.198
Subsequently, the Immigration Act 1924 made application of the dictation test easier and
the Immigration Act 1925 responded to tightening of immigration into the USA, by
imposing measures to limit immigration from Southern Europe to Australia.199 This
measure was based less on racial issues than on fears that a large influx of Southern
Europeans would increase unemployment locally.
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Customs Legislation
Five Customs Acts emerged in this period, the Customs Acts 1923, 1930, 1934, 1935 and
1936. Very little of the legislation focused on border protection; most of it being related
to changes to duties and tariffs.200

201

In contrast, the 1923 Act listed the circumstances

in which vessels could be subject to seizure and forfeiture, including smuggling and
hovering within one league of the coast.202

The 1923 Act also added aircraft to the craft that could be apprehended if suspected of
illegality. Following the provisions in the original Customs Act 1901, commanders or
officers-in-command of any ship, boat or aircraft in His Majesty’s service, or in the
service of the Commonwealth or Customs, if showing the proper flag or ensign, could
pursue any ship or aircraft that failed to stop or land when lawfully directed to do
so.203 The Act also allowed for ships or aircraft being pursued to be fired at or into, to
compel them to bring to or land.204

The early Customs Acts are clear indications of the approach taken by successive
governments to enforce maritime security. They are robust in their acceptance of the
use of force, but in reality there were few ships or aircraft available to enforce the law.
The 1923 Act is symptomatic of early government approaches to border security and
the constabulary function: it took little account of the lack of enforcement capacity.
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Quarantine Legislation
Only two quarantine acts were enacted during the period; the Acts of 1920 and 1924.
The Quarantine Act 1920 was a response to the haphazard way in which soldiers
returning from Europe were managed during the influenza epidemic. The States were
in charge but lacked uniformity and coherence in their management.205 The Act also
provided for compulsory inoculations onboard ship or in designated quarantine areas.
As in other instances of legislative overlap, the States feared that this legislation was
the beginning of a Commonwealth takeover.206 Acknowledgment of this fear was one
reason the Commonwealth was reluctant to accept border protection responsibilities
for many years.

Despite the qualms associated with greater Commonwealth powers, the Quarantine Act
1924 set out to extend them in a quarantine emergency, especially relating to plants
and animals.207 It reflected the significant pest issues in some States and a grudging
acknowledgement that quarantine was best managed centrally.208 Nevertheless, the
1924 Act retained the process of Commonwealth direction but State-based
administration.

The Implications for the RAN Between the Wars
The constabulary function barely touched the RAN in the inter-war years. The main
reasons for this were that the RAN was not configured for constabulary work, suffered
debilitating cuts in ship and personnel numbers and thus, was not seen by government
as a likely contributor to law enforcement at sea.

At the end of the First World War the RAN was a relatively strong force, structured for
war. Its main units are listed in Table 4.5 below. There were also some auxiliary ships
including a fleet oiler. For its time this was a compact, balanced force, reflecting recent
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wartime experiences. None of its units was designed for constabulary work although
the torpedo boat destroyers and sloops could have been used. Instead, those remaining
in commission after the War were at times used as training ships.209
Warship type
Battlecruiser
Flotilla leader210
Torpedo boats 1st
class
Torpedo boat
destroyers
Gunboat

No.
1
1
1

Warship type
Light cruiser
Turret ship
Sloops

11

Submarines

No.
6
1
4
6

1
Table 4-4: The RAN in 1920211

The RAN’s capacity for constabulary work diminished significantly during the 1920s.
Firstly, in Parliament there were occasional calls for cutting the Navy, which was then
seen to be too costly.212 Intriguingly, Senator Duncan (New South Wales) in one of the
calls, noted that the only work the Navy would be called on to do in the near future ‘
… will be merely police work in connexion (sic) with the Mandated Territories and the
Territories belonging to the Commonwealth’.213 Occasional Parliamentary comments,
such as this one, highlight that however ill-suited and unprepared the RAN was for the
constabulary task, it was the only Commonwealth government organization with any
offshore patrol capacity. Government priorities nevertheless did not include law
enforcement at sea and the associated constabulary function. The budget debates and
statements in the early 1920s made no mention of them in discussion of Defence.214
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Following the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference and the associated Treaty
for the Limitation of Armament, signed on 6 February 1922,215 RAN strength was cut.
Ships in commission reduced from 25 to 13 and personnel numbers dropped from 4
843 in 1921 to 3 500 in 1923.216 The Washington Treaty impact was compounded by the
global economic downturn from the late 1920s. By 1930 the RAN had only four ships
in commission; HMA Ships Australia (II), Canberra, Albatross and Anzac.217 So dire was
the situation that consideration was given to abolishing the RAN as an independent
organization, as an economy measure.218 At this point the RAN could not undertake
any kind of constabulary tasking; Anzac being the only ship in any way suitable for
such work.

Although this was the Navy’s nadir in respect of warship numbers, recovery was slow
and did not always occur for predictable reasons. By 1933 a sloop was being built in
Sydney’s Cockatoo Island dockyard, as relief work for the unemployed. As Mr
Harrison (Bendigo) pointed out, the ship was intended only for ‘… survey work, and
other necessary but purely peaceful activities’.219 By late 1933, however, the need for rearmament emerged as fears of another war grew.220 Thus, at a time when the
Government was beginning to act against illegal fishing in northern waters, its
perception of the Navy’s role was being shaped by the growing possibility of war. This
remained the case throughout the remainder of the 1930s and the Second World War.
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1945-1975: THE COMMONWEALTH STIRS
Resources Protection
After the Second World War resource protection remained the most important
constabulary task; becoming more complex as whaling, distant water fishing and the
discovery of oil and gas offshore generated new demands. The importance of the task
reflected the intent of other nations to fish in waters over which Australia could claim
rights, the prospects for offshore oil and gas discoveries with significant economic
implications for Australia and Australia’s confused and inadequate offshore legal
regime.

Attention focused first on the pearling industry, with fears that the Japanese would
reappear because of local labour shortages.221 Subsequent reports of Japanese pearlers
operating off the coasts of north-west Australia and Papua New Guinea drew calls for
naval patrols and an indication that there was little capacity available. The patrol craft
at Manus Island in Papua New Guinea was undergoing maintenance when the
pearlers were reported off the coast.222 Subsequent expressions of concern over
pearling were overtaken by the declining demand for pearl shell, being replaced by
plastic for many uses.223 Nevertheless, observation of the Japanese pearling operations
in 1959 was conducted by an RAN oceangoing tug, indicating the limitations of the
surface patrol capacity.224

Whaling also grew in importance during the late 1940s, because of foreign activity in
waters of interest to Australia and the establishment of a short-lived Australian
industry. Foreign whaling activity began with reports of Japanese whalers in Antarctic
waters and the prospect of Australia following suit.225 External Affairs Minister Evatt
noted in Parliament that Japan was not serious about complying with International
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Whaling Regulations and thus Australia would not support further Japanese whaling
expeditions in the Antarctic.226

In 1962, more whaling countries appeared not to be cooperating with the International
Whaling Commission over the take of hump-back whales in Antarctic waters, with
implications for whaling off the Australian coast. Furthermore, Russian whaling off the
Australian coast may have led to a scarcity of whales in the 1962 season.227 Russian
whalers continued to operate in waters off Australia amid concerns that RAN patrols
might be needed to protect the local industry.228

Nevertheless, east coast whaling ceased in 1962 because of depleted stocks. While the
whaling station in Albany Western Australia remained operational, the International
Whaling Commission decided against setting sperm whale quotas for the Australian
coast229 and Russian whalers continued to operate legally off the west coast.230 Whaling
attracted little more attention during this period, apart from receiving an
acknowledgement in Parliament that it was not being policed by the RAN either in
Antarctic waters or the Indian Ocean as late as 1971.231

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s concern grew in Australia at the extent of exploitation
of local fish stocks; notably by Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese fishers. Despite the
very small Australian fishing industry, a constant theme was of sightings of foreign
fishing fleets off the Australian coast, assumptions that they were fishing illegally and
calls for naval patrols to stop them.

Early concerns included Japanese tuna fishing off the Queensland coast and in the
Coral Sea.232 By the early 1960s large Japanese tuna fishing fleets were also operating
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off Western Australia amidst questions, from Mr Collard (Kalgoorlie) for example, as
to why Australia had no comparable tuna industry.233 Throughout the 1960s the
Japanese fleets fished off the east, west and southern coasts and generated concern in
Parliament.234 Mr Fulton (Leichardt) complained about Japanese fishing operations in
Torres Strait, and asked for patrol boats to protect Australian interests.235

The situation was exacerbated by the appearance of fishing vessels from Russia, South
Africa, China and Taiwan in the late 1960s. Concerns grew that foreign fishing vessels
were operating within the 12 nm fishing zone and even within the territorial sea. Calls
grew for patrol boats to be based around the coast.236 Particular attention was
demanded for patrols of the Gulf of Carpentaria during the 1960s especially, over fears
that foreign fishers were ruining the local prawn industry.237 This followed claims of
over 100 foreign fishing vessels in the Gulf in 1968 and no patrols to monitor their
activities. Consequently, there was another call, from Mr Fulton, to establish a coast
guard if the Services could not meet the demand for patrols.238

The discovery of offshore oil and gas deposits led to questions about protecting the
associated infrastructure. Although oil was found in Exmouth Gulf (Western Australia)
in 1954239 years passed before protection of the offshore infrastructure became a
significant issue.

An intractable problem concerning access to offshore resources was the legal status of
Australian waters. Throughout the 1960s Parliament debated the Commonwealth’s
offshore jurisdiction – whether it actually had any and what limits might apply.240
Debate also considered whether the States had any jurisdiction beyond the low water
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 37, 15 November 1962,
p. 2457.
234 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 58, 19 March 1968, p.
220.
235 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 58, 2 May 1968, p. 1019.
236 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 61, 12 November 1968,
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237 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 63, 21 May 1969, p. 2037.
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240 See for example, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 24, 10 September 1963, p.
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mark.241 Resolution of this question was hampered by a mistaken perception that
before Federation the colonies had acquired territorial seas. The question was not
clarified by the differing opinions proffered by the Judges of the High Court in the case
Bonser v La Macchia in 1969.242

The inadequacy of the resources available to patrol coastal waters and monitor the
activities of Australian and foreign commercial fishers, was equally disturbing. There
were claims that the coast from Cairns to Carnarvon was practically defenceless and
even when the Navy acquired patrol boats in the 1960s there were complaints that they
were too slow and too few.243
Marine Environmental Protection
The state of the marine environment became more pressing during this period as the
importance of coastal waters for resources and tourism became better appreciated.
Ship-sourced pollution, the health of the Great Barrier Reef, oil and gas rig safety and
the need for legal clarity were the main problems.

Ship-sourced oil pollution appeared either as slicks from leaks, or deliberate discharge
which sometimes washed ashore, and slicks from ships holed after running aground.
During the period the most serious incident was the grounding of the Ocean Grandeur
in Torres Strait on 3 March 1970, with a significant oil spill.244 This incident lent weight
to earlier expressed concerns over tankers sailing inside the Great Barrier Reef, the
potential for similar accidents there and the huge consequential environmental
implications.245
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Other important threats to the health of the Great Barrier Reef included the Crown of
Thorns Starfish, commercial fishing and the potential for oil exploration on the Reef.246
The uncertainty as to State and Commonwealth jurisdiction which made the legal
position on resource protection unclear had the same impact on marine environmental
protection. Mr Fulton raised the matter twice in Parliament during 1968.247 The matter
was raised again in 1971 along with a call for uniform marine oil pollution laws among
the States and the Commonwealth.

Border Protection
During this period border protection matters drew less attention than resources and
environmental protection. Nevertheless, smuggling became a greater problem, with
drugs becoming especially prevalent, and a substantial export trade emerged in
Australian native birds. Drug smuggling became a major issue in the 1960s with Asian
drug rings becoming prominent.248 Customs reported that they had intercepted 112
drug shipments in the year to February 1967.249 Although the coastline remained very
much open to smuggling, most of the drugs entered Australia through seaports and
airports. By contrast, outward bird smuggling took place mainly from small ports,
making the crime difficult to counter.250

The challenge of countering the smuggling trade was exacerbated by a shortage of
Customs officers and by suggestions of corruption in 1969. Twenty four officers were
charged with allowing the evasion of duties worth over $2m. The problem was as
much the result of the shortage of officers and disorganization within the Sydney office
as it was corruption.251

Quarantine remained a relatively high priority, with continuing concerns about foot
and mouth disease being introduced through illegal landings by foreign fishers on the
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north-west coast.252 The beginning of the container trade and the growth of
unscheduled light aircraft traffic to and from Southeast Asia, were also expected to
generate challenges for quarantine officials.253

Immigration remained a relatively minor border protection issue, although some
concerns were expressed about a small number of illegal immigrants. Some 1,674
people arrived in Australia without proper documentation; 1,542 by air, between 1967
and 1969. All but three were allowed to remain; discrepancies in documentation being
mainly oversight by the travellers.254 Additionally, from 1967 to 1970, 2,315 seamen
deserted from their ships in Australian ports, many remaining at large.255
The Government Response
Immediately after the Second World War the Commonwealth had many challenges in
returning the country to a peacetime footing and managing public expectations.
Consequently, little attention was paid to the constabulary function and the border
protection and associated tasks. As political and public interest grew in resources
protection and other offshore security issues, the Commonwealth was forced to act. As
in earlier periods, however, the Government reaction was reluctant, poorly
coordinated and until the end of this period, still limited by the lack of clarity in
offshore sovereignty legislation.

Although there were fears in the immediate post-war years of another global war at
any time, the Commonwealth Government strictly limited defence spending, especially
in the early years. Prime Minister Chifley announced in 1947 that ‘ … the Services
should be small and efficient,…’.256 They became small quickly and the Government
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admitted in 1947 that there were insufficient people to maintain reserve patrol craft in
Brisbane.257 By 1948 the RAN permanent forces comprised only 6,859 people.258

Concerns over the limited capacity of the Services continued through the 1950s and
early 1960s, with Labor’s Kim Beazley (Senior) in late 1961 suggesting steps needing to
be taken if ‘ … we are ever to have what could be regarded as a deterrent navy as
distinct from a police navy, which is what the Royal Australian Navy is’.259
Government incapacity to deal with the demands of the constabulary function was
evident in its basing of the inadequate HMAS Banks in Darwin for both survey and
patrol work.260

Because of concerns over foreign fishing throughout the 1950s there were several
parliamentary calls for naval forces to be based in the north. Government responses
pointed out that forces could be moved there if they were needed,261 or that those
already there were adequate. For example, Mr Osborne, the Minister for Air, was
typically offhand in August 1958; identifying the RAN presence in northern waters as
four ships engaged in survey operations and ‘other tasks’.262

There were still suggestions that the constabulary function should not be a Defence
responsibility. For example, in 1950 a patrol boat was operated by a Coastal Patrol
Service in Darwin and consideration was given to bringing the patrol craft operated by
the Native Affairs Department and the Police into the Coastal Patrol Service.263 Most
revealing was the indication that the Navy had ‘ … long pressed the point that
warships were not built, equipped or manned to act economically as fisheries
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257
258

166

surveillance vessels’.264 Later, in 1971, even after the Navy became formally involved,
the Minister for the Navy openly questioned whether constabulary work was a task for
the Navy or for a coast guard.265

An indication that the constabulary function would demand greater attention came
with the Customs Department proposal in May 1969 to purchase aircraft for northern
littoral surveillance and its suggestion that Australia should consider formation of a
coast guard.266 While the government did not act on these proposals, it did establish an
Interdepartmental Committee later in 1969 to examine the coastal surveillance needs.267
This was the first of several such committees over the following six years.

When the Government eventually engaged formally in the constabulary function its
earlier reluctance remained evident. The purchase of patrol boats for the RAN in the
mid-1960s responded to the need for additional forces to deal with Indonesian
Confrontation. It was not a response to foreign fishing or other offshore activity in
Australian waters.268 Twenty Attack Class patrol boats were commissioned in 1967
and 1968 and with Confrontation having ended in 1966, the patrol craft were available
for other employment.

There was still no urgency to base them in northern waters, the focus of most concern
over foreign fishing. Initial plans had the boats based in the southern States capital
cities and in Darwin; with the majority in Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney.269 By
1969 there were only four patrol boats in northern waters, but in 1970 the Government
announced the building of a base in Cairns to support three boats.270 Even as the patrol
boats assumed the constabulary function and conducted fisheries patrols, their
shortcomings were exposed. The Attack Class proved to be too slow, poorly armed and
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not well adapted for tropical operations.271 By 1974, just seven years after the first of the
Attacks commissioned, plans were in place to replace them, thereby giving substance
to the criticisms.272
Legislative Development
The lack of capacity to enforce the law in Australian coastal waters underlay all
challenges to the constabulary function. This became increasingly apparent as more
attention was paid to coastal waters and as foreign fishing expanded in waters off the
Australian coast. Ultimately it led to the enactment of ground breaking legislation
which greatly increased Commonwealth control over coastal waters and of activities in
them.
Resources Legislation
The first significant legislation was the Fisheries Act 1952 which legislated for the
management of fishing in ‘Australian waters’ beyond the three nautical mile territorial
sea limit.273 Until then existing legislation (State and Commonwealth) was confined
within the territorial sea. While the Act did not specify which waters outside the three
nautical mile limit would be affected, it stated that certain of those waters would be
proclaimed for the regulation of fishing.274 Debate on the Fisheries Bill 1952 noted the
economic importance of the Australian fishing industry, including pearling and
whaling.

Parliament was influenced by expanding offshore legislative activism in other parts of
the world, notably the USA, which claimed jurisdiction over the natural resources of its
continental shelf.275 It was also influenced by the potential of increasing foreign fishing
to affect Australian fisheries. Agreements to regulate these operations off the
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273 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 216, 28 February 1952,
p. 564. See also Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, pp. 18-25 for an explanation of the associated
constitutional legal debate from before Federation.
274 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 216, 28 February 1952,
p. 564.
275 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 216, 28 February 1952,
p. 565.
271

168

Australian coast would need the legal foundation provided by the 1952 Act.276 The Act
was amended by the Fisheries Act 1953, which included the extra-territorial waters of
Australia’s external territories.277 It was further amended by the Fisheries Act 1959
which provided the power to manage specific species or other categories of fish, in
extra-territorial waters.278 This Act also ensured the licensing of all Australian
commercial fishers.

There was still no coherent program to establish an offshore

legislative regime for Australia. The laws being passed reflect government reaction to
pressures from industry and to a lesser extent the public.

The first legislative sign of major change came with the Fisheries Act 1967, which
extended Australia’s exclusive fishing zone to 12 nm, thus providing control of fishing
to all waters between the three mile and 12 mile limits.279 The Act also introduced
licensing for foreign fishing vessels, with a phase-in period for those vessels which had
fished in Australian waters for some time.280 By formalizing Commonwealth
responsibility for fisheries legislation beyond territorial waters and by acknowledging
the growing presence of foreign fishers, this legislation responded to community
concerns expressed frequently in the Parliament.

The legislative effort gained impetus in 1969 from a case brought against a fisher
accused of using illegal equipment while fishing some six miles off the New South
Wales coast (Bonser v La Macchia). The High Court found unanimously against the
defendant, but the judges split on determining the inner limit of Commonwealth
power over fisheries.281 This case and the differing views of the High Court judges, led
to more assertive Commonwealth legislative efforts.
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More change, reflecting the increasing economic value of the fishing industry and
recognition of the need to manage fish stocks, came in the Fisheries Act 1973 which
enabled more limitations to be placed on fishing in specific areas and with respect to
specific species, and required licenses for fishing in these areas.282 The Law also limited
the amount of fishing gear carried by vessels and nominated penalties for illegal
fishing, including suspension of license and forfeiture of vessels. The Fisheries Act 1973
was enacted with the expectation that Australia’s claim for a 200nm fishing zone
would be upheld in law of the sea negotiations and lead to further legislation.283

The final piece of fisheries legislation in this period was the Fisheries Act 1975 which
was aimed at Indonesian commercial and other fishing activity off the Australian
north-west coast.284 It limited Indonesian fishing off the Australian coast to areas near
the Ashmore, Cartier and Scott Islands and reefs. This Act strictly limited the ability of
Indonesian fishers to land when looking for fresh water, because of quarantine and
illegal entry concerns.285

Non-living natural resources also gained attention in this period, not least because of
the growing importance of offshore petroleum deposits and the still unresolved matter
of Commonwealth and State jurisdiction beyond the low water mark. The first
significant legislation was the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967, providing a
legislative framework for the exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum
adjacent to Australia.286 The Commonwealth and States’ agreement to ensure legality
of titles for search and production of petroleum, but without any impact on the States’
constitutional claims, was an important aspect of the Act.287
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It took a change of government for real progress to be made and even then the contest
for offshore sovereignty between the Commonwealth and the States was not resolved
easily. On 10 May 1973, the new Labor Government introduced the Seas and Submerged
Lands Bill 1973.288 This Bill expressed Labor frustration at the failure of the previous
coalition Government to progress its own Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill 1970,
because of the differences between the Commonwealth and State Governments over
offshore sovereignty.289

The 1973 Bill tried to remove doubts over the Commonwealth’s exclusive rights to
sovereign control of seabed resources from the low water mark to the outer limit of the
continental shelf. Furthermore, it aimed to provide a legislative framework for offshore
exploration and exploitation of petroleum and other minerals.290 The Government
anticipated that the States would lodge legal claims against the Bill. The Opposition
also failed to support the Bill, objecting especially to Part III which sought to establish a
mining code for all minerals, which was to be managed by the Commonwealth,
thereby impacting on the States’ presumed powers.291 In a very significant ruling the
High Court of Australia, on 17 December 1975, upheld the Seas and Submerged Lands
Act 1973, thus granting the Commonwealth legal authority over the territorial sea and
continental shelf from the low water mark.292

The Commonwealth Government had attempted to enact a legal regime which would
give it unprecedented offshore authority and which would, by design or by default,
enable it to assume responsibility for the constabulary function in a comprehensive and
coherent way not previously possible.293 Its new powers would be tested in different
ways and in a relatively short time.
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Border Protection Legislation
Although Customs-related legislation dominated the border protection category from
1945 to 1975, little of it was significant for border protection. There were several
Customs Acts passed between 1950 and 1963, which mainly amended and strengthened
administrative and other processes.294 Nevertheless, as the period closed increasing
interest in border protection was reflected in two Acts.

The Customs Act 1967 was the first to reflect growing community and legal concerns
over narcotic drugs and especially their illegal importation. This Act increased
penalties for crimes associated with narcotics and also emphasized the responsibilities
of captains of ships and aircraft with respect to allowing their craft to be used for
smuggling.295 The Customs Act (No. 2) 1971 had a similar focus and aimed to strengthen
the law in relation to illegal importation of narcotic drugs. Despite the earlier
legislation, the drug problem continued to worsen, with only about 15 per cent of the
illegal substances being intercepted enroute to Australia.296

By 1973, the Customs focus had widened to include flora and fauna. The Customs Act
1973 enabled Customs to include endangered fish species within its purview under the
CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) to
which Australia had subscribed.297

Migration legislation during the period dealt primarily with administrative processes
and while it reflected ongoing concerns over illegal entrants, it also introduced the first
liberalization of racially-based immigration policy. The Immigration Act 1948 improved
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regulation of migration agents and the deportation of stowaways.298 Subsequently, the
Immigration Act 1949 acted on a High Court ruling invalidating the prior issuing of
certificates of exemption to thousands of persons who might otherwise have been
declared prohibited immigrants, and required the retrospective application of the
dictation test.299 The dictation test was replaced by a system of entry permits in the
Migration Act 1958, which also liberalized other processes, including those associated
with deportation. This Act recognized the damage which the dictation test was doing,
especially to Australia’s relationships with Asian countries and acknowledged that the
test was no longer appropriate.300

The growth in air travel created a significant risk of introducing diseases from which
Australia had remained free and resulted in the Quarantine Act 1947 and the Quarantine
Act (No. 2) 1947. The first Act applied stricter controls over the movement of people
and animals that might prove to be health risks, while the second Act increased the
Minister’s powers in the case of any quarantine emergency.301 Later, the Quarantine Act
1969 revised the penalties for quarantine breaches and focused on the potential
economic impact of any outbreak of foot and mouth disease.302
Environmental Legislation
Beginning in 1960, three successive Acts moved to reduce the potential for damage
from spills or intentional discharge of oil at sea. The Pollution of the Sea By Oil Act 1960
followed the coming into force in 1958 of the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954. It applied outside the territorial sea, and was followed
by complementary State legislation to cover territorial waters. The 1960 Act specified
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distances offshore beyond which oil could be discharged, penalties for improper
discharge, inspection and control mechanisms and the regulators’ powers.303

The two later Acts, Pollution of the Sea By Oil Acts 1965 and 1972, extended these
provisions. The 1965 Act extended the types and size of ships covered by the
legislation, extended prohibited zones and totally prohibited discharge from new ships
of greater than 20,000 tonnes. It also increased penalties for improper discharge.304 The
1972 Act reduced further the amount of oil that could be discharged and included the
Great Barrier Reef as part of Australia’s coastline, for protection.305 The strong focus on
marine oil pollution was emphasized with the amendment to the Navigation Act in
1971, making ships’ owners and masters responsible for oil spill clean-up.306

Public and parliamentary pressure for specific legislation to protect the Great Barrier
Reef was rewarded partially with the establishment of Royal Commissions, with
identical terms of reference, by the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments, in
1970. Both Royal Commissions examined the implications of drilling for petroleum on
the Reef.307 Ultimately, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 was passed. It
established the Marine Park Authority, which was to identify areas of the Reef to be
included in the Marine Park and decide appropriate uses for the entire Reef.308 The Act
prohibited any drilling on the Reef unless authorized by the Authority.

The Implications of the Constabulary Function for the RAN
Growing community and political interest in offshore activities around Australia after
the Second World War had some significant impacts on the RAN. Firstly, the
application of the Attack class patrol boats to the constabulary function in the late
1960s was evidence of government acceptance that the function was a Navy

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 26, 30 March 1960, p.
740.
304 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 45, 17 March 1965, p. 82.
305 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 81, 24 October 1972, p.
3085.
306 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 71, 31 March 1971, pp.
1225-6.
307 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 67, 5 May 1970, p. 1594.
308 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 95, 22 May 1975, p. 2679.
303

174

responsibility. Prior to that, as noted in Parliament in 1968, the Navy had conducted
only incidental fisheries patrols.309

Secondly, the introduction of the Attacks and their allocation to fisheries patrols and to
other law enforcement tasks, represented the acceptance of a new task by the RAN,
which had significant long and short-term ramifications for the organization. Firstly,
the RAN began operating from more bases, spread around the coast and developed
new operating facilities in Cairns (1974) and Darwin (1970).310 In the longer term this
posed challenges, such as provision of industrial and other logistics support and
provision of facilities for patrol boat crews and their families.

The new tasking also provided early command opportunities for junior officers311 and
an excellent training environment. It also introduced the RAN to the complexities of
the law of the sea and of Australia’s own legal framework, which would evolve
significantly in response to the growth of foreign maritime activity off Australia’s
coast.

Involvement in the constabulary function also brought the Navy into the public and
political eye with an unaccustomed regularity. Much attention related to interceptions
of foreign fishing vessels and the supposed inadequacies of the Attack Class patrol
boats. Mostly, it was not contentious. But the Navy’s leaders at the time were not
politically astute and in the eyes of one observer, ‘ … they had difficulty in
understanding politics and they doubted whether politics was either valuable or
essential’.312 Thus in late 1968 the Naval Board was forced to disagree publicly with the
repeated assessments by the Fleet Commander (Rear Admiral ‘Buster’ Crabb) that the
Navy needed 40 or 50 patrol boats, rather than the 20 in service.313 The need for
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political astuteness would be demonstrated repeatedly in succeeding years, not least in
respect of the Navy’s involvement in the constabulary function.
CONCLUSIONS
The constabulary function of the Navy was very slow to develop after Federation and
only became a formal part of Navy tasking after 1967 and the arrival of the Attack class
patrol boats. This reflected the nation’s approach to civil maritime security concerns,
which also evolved gradually, in an ad hoc manner and sometimes grudgingly. Limited
resources were a significant factor in the Federal Government’s ability to respond to
maritime security demands, along with restricted offshore jurisdiction, until a
landmark High Court decision in December 1975.

Although illegal immigration and the need to maintain secure customs borders were
the initial focus of the Federal Government, management of offshore resources became
an important issue before the First World War and remained so for much of the period
under review. Pearl and other fishing, including whaling, were joined towards the end
of the period by offshore oil and gas as the predominant marine resource challenges.
Concerns about the marine environment and the effects of marine pollution also grew
slowly, but in the latter part of the period they became significant, with the Great
Barrier Reef becoming a particular focus.

The Federal Government had few resources with which to respond to civil maritime
security challenges in the first decades after Federation. Also, for many years responses
seemed to be driven more by expected costs than by any desire to deter the challenges.
The first serious surface patrols appeared in northern waters in the 1930s but it was
many years before they were supported by aerial surveillance. Throughout the period
there was no consensus as to whether Defence should be responsible for the
constabulary function, a matter highlighted when the first true Navy patrol boat force,
the Attack class, was not acquired specifically for constabulary work.

Commonwealth legislation relating to civil maritime security functions was relatively
slow to emerge with two exceptions. Laws were passed very soon after the sitting of
the first Parliament to restrict immigration and to enable the collection of revenue from
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Customs duties and tariffs. They were followed by the Quarantine Act 1908. The first
substantial marine environmental legislation was not passed until 1932. Fisheries
legislation began appearing from 1952 and grew in importance and complexity as the
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) was declared and ultimately extended to 200nm.
Other marine resource legislation appeared from 1967 in support of offshore oil and
gas exploration, while long-standing legislation faced change because of domestic and
international developments. Thus immigration law was modified to reflect the end of
the so-called ‘White Australia Policy’ and Customs and Quarantine laws were
amended to cater for the strong growth in international air travel. Customs legislation
also responded to problems from the smuggling of drugs into Australia, and the
smuggling of flora and fauna into and out of the country. Towards the end of the
period, marine environmental legislation gained prominence, especially in response to
international action to combat marine pollution and in acknowledgement of the
increasing economic and environmental importance of the Great Barrier Reef.

Although the RAN conducted occasional patrols in support of the constabulary
function from early post-Federation days, many years passed before the function was
formally acknowledged. This reflected both ongoing uncertainty as to whether the
function was properly a Navy one, and the fact that the RAN was generally a very
small force, limited in every aspect of its operational responsibilities. Even when the
Attack class boats appeared from 1967, they were not initially tasked primarily on
constabulary operations. By the end of 1975, however, the patrol boat force was
engaged deeply in the constabulary function in both northern and southern waters, for
the first time providing the RAN with a significant peacetime public profile.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES: THE
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE - 1976 TO 1988
INTRODUCTION
From 1976 to 1988 development of the constabulary function in Australia was marked
by several significant issues. Firstly, the 1975 High Court decision on offshore
jurisdiction evolved to produce a compromise settlement with the States known as the
Offshore Constitutional Settlement. Secondly, the extension of the Australian Fishing
Zone (AFZ) from 12 nm to 200 nm and the declaration of an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) of the same width, extended the nature and extent of the constabulary function
and demanded a more comprehensive government response. Thirdly, for the first time
since Federation people began arriving irregularly by boat. These asylum seekers, later
termed irregular maritime arrivals, have come in several waves since 1976. Their
arrival has ignited old fears of invasion and has been exploited by political parties.
Finally, government response to the changing demands of the constabulary function
evolved slowly and hesitatingly, from ad hoc reactions to comprehensive deterrence
involving the coordinated efforts of several government instrumentalities. This
response emerged from a series of reviews conducted within and for the Government,
which exposed the extent and complexity of the constabulary function and the means
of enabling it.

This chapter continues examination of the evolution of the constabulary function in
respect of the three main tasks associated with it in Australia. The chapter also
analyzes the government response to those issues, including legislative action, and the
implications for the Navy of the issues and government response to them. This analysis
will demonstrate how the demands of maritime law enforcement expanded and how
governments struggled to develop a coherent response. It will also demonstrate the
growing involvement of the Navy in the constabulary function and the potential for
this involvement to impact on other aspects of the Navy’s operations.
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FROM 1976 TO 1988: TRIAL AND ERROR
Border Protection-Immigration
From 1945 until 1975 resources protection had been the main focus of the constabulary
function. There was a dramatic change after 1975 with the arrival of the first asylum
seekers1 attempting to make unauthorized landings in Australia by boat. Prior to 1975
refugees or asylum seekers, were virtually unknown in Australia.2 Geographical
isolation and restrictive immigration policies had combined to insulate the country
from refugee flows common in other parts of the world. Consequently, the few
irregular maritime arrivals before 1975 were dealt with individually by the
Immigration Minister under the Migration Act 1958.3
Circumstances changed quickly with the outflow of refugees from Vietnam after the
reunification of the country in 1975. The first boatload of Vietnamese irregular
maritime arrivals, five men, arrived in Darwin on 26 April 1976. This began what
became the first wave of then so-called ‘boat people’, some 2,059 people when the last
of the wave arrived in August 1981.4 By October 1977, the eleventh boat carrying
irregular maritime arrivals had arrived on the north coast5

By then, irregular maritime arrivals were causing concerns for more than the
immigration authorities. A report that one group of Vietnamese had spent a week on
the north-west coast awaiting rescue highlighted the quarantine implications,6 which
also extended to the boats themselves. Arrival numbers were small during this first

Several terms have been used to describe those people making their way to Australia by boat,
ostensibly as refugees. The term current at the time of writing is ‘irregular maritime arrivals’
will be used from this point onward. Border Protection Command,
<http://www.bpc.gov.gov.au> (23 May 2012).
2 Andreas Schloenhardt, ‘Australia and the Boat-People: 25 years of Unauthorised Arrivals’,
UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2000, p. 36.
3 Schloenhardt, ‘Australia and the Boat-People: 25 years of Unauthorised Arrivals’, p. 36.
4 Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976, Department of
Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 5 January 2011, p. 1.
5 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 74, 4 October 1977, p. 1009.
6 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 74, 17 August 1977, p. 128.
1
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wave and by 1979 the rate of arrivals was slowing: 20 boats had come in 1978, but by
November 1979 only six irregular maritime arrival boats had landed for the year.7

Indo-China was not the only source of irregular arrivals. There were occasional reports
in the 1970s of Papua New Guinea natives entering Queensland illegally through the
Torres Strait islands and staying in Cairns, Townsville and Weipa.8 Concerns were not
limited to the illegal movement of people but extended to the potential introduction of
exotic plant and animal diseases.9

The status of these first irregular maritime arrivals was the subject of parliamentary
discussion, with the then Minister for Immigration, Michael McKellar, suggesting they
were not ‘illegal immigrants’. ‘They have made unauthorized trips to Australia but as
soon as they arrive they are processed in the normal way and given valid entry
permits, so they are not illegal immigrants’.10 That judgment was questioned by those
who argued that it represented an open invitation for refugees to come to Australia.11
The differing views led to the first of many parliamentary debates on irregular
maritime arrivals and especially the so-called ‘people smugglers’ who brought them.12
Border Protection-Quarantine
Closely related to irregular maritime arrivals was the fear of quarantine breaches,
either by the arrivals themselves or by plants or animals in their possession. The matter
was raised in Parliament in August 1978 and while there was acceptance that boats,
their crews and passengers were correctly processed, concerns remained over disposal
of the boats.13

Incidents such as that reported in Parliament by Senator Tate

(Tasmania) on 24 May 1979 highlighted the potential for quarantine breaches and the
difficulty in preventing them on the remote north and north-west coast of Australia.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 83, 23 November 1979, p. 2958.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 71, 23 February 1977, p. 283.
9 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 114, 31 May 1979, p.
2734.
10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 109, 26 May 1978, p.
2591.
11 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 81, 2 May 1979, p. 1546.
12 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 119, 20 August 1980, p.
526.
13 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 78, 22 August 1978, p. 231.
7
8
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The Senator claimed that Quarantine officers had to charter a helicopter to access a
refugee boat some 130km from Darwin and that the officers were left at the site for 36
hours with no communications.14

Unauthorized landings by foreign fishing vessels also caused quarantine concerns. As
indicated by Minister for Health Mackellar, records of such landings were kept only
from July 1978, with the introduction of the upgraded Civil Coastal Surveillance
program. Twenty five landings were reported to late 1981, from some 54 foreign
fishing vessel sightings that could have led to landings.15 In many cases investigated,
illegal fishing had also taken place and where possible punitive action was taken.16

Other less intensive examples of quarantine breaches demonstrated ongoing concern
about the adequacy of policing. These concerns included the arrival in Australia of
insects carried in mail, and bird smuggling. The latter issue led to fears of an outbreak
of Newcastle disease, which was prevented, at least once, by the interception of a
smuggled infected bird.17

Border Protection-Customs
The illegal import of drugs and weapons and the export of drugs and fauna were also
significant during the period,18 with drug smuggling becoming a major problem for
Customs. In the late 1970s concerns emerged that unauthorized aircraft were bringing
drugs into northern Australia, with several unidentified aircraft reported in early
1978.19 None of these reports was verified; continuing a history of similar reports, of
ships or aircraft, from the remoter parts of Australia. Reports of unauthorized aircraft

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 81, 24 May 1979, pp. 2082-3.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 125, 17 November 1981,
p. 2967.
16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 125, 17 November 1981,
p. 2967.
17 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 107, 11 October 1977,
pp. 1842 and 1861.
18 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, The Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra,
1984, p. 2-6.
19 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 77, 24 May 1978, p. 1812.
14
15
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importing drugs through the Sir Edward Pellew islands followed in 1984.20 Ships were
also suspected of being used for drug smuggling when, for example, drugs were found
on beaches in Victoria, Western Australia and New South Wales during late 1975 and
early 1976.21

While the inward smuggling of birds generated quarantine problems, their outward
smuggling was also a serious matter for Customs officials. Between 1975 and 1982, 107
people were prosecuted for bird smuggling, 50 of them in New South Wales. More
than 800 birds were recovered between 1979-80 and 18 October 1981, at a reported
value of $41,748.22
Resources Protection
The activities of foreign fishing vessels operating off the Australian coast had long been
a concern, even before the declaration of an AFZ. The expectation of a 200nm AFZ,23
which was declared in November 1979, heightened anxiety.24 One fear was that foreign
fishers would gain access to the extended AFZ, through joint ventures with Australian
companies, before stocks were fully assessed.25 By 1979, 10 joint venture proposals had
been received for fishing in Tasmanian waters, three having been approved, with
Japanese, United States (US) and Polish companies.26 The Japanese and Taiwanese
proposals created the greatest fears, because of their long-standing interest in
Australian fisheries and their significant capacity.

The scale of the problem was illustrated in a question by Mr Wentworth (Mackellar) in
the House of Representatives on 19 May 1976. In response, Minister for Primary
Industry Sinclair, noted that between July 1975 and April 1976 hundreds of foreign
fishing vessels were sighted within 200nm of Australian territory, although some may
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 105, 13 September 1984, p. 997.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 98, 30 March 1976, p.
1095.
22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 130, 11 November 1982,
p. 3045.
23 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 82, 17 October 1979, p. 1389.
24 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 2-5.
25 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 76, 23 February 1978, p. 96.
26 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 82, 21 August 1979, p. 82.
20
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have been multiple sightings of the same vessels. They included 604 Japanese, 699
Taiwanese and 214 unidentified vessels.27

Similar figures were recorded for the period to February 1977.28 At this time, vessels
fishing outside the 12nm fishing zone were operating legally. Still, 22 fishing vessel
masters were prosecuted for breaches of Australian fisheries laws between April 1976
and February 1977.29 Despite fears of foreign fishers landing in remote areas and
thereby compromising quarantine regulations, no more than six such landings were
noted between 1 July 1975 and February 1977.30 The anxiety felt over foreign fishing
extended to Antarctic waters, and their potential for exploitation by foreign fishers.
Work was already progressing on a draft law to regulate such activity.31

Japanese fishing activity encompassed long line fishing off North Queensland, which
was allegedly depleting marlin stocks, to fishing off the Tasmanian coast, where some
vessels forfeited their catch and gear for fishing inside the 12nm AFZ.32 Some criticism
of Japanese fishing activity complained of it being predatory. There were claims by Mr
Bowen (Kingsford-Smith) in 1978 that the Japanese were taking some 50 to 60,000
tonnes of bluefin tuna annually, compared to the Australian take of 10,000 tonnes,
inside and beyond 200nm.33 34

Complaints about Japanese fishing also included the terms of the Australian-Japanese
Fishing Agreement negotiated in 1979. While placing limits on Japanese fishing in
Australian waters, industry representatives noted that it failed to apply total allowable

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 99, 19 May 1976, pp.
2256-8.
28 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 104, 21 April 1977, p.
1190.
29 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 104, 21 April 1977, p.
1190.
30 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 105, 26 April 1977, p.
1265.
31 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 77, 9 May 1978, p. 1489.
32 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 68, 25 May 1976, p. 1863, and Vol., 76, 22
February 1978, p. 21.
33 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 109, 11 May 1978, p.
2296.
34 The Australian Fishing Zone outer limit was fixed at 200nm from the baseline in 1979.
Warwick Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, LexisNexis, Butterworths, Chatswood, NSW, 2008,
p. 209.
27
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catch limits, was negotiated without industry consultation and allowed for catch of
black marlin.35

Taiwanese fishers were also extremely active and the source of many complaints and
some regulatory action. In the early 1970s Taiwanese boats were being apprehended in
Australian waters; four in 1972, two in 1973 and 1974, 25 in 1975 and 14 up to August
1976. In 1975, 11 boats were forfeited, with a further 12 in 1976.36 At that time, in
Parliament Mr Bungey claimed that the Northern Territory Administration believed
the Taiwanese were using some of their vessels as ‘bait’ for Royal Australian Navy
(RAN) patrol craft, so that those actually engaged in illegal fishing could escape.37

The major source of complaints against the Taiwanese fishers was for clam fishing in or
around the Great Barrier Reef, amid claims they knew the local waters better than our
own Navy.38 That about 50 per cent of giant clams in parts of the Great Barrier Reef
were dead led to suspicions that fishing was to blame, and led to research to determine
the actual cause.39

The Opposition complained that licensing fees paid by Taiwan were too low and did
not cover government costs. Furthermore, Senator Robertson (Northern Territory)
asked the Government to encourage the Australian fishing industry.40 This highlighted
the fact that Taiwanese and Japanese had been fishing off the Australian coast for
several years and it was only now, with the 200nm AFZ in place, that Australian
interest awakened.41 For example, in 1978, the year before the 200nm AFZ was
declared, Taiwanese fishers took 80,000 tonnes in waters off Australia, compared to
47,700 tonnes taken by Australian vessels.42
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 83, 6 November 1979, p. 1946.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 102, 2 December 1976, p.
3123.
37 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 104, 29 March 1977, p.
712.
38 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 114, 31 May 1979, pp.
2725-6.
39 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 115, 21 August 1979, p.
392.
40 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 88, 24 March 1981, pp. 667-9.
41 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 89, 7 April 1981, p. 1197.
42 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 125, 14 October 1981, p.
2024.
35
36
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The emerging poor state of tuna stocks was the result of long-term unmonitored
fishing. In 1983 overfishing by Japanese and Australian boats, since the 1950s, was
assessed to have reduced Southern Blue Fin Tuna stocks by about two thirds.
Consequently catch and size limits were imposed.43 An Industries Assistance
Commission report on southern blue fin tuna in 1984 recommended that the Western
Australian catch needed to be reduced by 75 per cent, while acknowledging the impact
on employment and the need for Japanese fishers to accept a quota.44

Environmental Protection
Environmental aspects of the constabulary function were concentrated in and around
the Great Barrier Reef during this period, because of the growing awareness of its
environmental and economic importance. The most contentious environmental issue
was drilling for oil or gas on the Reef. While there had been no drilling, exploratory or
otherwise, since 1971,45 the Labor Opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament
worried that the Queensland State Government and national Coalition Government
would again allow it.46

47

Despite statements by the Federal Government denying that

it would allow drilling on the Great Barrier Reef, the lack of any legislative action
continued to bother the Opposition. It led to a Matter of Public Interest being
introduced to Parliament by Mr Cohen (Robertson) criticizing the Government for its
lack of definitive action.48 The enactment of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement in 1979
awarding the States rights over the first 3nm of the territorial sea led to further fears
that the Queensland State Government would allow drilling on the Reef.49

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 133, 8 December 1983, p.
3646.
44 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 105, 22 August 1984, p. 157.
45 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 113, 29 March 1979, p.
1383.
46 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 72, 17 March 1977, p. 1089.
47 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 111, 26 October 1978, p.
2372.
48 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 113, 4 April 1979, p.
1481.
49 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 114, 24 May 1979, p.
2374.
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Ship-sourced oil spills were another environmental threat to the Great Barrier Reef,
and to other areas. Several related questions were raised in Parliament, generally
critical of an apparent lack of government action, including slowness in ratifying the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL 1973).50
The magnitude of the problem is exemplified in the list of ship-sourced oil spills
between 1 April 1977 and 17 November 1981, presented on 16 February 1982 in answer
to a Parliamentary question by Mr Humphreys (Griffith). One thousand two hundred
and sixty five reports had identified 768 spills.51

One of those spills occurred when the motor vessel (MV) Anro Asia grounded on Bribie
Island in Moreton Bay on 29 October 1981, spilling 70-100 tonnes of bunker oil, some
reaching the shore.52 The cleanup cost was assessed as $284,784.53 Concern for the
environmental state of the Reef extended to Torres Strait, with the potential for
groundings and oil spills in the Prince of Wales Channel.54 The lack of a compulsory
pilotage scheme there had drawn attention in the recent past,55 but no action was
taken.

Declaration of the entire Great Barrier Reef as a marine park was seen as one way of
ensuring environmental protection. Consequently, the delays in progressing this
matter raised warning signs for the Federal Labor Opposition, which feared that the
Queensland State Government would still allow mining on the Reef.56

Two other environmental problems emerged during this period, one exclusive to the
Reef and the other with national ramifications. The first was the spread of the Crown of
Thorns starfish from the north of the Great Barrier Reef. Despite earlier eradication
efforts, it reappeared in the early 1980s. Some believed that Reef spearfishers enabled
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 121, 11 March 1981, p.
656.
51 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 126, 16 February 1982,
pp. 191-6.
52 Major Oil Spills in Australia: Anro Asia, Bribie Island, Queensland, 29 October 1981,
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/marine_environment_protection> (6 June 2012).
53 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 128, 18 August 1982, p.
609.
54 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 101, 29 November 1983, p. 2970.
55 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 111, 26 October 1978.
56 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 121, 3 March 1981, p.
374.
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this by taking their predators.57 By 1985, this second infestation in 20 years had
worsened and was described by Mr Connolly (Bradfield) as a ‘serious threat’ to the
Reef.58

The second problem was the introduction of exotic marine organisms through the
discharge of ships’ ballast water in Australian waters.59 At that time there was no
routine analysis of ballast water from foreign vessels60 and the problem worsened,
despite a funded study into the problem by New South Wales Fisheries.61

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Government response to the demands of maritime law enforcement came in two
forms; the development of policies and associated laws and the implementation of
practical measures to support policies and laws. The period from 1976 to 1988 saw a
succession of reviews into aspects of maritime law enforcement, the first
comprehensive examination of the issue since Federation. The reviews were
accompanied by several efforts to establish an effective aerial surveillance and surface
response system, with the system still evolving in the late 1980s.

In the late 1970s the Government became aware of the significant legal issues relating
to law enforcement at sea. Some of these issues were associated with the proposed
establishment of an EEZ.62 They also included agreements with other countries and the
formulation of legislation to cover resources exploitation.63 Amongst the issues was
whether Australia would claim a 200nm EEZ in its Antarctic territory. The

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 89, 14 May 1981, p. 1968.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 140, 22 February 1985, p.
81.
59 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 115, 29 August 1979, p.
791.
60 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 115, 29 August 1979, p.
791.
61 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 114, 30 May 1979, p.
2620.
62 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 72, 15 March 1977, p. 153.
63 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 72, 15 March 1977, p. 153.
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Government was also forced to revisit offshore sovereignty, because the States were
found to retain some rights despite the 1975 High Court ruling,64 and because it was
administratively sensible for the States to retain some rights and responsibilities, such
as administration of recreational boats. The consequent 1979 Offshore Constitutional
Settlement required much negotiation and vested in each State proprietary rights and
title in respect of the seabed and adjacent territorial sea – to a limit of three miles – with
reservations for national purposes, such as defence.65

Later in the period the propriety of having Defence Force officers enforcing civil law
against Australian citizens was questioned66 Both the Constitution and the Defence Act
place limitations on Australian Defence Force (ADF) officers in this respect. For
example, except where specific Acts nominate ADF officers as enforcement officers, the
Governor General has formally to call out the Defence Force for such activities.67
Policy Development - the Early Reviews
The period from 1976 to 1988 marked the first time any Australian government
attempted to develop a coordinated approach to the key issues associated with the
constabulary function. New threats and extensions to offshore zones, which greatly
extended the area of maritime legal responsibility, determined the need for more
sophisticated options than merely reacting to threats as they occurred.

In this period governments of both major parties established 11 reviews, mostly
targeted against coastal surveillance, while the Royal Commission on Drugs in 1980
examined coastal surveillance in relation to illegal drug importation. The first review
See Attorney General’s Department, Offshore constitutional settlement: A milestone in co-operative
federalism, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1980, p. 4. The note refers to a
High Court case Pearce v. Florenca (1976) in which the Court upheld WA State fisheries law in
the territorial sea.
65 ‘Australia’s Offshore Legal Jurisdiction: Part 1 – History & Development’, Australia and New
Zealand Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2011, p. 9. The agreed arrangement in the Offshore
Constitutional Settlement are listed at Attorney General’s Department, Offshore constitutional
settlement: A milestone in co-operative federalism, pp. 6-8.
66 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 7-8.
67 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 7-8. The Defence Act 1903, Section 51A, lays out in detail
the conditions under which the Defence Force may be used to curb domestic violence. Defence
Act 1903 – Sect 51A, <http://www.austlii.edu.au> (2 October 2012).
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began in January 1978 as an Interdepartmental Committee of department heads, tasked
to review current coastal surveillance.68 The Government announced its findings on 9
July 1978.69 The Committee report demonstrated acceptance of the need for a
comprehensive approach to surveillance. It recommended a surveillance and
enforcement capacity combining deterrence of breaches of customs, health,
immigration and fisheries laws, with the highest practicable protection of national
quarantine interests.70

This review was the first comprehensive analysis of Australia’s coastal surveillance
and reflected growing public interest in the arrival of irregular maritime arrivals and
the recognition that distance no longer provided a barrier against exotic disease, drug
smuggling or other threats to border security. Similarly, the review acknowledged
Australia’s unique challenges; including a sparse population, especially in the north,
and relative proximity to Southeast Asia.71 While it noted the complexities related to
Australia’s federal system of government and the consequent sharing of responsibility
for offshore resources management,72 the Committee should have also acknowledged
the extent of coastline that needed patrolling and protection.

Significant review recommendations which were accepted included the introduction of
daily air surveillance of the north coast, principally in support of quarantine
management, extension of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) maritime patrol aircraft
surveillance of the AFZ to deter illegal fishing, a significant increase in surveillance
flying hours, and greater RAN patrol boat availability for civil enforcement
operations.73 The review also recommended air patrols of the approaches to Darwin,
specifically to deal with the Indo-Chinese irregular maritime arrival boats.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 1-3.
69 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 110, 15 August 1978, p.
296.
70 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 1-3.
71 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 1-3.
72 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 1-3.
73 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 1-3. The recommendation was for an increase to 27 000
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A further Coastal Surveillance Review was conducted in 1981. Initially, the intention
had been to consider the outcomes of the 1978 Review after two years, but difficulties
in implementing some recommendations delayed this until late 1981.74 Focused on the
cost-effectiveness of the coastal surveillance regime, this was a holdover from earlier
times when the cost of surveillance seemed as important as operational achievement.
Yet it also foreshadowed a lengthy and indecisive effort to determine how best to fund
coastal surveillance and how to determine cost-effectiveness. The 1981 Review
therefore concluded that there was an urgent need for departments critically to
examine their surveillance needs, so that resources could be applied most efficiently.75

Furthermore, the 1981 Review recommended that each department using civil
surveillance services should pay in full for the service - the ‘user pays’ approach. This
Review also considered that user departments should bear the costs of any equipment
that Defence acquired specifically for coastal surveillance.76 The review also proposed
that in future the ‘user pays’ principle should apply to the use of ADF assets in coastal
surveillance, noting that in 1983-84 the anticipated P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and
Fremantle class patrol boat effort was expected to amount to 40 per cent of the total
surveillance budget; that is $8.3m of $20.7m.77 Furthermore, the 1981 Review argued
that the cost of conventional surveillance systems to counter unauthorized flights
importing drugs would be prohibitive.78

Sandwiched between these two surveillance reviews was the Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Drugs of 1980. This Inquiry focused on the impact of illegal drugs on
Australian society, and investigated how drugs entered the country. The Inquiry was
particularly interested in unauthorized aircraft taking advantage of the empty
hours per year, up from 4 600 in 1977/78. Delays in acquiring civil charter aircraft meant that
the increased target was not met initially.
74 Paul Eccles, Civil Coastal Surveillance, a paper presented by the Department of Transport and
Construction in Port Hedland, October 1982, p. 4.
75 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 6-5.
76The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 6-5.
77 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 6-6.
78 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 6-12.
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expanses and many disused airfields in the north. For example, at the close of hearings
on 5 September 1979 the Inquiry had records of 109 unresolved aircraft sightings, with
firm dates and locations for them.79

The Royal Commission recommended: a surveillance regime focused on, but not
exclusively confined to, the north; that the Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre
should manage all elements of surveillance and response; that States, the ADF and
other government authorities should attach liaison officers to the Australian Coastal
Surveillance Centre; and that the Customs Nomad aircraft should transfer to
Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre control while the Customs patrol craft should
be upgraded.80

Policy Development - the Beazley Review
The election of a Labor Government in March 1983 brought an almost immediate new
focus to coastal surveillance and the constabulary function. The new Ministers of
Defence and Transport jointly asked the Minister for Aviation (Kim Beazley) to:
… examine Australia’s needs for coastal surveillance and protection in
peacetime and how they are met, and to report and make recommendations.81
This comprehensive review, the first undertaken at ministerial level, surveyed three
major issues; what kind and level of surveillance and law enforcement capacity was
needed, what arrangements and capacity existed, together with their costs and
effectiveness, and what recommendations were needed to improve the arrangements
while managing cost.82 The long-standing focus on cost remained in place. The Review
asserted that the primary justification of a coastal surveillance regime was economic
and thus the regime should not cost more than the potential loss of resources;
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notwithstanding the admitted difficulty in adopting such a quantitative approach.83
The Review also acknowledged that not even the most comprehensive surveillance
system could guarantee that objectives would always be met and that the benefits of
any surveillance system might be, for the most part, unquantifiable.84 Adding to the
complexity, an internal Department of Health review had shown that the aerial
surveillance program was excessive for quarantine purposes on the basis of the
Department’s threat assessment.85

Major recommendations of the Beazley Review, announced in mid–1984, resulted in
significant change to the coastal surveillance regime. Although the focus on drugsmuggling was unsurprising, the organizational arrangement selected to support it
was unexpected. Management of the surveillance program was transferred to the
Australian Federal Police, because of their existing responsibility for a significant part
of the protection regime.86 A Coastal Protection Unit was to be established within the
Australian Federal Police, which had no previous experience of maritime surveillance.
The Unit would operate within the existing Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre,
jointly with the Department of Transport.87 Under this arrangement, the Department of
Transport would manage the Centre and retain responsibility for maritime safety and
search and rescue. Notably, the ADF was to continue with offshore aerial surveillance
and surface response.

For management, the Standing Interdepartmental Committee on coastal surveillance
was to remain in place and a Standing Advisory Committee–Coastal Protection and
Surveillance was to be established at Commonwealth and State levels.88 This committee
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was to examine the need for night surveillance and for civil airspace surveillance,89
noting that civilian charter aircraft would continue to be used for surveillance.
Individual departments were still to be responsible for defining threats and risk for the
allocation of surveillance assets.

Significantly, the user pays principle was to remain in place, including for the use of
ADF assets beyond a level determined to be the Defence ‘justifiable contribution’.90
Equally important, Quarantine continued to fund the surveillance program and
claimed the right to maximize value for its own needs.

91

This was contrary to the

Review recommendations, and apparently inconsistent with the Health Department’s
assessment that the effort devoted to quarantine was excessive.

In Parliament the Opposition focused on the Government’s proposed ‘rationalization’
of coastal surveillance, which was to deliver more effective performance through better
management. Accordingly, it criticized a claimed reduction in annual surveillance
flying hours from 20,200 to 14,600.92 Thus, while the Beazley Review was a
comprehensive and lengthy analysis of coastal surveillance, doubts remained as to
whether it had identified what needed to be done, how best to do it and what it should
cost.

Policy Development - the Later Reviews
In May 1986 a Sub-committee of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Expenditure tabled a report entitled Footprints in the Sand, which examined the
implementation of the earlier Beazley Review. It recommended several changes,
confirming that the Beazley Review had not solved the coastal surveillance problem.
The major proposed change would have further complicated the management
arrangements by moving some Coastal Protection Unit responsibilities from the
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Federal Police and Special Minister of State to the Department of Transport. This
would have made the Minister for Transport responsible for the coordination of civil
coastal surveillance.93 Additionally, the Federal Police would have staffed the three
regional Coastal Protection Units and senior officials from the Federal Police and
Customs were to have been attached to Transport, to ensure coordination.94 However,
the Government decided against this major change so soon after the Beazley Review.95

Footprints in the Sand reported that the attention to illegal drugs importation
recommended in the Beazley Review had not been achieved. The Federal Police
advised that the existing patrols, with Customs’ surveillance and intelligence
gathering, provided effective management of the perceived threat96 and that aerial
surveillance alone was not especially effective against drug trafficking.97 This report
also confirmed that the surveillance program still focused on quarantine and fisheries.
The Health Department’s Dr Proudfoot argued that ‘The basis of the littoral
surveillance program is a quarantine program. There are spin offs to other services –
Customs and Immigration – but it is primarily a quarantine program’.98

Nevertheless, in December 1987 an independent review into Australia’s quarantine
program (The Lindsay Review) determined that aerial surveillance was of little
quarantine value. Quarantine authorities decided that the biggest quarantine threat
existed at Australia’s major air and seaports.99 Yet, the Quarantine Service continued to
fund aerial surveillance100 and thus determined surveillance priorities.101 The Lindsay
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Review recommended a more flexible approach to quarantine protection, with a focus
on the Torres Strait and the capacity to react to emerging threats.102

The final review of this period, Hugh Hudson’s Northern Approaches, showed that
government was still unsure about border protection and it recommended yet more
organizational change. The Review was a response to Footprints in the sand and
preceded the renewal of Skywest’s aerial surveillance contract on 30 March 1989.103

Northern Approaches recognized the growing complexity of surveillance and response
tasks and the need for aircraft and patrol craft capable of responding to the needs of
several government agencies.104 The review contended that the level of surveillance
then being provided was not commensurate with Australia’s 200nm AFZ claim105 and
remarked on the need for night surveillance.106 Northern Approaches recommended the
establishment of an independent agency, within the Department of Transport and
Communications, directly responsible to its Minister.107

The review recommended strongly a move from the long-standing ‘user pays’ system
to one in which the entire program would be funded within the Department of
Transport and Communications.108 This reflected the ongoing difficulty in attributing
surveillance costs, especially when there were multiple beneficiaries.109 The funding
was to be sufficient to cover core tasking – at least 10,000 flying hours per year.110
Economy of effort continued to dominate in establishing new surveillance regimes. For
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example, Northern Approaches reported the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority’s
claim that the Great Barrier Reef surveillance conducted by Skywest could be provided
more cheaply with less capable aircraft, because of the relatively benign Reef
geography.111 Thus, cost and not performance continued to be the driving force.

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: PRACTICAL MEASURES
The Government’s practical response comprised two elements of the constabulary
function; aerial surveillance and surface response. Aircraft equipped with search
sensors, including radar, are excellent surveillance platforms, covering large areas
relatively quickly. Surface vessels, much more limited in their search capacity, provide
the only means of responding to aerial detections; being able to stop, inspect and
detain suspect vessels. Aerial surveillance was conducted largely by the RAN and the
RAAF in the early part of the period, but later became primarily a civilian contract
aircraft responsibility with RAAF support. Surface response was a responsibility of the
RAN with Customs support throughout the period.
Early Inadequacies - Aerial Surveillance
The first wave of irregular maritime arrivals and the extension of the AFZ to 200nm
were catalysts in developing a more coherent approach to border protection and the
constabulary function. Both events illustrated the inadequacy of maritime surveillance
especially in the north. A third factor was the claim by the 1980 Australian Royal
Commission into Drugs that authorities still could not determine the extent of coastal
incursions.112 This situation still existed four years later, when Senator Kilgariff
(Northern Territory) claimed in Parliament that illegal flights were being made into the
north; the Northern Territory News reporting 22 in the previous three years.113 Despite
investigation, the claims could not be substantiated.

The achievements of aerial surveillance and the full extent of the task were difficult to
quantify. In 1975-76 there were 473 foreign fishing vessel sightings, increasing to 505 in
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1975-76.114 Figures for 1982-83 indicate that 74 sightings were made; 32 off Queensland,
19 off Western Australia and 16 off the Northern Territory.115 These figures suggest the
north was the focus of potential illegal activity, that surveillance was concentrated
there and that the level of illegal activity was variable. There was very little groundbased radar search capability to supplement the aerial patrols. The RAAF had only two
portable surveillance radars, one of which was located in Darwin.116 Even with a
limited range against surface targets, it could have provided a useful short–range
warning function against vessels approaching Darwin.

Aerial surveillance was also diminished by the inadequacy of operational planning.
Specifically, flight schedules were too predictable and were limited to daylight
hours;117 the aircraft being unable to identify contacts detected by radar at night.118
There were questions about the adequacy of the Side-Looking Airborne Radar fitted to
Shrike surveillance aircraft operating over the Great Barrier Reef. Skywest, the
contractor, was forced to provide an aircraft fitted with 360° (all-round) scan.119
Furthermore, coordination between Commonwealth and State-based surveillance
efforts was inadequate.120

The problems were underscored by an inability of government to focus clearly on
establishing an effective surveillance program led by a suitable authority. Debate in
Parliament sometimes questioned whether surveillance was a military or civil
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responsibility.121 The Labor Opposition’s Mr Gordon Scholes strongly suggested that
surveillance was a Defence responsibility:
I want to make it absolutely clear that in my opinion the protection of
Australia’s sovereignty is a defence responsibility and should be undertaken on
that level. The Government should make it quite clear that that is its policy
decision and should then require the defence forces to meet that obligation. I
understand the reluctance of the defence forces. It is a question of money. Who
pays?122
Similar views were held outside Parliament with The Australian in July 1978 decrying
what it called ‘stopgap measures’. The newspaper proposed that coastal surveillance
should be ‘ … an integral part of our defence system …’ and should eventually be
conducted by a coast guard.123
The Government view, provided by Mr Connolly (Bradfield) did not necessarily
support this position.
However, a clear distinction must be made between peacetime law enforcement
and the protection of the nation’s sovereignty. I suspect that on this point the
honourable member for Corio and speakers from the Government side will
have some area of disagreement.124
Early Inadequacies - Surface Response
The surface response capacity, represented by the Attack class patrol boats, was
inadequate. For example, an Indonesian fishing vessel dropped two Indonesians
ashore north of Broome on 31 December 1983 and it took two days to find the boat,
hidden by mangroves, and longer to find those who had landed.125 Such instances
highlighted the difficulty in preventing such landings and the limited capacity to
respond to them.
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The patrol boats themselves were also criticized. A case was made for smaller boats
able to operate effectively in shallow inshore waters, such as along the Kimberley
coast.126 Yet, Dr Richardson (Tangney) called for new patrol craft with long-range
detection systems for the north and north-west and Mr Thompson (Leichardt) voiced
Opposition complaints that the project for the new Fremantle class patrol craft was
proceeding too slowly.127

Predictably the authorities relying on these surveillance operations became dissatisfied
with the inadequacies. Among these were the Departments of Primary Industry,
Immigration and Resources and Industry. Primary Industry was dissatisfied with the
irregularity of sighting and identification of foreign fishing vessels and the lack of
surface response vessels to enforce licensing provisions. Primary Industry also asked
for more cost-effective patrol aircraft than the RAAF P-3 Orions. They needed smaller,
simpler aircraft, stationed around the coast.128

There were concerns that the focus on illegal fishing and quarantine meant that issues
such as smuggling were neglected.129 Unease generated by perceptions of inadequate
surveillance was often reflected in Parliamentary debates and resulted in calls such as
Senator Kilgariff’s for P-3 Orions and warships to be based in Darwin and for the
Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar, when operational, to be used for surveillance of the
north.130

Developments in Aerial Surveillance
The Government response to inadequacies in surveillance and response included a
greater involvement by the Navy. Three RAN S-2E Tracker anti-submarine patrol
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aircraft deployed to Broome on Operation Trochus in early 1975 and again in 1976.
Supported by infrequent RAAF P-3 flights this was the first significant use of ADF
aircraft for coastal surveillance and resulted in a long term decline in illegal trochus
shell fishing by Indonesians off the north-west coast.131 Operation Trochus continued
until 1980.132 Another S-2E Tracker detachment began flying from Darwin in
November 1977, responding to the first of several waves of irregular maritime arrivals,
coming from Southeast Asia.133 The Trackers were replaced by civilian contract Nomad
aircraft in 1980.

Navy Tracker aircraft also undertook coastal surveillance operations in southern
waters for Operation Estes. This operation involved daily flights in the vicinity of the
oil and gas platforms in Bass Strait, in response to safety concerns relating to passing
merchant shipping. The fitting of X-band search radar to Bass Strait platforms and the
withdrawal of the Trackers from service ended this surveillance operation.134

While foreign fishing was the catalyst for Navy Tracker aircraft to begin coastal
surveillance operations, the initial influx of Vietnamese irregular maritime arrivals or
‘boat people’ led to the initiation of RAAF aerial surveillance. A C-47 Dakota transport
aircraft flew visual search sorties between Darwin and Broome from October 1977 until
replaced by the Trackers.135 RAAF P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft began civil coastal
surveillance operations by supplementing the Trackers on Operation Trochus with
fortnightly flights.136

The RAAF contribution increased significantly, with the P-3 range and endurance ideal
for offshore fisheries surveillance. There was also an expectation, as early as 1978, that
the Jindalee Over the Horizon Network would enter service and assist coastal
surveillance.137 Irregular maritime arrivals and a growing interest in foreign fishing
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activities in coastal waters saw a substantial increase in coastal surveillance. For
example the combined civil and military aerial surveillance flying hours jumped from
5,000 in 1977-78 to a planned 27,000 in 1978-79.138 Of this total, the P-3s flew 6,000
hours.139 Over time, the P-3s’ rate of effort reduced and by 1981 they were conducting
from two to four AFZ patrols per month.140 In the three years from 1977-78 to 1979-80
the P-3s averaged 2,376 hours annually.141

Using the P-3 for coastal surveillance was controversial. The aircraft and their crews
were capable, but were a very expensive means of conducting coastal surveillance, and
had difficulty meeting all commitments. For example, in 1984 they could provide only
1,200 of the 2,000 hours requested for coastal surveillance, because of training
commitments to the Navy following that Service’s loss of its own fixed wing aircraft.142
Another limiting factor was that each of the two P-3 squadrons of 10 aircraft had only
six crews.143 By 1988, Australian fisheries authorities had become unhappy with the P-3
reduced annual rate of effort, now from 2,500 hours to 700 hours, the aircraft cost and
the offshore focus which was not optimal for their fisheries surveillance needs.144

The withdrawal from service of the Navy Trackers, and questions about their costeffectiveness in the coastal surveillance role,145 together with the P-3 cost and
availability issues, encouraged the introduction of civil contract aircraft for aerial
surveillance. The ongoing and still current use of the P-3s, and questioning of their
cost-effectiveness, highlights the long-standing debate in Australia as to the role of the
military in law enforcement at sea and the associated constabulary function.146
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Civil contract-provided coastal surveillance is now the preferred solution, but it has
been a long and painful journey. Cost was a major factor in the initial and subsequent
decisions.147 This meant that aircraft performance was initially limited and
consequently the civil aircraft were confined to inshore or ‘littoral’ surveillance while
military aircraft flew the offshore missions.

The first two civil surveillance contracts were established by the Department of
Transport, each for two years. One had aircraft conducting daily quarantine-related
surveillance flights, between Geraldton and Cairns, and the other dedicated three
aircraft to Customs tasks.148 An indication of the initial surveillance capability is
evident from the choice of aircraft for the quarantine task, the Rockwell Shrike
Commander 500, a six seat twin-engined high-wing aircraft, excellent for visual search
but with no electronic search or localization sensors.149 These aircraft were therefore
limited to littoral visual search. Scheduled surveillance hours flown for the first three
financial years of civil coastal surveillance were: 1977-8: 4,200 hours; 1978-9: 13,800
hours; 1979-80: 23,126 hours.150

As the civil surveillance program progressed two issues became clear. Firstly, the
emphasis on economy remained fundamental. This was highlighted by the Minister for
Transport in a reply to a Parliamentary question on the calling of tenders for new
surveillance contracts. Mr Hunt noted that:
We will continue to use the resources of the Department of Defence and civil
tendering arrangements which are undoubtedly the most economic way to
provide a valuable coastal surveillance service for this country.151
It was raised again just five years later in 1987, when Senator McGibbon commented:
This Government has an obsession with the Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar
system…because it seems a cheap option … for knowing who is coming and
going around the northern half of Australia. That is an absolutely fundamental
requirement, but Jindalee will not satisfy it.152
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The second issue was the lack of expertise in the Department responsible for
establishing the surveillance contracts, which became evident in the management of
two sets of contract negotiations and impacted on the surveillance performance. The
first contract related to surveillance sensors, noting that some of the civil aircraft,
Nomads, had been fitted with search radar by the early 1980s. A change of surveillance
provider for Great Barrier Reef surveillance in mid-1984 meant a change of aircraft
type and a switch from the Nomad with all-round search radar to the Shrike
Commander, now fitted with side-looking radar.153 Experience demonstrated quickly
that the side-looking radar was less effective, needing more flying hours than an allround scan radar-equipped aircraft to search the same area.154 This unfortunate
outcome, together with the recommended 5,600 hours per year cut to surveillance
flying resulted in a reversal of the radar decision.155

The second contract-related problem was even more significant and involved the
awarding of a coastal surveillance contract to Amman Aviation in 1987. Subsequent
revelations in Parliament indicated that the Department of Aviation had concerns
about the company’s aviation credentials and that the Victorian Police had other
suspicions.156 Tender selection criteria that favoured accepting the most technically
competent bid were probably undermined by the need also to select the cheapest
compliant bid.157 Prolonged Parliamentary scrutiny determined that the tender process
had been inadequate and Amman’s contract was cancelled soon after the company
took over the surveillance task.158
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Surface Response Developments
In a reversal of the aerial surveillance situation, surface response became and remained
primarily a naval task, with civil support mainly from the Customs National Maritime
Unit. In 1978, the Navy added two patrol boats to the seven already committed to the
constabulary function, to manage the increasing number of Vietnamese irregular
maritime arrivals.159 The constabulary work included Operation Trochus in the late
1970s and resulted in Darwin and Cairns becoming the focus of Navy patrol boat
activity from as early as 1972.160 In July 1977 the Customs patrol craft Jerboa joined the
Navy patrol boats in Darwin, and other Customs boats were based in Cairns and
Broome. Customs moved its Cairns and Darwin-based boats to Geraldton and Port
Hedland in December 1978, reflecting the changing focus of operations.161 Jerboa was to
be replaced in Darwin by another patrol craft.162 The Department of Transport’s
lighthouse supply ship Cape Pillar also took on patrol duties during 1979, indicating
how irregular maritime arrivals stretched the existing surveillance and response
resources.163

While the major surveillance and response activities continued in northern waters,
Navy patrol boats joined the naval aircraft engaged in oil and gas platform surveillance
in Bass Strait. The Attack class boats were unsuited to this work because of their
limited capacity to operate in the frequent high seas in the area. As early as September
1977, replacements for the Attack class were announced.164 These would be 15 boats
designed by the British firm Brooke Marine, would be 10m longer than the Attack class
and have a speed of up to 30kts.165 They became the Fremantle class, the first being
accepted on 5 March 1980.166
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Fisheries patrols in southern waters, involving some of the Navy’s minesweepers
reflected the heavy constabulary function workload. As an example, Her Majesty’s
Australian Ship (HMAS) Curlew caught a Japanese fishing vessel inside the Tasmanian
Fishing Zone in February 1978. Subsequent prosecution led to the loss of catch and
fishing gear by the Japanese.167 Fisheries patrols were also conducted frequently within
the Great Barrier Reef. At least 30 foreign fishing vessels were apprehended for illegal
fishing in the reef area during the 1970s and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing remained a problem into the 1980s.168

Growing surveillance and response activity in the north and north-west led to the
usual calls for a greater military presence, including an additional patrol boat base in
the north-west.169 The Government decided against building such a base170 and despite
recent calls to re-examine the issue it has not yet gained enough support within
Defence. Consequently, the 2012 Force Posture Review ‘ … recommended Navy
upgrades to Western Australia’s North West commercial ports in Exmouth, Dampier,
Port Hedland and Broome to allow access by larger warships’. It recommended no new
permanent bases.171 Following earlier abortive efforts in 1989, the future of permanent
naval bases in the north-west appears bleak.172 Reliance on access to commercial ports
has risks, as merchant ships have priority for berths, even having naval ships moved so
that they can come alongside.173

As the Navy presence in the north expanded to meet the demands of the constabulary
task, Customs also tried to boost its efforts. In November 1985 the patrol craft Jabiru
relocated from Geraldton to Darwin and was tasked with extensive patrolling in
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media release, 1 February 2012.
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172 Prior to the 1989 election Defence Minister Beazley announced that a patrol boat base would
be built in Port Hedland, but nothing came of it. Senator Alan Eggleston, ‘Senate Estimates reveal
North West defence presence neglected’, media release, 15 February 2012.
<http://www.senatoralaneggleston.com/Newsroom/MediaReleases/tabid/91> (27 August
2012).
173 Discussion with patrol boat commanding officers at Darwin Naval Base 2 May 2011.
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conjunction with Coastwatch aircraft.174 Two other ‘J’ class patrol craft continued
operating from Broome and Port Hedland while one of the new Minister class patrol
craft operated from Geraldton.175

Quarantine, Customs and the Environment Demand Attention
Increases in foreign fishing, together with the appearance of the first irregular maritime
arrivals, demanded other law enforcement responses from government. In addition to
the growing Customs presence in the north Quarantine officers were dispatched to
Karratha and Port Hedland in late 1976.176 Fear of unauthorized landings leading to
outbreaks of diseases such as foot and mouth disease, meant that all reported or
suspected landings by foreign fishing vessels or other craft were followed up by
Quarantine officers.177 The ease and frequency with which people moved across Torres
Strait meant that a Quarantine officer was stationed at Thursday Island to check all
arrivals.178 Illegal drug importation, as identified by the Williams Royal Commission
remained a serious problem and by the mid-1980s Australian Federal Police units had
been established in north-west Western Australia, Darwin and north Queensland.179

The growing importance of environmental management, especially for the Great
Barrier Reef, an ever more popular tourist destination, also demanded government
action. Practical measures included the decision to inspect all oil tankers in their first
Australian port of call.180 By 1982 the Department of Transport was responsible for the
National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil. The plan was tested periodically
through exercise and relied partly on placing stockpiles of dispersant and pollution
control equipment around the coast.181
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pp. 887-8.
178 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 112, 21 November 1978,
p. 3146.
179 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 139, 10 September 1984,
p. 913.
180 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 80, 22 February 1979, p. 162.
181 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 93, 22 February 1982, p. 310.
174
175

206

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: LEGISLATION
Introduction
Much maritime legislation during the period 1976 to 1988 was notable for its
incrementalism. Politicians consistently had difficulty in responding adequately to the
rapid change in the nature and scope of threats to maritime security, as well as to the
increasing volume of international regulation. Law making was further complicated by
the propensity for activities in one sphere to require legislation relating to several
others. For example, the placing of oil and gas platforms within the EEZ demanded
legislation covering the environment, immigration, customs and quarantine, as well as
financial regulation. As a result, many laws were enacted during the period and
subsequently amended, sometimes repeatedly.
The 1979 Offshore Constitutional Settlement was an important influence on legislation. It
was produced to resolve issues relating to State and Commonwealth offshore
responsibilities, in the wake following the 1975 High Court decision on offshore
sovereignty. Other important influences included irregular maritime arrivals and
illegal drug importation. Nevertheless, the most substantial legislative effort involved
resources and the environment. Offshore resource exploitation, along with its
international dimension, was the major catalyst for new legislation. Similar pressures
existed in the maritime environment, with protection of the Great Barrier Reef
becoming a priority, along with the ratification of international conventions on
preventing marine pollution.

Legislative Developments: General
The entire legislation section examines the Government’s legislative response to law
enforcement at sea challenges. In doing so it considers the significant Bills presented to
Parliament for each main categories of law enforcement and clarifies the problems
faced by law makers in keeping pace with emerging law enforcement challenges.

The Crimes At Sea Act 1978 which covered crimes at sea and in foreign ports or
harbours, applied the criminal law of the appropriate State or territory to offences
207

committed on or from Australian ships on overseas, inter-state or inter-territory
voyages.182 The Act also applied, in special cases, to foreign ships beyond the territorial
sea. Significantly, this Act heralded a move to reduce Australian reliance on Imperial
legislation.183 Together with the subsequent Crimes (Offences At Sea) Act 1979 the 1978
Act reflected the agreements between States and the Commonwealth resulting in the
Offshore Constitutional Settlement.
Offshore Constitutional Settlement. Following the agreement with the States that led
to the Offshore Constitutional Settlement several Bills were introduced to give effect to
the Settlement. Two of these Bills became the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 and
the Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980.184 They gave the States power and title over the
territorial sea and over the land underneath coastal waters adjacent to the States, to the
three nautical mile limit.185 The Coastal Waters (Northern Territory) Title Act 1980 did the
same for the Northern Territory. Other related Acts were the Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) Amendment Act 1980, Fisheries Amendment Act 1980, Navigation Amendment Act
1980 and Historic Shipwrecks Amendment Act 1980.186 These latter four Acts clarified
Commonwealth and State offshore responsibilities, with, for example, the Petroleum
Act establishing Commonwealth responsibility beyond three nautical miles and the
Fisheries Act providing joint authority of specified fisheries, and confirming
Commonwealth responsibility beyond three miles, while allowing for Commonwealth
responsibility also from the low water mark where two or more States are involved.187
The Labor Party opposed these Bills because they strengthened State powers at the
expense of the Commonwealth.188
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Subsequently, the Torres Strait Treaty (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1984 was
introduced to enable ratification of the Torres Strait Treaty 1978. The novelty and
complexity of some provisions, including those relating to fisheries, caused difficulties.
This Act ensured that Australian fisheries legislation no longer applied to the Treaty
protected zone, or other waters to which the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 applied.189
Ten Commonwealth Acts were affected by the Torres Strait Treaty Act so that
traditional people of the Torres Strait could continue conducting traditional activities,
as far as possible, without compromising Australian border security. The Migration and
Quarantine Acts provided specially for Papua New Guinea citizens entering the
protected area, and the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982
was amended to allow traditional hunting.190 Similarly the Customs Act was amended
to allow exemptions for traditional activities, while maintaining controls over the
movement of prohibited substances.

Legislative Developments: Border Protection
Although irregular maritime arrivals became a major border protection matter during
the period, the first migration-related legislation was more broadly focused and hinted
at tough measures to come. The Migration Amendment Act 1979, aimed to tighten
regulations and enforcement, with a special concentration on people who stayed
beyond visa limits and who attempted to work without permits.191 Allegedly 57,000
people were in Australia illegally at the time.192

The first legislation specifically aimed at unauthorized arrivals by sea (and air) was the
Immigration (Unauthorised Arrivals) Act 1980. The Act aimed to curb activities of the
‘people smugglers’ by penalizing ‘masters, owners, agents and charterers of vessels’.193
It was not specifically aimed at their passengers, who could qualify as refugees.
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Responding to 53 boats carrying 2,067 irregular maritime arrivals over the previous
five years, the Act delivered penalties of up to $A100,000 or 10 years gaol for bringing
more than five ‘relevant’ persons into Australia.194 It was followed by an amending Act
six months later; the Immigration (Unauthorised Arrivals) Amendment Act 1980, which
extended the jurisdiction of the earlier Act to Christmas Island and widened powers of
boarding.195 Yet another amending Act, the Migration Amendment Act 1983 added
penalties for document forgery and misuse and facilitated the deportation of noncitizens.196

The use of Amendment Acts became quite widespread in border protection legislation
during this period. This reflected the rapid evolution and growing complexity of the
problems. Yet, it also reflected the long-standing reactive nature of Australia’s
approach to border protection and the constabulary function. Customs and Quarantine
legislation clearly illustrated this trend.

Customs. Customs legislation during this period concentrated on dealing with an
alarming growth in illegal drug importation and evidence of organized criminal
involvement.197 The Customs Amendment Act 1977 raised the maximum penalties for
drug trafficking to $A100,000 or up to 25 years gaol.198 Subsequent Amendment Acts
took additional steps against drug crimes. Invariably, they appeared as reactions to
criminal initiatives rather than reflecting any ability by law enforcement authorities to
gain the initiative. The Customs Amendment Act 1979 attacked the source of the drug
trade by providing for eavesdropping and increasing trafficking penalties to include
life imprisonment.199 The Customs Amendment Act (No. 2) 1979, related to consequent
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changes to telecommunications and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
legislation.200
While the Customs Amendment Act (No.3) 1980 dealt only with minor offences, the
Customs Amendment Act 1981 implemented several recommendations from the Williams
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs 1980. These included moving responsibility for
narcotics control beyond the Customs barrier to the Australian Federal Police and
extending Customs control over ships and aircraft to 12nm from the coast for foreign
craft.201

During the period, two unsuccessful Customs Bills aimed to prevent the export of
goods rather than control imports. The Customs Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1981 sought to
prevent sand mining on, and prohibit the export of rutile from, Fraser and Moreton
Islands.202 Similarly, the Customs (Nuclear Materials and Hardware) Prohibition Bill 1983
was introduced to ban the export and import of nuclear material.203 That both were
private members’ Bills probably explains their failure.
The final piece of relevant Customs legislation for the period demonstrated the
awakening within Government that new approaches were needed for successful
border protection. The Customs Administration Act 1985 established the Australian
Customs Service as a separate entity within the Department of Industry, Technology
and Commerce, while noting that the Service had previously been transferred six times
among several organizations.204

From

1976

to

1988,

quarantine

legislation

produced

incremental

changes,

strengthening controls and raising penalties. The Quarantine Amendment Act 1979 and
the Quarantine Amendment Act 1984 increased penalties because of the fear of animal
and plant diseases being introduced; including by foreign fishers landing unauthorized
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in the north.205 Fear of foot and mouth disease and its potential economic impact was a
catalyst for these Acts.206 The Quarantine Amendment Act (No. 2) 1979 extended airport
and seaport baggage and premises search powers to Quarantine officers.207

Quarantine management advanced with the establishment of the quarantine station on
the Cocos Islands in late 1981. The Quarantine Amendment Act 1981 updated the
Quarantine Act to reflect the forthcoming availability of the Cocos Islands station and
its comprehensive disease control arrangements.208 As with Customs, changes in
quarantine administration saw responsibility for animal and plant quarantine move, in
this case to the Department of Primary Industry, a change given effect by the
Quarantine Amendment Act 1985.209
Resources Legislation
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1979, and the introduction of a 200nm AFZ and
subsequently a full EEZ, led to the enactment of a great deal of legislation involving
the exploitation of living and non-living resources. The Government also sponsored
several bilateral fishing agreements with Japan and Taiwan.

Extension of jurisdiction over foreign fishers to 200nm came with the Fisheries
Amendment Act 1978, which also closed the Gulf of Carpentaria to foreign fishing,
ending a long-standing grievance on the part of local prawn fishers.210 This Act also
obliged Australia to assess AFZ total allowable catches. Later, the Fisheries Legislation
Amendment Act 1985 provided legislative cover for the development of fisheries
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management plans to prevent over exploitation.211 This was important considering the
limited fish stocks in Australian waters.

Maritime

security

legislation

continued

responding

incrementally

to

policy

development. The Fishing Legislation Amendment Act 1984 generated administrative
changes to three related laws, provided licensing arrangements and allowed for the
entry of unlicensed foreign fishing vessels to Australian ports for repairs.212
Subsequently, the Fishing Legislation Amendment Act 1987 introduced administrative
measures that implemented a series of related laws and strengthened powers of
enforcement in Australian fisheries.213 In the same year the Fisheries Amendment Act
1987 implemented the treaty between South Pacific States and the USA, allowing US
tuna purse seining in all Forum Fisheries Agency zones under a single license. Access
to the AFZ was initially limited to part of the Coral Sea.214

Establishment of the 200nm AFZ and the relatively small scale of Australia’s ocean
fishing industry led to the enactment of several agreements with foreign governments
or companies for licensing fishing in the AFZ. These were intended to manage foreign
fishing because of disquiet within the Australian industry.215 One legislative expression
of the disquiet was the Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Amendment Act 1978.
The Act made it difficult for foreign fishers to avoid prosecution for IUU fishing on
technical grounds.216 It also aimed to prevent sedentary species being taken with the
defence that the catch was not for commercial purposes.217
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The Australian-Japanese Fishing Agreement of October 1979 was the first of a series of
annual agreements which placed conditions on fishing within the AFZ.218 The
conditions included exclusion from some waters, position reporting each two days,
catch and effort reports each six days, and the right to inspect vessels at any time.219
The Agreement did not specify allowable catch limits and was made without local
industry consultation.220 The licensing of Japanese fishing vessels carried a fee
amounting in 1983 to $A2.275m for the 290 vessels involved.221 At about $A9,000 per
vessel it does not seem to be reasonable compensation for access to Australian fishing
grounds.

The Government also set up joint ventures with foreign companies as a means of
ensuring Australian fishing industry participation in the expanded fisheries
opportunities and of exposing the local industry to foreign expertise.222 The earliest of
these joint ventures involved Japanese, US and Polish companies wanting to fish in
Tasmanian waters. They began in 1979 for two year periods.223 The Polish joint-venture
also examined the fishing potential of sub-Antarctic waters.224 A later agreement
between the Commonwealth and the Kaohsiung Fishing Boat Commercial Guild
intended to foster a joint venture for fishing in northern Australian waters, but the
Opposition feared it merely facilitated access to the AFZ for the Taiwanese.225
Licensing of Taiwanese trawlers ceased there from 1990, because of the growing
activity by Australian stern trawlers.226

Development of Australia’s offshore oil and gas generated legislation to protect those
resources and the surrounding marine environment. The Petroleum (Submerged Lands–
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Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1981 extended provisions of the existing legislation227 to
the continental shelf of the Coral Sea. By contrast, there was an environmental aspect to
the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 1984 which, inter alia, declared an area
around the Bass Strait oil and gas platforms prohibited to Australian ships over 200
tons, and to all Australian ships in case of a terrorist threat.228 Foreign vessels had
already been prohibited from entering the area through International Maritime
Organization (IMO) advisory measures promulgated in October 1982. The Act also
prescribed fines for related offences. Environmental matters featured also in the Sea
Installations Act 1987, which ensured that proposals for offshore installations were
technically sound and environmentally safe.229

The introduction of offshore oil and gas platforms created a need for legislation beyond
the resources sector such as the Off-shore Installations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act
1982. The intent of this Act was to mandate that, ‘When the installations are attached
to the seabed, they will become under the legislation, part of Australia’.230 This decision
had customs, quarantine and immigration implications and therefore required changes
to the relevant Acts; the Customs Act 1901, Excise Act 1901, Quarantine Act 1908, and the
Migration Act 1958231 to ensure that the installations were not used for illegal purposes,
such as the importing of illegal drugs. Furthermore, the Act allowed platforms to be
installed without having to be imported through an Australian port.232 Subsequently,
the Sea Installations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987 further amended the four Acts
listed above ‘ … to give to officers administering the respective Acts power over such
installations, ships, aircraft, persons and goods arriving with or at the installations or
departing overseas from such installations’.233 The main change from the 1982 Act was
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967, as amended in 1980, established 500 metre safety
zones around offshore installations and set penalties for infringement of the zones. The
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Protection Arrangements–A Review, p. 2-7.
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to extend coverage, from the installations and the ships and aircraft supporting them,
to include the people involved and their movements.
Environmental Legislation
A wealth of environmental legislation was enacted between 1976 and 1988, with most
attention on protecting the Great Barrier Reef, as well as more general marine pollution
management. Domestic pressures were mostly responsible for the Barrier Reef
legislation, but the enactment of international regulations for managing pollution of
the sea produced the impetus for local marine pollution laws.

Legislation covering the Great Barrier Reef was iterative. As the extent of the Park
grew the environmental and commercial management issues expanded and became
more complex. The first Act relating to the Great Barrier Reef during the period was
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment Act 1978. This Act amended the area
covered by the Marine Park, closing it off at the tip of Cape York Peninsula and
excluding Saumarez Reef, because it belonged in the Coral Sea Islands Territory.234
Legislative incrementalism was evident in the tabling of the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park (Capricornia Section) Regulations in May 1981. The regulations covered a 12,000 sq
km section of the Marine Park where fishing was to be limited and monitored, and
where minerals exploration was to be banned.235 Opposition criticism centred on
Government failure to gazette the entire Great Barrier Reef as a marine park.236
Nevertheless, by 30 October 1983, 98.5 per cent of the Great Barrier Reef had been
declared as Marine Park and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment Act 1983
formalized management issues, such as having the Queensland National Parks and
Wildlife Service take on routine management of the Marine Park for the Park
Authority.237 The Act also highlighted the need for Commonwealth and State
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involvement in offshore management and the potential for difficulties therein. The first
of two unsuccessful attempts to further enhance the status of the Marine Park, the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment (Prohibition of Mining or Drilling Activities) Bill
1985 proposed to prohibit ‘ … operations for the recovery of minerals, or for any
purpose ancillary to such operations, … within the marine park’.238

The final Great Barrier Reef Marine Park environmental Acts for this period
highlighted the increasing attractiveness of the Reef as a tourist destination and its
ongoing importance to the fishing industry. The Sea Installations Act 1987, established a
regulatory mechanism before the first floating hotel was opened within the Great
Barrier Reef.239 Then, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment Act 1988 increased
fines for breaches of the Act, to $A10,000 for individuals and $A50,000 for corporations.
Because of the growing difficulty of policing the vast Marine Park the powers of
inspectors were expanded. Search and seizure powers were extended to allow
apprehension of offenders outside the Marine Park.240

The first legislation aimed at management of pollution at sea illustrated the growing
influence of international law and was presented as a package of six Acts entitled
‘Protection of the Sea’.241 The essential elements of this group of Acts, the last two of
which dealt with funding pollution clean-up measures, were that: Australia
implemented the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969
with the 1976 Protocol;242 ships carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of oil as cargo needed
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to have pollution liability insurance;243 Ministers could act against the threat of
pollution by Australian or foreign flag shipping on the high seas or in the territorial
sea;244 Australia retained through customary law the power to ‘ … protect its territory
and coastal sea …;’245 and Australia could prohibit discharge of oil within 50 nautical
miles of the outer edge of the Great Barrier Reef,246 and maintain survey and
construction standard requirements in the one piece of legislation.247

Legislation to prevent or manage marine pollution developed quickly during this
period, with the result that many Acts passed by Parliament amended or superseded
earlier laws, or ensured compliance with evolving international regulation. One such
Act was the Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981, the purpose of which was
to ‘… control marine pollution through dumping and incineration, by implementing
the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, together with amendments to the convention introduced in 1978 and 1980’.248
The Act applied to ‘ … Australian vessels, aircraft or platforms believed to be engaged
in dumping and vessels and aircraft loading in Australia or in Australian waters matter
which is to be dumped’.249

In 1983 the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 was
introduced by the incoming Labor Government, following similar lapsed legislation
proposed by the Coalition Government. It gave effect to the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973-78 (MARPOL) providing uniform controls
over ship-sourced pollution.250 Delay in enacting complementary State and Territory
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legislation to support MARPOL led to the introduction of the Protection of the Sea
(Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1986 to cover ‘ … all ships in the territorial sea
and the sea on the landward side of the territorial sea’.251 The Act contained provisions
allowing State legislation to prevail where it applied. This Act was complemented by
the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Amendment Act 1986, which amended the
1981 Act of the same name.252 In this case, updating was required because Australia
had ratified the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, the London Dumping Convention 1972.

Australia made several anti-dumping related international commitments. These
included signing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which prohibited the
dumping of radioactive waste at sea within the Treaty area, including the territorial
seas of contracting parties.253 Australia also negotiated the Convention for the Protection
of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region – (SPREP) to regulate
the dumping of wastes at sea and preclude the sea dumping of radioactive matter
anywhere in a defined South Pacific region.254

The final update was the Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Act 1986, enabling
Australia to implement particular annexes of MARPOL and the 1969 Convention on Oil
Pollution Damage, thereby ensuring greater control over ship sourced pollution.255 The
Act also enabled Australia to implement the 1984 protocol to the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969. This provided coverage out to
200nm and offered additional protection to sensitive areas like the Great Barrier Reef.256
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256 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 151, 8 October 1986, p.
1676.
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Other significant environmental legislation included two Acts associated with
Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 focused on protecting
wildlife and protecting the ecology, through giving measures agreed under the
Antarctic Treaty the force of Australian law.257 The Antarctic Marine Living Resources
Conservation Act 1981 allowed Australia to implement the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) which protects harvested
species and the entire ecosystem.258 Thirdly, the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports
and Imports) Act 1982, strengthened export and import controls relating to endangered
wildlife species in line with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).259 The Act proposed significant penalties for individuals
and organizations breaching the Act’s conditions.

During the 1970s international pressure grew for a global moratorium on whaling. To
ensure consistency with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, The
Australian Government introduced the Whaling Amendment Bill 1978.260 This was to
confer jurisdiction over whaling throughout the AFZ, but with qualifications that
would not apply to other fishing. Specifically, Australia would have no whaling
jurisdiction over ‘ … vessels or aircraft which are flying the flag of, or registered in, a
foreign country that is a party to the International Whaling Conventions and whose
use in connection with whaling is duly authorised by that country and is not in
contravention of any of the provisions of the schedule to the Convention’.261 Although
the Bill did not pass, support for whale conservation was provided by the Whale
Protection Act 1980, which prohibited capture and killing of cetaceans by anyone in the
AFZ, and beyond the 200nm limit by Australians. This Act imposed penalties of up to

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 118, 22 May 1980, p.
3110.
258 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 121, 26 March 1981, p.
1007.
259 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 127, 6 May 1982, p.
2391.
260 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 108, 13 April 1978, p.
1519.
261 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 108, 13 April 1978, p.
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$A100,000.262 These legislative moves were early sallies in an ongoing attempt to
outlaw all whale hunting.
The Implications of the Constabulary Function for the RAN
Before the 1970s the RAN’s involvement in constabulary operations was episodic and
improvised. The Navy rarely had vessels specifically designed for the work. The
200nm limit AFZ and subsequently EEZ, increasing interest in the maritime
environment, and the first wave of irregular maritime arrivals, demanded change. For
the Navy, this came as the Attack class patrol boats; the mainstay of the surface
response capability, until their replacement by the larger and more capable Fremantle
class.

It also involved the Navy’s carrier-based anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft for
some eight years, before their replacement by civil contract aircraft. Despite the
significant Navy commitment to the constabulary function from 1976 to 1988, debate
continued as to whether the task was inherently military or civilian. Nevertheless,
there was a sense that the demand for civil surveillance would increase with the
anticipated expansion of Australia’s resource zone.263 Discussion of the matter often
accompanied calls for the creation of a coastguard. On the other hand, Paul Dibb in his
1986 Review of Australia’s defence capabilities, cautioned against allowing the civil coastal
surveillance commitment to distort Defence Force capabilities and priorities.264

In 1976 the Labor Opposition’s Kim Beazley (Senior) (Fremantle) stated in Parliament
that there was: ‘ … the very great need in this country for what there is in the U.S.A.-a
coastguard, or, alternatively, a properly equipped maritime police’.265 Just two years
later The Australian newspaper called for the entire task to be ‘ … an integral part of our

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 118, 23 April 1980, p.
2185.
263 Australian Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1976, p.
16.
264 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s defence capabilities, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, March 1986, p. 44.
265 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 98, 2 March 1976, p.
434.
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defence system …’ but eventually to be run by a coastguard.266 By 1978 Labor
politicians were convinced the task was one for Defence, with Mr. Gordon Scholes
(Corio) making the claim in Parliament267 and Senator Lewis asking whether the use of
Tracker and Orion aircraft would not be more economical than the creation of an
entirely new organization.268 These statements encapsulated the uncertainty over law
enforcement at sea.

By May 1983 when the future of the Navy’s fixed-wing aviation was in doubt, the
former Coalition Government’s Minister for Defence was quoting Labor’s claim in
February 1982 that it would use the Navy Tracker aircraft for coastal surveillance and
would base three of them in Townsville or Cairns.269 In government just over a year
later Labor decided to retire the Trackers and rely on civil contract surveillance
aircraft.270 By 1988 it was the Coalition, now in opposition, imploring the Government
to, ‘ …give the defence forces a proper and meaningful job to do to control and coordinate coastal surveillance and put some guts and efficiency into it’?271 Defence, in
evidence before the 1983 Beazley review, indicated that coastal surveillance was not its
responsibility.272

The main impact of indecisiveness on the Navy was felt by the two Tracker squadrons
which were involved in coastal surveillance operations, from Broome, Darwin and
Nowra between 1975 and 1983. The almost continuous deployment of three VS 816
aircraft and their crews in Broome and Darwin from 1975 to 1980 significantly reduced
the anti-submarine capability of the squadron. It also stretched the squadron’s logistics
organization, which had simultaneously to support operations from Broome or Darwin
and Nowra or HMAS Melbourne. Normally, it operated from only one location, Nowra
Day, Contraband and Controversy: The Customs History of Australia From 1901, p. 427.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 108, 4 April 1978, p.
912.
268 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 76, 8 March 1978, p. 424.
269 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 131, 11 May 1983, p.
391.
270 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 131, 11 May 1983, p.
391. The decision was made ostensibly on cost comparison grounds, noting also that with the
retirement of HMAS Melbourne the primary rationale for keeping the Tracker aircraft ceased to
exist.
271 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 159, 23 February 1988,
p. 508.
272 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol., 145, 13 November 1985,
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or the carrier Melbourne. The Bass Strait surveillance, conducted by the training
squadron, VC 851, had less impact, but it meant that the highest priority for serviceable
aircraft was always the surveillance task, at the expense of training commitments.273

The most serious impact on the squadrons was the Government decision to prefer civil
contract aircraft for the ongoing coastal surveillance task, mainly because of cost.274
This led to the withdrawal from service of the Trackers and the loss to the ADF of a
capable anti-submarine and surveillance capability. It also led to the loss of a
considerable number of aircrew who sought opportunities elsewhere; the RAAF, the
Royal Navy (RN), Royal Air Force or airlines.

Nevertheless, until that point the implications for the two squadrons had not been
entirely negative, with opportunities to participate in nationally important tasks being
seen as a welcome change from training and exercising. Apart from the associated
improved morale, the coastal surveillance operations enabled both squadrons to
continue developing surface surveillance skills, which had become increasingly
important during the 1970s. This was sometimes to the detriment of anti-submarine
warfare training.275

The greatest impact of the expanding constabulary task and government response fell
on the Navy’s patrol boat force, which had been involved since the Attacks entered
service in late 1967.276 The ongoing uncertainty, relating to whether the constabulary
task should belong to the military, did not impact significantly on the patrol boat force.
The need for surface response forces was evident and the Navy was best placed to
provide them. At the time, the Customs ‘fleet’ was capable only of inshore work and
was dedicated primarily to port operations.277

From April 1981 to May 1982 the writer was responsible for managing the Squadron’s
training and operations programs.
274 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol., 103, 30 May 1984, p. 2164.
275 From the writer’s own experience with both squadrons at the time, beginning in the early
1970s the emphasis in training moved from anti-submarine warfare to surface surveillance in
support of strike operations by the A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft.
276 Colin Jones, ‘Early years of the coastal patrol’, David Stevens, ed., Maritime Power in the 20th
Century, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1998, p. 159.
277 The ‘J’ class patrol boats of the 1970s were only 13m long and had a range of only 500nm.
They and the predecessor Collector class boats were not suitable for offshore work. M.J.
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Had a decision been made to establish a coast guard then the Navy’s patrol boat force
would almost certainly have been affected. Informal surveys conducted in 2004, when
the issue was proposed by Labor in opposition, suggested that the patrol boat force
would lose a majority of its personnel through transfers to a new coast guard.278 A
similar result would have been expected had a coast guard been proposed between
1976 and 1988, because naval personnel would have transferred in expectation of a
more predictable life.

One of the most tangible implications for the Navy was the confirmation of patrol boat
basing in the north – Cairns and Darwin. Initially the Attack class patrol boats had
been based around the Australian coast, with seven in Sydney, two in Darwin, and one
in each of Fremantle, Jervis Bay, Melbourne, Westernport Bay, and Brisbane.279 As the
task of monitoring and dealing with illegal fishing, potential quarantine breaches and
irregular maritime arrivals grew, the focus shifted to the north and north-west.
Eventually, patrol boat basing became concentrated in Cairns and Darwin. By 1988 the
disposition of the new Fremantle class was, six in Darwin, five in Cairns, two in HMAS
Stirling (Western Australia), one in Sydney and one in Westernport Bay.280
A major outcome of this new basing regime was the expansion of the Navy’s ‘footprint’
in Australia with the addition of two new home ports in Cairns and Darwin. Basing the
patrol boats in the north brought a demand for housing for families and support
services associated with the maintenance and operation of the boats. There was a
commensurate reduction in the patrol boat presence in southern Australia. That would
become an issue later with the expansion of foreign fishing in the Southern Ocean.

Operationally, the major implication for the Navy of increasing involvement in the
constabulary function, was the establishment of a need for patrol boats more capable
Bannon, The Evolution of the Role of Australian Customs in Maritime Surveillance and Border
Protection, Master of Maritime Studies Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2007, pp. 65-6.
278 Informal discussion in early 2005, between the writer and a member of the Prime Minister’s
2004 Task Force on Offshore Maritime Security.
279 Jones, ‘Early years of the coastal patrol’, Stevens, ed., Maritime Power in the 20th Century, p.
159.
280 Department of Defence, Annual Report 1988-89, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1988, p. 100. At this time, three of the Attack class remained in service for reserve
duties and were based in Adelaide, Hobart and Fremantle.
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than the Attack class which had significant sea-keeping limitations.281 Despite their
better performance at sea, economy measures dictated that the new Fremantle class
retained the Second World War vintage 40mm Bofors guns.282 Even with their greater
size and better sea-keeping ability, the Fremantles were not entirely satisfactory, and
their eventual replacements, the Armidale class, were 57m vessels.283 Implicit in the
decision to follow the Attack class with the Fremantles, was acknowledgment by the
Navy that the constabulary task had become a long-term role.

The constabulary task, brought the Navy frequently and almost always positively, to
the notice of the public, for the first time in peacetime. The Navy’s other peacetime
activities rarely attracted any media attention. The constabulary function was different,
as video coverage for TV news, of boardings and detention of foreign fishing vessels
and

irregular

maritime

arrival

boats,

became

and

remained

newsworthy.

Consequently, the Attack and Fremantle class boats, their crews and activities, became
the subject of two successful TV drama series called Patrol Boat in 1979 and 1982.284 For
a Service which operated primarily ‘out of sight and out of mind’ constabulary work
provided a consistent reminder to the public of its value. The publicity generated by
the constabulary task proved also to assist Navy recruiting.

The constabulary function had an important personnel impact within the Navy. Firstly,
as constabulary work became an apparently permanent part of the Navy’s role it
became an attractive alternative to other surface ships for many junior officers and
sailors. The nature of the work, the camaraderie associated with small crews and the
attraction of Cairns and Darwin as home ports all contributed to this. The constabulary
function also generated important command experience and training opportunities,
especially for junior officers. The paying off of HMAS Melbourne in 1982 had deprived

Jones, ‘Early years of the coastal patrol’, Stevens, ed., Maritime Power in the 20th Century, p.
166.
282 Peter Jones, ‘1972 – 1983: Towards Self-Reliance’, in David Stevens ed., The Royal Australian
Navy: The Australian Centenary History of Defence Volume III, Oxford University Press, South
Melbourne, 2001, p. 222.
283 <http://www.navy.gov.au/HMAS_Armidale>. (1 September 2012)
284 Jones, ‘1972 – 1983: Towards Self-Reliance’, Stevens ed., The Royal Australian Navy: The
Australian Centenary History of Defence Volume III, p. 232.
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the Fleet of a significant number of at sea training places, for which the Fremantles
provided some compensation.285

Secondly, constabulary work built a substantial body of expertise and experience in
new skills. Most noteworthy was expertise gained in boarding and inspection
operations, in a variety of conditions and operational circumstances. This became more
significant when Navy surface combatants engaged in interception operations in the
Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea during the lead-up to the 1991 Iraq War, a task they
continue to perform.
CONCLUSIONS
From 1976 to 1988 the constabulary function evolved rapidly in response to significant
growth in the nature and scope of the law enforcement at sea task. For the first time
since Federation, illegal drug importation, IUU fishing, quarantine, marine
environmental protection and irregular maritime arrivals all manifested as problems
simultaneously. This demanded a more coherent and comprehensive response than the
hitherto episodic reaction to individual events.

Both Coalition and Labor Governments struggled to develop an adequate response
and had difficulty moving away from a primarily cost-driven approach. A succession
of government reviews of coastal surveillance and related matters provided the means
of responding to the new developments. Additional resources were allocated to the
constabulary function and incremental organizational improvements were made.
Although the response capacity for law enforcement at sea was not optimal by the end
of the period, it was much improved.

There was also an unprecedented amount of supporting legislation passed. The
eventual agreement between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories on
offshore sovereignty was a catalyst for this. Other important factors were the
expanding influence of international conventions governing maritime law, especially

Conversation with Rear Admiral James Goldrick, RAN Reserve on 2 October 2012. Admiral
Goldrick had experience of this issue both as a Commanding Officer of the Fremantle class
patrol boat, HMAS Cessnock and subsequently as Commander Border Protection Command.
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relating to the marine environment and the economic importance of offshore resources.
Policy development which had to adjust continually to changing and growing threats
also generated substantial legislation.

Whether the constabulary function should be a military one remained in dispute. How
this dispute would be resolved in the future would have repercussions for the Navy,
with the formation of a coast guard having the potential to strip the Navy of its patrol
boats and some or all of the crews.

For the Navy, the most important implication of its constabulary function between
1976 and 1988 was that a previously ad hoc and periodic commitment became formal
and long term. This meant the acquisition of appropriate patrol craft, based to reflect
the focus of operations; that is in northern Australia. Thus the Fremantle class boats
were acquired and new bases built in Darwin and Cairns.

These implications affected personnel, through training commitments and the move of
families to the north, together with extensions to the Navy’s logistics chain. While the
focus on constabulary operations may have been a diversion for naval aircraft, their
employed proved to be worthwhile for the Navy. Conversely, the replacement of the
naval aircraft by civilian contract aircraft for aerial surveillance led to the retirement of
the Navy’s fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft and the loss of a valued capability.

For the first time, however, the public gained a perception of the Navy’s contribution
to Australia’s peacetime border security, while the Navy itself came to appreciate the
value of one of its less glamorous tasks. The earlier discomfort with media attention
dissipated and was replaced by the realization that the attention provided excellent
publicity. Consequently, the Navy relished the publicity glare associated with two
television series about the patrol boat activities and their contribution to the nation.

227

CHAPTER SIX
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES: THE
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE – 1989 TO 2001
INTRODUCTION
The period from 1989 to 2001 maintained the main constabulary function trends
examined in the previous chapter. Law enforcement at sea demanded responses to
concurrent and continuing threats in geographically diverse locations. New waves of
irregular maritime arrivals, resources management and environmental stewardship
placed the greatest demands on constabulary organizations and forces. Illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing continued to pose a significant challenge,
while quarantine and illegal drug importation matters arose occasionally, and with less
impact.

With the organizational changes detailed in Chapter 5 settled at least for the time
being, the major developments during the period were the setting aside of political bipartisanship in dealing with irregular maritime arrivals and the introduction of
harsher and increasingly less humanitarian policies. This change of approach, from the
second half of 2001 coincided with a rise in numbers and with a boost in the Navy’s
commitment to the constabulary function.

This chapter examines the development of the law enforcement at sea problems that
continued to demand government response between 1989 and 2001. It focuses on the
opening of the Southern ocean to foreign fishing and the emergence of another wave of
irregular maritime arrivals. The chapter also identifies the continuing importance of
quarantine and marine environmental issues.

Government responses are presented in three discrete sections. The first exposes the
development of government policy for each major challenge and demonstrates the
influence of international agreements on national policy. The second section examines
the continuing evolution of the practical response to maritime law enforcement needs,
with special attention to organization and resource matters. The final section
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demonstrates the explosion of related legislation, much of it reflecting international
influences.

Chapter Six concludes with consideration of the implications for the Navy of the
constabulary function, which grew significantly in scope and complexity. Issues
examined include the tasking of the patrol boat force and increasingly other elements
of the Fleet, patrol boat capability and basing and the ramifications of the constabulary
tasking for Navy people.

FROM 1989 TO 2001: THE DEATH OF BIPARTISANSHIP
Resources Protection
Up to 2001 resource protection was consistently the biggest law enforcement at sea
problem, despite border protection having a higher public profile. Issues ranged from
traditional fishing by Indonesians in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) to commercial
fishing by foreign and Australian fishers and concerns over fish stocks. A complicating
factor was the opening of the Southern Ocean to fishing, especially in the late 1990s,
and the challenges for Australian authorities which initially lacked any monitoring or
deterrence capability.

In the early 1990s, Indonesian fishing in the Arafura Sea and off the north-west coast of
Western Australia caused concern for fish stocks.1 Concern was also expressed in
Parliament because of higher numbers of foreign fishing vessels operating in the AFZ.
By April 1991, 70 foreign fishing vessels had been reported for the calendar year, a rise
of 400 per cent over the same period in 1990.2

After some quiet years, foreign fishing vessels began to generate further concern in
1998. By mid-year a record 50 foreign fishing vessels had been caught fishing illegally
in the AFZ.3 Australia and New Zealand took action against Japan at the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in July 1999, because of the growing pressure on fish
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 133, 4 May 1989, p. 1789.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 176, 11 April 1991, p.
2434.
3 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 191, 22 June 1998, p. 3678.
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stocks.4 Although the case, to stop Japan’s experimental southern bluefin tuna
experimental catch program failed, Japan agreed to limit the program to the
satisfaction of both Australia and New Zealand.5

The Southern Ocean gradually became a focus of activity through the late 1990s.
Attention was first drawn to it in Parliament during 1996, with reports of a huge
increase in trawling near Heard and MacDonald Islands.6 Questions continued to be
raised about illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in that region, with
reports of 15 incidents between April and October 1997.7

During the period fish stocks, tuna and shark especially, were being depleted by overfishing and the matter was exacerbated by under-reporting of catch. From 1989 the
Government was considering a joint moratorium with New Zealand, on southern blue
fin tuna, following a 50 per cent reduction in allowable catch in the previous year.8
Following consultation with the four State Ministers involved and with the South East
Trawl Management Advisory Committee a quota management system was introduced
in the South east Trawl Fishery.9 As the Minister for Primary Industry, Mr Kerin,
noted, ‘Basically the problem is overcapitalisation and too many boats chasing too few
fish’.10

The problem was not limited to tuna stocks, with similar fears expressed in relation to
orange roughy and gemfish.11 Nevertheless, attention was kept on tuna, with the
Director of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency noting in 1995 that since taking
81,000 tonnes of southern blue fin tuna in 1961, Australia’s catch had continually
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case–Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, August 4, 2000 rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&action
Val=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=7_10.pdf > (22
November 2012).
5 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case–Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility August 4, 2000, p. 88.
6 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 181, 12 December 1996, p. 7325.
7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 188, 17 November 1997, pp. 8946-7.
8 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 167, 5 October 1989, p.
1571.
9 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 171, 9 May 1990, p, 117.
10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 171, 9 May 1990, p, 117.
11 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 145, 14 May 1991, p. 3229.
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declined to the 11,750 tonnes caught in 1994. He called for better stock management.12
Catch quotas were agreed for southern bluefin tuna from 1995; for Australia 5,265
tonnes, 6,065 tonnes for Japan, and 420 tonnes for New Zealand.13

Fisheries management concerns continued, however, with an Australian National
Audit Office Report into the Australian Fisheries Management Authority in 1996.14 The
lack of reliable information on fish stocks and the consequent inability to establish
sustainable yields were among the main shortcomings uncovered.15 Despite a lull in
expressions of concern over fish stocks, the problem did not disappear.

The continuing under-reporting of catch compounded tuna stock management
problems. Japanese long line tuna boats were caught twice under-reporting their catch
and their crews were prosecuted in 1990.16 Some years later, Japanese tuna boats left
Hobart after a difference of opinion on stock levels between Japanese and Australian
scientists.17

Border Protection - Immigration
From 1989 irregular maritime arrivals became the main border protection problem and
remained a source of concern throughout the period. While earlier irregular maritime
arrivals came from Southeast Asia, subsequent waves came from Southwest and South
Asia as well. Table 6–1 below shows the number of irregular maritime arrivals in

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 199, 8 February 1995, p.
730.
13 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 177, 6 May 1995, p. 327.
14 Audit Report Summaries, Australian Fisheries Management Authority: Commonwealth Fisheries
Management, Audit Report No. 32 1995-96, 25 June 1996,
<http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports?year=1995-1996&portfolio=2> (24
November 2012). Among the reported shortcomings were a lack of administrative policies for
fisheries management, too few statutory management plans and a lack of information on the
environmental impact of commercial fishing.
15 Audit Report Summaries, Australian Fisheries Management Authority: Commonwealth Fisheries
Management, Audit Report No. 32 1995-96, 25 June 1996, p. 2.
16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 172, 21 August 1990, p.
1115.
17 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 175, 16 November 1995, p. 2548.
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Australia and the number of boats in which they arrived. There is a discernible spike in
arrivals at the turn of the century.18
Year

No. of Boats

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

1
2
6
6
3
18
7
19
11
17
86
51
43

No. of People (excludes
crew)
26
198
214
216
81
953
237
660
339
200
3721
2939
5516

Table 6–1: Irregular Maritime Arrivals 1989 - 200119
Early in the period irregular maritime arrivals came mainly from Cambodia, Vietnam
and China and landed in widely separated parts of the mainland, from Darwin to the
Kimberley coast of Western Australia.20 In one case, irregular maritime arrivals were
on the coast for 16 days before being found, raising quarantine fears as well.21 The
arrival of 139 Chinese by ship in the Torres Strait in June 1997 attracted attention
because of the large number of irregular maritime arrivals and the apparently wellorganized nature of the venture.22 In the mid to late 1990s irregular maritime arrivals
began arriving also by aircraft, carrying either fraudulent identification or none at all.23
At about this time, Bangladeshis began appearing on the north coast, in some cases
This table is taken from Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia since
1976’, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 11 February 2011,
Appendix A.
19 Phillips and Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976’, Appendix A.
20 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 144, 11 March 1991, p. 1548, and House of
Representatives, Vol. 183, 2 April 1992, p. 1817.
21 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 183, 2 April 1992, p.
1817.
22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 214, 17 June 1997, p.
5356.
23 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 221, 28 May 1998, p.
4129.
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having been brought by Indonesian fishers, who were paid relatively large sums of
money.24 Gradually rising numbers of irregular maritime arrivals in the late 1990s led
the Minister for Justice and Customs, Senator Vanstone, to put the matter in
perspective as part of a global problem, which remained relatively minor in Australia’s
case.
No-one denies that the recent arrivals by boat are a serious problem, but it does
need to be kept in context. Ten times the number of illegal immigrants
attempted to enter Australia via scheduled airline flights than (sic) by
unauthorised boats in 1997-98. In contrast to that, overstays on legitimate visas
are also a problem, and there are estimated to be some 51,000 overstayers in
December 1997. There were 348 people who arrived by boat between 1 July
1998 and 30 April of this year. That is already double the number who arrived
in the previous year. So we do need to understand what is driving the increase
in attempts at coming into Australia.25
Nevertheless the increase in numbers of irregular maritime arrivals during 1999, with
some 1,200 of the 3,721 for the year arriving in November alone, brought a renewed
focus to the problem.26 Irregular maritime arrivals arriving as far south as Port Kembla
in May 1999 added a new dimension to the problem, which had been confined to
northern waters.27 Similar increases appeared also in 2000 and 2001 before the flow
reduced dramatically for several years.

The Government ascribed the spike in numbers at the turn of the century to Australia’s
attractiveness and to its laws, through which 75 per cent of claimants for asylum were
granted refugees status.28 Furthermore, the Government pointed out that refugee
assessment in other countries and by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees produced less satisfactory results, from the applicants’ point of view. The
turn of the century also witnessed three incidents which polarized political responses
to the problem and generated unprecedented public interest and reaction.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 191, 22 June 1998, p. 3678.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 196, 25 May 1999, p. 5285.
26 Adrienne Millbank, ‘Boat People, Illegal Migration and Asylum Seekers: in Perspective’,
Current Issues Brief, 13 1999-2000, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 14 December 1999, p. 1.
27 Sam Bateman, ‘Securing Australian Maritime Approaches’, Security Challenges, Vol. 3,
Number 3, August 2007, p. 110.
28 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 27 August 2001, p.
30286.
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The first of the incidents occurred in August 2001, in the lead-up to a Federal election.
The Motor Vessel (MV) Tampa rescued 434 irregular maritime arrivals from a sinking
Indonesian vessel at the request of Australian search and rescue authorities.29 The
Tampa, which had been heading for Indonesia was forced by threats from those it had
rescued, to turn for Christmas Island. Refused permission to enter the territorial sea,30
the Tampa remained at 12nm from Christmas Island until several irregular maritime
arrivals threatened to jump overboard.31 The Tampa’s captain then took the ship to
within four miles of Christmas Island, where 45 Special Air Service soldiers boarded it
to provide medical assistance to the irregular maritime arrivals and prevent them from
landing in Australian territory.32 After a prolonged standoff the passengers were taken
by Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships for processing in Nauru and New Zealand.33

The second major incident became known as the ‘children overboard’ incident which
occurred in early October 2001, during the election campaign. The suspected irregular
maritime arrival vessel, which became known as Suspect Illegal Emigrant Vessel
(SIEV) 4, had been detected heading for Christmas Island, with irregular maritime
arrivals on the upper deck wearing life jackets. Australian authorities believed they
may have been preparing to sabotage the vessel and take to the sea to ensure rescue by
the RAN.34

In fraught circumstances, under instructions from the Government, a boarding party
from Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Adelaide turned SIEV 4 back towards
Indonesian waters. Not long after, the boat became disabled and people began jumping
into the water, thus forcing the rescue that the Government wanted to avoid.35
Somehow, information reached authorities in Canberra that some irregular maritime
arrivals had thrown their children overboard.36 Although this claim has been the

Anthony Heiser, ‘Border Protection; UNCLOS and the M.V. Tampa Incident 2001’, Australia
and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 16, 2002, p. 92.
30 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 29 August 2001, p.
30516.
31 Heiser, ‘Border Protection; UNCLOS and the M.V. Tampa Incident 2001’, p. 93.
32 Heiser, ‘Border Protection; UNCLOS and the M.V. Tampa Incident 2001’, p. 93.
33 Heiser, ‘Border Protection; UNCLOS and the M.V. Tampa Incident 2001’, p. 94.
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subject of much debate and subsequent investigation, it provided government with a
picture of callousness that played well in some segments of Australian society leading
to the election.

The last of these incidents was the sinking of a vessel, which became known as SIEV X.
On October 19 2001, the overcrowded boat, carrying about 400 men, women and
children, encountered poor weather and suffered engine failure.37 SIEV X sank, not far
from the southern coast of Java, with the loss of 352 lives; only 44 survived.38 Neither
the exact location of the sinking, nor the failure of Indonesian of Australian authorities
to locate the boat, have been explained by the subsequent official investigations.

Each of these three events is very important in the development of the challenge posed
by irregular maritime arrivals. Firstly, they have pointed to a growing sense of
desperation among those trying to get to Australia by irregular means, which in some
cases has been heightened by having family members already in Australia. Secondly,
they have reflected hardening attitudes towards irregular maritime arrivals and have
been used politically in a way not previously seen in Australia, to the advantage of the
political parties prepared to adopt hard line policies.
Border Protection – Customs
Throughout the period to 2001 the biggest Customs challenge was illegal drug
importation. Figures produced in October 1992 indicate the scale of the problem at that
time. From 1 January 1992, 29kg of heroin worth $35m, 200kg of cocaine worth $160m
and 7 tonnes of cannabis resin worth $105m were seized by Customs.39 The leap in
drug seizures from 162kg in 1971-2, to 5,071kg in 1991-2 demonstrated the seriousness
of the challenge.40 Yet, in the early 1990s only about 1.5 per cent of shipping containers
were being inspected for drugs. Illegal drugs were also entering Australia through
Torres Strait and the local residents themselves expressed fears about the trade.41 Fears
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were also expressed, principally by the Labor Opposition, that only about 10 per cent
of heroin was being intercepted on entry to Australia.42

Bird smuggling, into and out of Australia, was an occasional challenge for Customs. In
1990 for example, Senator Vallentine (Western Australia) accused US Air Force
personnel of taking birds from Australia in regular flights that serviced facilities in
Australia such as North West Cape and Pine Gap.43

Illegal bird imports were

considered a greater threat, because of the potential introduction of exotic diseases.
This matter was rarely mentioned in the Parliament after 1993.44

Occasionally, doubts were raised about the performance of Customs in its border
protection role, with budget, organizational and cultural issues blamed for
shortcomings. In 1989 questions were asked in Parliament about the impact of budget
cuts on Customs capacity.45 Subsequently, in 1994 and 1995 the Coalition Opposition
claimed the Customs presence in Torres Strait was inadequate, with possible illegal
people movement the main problem.46 The Government continually defended reduced
Customs officer numbers on the basis of improved technology.47
Border Protection - Quarantine
Quarantine provided several challenges for border security from 1989 to 2001. These
ranged from serious outbreaks of plant and animal diseases to the export of diseased
animals. The nature and extent of quarantine breaches led to severe doubts about the
capacity of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) to ensure its
elements of border security and questions as to the efficacy of quarantine policy.
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Two plant disease issues involving New Zealand apples alleged to be contaminated by
fire blight and the unwitting importation of Papaya fruit fly, were both potentially
damaging to local primary industry. Fire blight first gained attention in 199048 but
achieved public prominence only with a suspected outbreak in the Melbourne
Botanical Gardens in May 1997.49 That the discovery was made by a New Zealand
Ministry of Agriculture Chief Plants Officer raised suspicions, given New Zealand’s
ongoing efforts to export apples to Australia.50 The outbreak was successfully
contained,51 but it was many years before New Zealand apples gained import
clearance.

Papaya fruit fly was first detected in Torres Strait in 1993, among fears of repeat
incursions and damage to local industry, with claims that AQIS procedures were not
sufficiently strict.52 Similar fears attended moves to allow banana imports from the
Philippines, and local growers insisted on risk analysis.53 Later claims that Philippine
bananas carried 23 diseases heightened the fears of local growers.54 With each of these
issues, there was an element of local industry protection which complicated the AQIS
task and led to claims of unfair trade practices. This was further complicated by
Senator Margetts’ (Western Australia) claim that the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reversed the onus of proof regarding quarantine
regulations, effectively making a country’s decisions to retain a disease-free status a
trade barrier.55

Before a major review in 1992 not much AQIS attention had been paid to the potential
for fish and seafood diseases, primarily because of a lack of knowledge.56 The prospect
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of salmon imports from New Zealand and Canada, which had salmon diseases
unknown in Australia, generated concerns as to AQIS’ competence to deal with the
matter.57 Problems continued to arise, including with the illegal import of Thai prawns
for bait, and quarantine breaches with the import of salmon products from Vietnam
and Russia.58

One of the major quarantine controversies concerned the import of cooked chicken
meat in 1997. The decision to permit the imports ignored strong representations from
the local industry but with assurances from AQIS, together with what was described as
a very high quarantine barrier.59 A subsequent outbreak of Newcastle disease proved
costly for the chicken meat industry in New South Wales, with the destruction of
nearly two million chickens in northern New South Wales. Although unrelated, this
incident heightened the concerns of the local chicken meat industry regarding chicken
meat imports.60

The period from 1989 witnessed unprecedented attention to quarantine and to AQIS as
the relevant border protection agency. The challenges and problems related above
ensured that the organization was scrutinized. Its task was made more difficult by
allegations of staff-cutting and misapplication of resources. In late 1995, for example,
the Coalition Opposition argued that AQIS focused too much on export controls, rather
than on import controls.61 A motion to debate a Matter in the Public Interest was
moved on AQIS’ poor performance in North Queensland, where inspection of a boat
imported from Taiwan failed to discover Formosan termite which could have damaged
the local sugar industry.62

Performance pressures felt by AQIS would only have increased with speculation in
Parliament in late 2000 that elements of the organization were being assessed for
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outsourcing to the private sector.63 Although nothing came of the matter then, AQIS
began using contractors for some functions.
Marine Environmental Protection
The marine environment remained important for the constabulary task during this
period from 1989. Most of the earlier problems continued to pose challenges, while
several new problems arose. As the pre-eminent marine environmental attraction in
Australia, the Great Barrier Reef held the attention of relevant authorities. Landsourced pollution became an increasingly significant issue for Reef environmental
management. Sewage runoff has increased with coastal residential and other
development, becoming a problem near Heron Island as early as 1989.64

River runoff from mining in Papua New Guinea became another source of pollution
with the potential to affect the Great Barrier Reef, and the Torres Strait. In 1989,
$200,000 were allocated for a study into the matter.65 Runoff from a variety of land
sources continued to affect the Great Barrier Reef, throughout the period.

Oil spills from ships, caused by sinking, grounding or inadvertent leaks from
machinery, also caused marine environmental damage. While pollution of this kind
could occur anywhere on the coast,66 the potential for damage was most serious on the
Reef. Similarly, the prospect and reality of shipping accidents within the Reef resulted
in compulsory pilotage for all ships over 70m in length and for all oil tankers.67 Yet, in
the early stages, not all ships complied with the requirements.68

Several other environmental issues caused problems within the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park (GBRMP). Gill netting led to the death of some of the dugong population69
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and inadequate regulation allowed unsustainable trawling.70 The crown of thorns
starfish again began infesting parts of the Reef, despite the earlier remedial measures
and, in the view of the Labor Opposition, because of inadequate funding.71

The discharge of ballast water in Australian waters by visiting ships introduced
invasive pests and became one of the most worrying marine environmental problems.
Early concerns related to Tasmanian waters and fishing industry fears that inaction
would damage their livelihoods. AQIS estimated about 60 million tonnes of ballast
water were being discharged annually in Australia.72 Media reports identified bulk
carriers using ports in the north west of Western Australia as the main culprits, being
responsible for up to 58 million tonnes of ballast water each year.73

The investigation also found that 14 species of fish, algae, invertebrates and seaweeds
had been introduced by ballast water by mid-1991, confirming the fears of the
Tasmanian fishers – even if the problem was mostly remote from them.74 But, the
ballast water problem spread from north-west Western Australia, introducing exotic
worms to Port Phillip Bay during 1994, and subsequently to Cockburn Sound in
Western Australia.75

Living organisms were not the only source of such problems for the marine
environment. The Pasminco company angered Tasmanian rock lobster fishermen by
dumping Jarosite (a byproduct of zinc refining) in local waters, even though no
environmental degradation had been noted.76 Well-founded fears were expressed over
traces of Tributyltin, a hull preservative, with toxic properties, being found in mussels
growing near the Cockburn Sound naval base in Western Australia in 1994.77
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Another new, serious and costly problem during this period emerged with the
realization that many merchant ships trading through Australian ports were unsafe.
Environmental pollution was not the only threat posed by these ships, with crew safety
and economic loss equally worrisome. One early example was the MV Berlina, which
was delayed in Port Kembla late in 1991, to rectify numerous serious defects.78 It was
the fourth ship held in Port Kembla in similar circumstances within the previous
year.79 The seriousness of this matter was highlighted when the Greek tanker Kirki lost
its bow off the Western Australian coast on 21 July 1991. Although the major section of
the tanker was towed to safety, some 17,280 tonnes of light crude oil were lost. Only
current and weather conditions prevented serious marine pollution along the Western
Australian coastline.80 A subsequent Matter of Public Interest motion in the House of
Representatives on 14 November 1991 pointed out that of 21 bulk carriers lost between
January 1990 and August 1991, six had sunk after loading in Australian ports,
underlining the need for urgent action.81

Management of whales presented yet another challenge. Australia wanted to ban all
whaling in the Southern Ocean, while Japan continued its scientific whaling program,
and Russia showed interest in establishing a similar program.82 A new concern
emerged in the mid-1990s; the impact of Navy ships and their activities on migrating
whales.83 While the danger of collisions with ships was the initial concern, it expanded
to include the possible impact of ship sonar transmissions on whales,84 especially
because of several unexplained whale strandings worldwide.85
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THE GOVERNMENT POLICY RESPONSE: INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
The more comprehensive policy response noted from 1976 to 1988 developed further
up to 2001. Policy development during this period featured international influence;
reflected in Australian government decisions to accede to international agreements,
promoting marine environmental protection, and engaging with neighbouring
countries to ensure the effectiveness of domestic policies with international
implications.

Resources Management
One of the earliest policy developments was the agreement with Indonesia to manage
more effectively the 1974 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) relating to
traditional Indonesian fishing activities in the AFZ.86 The difficulties in managing
fishing in the agreed areas (the MOU Box) necessitated many meetings between
Indonesian and Australian officials, before resolution was achieved after 2001.

Other significant initiatives for managing fish stocks throughout the AFZ involved
tuna, other high value fish stocks and Japan, one of the most important fishing nations
active in the AFZ. In 1989 the Government restricted Japanese tuna fishing off the New
South Wales coast, with seasonal closure of some waters and finally a permanent
prohibition against fishing within 50nm of the coast.87

Despite these measures, Japanese tuna fishing remained a concern, including through
under-reporting of catch. In May 1993 the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and
Japan signed the legally binding International Convention for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna to establish sustainable quotas.88 At the first meeting of the Commission
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna in May 1994, southern bluefin tuna
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quotas were confirmed and all southern bluefin tuna fishing nations were encouraged
to sign the Convention.89

The legally binding agreement proved inadequate for stock management. In 1999 the
Australian Government decided to prosecute Japan for breaching its agreed southern
bluefin tuna limits.90 Against Australian and New Zealand objections, Japan had
instituted a unilateral experimental fishing program to enable a take beyond the agreed
quota.91 This was strikingly similar to Japan’s scientific whaling program.
Highly Migratory Fish
There was an overarching acknowledgement of the need to manage fish stocks
sustainably, and acceptance that some stocks were already significantly threatened.
International agreements were one imperfect means of imposing sustainable
exploitation rates. Domestically, more practical policies were enacted because of
dwindling fish stocks. Thus, the way was cleared for quota management, with
agreement by the States and acceptance by the fishing industry.92
Yet, more robust and effective policies were needed. An Australian National Audit
Office audit report of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) in June
1996 pointed to serious problems, including insufficient information on fish stock
levels and a propensity by AFMA to set catch levels more likely to keep industry viable
than to maintain or recover stocks.93
Border Protection - Immigration
Increasing numbers of irregular maritime arrivals also demanded a comprehensive
policy response, which made it increasingly difficult for the arrivals to gain entry to
and remain in Australia. In 1990 the Joint Standing Committee on Migration
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Regulations presented a report entitled ‘Illegal Entrants in Australia: Balancing Control
and Compassion’. The report examined the impact of existing migration legislation and
regulations, noting inter alia that, ‘ … the Committee is unaware of any other
developed country which has automatic and mandatory deportation for nearly all of its
illegals… ’.94 The report dealt with people already in Australia illegally, and much of
its ‘compassion’ referred to dealing with them fairly. Nevertheless the report also
concluded that only about 4,000 of the estimated 90,000 people in Australia illegally
would be permitted to stay. The tough Government policy was supported by the
Coalition Opposition.95

Almost a decade later, the preferred mix of control and compassion had not deterred
irregular maritime arrivals, prompting the Minister for Justice and Customs, Senator
Amanda Vanstone, to claim that, ‘ … detection and interception are not the problem –
primarily because these people want to be found, intercepted and brought to the
Australian mainland’.96 The Government then responded with what later became
known as the Pacific Solution, which included offshore processing and detention of
irregular maritime arrivals97 and the introduction of Temporary Protection Visas which
limited access to family reunions and provided no guarantee of further entry for
holders who left Australia.98

Other initiatives included hosting a regional consultation on illegal migration in April
1994 and engaging closely with Indonesia, which in late 1999 broke a false passport
ring operating in the country.99 A Regional Cooperation Agreement, concluded with
Indonesia in 2001, aimed to prevent the onward movement of irregular maritime
arrivals from Indonesia.100
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Border Protection - Quarantine
Management of quarantine protection was much less controversial than was illegal
immigration during the period. AQIS had been subject to the Lindsay Review from late
1988, which found that the Service was both effective and efficient in its operations.101
Increasingly, however, AQIS struggled to maintain biosecurity standards while not
limiting free trade, and thus the import and export of live animals and foodstuffs. An
early expression of this struggle was the call in Parliament for AQIS to be privatized.102
The Labor Government was also disposed to reduce AQIS staffing in the early 1990s
but intended to retain service levels, in part by relying on industry to instigate effective
quality assurance processes.103

Over time, AQIS gained more funding and staff to enable it to meet its regulatory
responsibilities. In 1997, funding was boosted by $76m and by a further $100m in 1998,
including funds for additional shipping container inspection.104 Pressure to allow food
imports generated a strong focus on AQIS risk management processes, which were
based on, ‘ … a conservative, but not a zero-risk, approach to the management of
biosecurity risks. This approach is consistent with the World Trade Organization’s
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures… ’.105 The acceptance
of a level of biosecurity risk often led to questions about the dangers to Australian
primary industry, as for example when bananas from the Philippines were undergoing
an 18 to 24 month risk assessment in 2000.106

Border Protection - Customs
Unlike AQIS, the Customs Service was accused of performing poorly. In a review
entitled ‘The Turning Point’ in 1994, Customs was severely criticized for, among other
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matters, being insular, lacking strategic direction and avoiding critical decisions.107 In
response, the Comptroller General resigned and 386 other officers left the Service
through voluntary redundancy or retirement.108 The dramatic action taken to improve
management was long overdue, given that the organization had been subject to 20
reviews in the previous 20 years, with little evident benefit to performance.109 Of the
$32m allocated for Customs reforms, $24.6m paid for redundancies and $5.7m was
allocated to business improvement.110

Marine Environmental Protection
Environmental policy developments in response to the challenges of the period were
broad and were influenced by international organizations and protocols. Dealing with
marine pollution from oil spills was a high priority and in 1989, with the Exxon Valdez
pollution disaster fresh in many minds,111 Australia had oil spill plans at the
Commonwealth and State levels, together with response equipment stored around the
coast.112 Following the Kirki incident off the Western Australia coast in July 1991, when
a pollution disaster was averted, the Government called for a thorough review of the
national plan to combat marine pollution from oil spills.113 Additional measures were
taken in later years to deal with emerging problems.

To preserve diminishing whale populations, Australia agreed to support a French
proposal for a whale sanctuary in the Southern Ocean, south of 40°S. The proposal was
accepted overwhelmingly by the International Whaling Commission in May 1994.114
The Australian Minister for the Environment, Senator Hill, also made clear that the aim
for whale conservation was, ‘ … implementation of a permanent international ban on
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commercial whaling’.115 In June 2000, the Government, hosting an International
Whaling Commission meeting in Adelaide, proposed a whale sanctuary for the South
Pacific.116 Additional action included listing six species of whale in the Convention on
Conservation of Migratory Species.117
The Commonwealth and State Governments moved to establish marine parks around
the Australian coast and to limit activities within them. Thus, the Federal Government
established a 25 year strategic plan for the Great Barrier Reef Heritage Area, with
funding supplied by the Queensland Government.118 Furthermore, the Queensland
Government banned fishing in its national parks, upsetting recreational fishers, among
others.119 Protective actions were also taken in other parts of the coast. The South
Australian Government declared the Great Australian Bight Marine Park, while in 1998
the Tasman Sea Mounts Marine Reserve was established in an area about 100nm south
of Tasmania.120

Government policy response to challenges in the Torres Strait included the
establishment of formal mechanisms with the Papua New Guinea Government in 1989,
to consider the potential for Torres Strait to become polluted by mining in that
country.121 Shipping safety in Torres Strait was also considered and by 1991 most
commercial ships transiting the strait were using pilots – 1,337 of 1,407 ships in that
year.122 Consequently, the Government decided against imposing compulsory pilotage
then.

Attention also focused on the mortality of sea birds as by-catch in commercial fishing.
The 13th annual Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) meeting in Hobart during November 1994 considered measures to reduce
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the mortality rates.123 Soon after, the Government nominated 11 albatross species for
protection within the Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.124

The Government acted to combat the introduction of invasive pests through the
discharge of ships’ ballast water, with a range of measures introduced in late 1999, to
take effect from 2001.125

Organizational Issues
Following numerous reviews into coastal surveillance and other aspects of border
protection during the 1980s, the period from 1989 to 2001 was relatively settled. The
major organizational matters were the evolution of Coastwatch into a multi-agency
organization, generally accepted as being effective and efficient, and Labor’s
proposition that only a dedicated coastguard could meet Australia’s border protection
needs.

Following the establishment of Coastwatch within Customs in July 1988, Defence
became a major contributor to it. Intelligence sharing became more pervasive and
Defence participated in the establishment of the National Surveillance Centre, which
became operational within Coastwatch on 26 January 2000.126 The status of Coastwatch
within Customs evolved, making it more independent of the parent body; thereby
reducing an apparent bias towards Customs operations.127

There were three noteworthy reviews during the period, of which, the Prime Minister’s
Coastal Surveillance Task Force, reporting in June 1999 was the first.128 The Task Force
Report noted the global illegal immigration problem, its cost to Australia and the
potential for serious quarantine breaches. The Report proposed strengthening
Coastwatch with a $124m package, including stronger official representation in source
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countries, additional surveillance aircraft and flying hours, and the establishment of a
National Surveillance Centre in Canberra.129 It also foreshadowed the use of the
Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar Network while acknowledging its limitations in
searching for small surface vessels.130 Other significant recommendations included the
establishment of Coastwatch as an autonomous group within the Customs Service,
with a serving ADF officer as Director General.131

The need for a dedicated coast guard for effective law enforcement at sea had been
questioned in Parliament and in the media intermittently since Federation. The issue
appeared again at and after the turn of the 21st century, when the Labor Opposition
argued strongly for a coastguard. In Parliament during August 1999, Labor sought the
Government’s views on formation of a coast guard. In response the Minister for Justice
and Customs noted that Labor’s 1984 Review of Coastal Surveillance had itself rejected
the notion of a coast guard.132
The expanding demands of law enforcement at sea led to gradual, uneven, but definite
increase in funding for the organizations involved. Table 6-2 below illustrates the
doubling of Coastwatch funding over seven financial years during the 1990s.133
Financial Year
Expenditure ($m)
1990-91
16.6
1991-92
23.7
1992-93
23.1
1993-94
22.7
1994-95
23.8
1995-96
28.8
1996-97
35.2
Maritime Security
Table 6-2: Coastwatch Expenditure 1990-91 to 1996-97134

Moore-Wilton, Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force Report, pp. I, A-1 and A-2.
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131 Moore-Wilton, Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force Report, p. A-2.
132 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 198, 25 August 1999, p. 7722.
133 Graham Giles, ‘Role of Coastwatch’, Anthony Bergin and Mohd Sidik Shaik Osman, eds.,
National Coordination of Maritime Surveillance and Enforcement, Australian Defence Studies
Centre, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996, p. 28.
134 Giles, ‘Role of Coastwatch’, p. 28.
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THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE IN PRACTICE: UPGRADING CAPABILITY
Organization
From 1989 to 2001 Defence committed strongly to aerial surveillance and surface
response. For example, in 1990 the RAN provided 1,800 patrol boat days, while the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) provided 700 P-3C flying hours at a total cost of
$23.6m.135 The patrol boat commitment remained consistent for some years but P-3C
hours varied according to tasking priorities. Thus in 2001 they provided only 250 hours
– about 20 individual sorties.136 This reflected the patrol boats’ primary tasking for the
constabulary function, whereas the P-3s had a range of other national and Air Force
tasks competing for attention. At this time, the Government claimed its surveillance
and response ensured that 98.6 per cent of all irregular maritime arrivals were
intercepted when trying to enter Australia.137

Coastwatch made the main contribution towards aerial surveillance with its fleet of
contracted aircraft, increasingly capable with successive iterations of the surveillance
contracts. By 2001 Coastwatch was operating five Dash 8-200 maritime patrol aircraft
fitted with radar, forward-looking infra-red camera and low light TV, and a
comprehensive communications outfit. They were supplemented by three smaller and
shorter range Reims F406 aircraft, with similar if more limited equipment fit. There
were also seven less capable aircraft used for visual surveillance. Among these were a
number of Britten Norman Islanders which had previously been criticized for lack of
speed.138 Completing the fleet were two Bell Long Ranger helicopters, equipped for
surveillance and used for Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef work.139

Similar evolution has been evident in the development of the surface response
capability. This has applied to the Navy from the original inadequate Attack class and
to the Customs patrol boat fleet. For Customs, the Bay class provided a genuine, if
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 139, 24 May 1990, p. 1000.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 20 August 2001, p.
29709.
137 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 20 August 2001, p.
29709.
138 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 175, 21 November 1995, p. 3390.
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limited, oceangoing capability from 1999 and 2000.140 Unlike the Navy patrol boats, the
Bay class did not carry fixed armament at first.141 Deck-mounted machine guns were
fitted later,142 to counter the more aggressive responses of some foreign fishing vessels.
For the Navy, the 42m Fremantles were a significant advance on the Attack class boats,
but they still lacked sea keeping and endurance commensurate with their operating
environment. Although the Defence White Paper of 1994, Defending Australia, indicated
that the next generation of patrol craft would be capable of inshore surface warfare,
the next White Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, simply announced plans
for a new class of patrol boat to enter service from 2004-05.143

Examining the potential of other technology solutions became increasingly important
in the government response to maritime security threats. Considerations included over
the horizon radar, remotely piloted vehicles, airborne early warning and control
aircraft, satellites and ground-based radars.144 Some of these were either unavailable
when initially examined - airborne early warning and control aircraft and the Global
Hawk remotely piloted vehicle for example - or proved to be too expensive, as in the
case of satellites.145 Those seriously considered were the Jindalee Over the horizon
Radar Network and ground wave radar. Early expectations for Jindalee were high, as
expressed by Mr Beddall, the then Minister for Small Business and Customs in August
1990. He suggested that, ‘ … Jindalee is expected to be able to detect ships and aircraft
up to 3,000km away…should be able to provide a deterrent to illegal immigration and
drug smuggling … ’.146 The Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force report in
June 1999, acknowledged that Jindalee was not optimized for surface vessel search.147

‘Australian Customs 38m’, AUSTAL Defence Products,
<http://www.austal.com/en/products-and-services/defence-products/patrolboats/australian-customs-38m.aspx > (16 January 2013).
141 Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of Coastwatch: Report 384 p. 107.
142 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, ‘Customs and Border Protection Bay
Class Vessels’,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/BayClassVesselsFactSheet.pdf> (16
January 2013).
143 Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000, p. 91. The
Armidales, lacking any real combat capability, began to enter service in July 2006.
144 Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of Coastwatch: Report 384, pp. 79-82.
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Experience would show that Jindalee had limited capability against the generally
smaller and wooden–hulled boats normally used for people smuggling.148
Resources
Between 1989 and 2001 a substantial aerial surveillance and surface response effort was
mounted against IUU fishing around the Australian coast. Early in the period, the
Government claimed success in the Great Barrier Reef as a result of surveillance by
Coastwatch, RAAF and Queensland National Parks and Wildlife Service aircraft, along
with RAN and Queensland Government patrol boats.149 There were frequent
interceptions and apprehensions of boats alleged to be engaged in IUU fishing. For
example in December 1999, HMAS Gladstone apprehended a Korean fishing boat in
northern waters, within the AFZ and unusually, had to open fire to stop the boat. The
Korean crew was subsequently prosecuted.150 Indonesian fishing boats featured
strongly in incidents at this time, with 285 Type II and III Indonesian fishing vessels
apprehended between March 1996 and December 1999.151
Even more noteworthy was the apprehension in the Southern Ocean involving the
Australian Customs Service patrol vessel Southern Supporter. In April 2001, the
Togolese-registered South Tomi was chased across the Southern Ocean from the Heard
and McDonald Island EEZ to the vicinity of Cape Town, South Africa. There an
Australian Defence Force (ADF) boarding party, assisted by South African Navy ships
boarded the South Tomi and escorted it to Fremantle.152

See Natalie O’Brien, ‘Border radar fiasco’, The Age, 3 July 2011,
<http://www.theage.com.au> (17 June 2013). Border Protection Service in a response to a
Freedom of Information request admitted that the Jindalee Over the horizon Radar Network
had not detected any asylum seeker vessels during the previous two years.
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Border Protection - Immigration
In responding to irregular maritime arrivals in the late 1990s, the Government
provided funds for two additional fixed wing surveillance aircraft and night-capable
helicopters for the Torres Strait.153 This funding, $124m over four years, also enabled
positioning of Immigration Officers in source and transit countries. These placements
enabled better cooperation from these countries, with for example, Indonesia
preventing more than 100 asylum seekers with false papers, flying from Kupang to
Darwin.154

Other physical measures included the repatriation, during 1995, of Chinese irregular
maritime arrivals in accordance with an MOU agreed with the Chinese Government.155
Although the Australian Government claimed that the repatriations had led to a
cessation of people leaving China for Australia, almost 300 arrived at Cocos and
Christmas Islands in May 1996. They too were repatriated.156

Border Protection - Customs
Smuggling of illegal goods remained a problem and Customs began to concentrate
more on port security with the resurgence of terrorism. Throughout the period there
was a strong focus on drug smuggling and the 46 per cent rise in drug interceptions at
air and seaports in the financial year 1988-89 was evidence of effective work, and
undoubtedly of a growing problem.157 The extent of the problem - and of Customs
success - can be seen in the dramatic growth in drug seizures from 162kg in 1971-72, to
5,071kg in 1991-92.158
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Drug seizures continued to increase through the 1990s, with a record cannabis haul of
five tonnes being made in 1996159 and 25 tonnes of cannabis seized in the first half of
1997, amid concerns that Customs was merely scratching the surface of the illegal
trade.160 Drug seizures were also made directly from ships occasionally; the MV Uniana
in October 1998, and an ocean-going tug in July 2001, for example. The terrorist attacks
in the USA on 11 September 2001 brought a new urgency to port security. For example,
in 1996, all 1,003,886 incoming sea consignments were screened for risk associated with
drug smuggling, with only 8,382 assessed as posing any risk.161

Border Protection - Quarantine
Practical responses to quarantine threats resembled the Customs measures, including
x-ray inspection of incoming shipping containers as well as mail and air cargo. There
were also funding and staffing increases in 2001, with AQIS staff directly involved in
border protection increasing by 70 per cent, and more detector dogs and inspection
equipment.162 The Government also allocated $10m for a public campaign entitled
‘Quarantine Matters’ for three years from 2001-02.163
Marine Environmental Protection
Among the most significant environmental measures of the period was the
introduction in 1990, with International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreement, of
compulsory pilotage through part of the Great Barrier Reef. Within the northern part of
the Inner Reef and Hydrographers’ Passage all ships greater than 70m in length as well
as all loaded tankers and gas carriers, regardless of length, were subject to the
regulation.164 From 2000 other environmental management initiatives were introduced
for the Great Barrier Reef; including a 40 per cent increase in aerial surveillance which
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led to numerous convictions, new measures for aquaculture waste management and
new zoning plans for the northern part of the Reef.165
The April 1991 MV Kirki incident (see above) led to a review of marine pollution
control measures. Specific measures included allocation of $5.6m for equipment to
enable better initial response to spills in high risk areas, implementation of a national
training program, enhanced rapid response measures, better command and control
and more effective integration of government and industry response capacity.166
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: BILLS, BILLS AND MORE BILLS…
Between 1989 and 2001, the Government’s legislative response grew in scope and
complexity. Most legislation was for the immigration and the environment, although
resources and quarantine legislation also featured. With over 150 Bills related to
aspects of the constabulary function presented, only those with a significant impact on
the major law enforcement at sea problems are considered below.
Resources Legislation
Marine resources legislation dealt almost entirely with fisheries management,
beginning with the Fisheries Administration Act 1991 which emerged from a
comprehensive review of Commonwealth fisheries management completed in 1989.
The review established the need to prevent over-exploitation of Australian fisheries,
ensure sustainable exploitation and efficient commercial fishing operations, and to
ensure that fishers paid for the right to exploit fish stocks.167 The Fisheries
Administration Act 1991 established the Australian Fisheries Management Authority,
along with the Fishing Industry Policy Council and the Fisheries Research and
Development Corporation.168 The subsequent Fisheries Management Act 1991 gave
AFMA the powers to meet its responsibilities.169 This Act acknowledged that fisheries
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management included management of both fish stocks and the number of licensed
fishers.170

There was a succession of fisheries-related Bills after the change of government in 1996,
indicating the growing concern for effective fish stocks management and moves by
international authorities to participate in that task. The Fisheries Legislation Amendment
Act (No. 1) 1998, formalized a voluntary ban on taking black marlin throughout the
AFZ and imposed fines of up to $13,750 for breaches.171 Then the Fisheries Legislation
Amendment Act (No. 1) 2000, introduced new powers and sanctions against foreign
fishers especially in remote regions such as the north-west coast and the sub-Antarctic
territories. The Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Mr Truss commented:
Australian fisheries officers will be able to seize foreign boats, fishing gear or
catch which have been automatically forfeited to the Commonwealth as a result
of illegal fishing in the Australian fishing zone. The onus will then fall to the
illegal foreign fishers to establish their legitimacy for being present in the
Australian fishing zone without authorisation.172
The Act also provided for the use of force, including the firing of warning shots and
firing at or into a ship to stop it.173 Beyond that, it enabled implementation of the
obligations associated with the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)-related Agreement
for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks.174

Emphasizing the almost constant need to amend fisheries management legislation, the
Fisheries Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2000 sought to refine management practices
and reflect changing circumstances.175 The major elements of the Bill included
placement of Australian observers on foreign fishing vessels outside the AFZ and
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controlling access of foreign fishing vessels and their support vessels to Australian
ports.176
Immigration Legislation
A large amount of immigration-related legislation was presented to the Parliament, the
most contentious of which coincided with the three controversial incidents around the
time of the 2001 Federal election. The first Bill became the Migration Reform Act 1992,
which aimed to strengthen Australia’s ability to control entry to the country.177 It
required detention for anyone entering the country without valid documents, and
ultimately their removal from Australia if claims for settlement were not upheld. This
was the beginning of mandatory detention for irregular maritime arrivals.178 The Act
also enabled the establishment of a ‘ … specialist refugee review tribunal… ’ for
independent review of refugee status decisions.179 This Act also introduced regulations
relating to the introduction of temporary protection visas, for periods of five years.180
The move was short-lived as ‘temporary’ visas were abolished in the Migration
Legislation Amendment Act 1994 because of the uncertainty they created for refugees.181

The Migration Amendment Act (No. 4) 1992 was introduced earlier, following a High
Court challenge to the detention provisions of the main Act.182 Although the High
Court supported the Government position, the Amendment Act was introduced as a
temporary expedient, to limit claims for compensation (to $1 per day) and to remove
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remaining uncertainty over the legality of detention in certain circumstances.183 The
introduction of mandatory detention was controversial from the outset and has
remained so, as the main political parties disagree over the harshness of the measures
needed to deter irregular maritime arrivals. Subsequently, the Migration Laws
Amendment Act 1993 deferred implementation of measures in the 1992 Act that were to
come into effect in November 1993. The delay was the result of the substantial changes
incorporated in the 1992 Act.184

Difficulties with immigration legislation continued through the 1990s. They included
challenges to sections of the Migration Reform Act 1992 relating to detention and to the
fairness of the compensation on offer ($1 per day) because it involved the acquisition of
property, namely irregular maritime arrival boats, ‘ … otherwise than on just terms’.185
Further amendments were made through the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.
4) 1994 which sought to prevent asylum seekers with claims rejected in one country
moving to another to restate the claim.186 The legislation was prompted by the case of
17 Vietnamese asylum seekers who arrived on the boat ‘Vagabond’, having had asylum
claims rejected in Indonesia.

Numerous legal challenges to immigration legislation meant that in 1998 the
Government introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment – Judicial Review Act 2001
to limit severely ‘… access to Federal and High Court judicial review of administrative
decisions made under the Migration Act 1958’.187 This was a Coalition Government
response to the regular recourse to litigation by irregular maritime arrivals, with the
attendant cost and delay in making determinations. There had been nearly 400
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applications to the Federal and High Courts in 1994-95, rising to nearly 800 in 199798.188

Increasing numbers of irregular maritime arrivals generated additional legislative
effort. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ruddock introduced the
Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 in September. It focused specifically on
people smugglers who remained outside territorial waters. The Act granted new
powers to enable enforcement beyond the territorial sea and ensured, through
amendments to the Migration Act and Customs Act, that officers involved in
constabulary operations would have appropriate powers, including ‘ … the detaining,
forfeiture, seizure and, as necessary, disposal of ships and aircraft used in people
smuggling operations’.189 This Act also provided for Customs officers to be suitably
armed.190 Furthermore, the Act proposed amendments to the Fisheries Management Act,
allowing for the detention of illegal fishers, for fisheries violations and subsequently,
under the Migration Act, for any other offences.191

Separately, the Migration Amendment Regulations 1999 (No. 12) 1999, gave the Minister
authority to issue temporary protection visas, for a period of up to three years.192 Also
underscoring the need to act decisively against the growing people smuggling
problem, the Government introduced the Crimes at Sea Act 2000. The main thrust of the
Act was to provide an effective offshore legal regime to deal with crimes at sea. Thus,
after agreement was reached with the States, State laws were to apply within the
territorial sea while Commonwealth law would apply outside the territorial sea to the
limit of the EEZ.193
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Up to this point there was a generally bipartisan approach to immigration legislation.
Labor and the Coalition were both keen to prevent irregular maritime arrivals from
landing in Australia and were equally keen to deter them from even considering the
attempt. In presenting this Bill, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
Mr Ruddock, noted that he was, ‘… heartened to read that the shadow minister for
employment, training and population had placed a motion before the House indicating
the utmost concern about the activities of people smugglers’.194 Nevertheless,
Schloenhardt, writing in 2000 made a point that would deserve consideration
frequently in the future, when he said that:
…none of the harsh measures that have been implemented in the past 25 years
have reduced the incentives for migration to Australia. They have meant,
rather, that potential migrants started to look for other ways to migrate, which
they found in clandestine, illegal migration and migrant trafficking. Tightening
borders and criminalising irregular migration has so far been unsuccessful in
reducing the number of undocumented immigrants and deterring further
arrivals.195
The spirit of bipartisanship began to erode in late 2001 as the controversial irregular
maritime arrival events discussed above played out. As the MV Tampa affair began to
unfold, but probably not because of it, the Government introduced the Migration
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) 2001. This was done to combat the growing tendency
among irregular maritime arrivals to dispose of identification documents before
arriving in Australia and to address the increasingly broad interpretations of the
refugee convention in Australian courts.196 Countermeasures in the Act included
enabling the Minister to make adverse inferences when irregular maritime arrivals
either have no documentation or refuse to make an oath or affirmation about the truth
of information they provide. The Act also provided for a stricter interpretation of
refugee status to prevent people to whom the Refugee Convention was not intended to
apply from taking advantage of existing rules.197
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Much more controversially and as a direct result of the then unfolding MV Tampa
affair, on 29 August 2001 the Government introduced the Border Protection Bill 2001.
The aim of the Bill was to permit the removal of a ship and all onboard it from the
territorial sea.198 Furthermore it directed that instructions given under the Bill would
not be subject to court challenge and that claims for refugee status would not delay the
removal of any ship. The Bill was intended to come into effect from 0900 on 29 August,
specifically to apply to the MV Tampa.199 Labor refused to support the Bill, which they
claimed was both too broad and unnecessary for what was not a ‘… national
catastrophe’.200 Indicating just how contentious it was, the Bill was rejected by the
Senate.201

Subsequent legislation was even more extreme in its endeavours to stem the flow of
irregular maritime arrivals, driven now by organized criminal gangs,202 which was
clearly worrying the Government approaching the 2001 Federal election. The first of a
package of three Bills presented in September led to the Migration Amendment (Excision
from the Migration Zone) Act 2001. As the title implied the Act excised certain offshore
territories from the migration zone–specifically Ashmore and Cartier Islands,
Christmas and Cocos Islands, as well as offshore resource and similar installations.203
The intent was that unlawful arrival at one of these excised places would not entitle the
irregular maritime arrivals to apply for a visa.204

The second of the three Bills became the Migration Amendment (Excision from the
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 which amended the Migration Act
and Regulations to strengthen the capacity to deal with irregular maritime arrivals.
Measures introduced included the power to move a person to another country together
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with the precluding of recourse to legal proceedings in any court apart from the High
Court. The Act also introduced temporary protection visas for irregular maritime
arrivals and people who choose to leave their country of first asylum.205 Completing
the trio was the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 which
ensured that the actions taken against the MV Tampa would be deemed to have been
lawful when they occurred. It also confirmed the power to move vessels carrying
irregular maritime arrivals and the people themselves.206 The three Acts represent
quick and reactive law-making in the face of a problem that was growing in size and
sophistication. The harshness of some of their measures reflects the nature of politics,
with an election looming and the opportunity to show Labor as being ‘soft’ on border
protection.

One further related Bill was presented before Parliament rose prior to the election. This
became the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 which restricted
access to judicial review by all courts, except in exceptional circumstances and had
been held in the Senate since 1998.207
Quarantine Legislation
Although there were several quarantine scares from 1989 to 2001, the amount of
consequent legislation was limited and not especially significant. The first two
potentially significant Bills were introduced by private members because of fears of
laxity in AQIS procedures. The Quarantine Amendment Bill 1996 presented in October
1996 responded to fears of the introduction of disease likely to damage the local fruit
growing industry.208 It was followed by the Quarantine Amendment Bill No.2 1996
which attempted to give the Minister (as opposed to public servants in AQIS) the
power to approve or deny the import of foodstuffs on quarantine grounds. The
motivation was again fear that local primary industry would be devastated by the
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inadvertent introduction of pests or disease.209 That said, there were fears among
Government members that the Bill was also being used to protect the local chicken
industry from international competition.210 Neither Bill passed.211

The only truly significant piece of quarantine legislation appeared as the Quarantine
Amendment Bill 1998 in December 1998, as part of the Government response to the
wide-ranging Nairn review of AQIS. The consequent Quarantine Amendment Act 1998
was designed to ensure that Australia’s regulatory framework provided adequate
protection to primary industry while also encouraging export industries.212 Included in
the framework of the Act were improvements in shipping pre-arrival and predeparture reporting to allow for proper coverage of all quarantine related matters,
more flexibility in the application of prescribed treatments and periods and new
powers relating to the import of goods contrary to the Quarantine Act.213
Environmental Legislation
By contrast with quarantine-related legislation, there was a very substantial amount of
environmental legislation proposed, concentrating on the Great Barrier Reef, marine oil
pollution, ballast water and whale protection. Four Acts affected the Great Barrier Reef,
beginning with the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment Act 1990. This Act
responded to boats bringing uncontrolled numbers of visitors to Green Island and so
clarified the activities allowed under the various zoning plans.214

Subsequently, and considering the potential for significant damage from oil spills, the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment Act 1991 was passed in June 1991. It made
pilotage compulsory for ships using the northern inner route of the Great Barrier Reef,
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4001.
211 Parliament of Australia, Bills Digest alphabetical index 1996-97,
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/BD9697> (25 January
2013).
212 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 223, 3 December 1998, p.
1277.
213 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 223, 3 December 1998, p.
1277.
214 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 171, 9 May 1990, p. 174.
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because some 10 per cent of large ships, or those carrying potentially hazardous cargo
on that route, were not using the voluntary pilotage regime then in place.215 The Act
imposed fines of up to $50,000 for a range of related offences.

Increasing use of the Great Barrier Reef, for merchant shipping and tourism saw the
introduction of charges to commercial users through the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
Amendment Act 1993.216 The initial levy was set at $1 per day per person using the
Marine Park and reflected the need to spend more for Park upkeep as a result of the 10
per cent per year growth of tourism there.217

Planning for the use of the Marine Park became more important and more contentious
as tourism and shipping continued to grow. During 2000, for example there was an
attempt in the Senate by the One Nation Party, to disallow the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Amendment Regulations 1999 (No. 1). These contained a revised plan for the Marine
Park, restricting some uses, and irritating commercial users, such as game fishers;
many claiming a lack of consultation.218 The attempt gained little support.219
With more shipping in the Great Barrier Reef accidents were almost inevitable. On 2
November 2000, shortly after dropping off the pilot, embarked for the compulsory
pilotage stage, the MV Bunga Teratai Satu grounded on Sudbury Reef, fortunately
without spilling any oil.220 The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Amendment Act 2001 was
enacted in response, to increase protection from such incidents. It incorporated strict
provisions relating to illegal fishing within the Marine Park, with penalties for oil
spillage rising to $1.1m for corporations.221 There was a strong environmental focus to
the International Maritime Conventions Legislation Amendment Act 2001, which amended
four other Acts, two of which had marine environmental implications. One

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 177, 15 May 1991, p.
3800.
216 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 188, 5 May 1993, pp. 967.
217 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 158, 18 May 1993, p. 665.
218 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 202, 13 April 2000, p. 14047.
219 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 202, 13 April 2000, p. 14047.
220 Australian Transport Safety Bureau, ‘Marine Safety Investigation Report 162, Bunga Teratai
Satu’, Canberra, 2001, p. 1.
221 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 240, 7 June 2001, pp.
27614-5.
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amendment covered the Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Act 1981, revising
the list of chemicals that could require Australian Maritime Safety Authority
intervention at sea to prevent or reduce pollution.222 The second amendment was to the
Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983, which strengthened
pollution prevention measures by, for example, mandating waste management
systems for Australian ships of 400 tonnes or more.223
Beginning in 1993 a series of Acts to prevent oil pollution at sea and manage the
consequences of any spills was passed by Parliament. The first was a package of four,
with the Protection of the Sea (Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) Act 1993 becoming the
primary Act.224 The Acts intended to give effect to the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971, as
well as to protocols adopted in 1976 and 1992 but not internationally in force.225 The
supporting Acts imposed financial contributions from the movement of oil by sea. Two
subsequent Acts in 1993 had a similar focus. The Protection of the Sea (Shipping Levy)
Amendment Act 1993 raised the oil pollution levy for ships visiting Australian ports,
while the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Amendment Act 1993 enabled Australia
to ratify the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping
(SPREP).226
After a period of little legislative activity the Bill for the Environment and Heritage
Legislation Amendment Act 2000 was introduced in May, with two main aims, the first
relating to pollution. It sought to amend earlier legislation to implementing the 1996
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, 1972 (the London Dumping Convention) which covered the dumping and

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 239, 4 April 2001, pp.
26345-8.
223 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 239, 4 April 2001, pp.
26345-8.
224 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 188, 5 May 1993, p. 147.
The other three Acts were The Protection of the Sea (Imposition of Contributions to Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund—Customs) Act 1993, The Protection of the Sea (Imposition of Contributions to Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund—Excise) Act 1993, and The Protection of the Sea (Imposition of
Contributions to Oil Pollution Compensation Fun—General) Act 1993.
225 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 188, 5 May 1993, p. 147.
226 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 191, 16 December 1993
and 17 December 1993, pp. 4299 and 4368.
222

265

incineration of material at sea.227 This was soon followed by the Protection of the Sea
(Civil Liability) Amendment Act 2000, requiring all ships above 400 tonnes displacement,
entering or leaving Australian ports, to have insurance for oil spills.228

Emerging problems of pest infestation from the discharge of ships’ ballast water and of
environmental damage from harmful anti-fouling coatings led to two pieces of
legislation during the period. The first, the Ballast Water Research and Development
Funding Levy Act 1998, imposed a levy on all ships with a length greater than 50m for a
period of two years, to support research and development aimed at minimizing the
entry risk of pests and disease pathogens.229
Although there was no whale-specific legislation introduced during the period to 2001,
several Acts relating to Antarctica came into force. Firstly, the Antarctic Mining
Prohibition Act 1991 was designed to prohibit mining in the Australian Antarctic
Territory and by Australians elsewhere in the Antarctic.230 The Act included fines up to
$500,000 for corporations. This was followed by the Antarctic (Environmental Protection)
Legislation Amendment Act 1992 giving effect to the Protocol on Environmental Protection
to the Antarctic Treaty, known as the Madrid Protocol.231 This Protocol was an
international agreement to ban mining in Antarctica and to acknowledge it as a place
of special environmental significance.
Other important environmental legislation included the succession of Bills relating to
environmental protection and biodiversity conservation, beginning in 1998. Firstly, the
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Bill 1998 was introduced in July to
overhaul and update the existing Commonwealth environmental legislative
framework.232 It was intended to rectify the reliance on indirect triggers, such as
foreign investment approvals, to generate Commonwealth environmental action. It
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 233, 11 May 2000, p.
16290.
228 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 234, 28 June 2000, p.
18394.
229 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 216, 24 September 1997,
p. 8273.
230 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 176, 6 March 1991, p.
1417.
231 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 186, 14 October 1992, p.
2149.
232 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 195, 27 April 1999, p. 4333.
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also introduced a more efficient assessment and approval process for marine and other
important environmental matters.233 The Minister claimed that it ‘ … represents the
only comprehensive attempt in the history of our Federation to define the
environmental responsibilities of the Commonwealth.’.234

Following a protracted consultation process and the 1998 Federal election the Bill was
finally enacted in July as the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
1999.235 Marine environmental provisions included protection for endangered and
migratory species and protection of Commonwealth marine areas.236 Further protective
legislation followed with the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Amendment (Wildlife Protection) Act 2001 introduced in April 2001. The Act focused on
countering the illegal wildlife trade, placing the burden of proof of legal import of
endangered species on the importer, as well as simplifying procedures.237

More specific marine environmental protection legislation was enacted during the
period to 2001. In March 1999, the Bill for the Environment and Heritage Legislation
Amendment Act 2000 was introduced. It amended existing legislation relating to
dumping of material at sea and to the authorization of sea installations in areas beyond
the 3nm limit of State-controlled waters.238 The Act also enabled Australia to meet its
obligations under the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention on dumping at sea.
The 1996 Protocol superseded the Convention.239

During the 1990s two Acts relating to wildlife protection progressed through
Parliament. The Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Amendment Act
1991 raised penalties for illegal export and import of wildlife, taking account of the

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 195, 27 April 1999, p. 4333.
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235 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999,
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Conservation Bill 1998,
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potential damage to native species.240 A maximum custodial sentence of 10 years was
introduced. This was followed by the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and
Imports) Amendment Act 1995, which strengthened the enforcement and administration
provisions of earlier legislation, making it consistent with Australia’s obligations under
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.241

Other noteworthy environmental legislation included the Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
Amendment Act 1991 which amended the 1967 Act to ensure oil spill cleanup costs were
to be borne in full by those responsible for them.242 It also terminated some long
unused drilling permits in the Great Barrier Reef.
Customs Legislation
Increasing community concern over illegal drug imports led to new Customs
legislation. The Customs (Detection and Search) Act 1990 provided new powers of search
and detention, including measures to counter internal concealment of drugs.243 The Act
also provided protection for suspects and Commonwealth officers, and permitted nonconsensual search as a last resort. The potential for drugs to be imported through sea
ports, identified in the National Crime Authority’s 1989 report on port security and
illicit drugs, resulted in the Customs Legislation Amendment Act 1992. It enabled
Customs Officers to ask for identification from persons in ‘Customs’ areas and to stop
and search vehicles in those areas.244

Drug smuggling was the focus of the Customs Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999.
The Act empowered Customs Officers to search maintenance and other personnel with
access to ships and aircraft.245 It also gave frisk search powers and extended boarding
and search powers to the contiguous zone, with the right to remove improperly stowed
weapons from visiting ships and yachts.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 147, 13 August 1991, p. 14.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 171, 9 May 1995, p. 43.
242 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 177, 8 May 1991, p. 3262.
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Smuggling, more generally was a focus of the Customs Legislation Amendment Act 1993.
It tightened control of movement of people and goods between the mainland and Zone
A of the Timor Gap, mainly for offshore resource exploration and exploitation.246 The
Act also introduced mandatory reporting of all crew possessions by arriving ships, and
the forfeiture of non-declared items subsequently discovered. This broader focus was
also evident in the Customs Legislation Amendment (Criminal Sanctions and Other
Measures) Act 1999, which was enacted with the then forthcoming Sydney Olympic
Games in mind.247 The Act introduced tougher penalties for import and export civil
and criminal offences. The most serious crimes, such as import of child pornography,
attracted $250,000 fines with the option also of up to 10 years imprisonment.248
Significantly, the Act allowed Customs officers to examine incoming mail items
covertly.
Other Legislation
One of the most important Acts passed during the period was the Maritime Legislation
Amendment Act 1994, which brought Australia’s maritime zones in line with
entitlements under the LOSC, which Australia had not then ratified.249 The major
changes wrought by the Act included: the establishment of rights in the EEZ, a revised
definition of the continental shelf, assertion of rights in the contiguous zone and
adoption of new legal provisions for drawing territorial sea baselines.250 The Act most
affected by these changes was the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973.

Several other Acts with implications for the constabulary function were passed during
the period. The first of these was the Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 1992, which
implemented the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 190, 16 November 1993,
p. 2896.
247 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 230, 24 November 1999,
p. 12467.
248 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 230, 24 November 1999,
p. 12467.
249 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 190, 17 November 1993,
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of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf.251 The Act and underlying
international conventions were inspired by the terrorist attack against the MV Achille
Lauro in November 1985, and introduced offences such as seizing control, committing
acts of violence against or damaging or destroying ships or fixed platforms, and
causing death or injury.252 The Act applied to ships on international voyages and to
fixed platforms on the continental shelves of protocol states. It was the first of much
terrorism-related legislation.

The strong focus on irregular maritime arrivals and the Government’s difficulty in
dealing with the MV Tampa in August 2001, prompted the then Leader of the
Opposition to introduce the Australian Coast Guard Bill 2001. One of the Bill’s primary
arguments was that a dedicated coast guard would provide law enforcement at sea
much cheaper than the Navy’s warships.253 The Bill did not proceed.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NAVY: A NEW LEVEL OF COMMITMENT
The implications of the constabulary function for the Navy from 1989 to 2001 were
wide-ranging, because they continued to involve elements of the Navy other than the
patrol boats and because they involved the Navy politically to an unprecedented
extent. Constabulary operations also impacted on the capacity of the patrol boats to
engage in other work, and demanded judgments on the suitability of the Fremantles
for their primary role. The nature of the constabulary tasking and one of the two
geographical foci of the work also determined new patrol boat basing arrangements.
Furthermore, the constabulary task became more complex and demanding for those
involved, particularly because of increasing workload and a growing need for
commanding officers to be familiar with relevant domestic and international law.
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Patrol Boat Tasking
Table 6-3 below, shows the major employment undertaken by the patrol boat force,
other than for the constabulary function, between 1989 and 2002. The table highlights
the extensive regional engagement work undertaken by the patrol boats, as well as
their commitment to a range of other domestic tasks. The table also identifies how the
capacity of the patrol boats to undertake ‘other’ tasks diminished substantially towards
the end of the period.

Throughout the period, the Fremantles deployed frequently to Southeast Asia and to
the South West and Central Pacific. The deployments to Southeast Asia lasted up to 12
weeks,254 concentrated on visits to Indonesia,255 Brunei,256 and Malaysia,257 but ranged
as far afield as Hong Kong.258 South and Central Pacific deployments were equally
expansive throughout the period, with HMAS Geelong’s patrol in the second half of
1998 demonstrating the range of countries visited. During this deployment, the Geelong
visited Vanuatu, Fiji, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Tonga and New Caledonia.259
The overseas deployments were additional to the 1,800 days per year provided for the
constabulary task.260

These deployments gave the Fremantles opportunities to exercise with local navies or
local maritime or marine police forces and had two main advantages for the RAN.
Firstly, the deployments extended the web of regional engagement beyond the
capacity of the major surface combatants and other warships, given their operational
demands. Secondly, in the Pacific especially, the deployments enabled the RAN to
See for example, ‘Shield to Bendigo’, Navy News, Vol. 33, No. 13, 6 July 1990, p. 6.
See for example, LSPH Shane Cameron, ‘Navy, veterans make Ambon pilgrimage’, Navy
News, Vol. 38, No. 11, 16 June 1995, p. 7.
256 See for example, LEUT Warren Barry, ‘Patrol boats’ wild trip’, Navy News, Vol. 38, No. 17, 11
September 1995, p. 8.
257 See for example, Ross Gillett, ‘R.A.N. at Malaysian Navy’s 55 th anniversary’, Navy News, Vol.
33, No. 11, 8 June 1990, p. 2.
258 See for example, ‘Another first for patrol boats’, Navy News, Vol. 35, No. 1, 31 January 1992,
p. 6. This deployment by HMA Ships Geelong and Launceston was the first by the Fremantles to
Hong Kong.
259 See for example, ‘Well earned rest for Geelong’, Navy News, Vol. 41, No. 21, 2 November 1998,
p. 8.
260 Information provided by RADM James Goldrick RANR, Commanding Officer of HMAS
Cessnock in 1990-91.
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interact with many of the smaller Pacific Island Countries at a more appropriate level
and in places difficult to access for the major warships. For example, in March 1994,
HMAS Whyalla escorted the Republic of Kiribati Ship (RKS) Teanoai on its delivery
voyage to Kiribati. Whyalla then operated in company with the Western Samoan patrol
boat MV Nafanua and Vanuatu’s patrol boat, Republic of Vanuatu Ship (RVS) Tukoro
while visiting these countries.261
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Table 6-3: Fremantle Class Patrol Boat Tasking For Other Than the Constabulary Function,
1989 - 2002262
The Fremantles participated in many exercises in Australian waters, some involving
vessels of other countries. For example HMAS Gawler and some major warships joined

Lieutenant Commander W.E. Eversham, Lieutenant D.J. Byrne, and Sub-Lieutenant B.M.
Westcott, ‘HMAS Whyalla’s South-West Pacific Deployment’, in Australia’s Navy 1994-95,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995, pp. 62-4.
262 The information in this table comes from issues of Navy News, the fortnightly RAN internal
newspaper, as well as from the annual series of books, Australia’s Navy for the entire period July
1989-December 2001. The information may not be a complete record of all such employment as,
in the case of Navy News, it relies on individual patrol boats submitting articles in most cases,
and in the case of the Australia’s Navy annuals, it relies on the author considering events worth
noting in the annual publication. In any event it is representative of patrol boat activity and may
if anything underreport the other than constabulary function activities.
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Indonesian Navy ships in Exercise New Horizon off Darwin in August 1993263 and in
August 2000, HMAS Launceston took part in the Fleet Concentration Period, also off
Darwin.264 Similarly, the patrol boats were involved in many search and rescue (SAR)
operations. Some of these rescues involved diversions from normal tasking while
others were associated with routine border protection patrols. Notably, towards the
end of the period, several rescues involved irregular maritime arrivals from boats in
difficulty, as with HMA Ships Cessnock and Townsville in March 2001, when they
provided food, water and first aid to 340 irregular maritime arrivals at Ashmore
Reef.265
Major Warship Contributions
Despite the Fremantles meeting the vast majority of their operational tasking, major
warships undertook constabulary tasks during the period to December 2001.
Sometimes frigates carried out constabulary tasks incidentally to other operational
tasking. Examples included HMAS Torrens boarding three Indonesian fishing vessels
in the AFZ, while sailing between Darwin and Surabaya late in 1991, HMAS Arunta
directing an Indonesian fishing vessel to leave the AFZ in the vicinity of Wessel Island
early in 1999, and HMAS Newcastle becoming involved in boarding a vessel carrying
irregular maritime arrivals near Newcastle in early 1999.266

There was also more formal involvement by major combatants where the Fremantles
were incapable of accomplishing the task. This included fisheries patrols in the
Southern Ocean, for which the Fremantles lacked the range, seakeeping ability and
underway refuelling capacity.267 In October 1997, HMAS Anzac apprehended two
foreign fishing vessels in the Heard and Macdonald Islands Fishing Zone. As with

‘Australian Naval Operations 1993-94’, Australia’s Navy 1994-95, Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995, p. 9.
264 ‘Ships gather’, Navy News, Vol. 43, No. 16, 21 August 2000, p. 3.
265 ‘Minister praises our patrol boats’ professionalism’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2 April 2001,
p. 7.
266 See respectively ‘City turns on hospitality for visiting patrol boat’, Navy News, Vol. 35, No. 1,
31 January 1992, p. 7; ‘Patrol boats busy with illegal fishermen’, Navy News, Vol. 42, No. 8, 3
May 1999, p. 3; and Graham Davis, ‘Arrested’, Navy News, Vol. 42, No. 10, 31 May 1999, p. 1.
267 See ‘HMAS Fremantle II’, <www.navy.gov.au/hmas-fremantle-ii > (11 June 2013). The
Fremantle class had a range of 2360nm at 12kt, a displacement of 220 tonnes and a length
overall of 42m.
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other frigate deployments to the Southern ocean, Anzac was accompanied by the tanker
HMAS Westralia, because the distance was too great even for the frigate unrefuelled.268
The Navy’s operational limitations in the Southern Ocean were revealed starkly in the
operation to apprehend the fishing vessel South Tomi which had been fishing illegally
in the Heard and Macdonald Islands Fishing Zone. The Navy was unable to send a
frigate into the area as no supporting tanker was available and the task fell to the
Southern Supporter, chartered by AFMA.269

The second formal involvement was assigning major warships to manage the influx of
irregular maritime arrivals in 2001. Initially, there was consideration of assigning the
newly inducted HMAS Jervis Bay (a fast ferry leased from INCAT). Ultimately, in late
2001 HMA Ships Adelaide, Arunta, Warramunga, Newcastle, (all frigates) Manoora, Tobruk
(amphibious transports) and Westralia (tanker) were all assigned to deal with the
problem.270 This was the first significant allocation of major warships to the
constabulary task and was repeated.

The assignment of major warships to constabulary duties had several implications for
the RAN. Firstly, it was an admission that the task, at least temporarily, had become
too great for the patrol boat force. There were insufficient boats and they could not
accommodate large numbers of irregular maritime arrivals, taken from unseaworthy
vessels.271 One long term consequence of this was consideration of more numerous and
larger replacements for the Fremantles. The second implication for the RAN was the
withdrawal of the major warships from their primary tasks. Over time this would
result in an inability to meet some tasking and in a drop in readiness levels of ships
and their crews.272 Depending on the nature and extent of other operations, it might
LEUT Aaron Matzkows, ‘Anzac reins in poachers’, Navy News, Vol. 40, No. 21, 3 November
1997, p. 3.
269 Graham Davis, ‘You’re Nicked Mate’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 8, 30 April 2001, p. 2.
270 ‘Crash sail for Arunta’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 17, 3 September 2001, p. 1; and ‘Thick Grey
Line: Patrols aim to deter illegals’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 18, 17 September 2001, pp. 1 and 4.
See also Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, pp. 333, 340, 341, 348 and 349.
271 The Fremantles had a crew of 24 and very little additional space in which additional people
could be safely accommodated.
272 RAN warships have an operating cycle of; preparation, work-up, operations, and
reconstitution. See, RAN Doctrine 2 – The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, Sea
Power Centre-Australia, Canberra, 2005, p. 76. Unless actually employed in the operation for
which a work-up has been undertaken, the readiness levels of ships and their crews degrade
over time. See Australian Maritime Operations, Sea Power Centre-Australia, Canberra,
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also result in an inability to meet all commitments. In late 2001, this was not an
immediate concern, with only two frigates and a tanker assigned to Operation Slipper
as part of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom.273 The third implication for
the RAN was the additional cost of complex warships with crews of about 200 men
and women undertaking tasks for which the much smaller and simpler Fremantles
were generally more suitable.
The Fremantle Class Patrol Boats
In service from 1980 to 2007, the 15 Fremantle class patrol boats were markedly more
effective than their Attack class predecessors. Table 6–4 below compares important
characteristics of the Attack and Fremantle classes of patrol boats. The most significant
improvement of the Fremantle over the Attack class was the doubling of the range,
which also translated into greater endurance. The Fremantle class also had better seakeeping ability than the earlier boats, which it achieved without sacrificing the capacity
to operate in shallow water, with both classes having a draught of less than two
metres.
Class

Length Displacement Range

Attack

32.5m

Fremantle 42m

Speed Crew Draught

1188nm
24kt
at 13kt
2360nm
30kt
at 12kt

132 tonnes
220 tonnes

19

1.9m

24

1.8m

Table 6-4: Comparison of Fremantle and Attack Class Performance274
Yet, despite the performance improvements, the Fremantle class could not undertake
all tasks. Foremost among its limitations was sea-keeping which created problems for
the boats throughout the period.275 As noted in RAN Doctrine 2–The Navy Contribution to
Australian Maritime Operations, ‘ … patrol boats are normally limited to operations in

forthcoming, Chapter Six, page 5. This is the second edition of RAN Doctrine 2 for which the
writer was lead author.
273 Vanessa Bendle, David Griffin and Peter Laurence, eds., Database of Royal Australian Navy
Operations, 1990-2005, Sea Power Centre-Australia, Canberra, 2005, p. 44.
274 The information in the table comes from performance information provided on the RAN
website. <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet-ships-boats-craft/available-ship-histories> (12 June
2013).
275 RAN Doctrine 2–The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 136.
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less than sea states 4-5, and experience difficulty in conducting boarding operations in
seas exceeding 2.5 metres’.276 Navy News stories from 1989 to 2001 record at least 20
references to weather affecting the Fremantles’ performance.277 In some cases the
weather kept the patrol boats alongside. For example, in August 1996, HMAS
Townsville reported having to remain in Broome for several days because of bad
weather.278 Nevertheless, the main impact of the sea-keeping limitations was the
debilitating effect of constant boat movement on the crews.279

Although the Fremantles were almost 10m longer than their predecessors, they were
still constrained for space. There was very little free space on the upper deck that could
be used to accommodate irregular maritime arrivals needing to be rescued. Similarly
there was no accommodation below decks, apart from crew quarters, that could have
been used for the same purpose.280 This was to prove a severe limitation in late 2001 as
the numbers of irregular maritime arrivals increased dramatically and many had to be
transferred from the craft that brought them.

Additionally, the Fremantles could not embark and operate a helicopter. Helicopters,
carrying a variety of weapons and sensors, have become essential elements of warship
capability, by extending the search and attack ranges of their parent ships.281 They also
have an ‘inherent personnel and cargo transport capability’282 useful in search and
rescue and other humanitarian tasks. For the constabulary function, if helicopters
could have been embarked in the Fremantles, they would have complemented the
fixed wing aerial surveillance and would have provided an additional very responsive
means of managing humanitarian tasks. An example of this was provided by having a
helicopter from the mainland evacuate sick irregular maritime arrivals from Ashmore

RAN Doctrine 2–The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 141.
The references are spread throughout the period, beginning with ‘Busy year clinches major
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279 Information provided by RADM James Goldrick RANR, Commanding Officer of HMAS
Cessnock in 1990-91.
280 Information provided by RADM James Goldrick RANR, Commanding Officer of HMAS
Cessnock in 1990-91.
281 RAN Doctrine 2–The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 157.
282 RAN Doctrine 2–The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 157.
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Island in March 2001.283 HMAS Bunbury was present but could not provide the speedy
response needed by the state of health of the irregular maritime arrivals. Notably, too,
the Fremantles had no onboard medical facility and only very limited capacity to deal
with crew medical problems.

The Fremantle class limitations caused the RAN to consider a more capable more
costly vessel as a replacement. As early as 1994 the Coalition Government approved a
replacement design which was designated an Offshore Patrol Craft. This 80 metre
vessel was to have improved seakeeping, be more combat capable and carry a
helicopter.284 This project, proposed as a joint development with the Royal Malaysian
Navy, did not proceed when the Australian designer Transfield failed to win the
contract in Malaysia.285
The Patrol Boat Crews
Recruiting and retention of personnel have been major problems for the RAN for many
years.286 In the late 1980s administrative measures were taken to make Navy life more
attractive, but for the service to prosper attention to working conditions was essential.
As one writer noted of the period, ‘Working hours at sea had always been far in excess
of the national average, but the trend towards minimum-manned ships meant that this
workload was often equalled or surpassed when alongside’.287 The problem continued
to affect the Navy throughout the period to 2001, with shortages in some technical
categories reaching critical levels.288

The evolution of the constabulary function to 2001 proved to be demanding for crews
in several respects. One key to workplace satisfaction is a measure of predictability in

‘Bunbury calls in chopper for Ashmore Reef rescue’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2 April 2001,
p. 2.
284 Colin Blair, ‘Navy Budget: ‘Steady as she goes’, Navy News, Vol. 37, No. 9, 20 June 1994, p. 1.
285 Kathryn Spurling, ‘1991-2001 – The Era of Defence Reform’, in David Stevens, ed, The Royal
Australian Navy: The Australian Centenary History of Defence Volume III, Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 2001, pp. 274-5.
286 Peter Jones, ‘1983-1991–A period of Change and Uncertainty’,in David Stevens, ed, The Royal
Australian Navy: The Australian Centenary History of Defence Volume III, Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 2001, p. 255.
287 Spurling, ‘1991-2001–The Era of Defence Reform’, p. 283.
288 Spurling, ‘1991-2001–The Era of Defence Reform’, p. 284.
283

277

working hours. This was constantly under threat for the patrol boat crews, with
planned alongside periods often cut short with little or no warning, for boats or for
individual sailors and officers. Navy News records at least 16 such occasions through
the period to 2001; one typical example being HMAS Launceston in early 1994, having
returned to Darwin after an EEZ patrol and anticipating a weekend alongside, sailed
just six hours later, in response to foreign fishing vessel sightings.289 There is a further
report of Launceston in 1993, responding to a short notice call to deal with foreign
fishing vessels and conducting 50 boardings within 96 hours. Crewmembers were
working 20 hour days.290

The Navy tried to relieve the pressure on the patrol boat crews by changing the
operating cycle which had been six weeks operational, followed by four weeks in
assisted maintenance, followed by another six weeks operational. The new cycle
involved eight weeks operational, followed by four weeks in assisted maintenance and
then four weeks for leave and training, with that cycle repeated three times per year. 291
Another related measure adopted during 2001 was to mandate that ‘operational relief’
postings be limited to a maximum of 91 days in any one year.292 This was to prevent
personnel losing much of their shore respite time by being posted at short notice to fill
vacancies in patrol boats heading to sea.

Other demands challenged crews during the period. There was a growing propensity
for foreign fishing vessels to ignore directions to stop and to respond only when shots
were fired in front of or occasionally at the vessels themselves.293 Occasionally, foreign
fishing vessel captains would attempt to ram the patrol boats while trying to escape.294
These developments demanded skillful operation of the Fremantles and mature
LEUT Aaron Matzkows, ‘Always on the look out’, Navy News, Vol. 39, No. 7, 22 April 1996,
p. 12.
290 Sergeant Al Green, ‘Adaptability, flexibility requirements of north’, Navy News, Vol. 37, No.
5, 25 March 1994, p. 8.
291 LEUT Mark Wilsmore and LEUT Vanessa Power, ‘Course change for patrol boats’, Navy
News, Vol. 43, No. 14, 24 July 2000, p. 3.
292 ‘Operational relievers will be told “how long”’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 5, 6 August 2001, p.
2.
293 See Graham Davis, ‘Illegal fishermen hauled in: Shots fired during six hour chase’, Navy
News, Vol.40, No. 19, 6 October 1997, p. 1, for a report of HMAS Ipswich firing on an Indonesian
FFV with its main armament, the 40/60mm Bofors gun.
294 See Graham Davis, ‘Cessnock Rammed’, Navy News, Vol. 41, No. 4, 27 July 1998, p. 3, for a
report on HMAS Cessnock being rammed three times by an Indonesian Type 3 ‘Ice Boat’.
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restrained behavior on the part of boarding teams, especially when confronted with
armed foreign fishing vessel crews.295 Consequently, training for crews had to adapt to
the changing nature of the task and provide realistic preparation for crews which
comprised mostly junior officers and sailors. One result was the introduction of Minor
War Vessel Concentration Periods, which brought several boats together for intensive
periods of training under supervision of the Sea Training Group.296

Yet another significant challenge for the Fremantle crews came from the dramatic
increase in irregular maritime arrival numbers late in the period. Often, the patrol boat
crews had to deal with large numbers people, many needing immediate access to
health services. The Fremantles were poorly equipped to deal with such issues, which
at least twice involved delivering babies, with little time to consider cultural
sensitivities or expectations.297 In many such instances, the only professional medical
advice available was by radio with Fleet Medical Staff on the mainland.298
Patrol Boat Basing
In 1989 the Fremantles were based around Australia, with five boats in each of HMAS
Cairns and Darwin Naval Base, three in HMAS Stirling near Fremantle and one each at
HMAS Waterhen (Sydney) and HMAS Cerberus (Westernport Bay Victoria).299 The
basing arrangement reflected the nature of the constabulary task at the time, with
much of the fishing activity in northern waters. It also gave some consideration to
southern waters and especially the security patrols of the Bass Strait oil platforms.

See Graham Davis, ‘Naughty, Naughty! Illegal fisherman relieved of machete’, Navy News,
Vol. 40, No. 17, 8 September 1997, p. 1, for a report on HMAS Wollongong’s boarding party
being confronted by armed fishers on an Indonesian FFV.
296 See LEUT Aaron Matzkows, ‘A testing time for patrol boats’, Navy News, Vol. 39, No. 8, 6
May 1996, p. 3 for a report on a Minor War Vessel Concentration Period involving six
Fremantles–two of which had to leave the exercise in pursuit of foreign fishing vessels.
297 See ‘Bouncing boy for Gawler’, Navy News, Vol. 43, No. 6, 3 April 2000, p. 3, and ‘Quite a
haul’, Navy News, Vol. 43, No. 7, 17 April 2000, p. 8, for the first two births recorded in HMAS
Gawler.
298 See ‘Minister praises patrol boats’ professionalism’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2 April 2001,
p. 7, for a report on the Fleet Medical Officer providing advice to HMAS Cessnock which was
trying to manage 340 asylum seekers at Ashmore Island. Two Fremantle crew members were
qualified to administer first aid and to make diagnoses of a range of medical conditions.
299 See Mike Lawson, ‘Patrol boats lead the way’, Navy News, Vol. 34, No. 1, 18 January 1991, p.
5.
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The basing pattern changed from September 1994, with the move of HMAS
Warrnambool from HMAS Cerberus to HMAS Waterhen.300 In mid–1999, the increase in
irregular maritime arrival numbers meant several RAN, Australian Customs Service
and AFMA patrol vessels were moved north temporarily.301 Permanent changes were
made towards the end of 2001, resulting in all Fremantles being based in Darwin (10
boats) and Cairns (5 boats).302 This enabled quicker response to foreign fishing vessel
activities and irregular maritime arrivals, and allowed the crews more time alongside
in their new homeports.303

Homeporting the additional patrol boats, as well as two heavy landing craft in Darwin
necessitated the expansion of Darwin Naval Base. Consequently the Parliamentary
Public Works Committee in September 1999 approved a project for $12.4m which
extended an existing wharf, built a new wharf and provided additional cyclone
protection.304

Relocation meant dislocation for the crews and their families. The impact is difficult to
quantify, but the issues included the financial cost of relocating crews and families, the
disruption to schooling for children, possible loss of employment for partners and the
need to establish relationships in a new environment. Given a work environment
which was not always conducive to a normal lifestyle, the moves were unsettling for
some of those involved.
The Navy in the Public Eye
The Navy has long been known as ‘the silent service’,305 because of its reluctance to
engage the media in reporting its activities and because most of its activities were
conducted well beyond the daily horizon of the media. Exceptions to this situation,
more often than not, were the result of disasters such as the sinking of HMAS Voyager

‘Warrnambool comes in from the cold’, Navy News, Vol. 37, No. 4, 11 March 1994, p. 8.
‘Heat turned up on people smugglers’, Navy News, Vol. 42, No. 11, 14 June 1999, p. 3.
302 ‘Six ships headed north’, Navy News, Vol. 42, No. 24, 13 December 1999, p. 3.
303 ‘Patrol boats heading north’, Navy News, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2 April 2001, p. 6.
304 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report Relating to the Proposed Darwin
Naval Base Redevelopment, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2 September
1999, p. 2.
305 Spurling, ‘1991-2001–The Era of Defence Reform’ p. 287.
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on 10 February 1964 and United States Ship (USS) Frank E. Evans on 3 June 1969, both
after colliding with HMAS Melbourne.306 More recently, the fatal fire onboard HMAS
Westralia on 5 May 1998 and serious problems with the Collins class submarine project
in the late 1990s continued to generate a negative perception of the Navy, by the media
and thus by the public.307

The growth of the constabulary function from 1989 to 2001 provided an excellent
opportunity for the Navy to be seen favourably. The sight of Fremantle class patrol
boats leading apprehended foreign fishing vessels into either Darwin or Broome
became commonplace, was uncontroversial and confirmed the Navy’s commitment to
offshore resources protection.308 The same could be said about the Navy’s interception
of irregular maritime arrivals, some in poor health, attempting to land in Australia
from often unseaworthy boats.

The management of irregular maritime arrivals became controversial for the Navy
towards the end of 2001, specifically with the ‘children overboard’ affair and the
implementation of the Government’s decision to turn some SIEVs back towards
Indonesia. For example, on 6 October 2001, SIEV 4 was directed by the Commanding
Officer of HMAS Adelaide to return to Indonesian waters, but refused to comply until
shots were fired and the boat was boarded. After a stand-off and some confusion,
during which several of the irregular maritime arrivals jumped into the water, the
‘children overboard’ saga began.309

Because of political pressure, the Commanding Officer of the Adelaide waited until the
vessel began to founder on 7 October, before rescuing its desperate passengers.
Adelaide’s crew rescued the 223 irregular maritime arrivals, most of them directly from
the choppy sea.310 In the hours leading up to this risky rescue, the Chief of the Defence
Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, advised the Minister for Defence that, ‘ … the navy had
306Alastair

Cooper, ‘1955-1972: The Era of Forward Defence’, in David Stevens, ed., The Royal
Australian Navy: The Australian Centenary History of Defence Volume III, Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 2001, pp. 201-3.
307 Spurling, ‘1991-2001–The Era of Defence Reform’, pp. 285-6.
308 See MIDN Kirsten Farmery, ‘Hunting the line on 209’, Navy News, Vol. 43, No. 10, 29 May
2000, p. 9, and ‘Securing the north’, Navy News, Vol. 43, No. 24, 27 November 2000, p. 3, for
details of multi-foreign fishing vessel apprehensions.
309 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, pp. 181-8.
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obligations under Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention regulations and would not
risk the lives of the passengers regardless of the border protection policy’.311

Irregular maritime arrivals were also rescued from the foundering SIEV 6 on 27
October 2001, while SIEV 7 was returned to Indonesian waters despite the desperate
pleas and actions of the irregular maritime arrivals, some of whom jumped overboard
when their fate became clear. Claims subsequently made by the irregular maritime
arrivals accused RAN personnel of harsh treatment.312

The Navy was caught between its moral and legal responsibilities for the safety of life
at sea and the political demands of an increasingly testy national election campaign.
Several commanding officers at sea were placed in most invidious positions, in which
the lives of hundreds of irregular maritime arrivals and of their own crews, involved in
rescue efforts, were hazarded. Again, the reputation of the Navy was threatened; this
time by the imposition of an unprecedentedly harsh approach to border protection.
Intriguingly, Navy News, which had reported frequently on the constabulary work of
the patrol boats, made no mention of any of the contentious ‘children overboard’ or
‘turning back the boats’ episodes.
Legal Matters
With the extensive involvement of the Navy’s patrol boat force in the constabulary
function there was a growing need for commanding officers and others to have a
sound working knowledge of the relevant international and Australian law.313 This
was complicated by the number of Acts that empowered the ADF at sea and additional
powers granted by legislation introduced during the 1990s. These powers included the
authority to fire at and into vessels to force them to stop for boarding and ‘ … extensive
powers to search the vessel, arrest, detain and question.’314

Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, p. 188.
See Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, pp. 244-9 for a description of this event.
313 Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, ‘The ADF’s Role in policing the Offshore Zones’, Doug
MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood, Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones–Problems and Prospects,
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The Acts that directly empower the ADF include; Fisheries Management Act 1991,Torres
Strait Fisheries Act 1984,Fish Resources Management Act (WA) 1994,Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999,Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967,Customs Act
1901, including powers for offences under the Quarantine Act 1908,Migration Act
1958,and Crimes Act 1914 (for piracy).315

Complicating matters further, the legal powers vary from Act to Act with respect to
matters such as the use of force, seizure and safety zones.316 So, for example, the
Customs Act permits firing at or into a pursued vessel and the Fisheries Management Act
1991 allows for the seizure of fish, boats and gear.317 Furthermore, there is no
uniformity in the conferring of powers by the various Acts. For example, the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 empowers members of the ADF, while the Fish Resources
Management Act (WA) 1994, grants powers to officers in command of Commonwealth
naval vessels.318

Finally, patrol boat commanding officers had to be aware that as officers in the ADF
they enjoyed no general protection from civil or criminal liability for acts committed in
civil law enforcement.319 Because of these legal complexities patrol boats regularly
carry Customs, Fisheries or Australian Federal Police officers for the application of the
relevant laws. Even so commanding officers need a sound understanding of collection
of evidence, production of statements and the provision of evidence in court.320 An
additional complication was that patrol boat commanding officers and other crew
members found themselves increasingly involved in court proceedings, which had the
potential to delay patrol boat operating schedules.
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CONCLUSIONS
The period from 1989 to 2001 saw a great expansion in the Navy’s constabulary
function in Australia, with most aspects of it becoming more complex. Illegal fishing
operations spread to the Southern Ocean and there was a rapid and substantial
increase in the number of irregular maritime arrivals seeking asylum in Australia
towards the end of the period. The ever growing illegal drug trade and the potential
for disease to evade quarantine barriers made those aspects of border protection an
increasingly high profile government responsibility. Marine environmental protection
became more demanding, as threats emerged to the Great Barrier Reef and elsewhere.

Government policy responses involved agreements with other nations on fishing
activities within the Australian EEZ, dealing with irregular maritime arrivals, for
protection of the Antarctic environment and of whales. Organizational change was also
a feature of the Government response, with the Customs Service subject to a massive
management overhaul, from the top down and with AQIS gaining funding and staff.
Coastwatch become a multi-agency organization with a military head and enjoyed a
doubling of its budget during the period.

Practically, government responded by providing more resources for offshore
surveillance and patrol, primarily through a much expanded ADF involvement of
maritime patrol aircraft, patrol boats and intelligence. Initial planning began for a more
capable patrol craft to replace the Fremantle class, Coastwatch aircraft were upgraded
and other emerging technologies examined for their potential to improve awareness of
offshore activities. Port security was enhanced, initially to interrupt the flow of illicit
drugs and much later, following the terrorist attacks in the United States of America.

Policy and practical responses were underpinned by significant legislation throughout
the period. Most legislation related to IUU fishing and the irregular maritime arrival
surge. The more extreme of these legal measures eventually shattered the bipartisan
approach to irregular maritime arrivals and politicized the asylum seeker issue,
perhaps permanently. Marine environmental legislation was enacted to preserve the
Antarctic environment and to provide greater protection to the Great Barrier Reef.
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The implications for the Navy of these developments in the constabulary function were
profound. Although the Fremantle class patrol boats met most of their tasking
demands, the sea-keeping and range limitations of the class were exposed.
Furthermore, at times up to seven major warships were assigned to constabulary tasks
in addition to the Fremantles and Customs patrol craft. Consequently, by the end of
2001, the Government was planning for replacement of the Fremantles with a much
larger, more seaworthy vessel capable of operating a helicopter.

The expanding constabulary function generated its own demands on the patrol boat
crews, increasing workload and the unpredictability of the tasking. Increasingly
complex legal arrangements required patrol boat commanding officers to become more
conversant with the law, while the harsher management of irregular maritime arrivals
created ethical dilemmas for ships’ commanding officers and their crews.

All of the pressures caused the Navy to improve training, vary patrol cycles, base the
patrol boats in the north, reduce time at sea and provide greater certainty for allocated
time alongside. By the end of 2001, the constabulary function had evolved into a fulltime task for the Navy’s patrol boat force, and also involved a large portion of the
entire Fleet.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION OF NAVIES: THE
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 2002 - 2012
INTRODUCTION
The period from 2002 to 2012 continued the trend noted in Chapter 6. Irregular
maritime arrivals, resource management and environmental stewardship placed the
greatest demands on constabulary organizations and forces. Politicization of irregular
maritime arrivals and still tougher approaches to border protection, were noteworthy
features of the constabulary function. By 2012 an effective multi-agency organization,
involving several government authorities and formalized chains of command had
emerged as yet another development in the organizational change noted in earlier
chapters.
The nature of emerging threats meant that Navy surface combatants and other
specialized ships sometimes assisted with constabulary operations, generating an
unprecedented level of RAN commitment. Civilian ships were contracted, principally
for operations in the Southern Ocean and for support in northern waters. The opening
of the Southern Ocean to fishing posed major challenges to Australian authorities,
which initially lacked any means of monitoring or combating the activities.

FROM 2002 TO 2012: FISH, PEOPLE AND DISEASE
Resources Protection
Concerns about the sustainability of fish stocks in northern waters remained valid.
From January 2002 to February 2003, 62 Indonesian fishing vessels were apprehended
in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ); 27 of them had catch or fishing gear confiscated.1
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing involved both ‘traditional’ and
commercial Indonesian fishers.2

1
2

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 218, 5 February 2003, pp. 8650-7.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 226, 2 March 2004, p. 20621.
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The Northern Territory Assembly on 16 February 2006 condemned the alleged lack of
Federal

Government action.3 Senator Siewert, (Western

Australia)

criticized

Government failure to target the ‘ … large operators and organised crime networks
which are operating in Australian and Indonesian waters’.4 She claimed that targetting
smaller and traditional fishers was counter-productive.5 IUU fishing in northern waters
diminished from about 2006 (See table 7–1 below). This was confirmed during August
2009, when the Minister noted fewer foreign fishing vessels operating in northern
waters.6

Financial Year
2007-08
2006-07
2005-06
2004-05

Coastwatch
sightings
631
1216
2226
1772

Air Force sightings

Total sightings

220
90
Not avail.
Not avail.

851
1306
2226 at least
1772 at least

Table 7-1: Foreign Fishing Vessel Sightings between WA and Indonesian Coasts7
Yet, Indonesian IUU fishing was merely one element in a growing problem.8 For 2002,
394 foreign fishing vessels were sighted in the AFZ; with 50 apprehended.9 Foreign
fishing interest in Australia remained high, with most activity in northern waters, as
shown in the foreign vessel sighting numbers in Table 7-2 below.
The Member for the north Queensland seat of Kennedy, Bob Katter, expressed his
frustration in November 2005:
Current arrangements are that Customs, through Coastwatch, are responsible
for policing but they have no apprehension capability, whilst the Navy has the
apprehension capability but has no policing power.10
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 238, 27 February 2006, pp. 62-3.
Rachel Siewert, Media Release, Illegal fishing–no quick fixes, 26 February 2002,
<http://rachel_siewert.greensmps.org.au/content/speeches/illegal-fishing-no-quick-fixes> (15
November 2012).
5 Siewert, Media Release, Illegal fishing–no quick fixes, 26 February 2006.
6 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 311, 18 August 2009, p.
8264.
7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 258, 10 March 2009, p. 1228.
8 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 217, 9 December 2002, p. 7521.
9 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 230, 3 August 2004, p. 25537.
10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 276, 9 November 2005, p.
83.
3
4
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But he was wrong. The Navy has policing power through several Acts of Parliament,
which allow boarding and apprehension of vessels under various circumstances.11
Customs officers have similar powers, limited until mid-2004 in that Customs vessels
were unarmed.12

Financial
Year
2002-03
2003-04
2004-0513
Total

Total Sightings in
AFZ
5,829
9,348
4,122
19,299

Sightings in the Northern
Waters
5,468
9,259
4,102
18, 829

Vessels
Seized
29
83
94
206

Table 7-2: Coastwatch Foreign Fishing Vessel Statistics 2002-0514
Concurrently, the Labor Opposition, through Senator O’Brien (Tasmania) complained
of a dramatic increase in foreign fishing in the north and the Government‘s failure to
respond. Labor argued that there was no accurate record of the number of foreign
fishing vessels operating in the AFZ.15 However, the Government’s record of
destroying 555 seized foreign fishing vessels in the previous five years suggests some
success against IUU fishing.16

Nevertheless, Senator O’Brien, brought on a Motion for a Matter of Public Importance
on 5 October 2005, over Government failure to halt foreign IUU fishing. He noted that
foreign fishing vessel sightings had risen by 50 per cent over the previous two years
and the price of shark fin had risen from $70 per kg in 1997 to $600 per kg in 2005.17
The sharp price rise enhanced its attraction for foreign fishers, even though shark

Cameron Moore, ADF On the Beat: A Legal Analysis of Offshore Enforcement by the Australian
Defence Force, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 2004, p. 14
and p. 135 et. seq.
12 ‘Armed Australian Ships Patrol for Toothfish Pirates’, Environment News Service, 8 July 2004,
<http://ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2004/2004-07-08-05.asp> (5 December 2013).
13 The figures for Financial Year 2004-05 were for the first half of the year only. Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 234, 5 September 2005, p. 148.
14Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 234, 5 September 2005, p. 148.
15 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 235, 5 October 2005, p. 80.
16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 235, 5 October 2005, p. 82.
17 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 235, 5 October 2005, pp. 99-103.
11
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finning had been outlawed in the AFZ.18 IUU fishing in the AFZ continued into 2006,
with Senator Ellison, the Minister for Justice and Customs, admitting to 12,489 foreign
fishing vessel sightings in the financial year 2004-05.19

IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish, in the Heard and MacDonald Islands region of
the AFZ, was a particular concern.20 Foreign fishing vessels moved into Australia’s
Southern Ocean fishing zone as toothfish stocks declined around the Falkland Islands
and Antarctic Peninsula.21 IUU fishing also occurred on the high seas, in waters
covered by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, by fishing vessels from countries not party to the Commission and while
that fishery was closed.22

More recently, bottom trawling has become a problem involving foreign and domestic
fishers.23 Government continued to rely on non-specific measures aimed at IUU fishing
in general.24 As the Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation Senator Ian
Macdonald noted in February 2006, ‘ The Australian Government has a comprehensive
strategy of on-the-water and diplomatic action to deter all methods of IUU fishing,
both within the Australian EEZ and also on the high seas’.25

Similar problems re-emerged in 2009, with a proposal to open the Western Deepwater
Trawl Fishery and the North West Slope Trawl Fishery off the Western Australian
coast, to bottom trawling.26 This coincided with Commonwealth and Western

‘Independent Allocation Advisory Panel Factual Brief for the Southern & Western Tuna and
Billfish Fishery’, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, January 2002,
<http://www.afma.gov.au/home/afma-archives/archive-7/independent-allocation-advisorypanel-factual-brief-for-the-southern-western-tuna-and-billfish-fishery-january-2002/> (23
November 2012).
19 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 242, 8 August 2006, p. 188.
20 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 247, 19 August 2002, p.
4775.
21 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 216, 26 September 2002, p. 5046.
22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 232, 16 March 2005, p. 67.
23 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 236, 7 November 2005, p. 209.
24 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 238, 8 February 2006, p. 203.
25 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 238, 8 February 2006, p. 203.
26 Members (of the Western Deepwater Trawl Fishery) noted that the partial area closure in the
North West Slope Trawl Fishery notified in October 2007 would lapse on 13 October 2009 and
would not be renewed. However, to ensure the sustainability of gold band snapper
18
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Australian Government negotiations, on the boundary demarcating their fishing
responsibilities, as determined by the Offshore Constitutional Settlement in 1979.27 In
October 2012, Senator Siewert criticized local fishers intending to restart bottom
trawling, because of the failure of the Commonwealth and Western Australian
Governments to agree on the necessary legislation.28

Earlier problems with Japanese tuna fishers climaxed in 2006, with revelations that
Japanese tuna fishers had taken illegally about $A2bn of southern bluefin tuna in
Australian waters in the previous 20 years. The Director of the Australian Fisheries
Management Authority (AFMA) alleged that Japan had taken 12,000 to 20,000 tonnes
each year, instead of its agreed 6,000 tonnes.29 The state of southern bluefish tuna
stocks languished; by late 2009 they were only 3-8 per cent of original unfished levels.30

In mid-2012 the Tasmanian fishing industry complained about the planned operation
in the AFZ of the Fishing Vessel (FV) Margiris, a large factory ship.31 The Margiris was
to fish the Small Pelagic Fishery, from south east Queensland to south west Western
Australia, and take some 18,000 tonnes, about five per cent of the fishery’s stock of jack
mackerel and redbait.32 There were also fears that existing legislation would not permit
the Government to stop the Margiris, renamed Abel Tasman, from fishing in the AFZ.33

In March 2012 the government released the Australian Defence Force Posture Review, a
comprehensive examination of the basing and support of the Defence Force. It found
inter alia a perception among those in the resource sector and the community more
and red spot emperor, trigger limits would be set for these two species in the area of the
Fishery. Chair’s Summary of Western Trawl Fishery Management Advisory Council Meeting,
Fremantle, 10 June 2009, p. 2.
27 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 312, 17 September 2009,
p. 10046. Negotiations concerned the position of the 200m isobath, the boundary between
Commonwealth and State responsibilities in this case.
28 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 10 October 2012, p. 7859.
29 Andrew Darby, ‘Japanese accused of $2bn tuna fraud’, The Age, 12 August 2006,
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/japanese-accused-of-2bn-tunafraud/2006/08/11/1154803098670.html > (4 March 2013).
30 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 313, 27 October 2009, p.
11090.
31 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 June 2012, p. 7640. Note
that for 2011 and 2012 Hansards had not been bound and given volume numbers.
32 ABC South East NSW, ‘Will the super trawler Abel Tasman (Margiris) destroy our fisheries?
<www.abc.net.au/local/stories/> (4 March 2013).
33 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 September 2012, p. 10048.
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broadly, that the Defence Force presence in the northwest was inadequate.34 The
Review determined that the perception was inaccurate, failing to appreciate the mostly
unseen but significant operational presence countering IUU fishing and people
smuggling off the coast. Nevertheless, the Review recommended enhanced facilities at
Broome for a forward operating base and increased ship visits to ports in the region.35
The recommendation aimed to satisfy local concerns and to shape international
perceptions of Australia’s readiness to protect offshore resources and borders.
Border Protection – Immigration
Government attributed the increase in numbers of irregular maritime arrivals at the
turn of the century to Australia’s attractiveness and the legal system which granted 75
per cent of claimants refugee status,36 a high percentage by international standards.37
Whether because of the harsher response or otherwise, irregular maritime arrival
numbers dropped significantly and remained low until after Labor returned power in
November 2007. Table 7-3 shows much reduced numbers to 2007, and the sharp
upturn in the last two years of the decade.
Year

Number of Boats

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

1
1
1
4
6
5
7
61
134

Number of people
(excludes crew)
1
53
15
11
60
148
161
2849
6879

Table 7-3: Irregular Maritime Arrivals 2002 - 201038
Allan Hawke and Ric Smith, Australian Defence Force Posture Review, Australian Government
Canberra, March 2012, p. 20.
35 Hawke and Smith, Australian Defence Force Posture Review, p. iii.
36 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 27 August 2001, p.
30286.
37 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 27 August 2001, p.
30286.
38 This table is taken from Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia since
1976’, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 11 February 2011,
Appendix A. The figures for 2009 and 2010 include 47 people who died at sea and 42 people
34
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The increasing desperation of irregular maritime arrivals, whose boats were turned
back to Indonesia, led to sabotage in the hope of enforced rescue.39 This proved fatal
when Suspect Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) 36 was deliberately set alight in April 2009,
causing the death of five irregular maritime arrivals.40 Equally troubling was Senator
Faulkner’s (New South Wales) suggestion that the Australian Federal Police peoplesmuggling disruption program in Indonesia may have included physical interference
with or sabotage of vessels.41

Soon after Labor formed government in November 2007 irregular maritime arrival
numbers began to rise. Table 7-4, below, shows the numbers claimed by the
Opposition, from that time to the date specified. The numbers were questioned only
once by the Government.42 Increasing irregular maritime arrival numbers resulted in
many heated debates in Parliament, accompanied by frequent criticisms of
Government policy.43 The debates centred on Opposition claims that Government
policy changes encouraged more irregular maritime arrivals44 and Government claims
that ‘push’ factors in countries of origin were the major cause of the increases.45

saved from a sinking boat at Christmas Island. Only the figures for 2009 and 2010 include crew
members of the SIEVs.
39 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 244, 19 February 2002, p.
420.
40 Lex Hall and Jamie Walker, ‘Navy errors blamed for fire on SIEV 36’, The Australian, 26
January 2010. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/navy-errors-blamed-for-fireon-siev-36/story-e6frg6nf-1225823448912> (30 November 2012).
41 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 216, 23 September 2002, p. 4691.
42 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 312, 16 September 2009,
p. 9784. The Prime Minister refuted the numbers provided in row two in the above table,
claiming that only 1,025 irregulars had entered Australia since Labor came to power.
43 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 262, 15 September 2009, p. 6581, records one
of the first of these debates. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27
November 2012, p. 13468 records the last of them in 2012.
44 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 262, 14 September 2009, p. 6401.
45 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 314, 17 November 2009,
p. 11900.

292

Hansard
reference
Senate, Vol. 259,
12 May 2009, p.
3283
H of R,Vol. 312,
16 Sep 2009, p.
9784
H of R,Vol. 314,
24 Nov 2009, p.
12609
H of R,Vol. 315,
8 Feb 2010, p.
607
H of R,Vol. 320,
18 Oct 2010, p.
440
H of R,Vol. 322,
23 Nov 2010, p.
3248
H of R, 2 Nov
2011, p. 12511
H of R, 18 Sep
2012, p. 11012

Vessel Nos

Arrival Nos

Timespan

20

714

Since end of
2007

32

1,500 +

Since Aug 2008

54

2,400

Since Aug 2008

79

3,618

Since Aug 2008

106

5,260

Since Jan 2010

104

9,000

Since Feb 2008

251

12,942

Since Feb 2008

427

25,000

Since end of
2007

Table 7-4: Irregular Maritime Arrival numbers since 2007 election
Labor Home Affairs Minister O’Connor noted the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and
the civil war in Sri Lanka, as prime causes of the increase.46 But, the Opposition blamed
Labor policy changes which made Australia more attractive for asylum seekers. These
included the abandonment of offshore processing and temporary protection visas,
removal of the penalty of detention debt, provision of easier access to social security
benefits and budget cuts for the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.47 While
the impact of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors on the growth is difficult to quantify, Labor’s
more compassionate policies encouraged Opposition criticism.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 314, 17 November 2009,
p. 11900.
47 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 262, 15 September 2009, pp. 6582.
46
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Border Protection – Customs
The biggest Customs challenge remained illegal drug importation.48 By 2009 shipping
containers were identified as the primary means of illegal drugs entry,49 and only 5 to
7.5 per cent of them were searched for drugs.50 Arms smuggling also became
prominent. The alleged smuggling of 20 Russian-made rocket- propelled grenade
launchers occurred in 2006 and the problem grew perceptibly.51 By March 2012 all
police forces, State and Federal, were cooperating to prevent illegal weapons imports.52
The illegal importing of 220 Glock pistols through the Sylvania Waters Post Office, in
early 2012, prompted an unsuccessful Opposition demand, through Mr Morrison
(Cook) for an independent inquiry.53 The Australian Crime Commission was engaged;
the main fear being the often ‘bikie’-related violence associated with the illegal
weapons trade.54

Towards the end of 2012 the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Abbott, claimed that
reduced budgets had caused a 75 per cent cut in air cargo inspection rates and a 25 per
cent cut in sea cargo inspections by Customs.55 The Government response that
inspection rates were determined by a risk assessment process did not satisfy the
Opposition, which linked the reduced inspection rates with the illegal importation of
guns.56 The Opposition also focused on the drop in numbers of Customs staff in the
financial years 2007-08 to 2011-12. Border protection and enforcement staff reduced by
about 7 per cent, while overall Customs staff numbers fell by 9 per cent.57

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 307, 19 March 2009, p.
3285
49 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 307, 19 March 2009, p.
3285.
50 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 307, 19 March 2009, p.
3285.
51 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 244, 9 November 2006, p. 78.
52 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 March 2012, p. 2866.
53 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 March 2012, p. 3226.
54 Peter Bodkin,’ Postal gun plot accused “may know where” 150 Glock handguns are’, Daily
Telegraph, 14 March 2012.< http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/sydney-news> (20
March 2013).
55 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 March 2012, p. 2869.
56 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 March 2012, p. 2869.
57 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 August 2012, p. 8614.
48
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Border Protection – Quarantine
The most serious quarantine challenges included outbreaks of plant and animal
diseases, and a potential human flu epidemic. The nature and extent of quarantine
breaches created doubts about the capacity of the Australian Quarantine and
Inspection Service (AQIS) and the efficacy of quarantine policy.

In 2005 avian flu in Asia prompted a major AQIS response because of the potential
infection of Australian bird populations, and transmission to humans.58 The Minister
for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, Senator Macdonald claimed that an outbreak
could cost the local chicken industry some $6bn and up to 120,000 jobs, and that about
$300m had been spent on preparations.59 Fears of a pandemic affecting humans rose
with the failure of China and Indonesia to declare the disease outbreaks at the outset.60

In 2007 an outbreak of equine flu proved to be ‘ … the most serious emergency animal
disease Australia has experienced in recent history. At its peak, 47,000 horses were
infected in New South Wales on 5,943 properties… ’.61 An exhaustive inquiry could not
establish how the disease entered Australia. Nevertheless Commissioner Callinan was
scathing of lax quarantine practices at the Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, where
horses imported from Japan almost certainly led to the infection of local horses.62

The spread of contagious diseases was demonstrated again in 2009, when swine flu
was detected in Australia, having been transmitted from human to human in other
countries. Rapidly some 103 cases were reported locally, four of them serious. By June
2009 it had been declared the first global pandemic in 40 years and 30,000 cases had

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 232, 10 March 2005, p. 68.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 237, 29 November 2005, pp. 23-4.
60 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 237, 7 December 2005, p. 73.
61 ‘Summary of the 2007/08 Equine Influenza Outbreak’, New South Wales Department of Primary
Industries and Agriculture, 1 July 2008.
<http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/agriculture/livestock/horses/health/general/influenza/summ
ary-of-the-200708-ei-outbreak> (5 December 2012).
62 ‘Inquiry slams quarantine over horse flu outbreak’, ABC News, 13 June 2008.
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-06-12/inquiry-slams-quarantine-over-horse-fluoutbreak/2469204> (5 December 2012).
58
59
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been notified world-wide; 1,762 in Australia.63 The cruise liner Pacific Dawn had to
return to Sydney after an outbreak of the swine flu among the crew, further
emphasizing the nature of the problem.64

AQIS’ capacity to protect domestic primary industry received greater scrutiny after the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994. The emergence of the World Trade
Organization saw successive Federal Governments advance the cause of free trade but
at the expense of quarantine standards,65 which were argued by other countries to be a
restriction on free trade.66 Outsourcing quarantine functions was considered in 2008,
but rejected.67

The tension between the two requirements remained, with local primary industry
fearful of the inadvertent importation of disease, while the World Trade Organization
pressed for greater access to Australian markets. The import of Chinese pears and New
Zealand apples continued to cause concern, yet pears had been imported successfully
from China for over 10 years68 and after much pressure, New Zealand apples were
finally imported despite the fears of fireblight.69

Funding of quarantine services became controversial when in 2009 the Coalition
Opposition refused to pass previously bipartisanly agreed annual quarantine fee
increases. According to Mr Burke, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,
this unprecedented action removed $103m from biosecurity funding, with implications
for quarantine inspection rates.70 Ironically, the Opposition later accused the
Government of decreasing quarantine funding by $35.8m in the 2009 budget, also with

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 310, 15 June 2009, p.
5904.
64 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 308, 28 May 2009, p.
4772.
65 Colin Teese, ‘National Affairs: Quarantine and trade policy – a deadly mix’, News Weekly, 27
August 2005, p. 2. <http://newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=2034> (7 December 2012).
66 Teese, ‘National Affairs: Quarantine and trade policy – a deadly mix’, News Weekly, 27 August
2005, p. 3. .
67 ‘Quarantine outsourcing - it's back’, Community and Public Sector Union, 27 April 2008.
<http://www.cpsu.org.au/agency/news/12789.html> (6 December 2012).
68 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 10 February 2011, p. 497.
69 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 May 2011, pp. 5242-3.
70 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 312, 17 September 2009,
p. 9962.
63
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implications for inspection rates.71 Reduced quarantine funding could have been
justified by the more relaxed policies, especially for the import of foreign primary
produce.

Marine Environmental Protection
Although the Great Barrier Reef retained primacy among marine environmental
challenges, whaling in the Southern Ocean and the potential environmental impact of
the offshore oil and gas industry also caused concern. Land-sourced pollution became
increasingly serious for the Great Barrier Reef as sewage runoff increased with coastal
development.72 In 2009, the Marine Park Authority identified agricultural pesticides,
nutrients and sediments as the major source of the runoff, along with urban sewage.73

More recently, planned construction of a liquified natural gas export terminal at
Gladstone, involving the dredging and dumping of 55 million tonnes of spoil material
for port deepening, and other port developments for coal and aluminium production
on the Queensland coast, drew criticism from Senator Waters (Queensland).74
Complaints included the potential for damage to the Great Barrier Reef and
government failure to inform the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) of the planned activities.75 A subsequent draft UNESCO
report on the state of the Great Barrier Reef recommended no further developments
likely to cause further pollution, before conducting a strategic assessment of the Reef
and its condition.76

Ship-sourced oil pollution incidents in the Great Barrier Reef remain infrequent, but
always generated interest in the efficacy of current policy, as when the Pacific Quest

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 June 2011, p. 5952.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 220, 16 June 2003, p. 11507.
73 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 306, 4 February 2009, p.
524.
74 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 21 September 2011, p. 6757.
75 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 1 March 2012, p. 1416.
76 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 2012, p. 4482.
71
72
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discharged oily water in the Reef late in 2005.77 Most recently, the potential for climate
change to affect the Reef led to requests for further investigation.78

Concern over whaling grew again in 2005, when Japan sought an expanded whaling
program despite Australian opposition. The Government remained reluctant to take
the matter to the International Court of Justice,79 fearful of jeopardizing the close
diplomatic and trade ties with Japan. Furthermore, the Government suspected legal
action would fail, primarily because much of the whaling was in Antarctic waters,
where Australia’s claims were not widely supported.80

The oil and gas industry was criticized by environmentalists and Government when
the Montara oil field well head blew out on 21 August 2009, leading to a major oil spill
in the Timor Sea.81 This was Australia’s first blow out since 1984, despite some 1,500
wells having been drilled.82 The leak, estimated at 3-400 barrels per day, was sealed in
November 2009.83 Marine life in the area was affected by the spill and while no oil
reached the Australian coastline, some reached Indonesian islands.84

Other Issues
The terrorist attacks in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001 led to
re-consideration of maritime security in Australia, especially for single voyage permit
coastal shipping.85 A Liberian registered ship carrying 10,000 tonnes of ammonium

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 275, 13 October 2005, p.
153.
78 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 239, 30 March 2006, p. 103, and Vol. 245, 6
December 2006, p. 136.
79 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 270, 24 May 2005, p. 7.
80 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 236, 8 November 2005, pp. 28-9. See also,
Ian Campbell, ‘It’s not research – Japan’s whale slaughter is commercial’, On Line Opinion, 31
May 2005, <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/print.asp> (13 December 2012).
81 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 312, 7 September 2009, p.
8667.
82 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 312, 7 September 2009,
pp. 8667 and 9292.
83 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 262, 8 September 2009, p, 5920, and House
of Representatives, Vol. 314, 16 November 2009, p. 11863.
84 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 263, 27 October 2009, p. 7251.
85 A Single Voyage Permit (SVP) is issued for a single voyage between designated ports for the
carriage of a specified cargo or passengers. ‘Coasting Trade Licences & Permits’, Department of
Infrastructure and Transport,
77
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nitrate caused most concern.86 The high number of ships conducting single permit
coastal voyages, compared to those on continuous voyage permits illustrated in Table
7-5 below, enabled many seafarers to gain easy if short-term access to Australia. The
potential for deserters as irregular maritime arrivals or terrorists also intensified
interest; 103 seamen having deserted in Australian ports between

July 2001 and

August 2004.87

No of Foreign Ships
Calendar Year
SVP
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

269
283
325
381
346
329
270 to 29/09/06

CVP88
56
81
68
52
43
57
47 to 29/09/06

Table 7-5: Coastal shipping voyage permits89
In 2005, the Opposition criticized the fragmentary maritime security organization
supporting the constabulary function, with eight agencies managing 11 pieces of
legislation.90 Criticism also included the failure to curb IUU fishing and inaction on

<https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/maritime/freight/licences/index.aspx> (13 December
2012).
86 Ammonium nitrate is a chemical commonly used in explosives. Ninety nine per cent of all
ammonium nitrate used in Queensland is for explosives in the mining industry. ‘What is
ammonium nitrate and what is it used for’? Queensland Government,
<http://www.deir.qld.gov.au/workplace/subjects/hazardousmaterials/ammonium/definitio
n/index.htm > (13 December 2012). Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, Vol. 266, 9 August 2004, p. 32496.
87 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 266, 9 August 2004, p.
32497.
88 CVP is Continuing Voyage Permit issued for periods up to three months. See, Department of
Infrastructure and Regional Development, Coasting Trade Licences and Permits,
<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/maritime/freight/licences/> (2 April 2014).
89 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 286, 2 November 2006, p.
166.
90 The agencies were: Department of Defence, Australian Customs Service, Coastwatch,
Department of Transport and Regional Services, Australian Fisheries Management Authority,
Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Australian Quarantine Inspection Service, and
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,
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matters relating to maritime terrorism – including the use of ‘flag of convenience’
registered ships on coastal shipping routes.91
THE GOVERNMENT POLICY RESPONSE: HARD LINES IN THE SAND
Governments’ policy responses reflected the internationalization of threats to
resources, environmental and border protection. Coalition and Labor cooperated
informally and formally with foreign governments and international organizations, for
IUU fishing, marine environmental protection and irregular maritime arrivals.
Organizational changes continued to be made until an effective and multi-agency
organization was well established.
Resources Management
Protracted negotiations with Indonesia about traditional Indonesian fishing in the AFZ
were resolved with the April 2002 formation of a Joint Memorandum of Understanding
Box Management Committee.92 Australia joined the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
and tried to overcome cost difficulties for Indonesian membership of the Commission
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.93 Subsequently in 2005, Australian
Customs opened an office in Jakarta to examine IUU fishing and organized crime.94

Other IUU fishing also demanded policy responses, with Japan’s excessive southern
bluefin tuna take causing the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna to halve Japan’s take in 2006.95 These activities demonstrated Australia’s
confidence in international agreements to manage southern bluefin tuna stocks.
Nevertheless, tensions between those depending on fisheries for their living and those

Senate, Vol. 233, 16 June 2005, p. 136. See also Derek Woolner, Policing our ocean domain:
Establishing an Australian coast guard, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2008, pp. 6-7.
91 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 276, 7 November 2005,
pp. 70-2.
92 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 218, 4 February 2003, p. 8434.
93 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 217, 9 December 2002, pp. 7528-9.
94 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 235, 5 October 2005, p. 71.
95 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 244, 16 October 2006, p. 29.
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most concerned with stocks survivability, meant that agreements alone would not
ensure the recovery of southern bluefin tuna and other fish stocks.96

Local action included the 2005 Government ‘buy out’ of commercial fishing licenses on
the NSW south coast. Ulladulla commercial fishers, for example, received $43m as
compensation, and total allowable catches for those remaining were reduced to 619
tonnes.97 The total compensation package of $220m was well received within the
industry.98 Similar schemes were implemented in other fisheries, like Torres Strait,
where tensions between local and commercial fishers resulted in locals being granted a
50 per cent interest in rock lobster and fin fishing.99

The Government released its ‘Commonwealth Fisheries Harvest Strategy Policy and
Guidelines’ in September 2007, to manage the main commercial fish species and ensure
long term sustainability and economic viability.100 The policy provided a framework
for a science–based approach to total allowable catch levels in all Commonwealth
fisheries individually.101

Southern Ocean fisheries received funding for surveillance, patrolling and the
development of international cooperation.102 This culminated in the activation on 1
February 2005 of the Australia-France Surveillance Treaty for Cooperative Enforcement in
the Southern Ocean.103 Experience justified the arrangement, with cooperative patrols
ensuring that no IUU fishing was detected in the Southern Ocean between then and
late 2009.104

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 233, 14 June 2005, pp. 93-6.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 276, 1 December 2005, p.
122.
98 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 237, 30 November 2005, p. 66.
99 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 237, 30 November 2005, p. 67.
100 What is the Harvest Strategy Policy? Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
<http://www.daff.gov.au/fisheries/domestic/harvest_strategy_policy> (1 January 2013).
101 What is the Harvest Strategy Policy? Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
102 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 215, 17 September 2002, pp. 4316-9.
103 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 243, 12 October 2006, p. 113.
104 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 263, 28 October 2009, p. 7451.
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The strong public reaction against large foreign fishing vessels like the Abel Tasman
(Margiris) to impact on the local fishing industry105 caused the Government to
introduce legislation specifically to prohibit the Margiris from fishing in the AFZ.106

Border Protection - Immigration
Most irregular maritime arrivals in this period originated in Southwest or South Asia.
Most depart from an Indonesian port on the final leg, aiming for the north or northwest coast or Christmas, Cocos or Ashmore Islands. Consequently, Australian
governments have involved regional countries in developing policies to deter this
traffic.

After the Tampa incident, a Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime took place in February 2002,
involving 38 source, transit and receiving countries. The resulting Bali Process involves
ongoing workshops to build capacity and regional cooperation.107 The Australian
Government also worked with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to
persuade countries of first asylum to support refugees, and to discourage them from
onward travel.108

Australia appointed an Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues in February 2002,
further emphasizing the Government’s commitment to a regional approach.109
Cooperative efforts continued with several countries, including a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with Indonesia in June 2002.110 Similar MOUs were concluded

Monique Ross ,’Super trawler: destructive or sustainable’?ABC News On Line, 13 September 2012,
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-15/super-trawler-debate/4200114> (25 March 2013).
106 For further detail see the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment
(Declared Commercial Fishing Activities) Act 2012 at page 322 below.
107 The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime,
<http://www.baliprocess.net/about-the-bali-process> (2 January 2013).
108 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 242, 30 August 2001, p.
30666.
109 Hon. Alexander Downer, M.P., Joint Media Release Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues, 28
February 2002, <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/fa027_02.html> (2 January
2013).
110 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 246, 19 June 2002, p.
3829. This MOU was signed by the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian National
Police on 14 June 2002. AFP: Annual Report 2001-02, p. 50,
105
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with several other countries.111 That with Iran, signed in March 2003, proved
controversial, with the Government refusing to table it in Parliament, declaring the
matter not in the public interest.112

As the MOU provided for the return to Iran of Iranian nationals from Australia, it may
have contained provisions preventing Australia from assuring the wellbeing of
repatriated Iranians. This was alluded to by Immigration Minister Ruddock, when he
noted that ‘ … The Australian government takes seriously its obligation not to refoule
refugees, but also respects the principles of state sovereignty and does not monitor
non-Australian citizens in foreign countries’.113

The decision to excise Australian territory from ‘the migration zone’ so that noncitizens landing there without authority could be removed from Australia was
controversial.114 The first excisions were Christmas, Cocos, Ashmore and Cartier
Islands in the Indian Ocean and all Australian sea and resource installations.115 From
22 July 2005, all islands forming part of Queensland, the Northern Territory and
Western Australia, north of latitudes 21°S, 16°S and 23°S respectively, were also
excised.116

By 2006, the Government argued that temporary protection visas effectively deterred
irregular maritime arrivals; noting the absence of arrivals from November 2001 to June
2003, and the subsequent mere trickle.117 Penalties for ‘people smuggling’ were
toughened, including gaol terms of up to 20 years.118 Before the 2007 election, the

<http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-report-2001-2002.ashx> (2 January
2013).
111 DIMIA Annual Report 2002-03: Key Highlights,
<http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2002-03/report26html> (2 January 2013).
Countries involved included, Afghanistan, Laos, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Iran, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and South Africa.
112 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 219, 25 March 2003, p. 10088, and 26 March
2003, p. 10243.
113 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 256, 11 August 2003, p.
18155.
114 Fact Sheet 81–Australia’s Excised Offshore Places, Department of Immigration and Citizenship,
<http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/81excised-offshore.htm> (2 January 2013).
115 Fact Sheet 81–Australia’s Excised Offshore Places, Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
116 Fact Sheet 81–Australia’s Excised Offshore Places, Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
117 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 244, 17 October 2006, pp. 22-3.
118 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 215, 27 August 2002, p. 3766.
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Government accused Labor of having a ‘soft’ policy approach to irregular maritime
arrivals and of encouraging people smugglers.119 After regaining power in November
2007, Labor relaxed some deterrent policies because of community and Party disquiet;
closing offshore detention centres and abolishing temporary protection visas. In
response the Opposition claimed that a new surge in irregular maritime arrivals was
inevitable.120

Although Labor was criticized for revoking some of the harsher deterrent measures, a
response by Coalition Immigration Minster Ruddock, in 2002, to questions about the
efficacy of the excision of islands from the migration zone, suggested that irregular
maritime arrivals would continue to test any regulations or practical measures.121
Subsequently, the International Organization for Migration suggested that Labor’s
relaxation of border protection policies had resulted in a dramatic surge in people
smuggling.122

The Coalition increased pressure on the Labor Government, arguing that burgeoning
irregular

maritime

arrival

numbers

resulted

from

Labor’s

milder

policies.

Consequently, Labor stiffened its policy response; reconsidering offshore processing
and mandatory detention of irregular maritime arrivals, and re-opening the processing
centre on Manus Island.123 The centrepiece was an agreement with Malaysia for
Australia to take 4,000 refugees from Malaysia over a four year period, in return for
Malaysia accepting 800 irregular maritime arrivals from Australia.124 However, on 31
August 2011, the High Court ruled against the Government, stating that Malaysia did

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 290, 28 March 2007, p.
81.
120 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 304, 2 December 2008, p.
12212.
121 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 250, 10 December 2002,
p. 9983.
122 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 256, 1 December 2008, p. 7677.
123 ‘Manus Island as inhumane as Nauru: Amnesty’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 2011,
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/manus-island-as-inhumane-as-nauru-amnesty-201108201j3cf.html> (25 March 2013).
124 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 June 2011, p. 6896.
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not meet the necessary human rights criteria.125 Subsequent legislative attempts to
overcome this failed in the Senate.126

Prime Minister Gillard announced a review of asylum seeker and refugee issues,
seeking to reconcile Opposition and Government positions on these increasingly
divisive matters. In August 2012 the Government responded to the review, which was
conducted by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Mr Paris Aristotle and Mr Michael
L’Estrange. All 22 recommendations were accepted and included; increasing the
number of humanitarian refugee places to 20,000 per year, establishing processing
centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea and continuing to develop the agreement
with Malaysia.127 On 28 February 2013, the Government introduced a Bill for the
reinstatement of temporary protection visas.128 The dual realities of continuing growth
in irregular maritime arrival numbers and unrelenting pressure from the Coalition, led
to a reinstatement of much of the legislation which Labor had objected to in opposition
and had repealed on assuming government.

Border Protection - Quarantine
Tensions emerged between the demands of preventative quarantine work and the
imperatives of free trade. They highlighted Australian quarantine risk management
processes, which were based on, ‘ … a conservative, but not a zero-risk, approach to
the management of biosecurity risks. This approach is consistent with the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures …’.129
The acceptance of biosecurity risk led to consideration of the dangers to Australian
primary industry, as when Philippines bananas underwent an 18-24 month risk
assessment in 2000.130 In 2002 the Government responded with funding and staffing
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August 2011, <www.hcourt.gov.au> (25 March 2013).
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<www.comlaw.gov.au> (25 March 2013).
129 Risk Assessment Handbook 2011, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests –
Biosecurity Australia, Canberra, 2011, p. 6.
130 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 206, 10 October 2000, p. 18,243.
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increases for AQIS.131 Concerns also emerged in 2007 when Biosecurity Australia132 was
unilaterally proposing to lower the acceptable risk from 95 per cent to 50 per cent.133

The Government responded thoroughly to flu outbreaks. During the avian flu
outbreak, it worked closely with Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) by
funding and leading a pandemic response exercise.134 From 2003 to 2009 Australian
governments spent $805m on planning for a pandemic.135 The judicial inquiry into the
equine flu outbreak determined that Japan was the probable source of the virus, and
that poor practice by private veterinarians at the Eastern Creek quarantine facility was
responsible for infected horses being released.136 The inquiry led to new procedures
and a full review of quarantine and biosecurity systems.137

The Beale Review, ‘One Biosecurity – A Working Partnership’, completed in 2008,
acknowledged the fine work done by quarantine authorities but recommended a
broader approach to biosecurity, than relying on quarantine isolation and disinfection.
It also recommended a National Biosecurity Authority, along with additional
funding.138 The 2012-13 budget allocated $500m for biosecurity improvements and
committed a further $400m over seven years for additional quarantine facilities.139
Border Protection - Customs
The Customs organization was subject to further examination, beginning in 2004 with
an Auditor General report on the National Maritime Unit, which recommended

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 215, 28 August 2002, p. 3900.
The need to manage the whole biosecurity continuum – onshore, at the border and offshore –
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improvements to tasking, intelligence dissemination, and staff training.140 A follow-up
audit in 2008 noted progress in enacting the earlier recommendations, especially in
personnel matters.141 A further audit in 2011 examined the Customs and Border
Protection Service’s risk management process, which had reduced inspections by 76
per cent for air cargoes and 24 per cent for sea cargoes since 2009.142 The audit report
sought more data to determine whether the reduced inspection rates matched the
existing risks.143
Marine Environmental Protection
The Coalition Government continued to oppose Japanese scientific whaling in the
Southern Ocean, but refused to take legal action in the International Court of Justice;144
the relationship with Japan and continuing success in the International Whaling
Commission to prevent the re-introduction of commercial whaling were overriding
factors.145 The new Labor Government experienced sustained pressure from the
Coalition before agreeing to take legal action against Japan, eventually applying at the
International Court for legal action against Japan’s scientific whaling program.146

Government action in Queensland centred on the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.
During 2003, commercial coral collection was banned and fish no-take zones increased
to 33.3 per cent of the area.147 This was controversial because of the impact on smaller
commercial fishers and recreational fishers,148 and led to $90m compensation for the
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commercial fishers.149 Such was the animus against the rezoning that rumours spread
about the Queensland Government assuming control of the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Authority.150

Further policy action included declaration of the South-east Marine Protected Areas in
May 2006, one of six marine parks declared since 1996.151 Labor continued the
protective policies with extensive zoning proposals. These included the Coral Sea
Conservation Zone, an interim measure pending detailed marine assessments, and
with no impact on fishing.152 Furthermore, in November 2012 the Government
announced the establishment of a huge network of marine parks, covering 2.3m sq km,
including part of the Coral Sea. It acknowledged impacts on commercial and
recreational fishing and announced an assistance package worth $100m.153

Minister for Resources and Energy Ferguson responded to the August 2009 Montara
platform oil spill inquiry, in November 2010, accepting over 90 of the Report’s 105
recommendations.154 The Report criticized the operating company, PTTEP Australasia
(Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd for poor practices155 and criticized the Northern Territory’s
Department of Resources for ineffective regulation. The Government also investigated
potential breaches of occupational health and safety and other related legislation and
planned to introduce a single national offshore petroleum regulator.156
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Other Issues
In 2001 the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit found that Coastwatch was
the most effective model for border protection and thus for law enforcement at sea.157
Nevertheless, dissenting Labor members of the Committee argued for a coast guard,158
noting that less prominent client agencies of Coastwatch criticized the level of
service.159 The Labor members argued that the Coastwatch organization was at its
functional limits.160 Subsequent changes to the Coastwatch organization supported this
view.

The Prime Minister’s 2004 Task Force on Offshore Maritime Security concentrated on
the north-west shelf and potential terrorist activity against the important offshore oil,
and gas industry. The incorporation of Coastwatch into the newly established Joint
Offshore Protection Command in March 2005 resulted from this review.161 The Joint
Offshore Protection Command was an ‘ … interagency partnership, with officers from
Customs and Defence working together … to deliver whole-of-Government outcomes
... ’.162 Other Review outcomes included two additional Armidale class patrol boats for
northern waters.163

In December 2004 an Australian Maritime Identification Zone extending up to 1000nm
from the Australian coast was established. As noted by the Prime Minister, ‘On
entering this zone vessels proposing to enter Australian ports will be required to
provide comprehensive information’.164 It was to include position, crew and cargo

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and
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146.
158 Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of Coastwatch: Report 384, p. 179.
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161 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Review of the Defence Report 200405, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, October 2006, p. 31.
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details.165 Indonesia protested that the Maritime Identification Zone breached that
country’s sovereignty,166 and regional diplomatic sensitivity, over geographic reach
and mandatory reporting, led to the Zone being re-designated the Australian Maritime
Identification System, with a voluntary reporting regime.167

Joint Offshore Protection Command aligned Coastwatch to the Australian Defence
Force (ADF) command structure, because of the blurring of defence and
unconventional security threats, and greater involvement of Defence in non-traditional
roles.168 The new organization was expected to halt Labor calls for a coast guard, which
without Navy patrol boats (the then Labor option) would be too small, and with the
Navy patrol boats, would deprive the Navy of vital training capacity.169

The new Joint Offshore Protection Command comprised the Coastwatch division of
Customs, the ADF’s Northern Command, located in Darwin and a small
headquarters.170 The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, AFMA, AQIS
and Customs Enforcement Operations Coordination Unit provided staff for the
headquarters.171 In October 2006, Joint Offshore Protection Command was renamed
Border Protection Command, consistent with the maritime surveillance and response
role.172 Subsequently in December 2008 Labor renamed the Australian Customs Service
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, with overall responsibility for
the Government’s response to irregular maritime arrivals.173
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The Smith Review of Homeland and Border Security, presented to government in
December 2008, recommended the adoption of a whole-of-government strategic
planning framework for homeland and border security, rather than establishing a
single ‘border agency’. He also noted that ‘customer’ agencies were satisfied with the
increasingly effective role of Border Protection Command.174 By contrast, Derek
Woolner writing in June 2008 and again in 2011, argued strongly for the creation of a
single authority for maritime border security.175

Border Protection Command adopted ‘ … intelligence-led risk management … ’ as its
approach to surveillance and response.176 The Command’s policy guidance emanated
from the National Security Committee of Cabinet, with further direction from the
Secretaries Committee on National Security and subordinate operational level advisory
groups.177

Labor’s Australian Offshore Oil and Gas Resources Sector Security Inquiry, led by
Mick Palmer, a former Federal Police Commissioner was possibly the first
comprehensive review of the offshore resource sector against the threats of terrorism
and piracy. Its report, tabled in Parliament on 25 June 2012, recommended onsite
security audits and inspections, security access, exercise and exclusion zones, incident
response and cybersecurity.178

The Labor Opposition took its coastguard policies to elections in 2001, 2004 and 2007
before declining to establish a coastguard when in power from November 2007. Before
the 2001 election Leader of the Opposition Kim Beazley, introduced a private member’s
Bill for a coast guard, but without specifying how it would be equipped.179 The
organization would conduct surveillance and response operations, deterring and not
Ric Smith, Report of the Review of Homeland and Border Security: Summary and Conclusions, 4
December 2008, p. 4 although pages not numbered.
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merely reacting to threats.180 The coast guard would be responsible for all offshore law
enforcement matters and for search and rescue.181 Labor coast guard proposals
included one of up to 15 purpose-designed vessels,182 and one of 12 high speed twin
hull vessels of 45-60m for northern waters and three 80m vessels for the Southern
Ocean.183 The cost of the new vessels was expected to be $895m.184

In December 2002 Labor criticized the Government’s inadequate border protection
policies and proposed a coast guard instead. This version of Labor’s coast guard would
comprise three 80m helicopter-equipped patrol ships and would permit the RAN to
resume its proper Defence tasks.185 Labor appeared concerned at the financial cost of
having RAN ships and patrol craft involved in the constabulary function, at the
expense of their military function.186

Prior to the 2004 election, Labor’s new leader, Mark Latham, again committed the
party to a coast guard, this time including three 80m helicopter-equipped vessels to be
based in Cairns, Darwin and Broome.187 By July, however, Labor had changed its
approach again; moving away from the three large vessels to three 55m and five 35m
patrol vessels, which would save $100m.188 Intriguingly, Labor also declared that its
coast guard would be operated by the Australian Federal Police, ignoring its previous
unsuccessful experiment with that approach in 1984.189
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There was little coherence in the various Labor iterations of its coastguard proposals,
allowing the Government to claim that, ‘ … Labor has released not one, not two, not
three, but four coastwatch policies since 2001 - each one different and each one
erroneously costed’.190 Whether Labor believed a coast guard was the best option, or
merely provided a means of differentiating it from the Government, it failed to
formulate a convincing model while in opposition. Worse, however, the lack of
credible detail in its coastguard proposals allowed the Government to deride Labor’s
ideas.191

Meanwhile, the Coalition Government continued to increase funding for law
enforcement at sea. The 2002-03 budget allocated an additional $280m to Customs,
$28m of which was to boost Coastwatch surveillance flying hours and double Customs
fleet sea days for the year.192 That was part of a much larger commitment of $1.24bn
over the five years 2001-02 to 2005-06 for border protection.193 Extra funding in 2006-07
reflected the expanding nature and unpredictability of the task, providing an
additional $389m over four years for border protection measures. These included more
helicopters, intelligence systems and a commercial ship to relieve patrol vessels of the
onerous task of processing apprehended vessels and their crews and passengers.
Another $96m brought two Huon class mine countermeasures vessels up to
operational status for border protection.194

Changes to border protection policies by the Labor Government during 2008 arguably
contributed to the noticeable rise in irregular maritime arrivals from that time.
Consequently, during 2009, Labor flagged the need for additional resources to cope
with the rising numbers, while arguing that increasing numbers of people seeking
asylum worldwide, was contributing to the greater irregular maritime arrival
numbers.195
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THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE IN PRACTICE: NEW EQUIPMENT AND NEW
CHALLENGES
Surveillance and Response
By late 2012 the Coastwatch surveillance aircraft force had been further improved with
10 Dash 8-200 maritime patrol aircraft and four longer range Dash 8–300s, all with
updated surveillance sensors and communications equipment, including the capacity
to transmit data in near real time.196 Helicopters were retained for Torres Strait and
Great Barrier Reef operations, with the potential for smuggling of people and goods
across Torres Strait at times demanding two helicopters, two fixed wing aircraft and a
Customs vessel.197

From the late 1990s, the Customs Bay class boats provided over 1,350 sea days
annually for constabulary work.198 The first of eight larger replacement Cape class
patrol vessels was expected to enter service in March 2013; to provide a genuine ocean
going capability.199 Yet, because of the unique demands of the Southern Ocean, neither
the Armidale nor Cape class are suited for operations there, and commercial vessels,
starting with the Southern Supporter, have been chartered since 2000.

In 2003, some 25 per cent of all Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-3 flying hours
were devoted to Operation Relex.200 RAAF C-130 and Caribou transport aircraft were
also tasked for aerial surveillance; the C-130s in the Southern Ocean, and the shorterrange Caribou in northern waters.201 IUU fishing and irregular maritime arrivals also
stretched existing Navy and Customs patrol boat forces, so that other RAN ships were
diverted to Operation Relex. The involvement of RAN amphibious ships,
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replenishment ships, major surface combatants, hydrographic ships and mine warfare
vessels reflects the extent of the problem.202
Resources Protection
From January 2003 to March 2004 1,558 foreign fishing vessels, suspected to be
operating illegally, were sighted in the AFZ. Of these, 253 were later confirmed to be
IUU fishers, 168 were apprehended, while the remaining 85 had their catch
confiscated.203 Efforts to apprehend fishing boats continued, with the introduction of
the Armidale class patrol boats and four additional Customs response vessels. These
additional vessels were to escort apprehended fishing boats into port, thereby enabling
RAN and Customs patrol craft to remain on station.204

There were 281 apprehensions in 2005 and by October 2006 there had been a record
number of 308 IUU fishing boat apprehensions.205 Three hundred and sixty five foreign
fishing vessels were seized in northern waters and destroyed in 2006. By March 2007
progress was evident with sightings of foreign fishing vessels down 40 per cent for the
year to that time.206 Improved Indonesian cooperation and more surveillance flights
contributed to this result.207

IUU fishing in Australia’s Southern Ocean AFZ demanded a different response,
because of the distances involved, difficulty in determining the nature and level of
fishing and the prevalent poor weather and rough seas. In February 2002, Her
Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Canberra apprehended the Russian-flagged Lena
and Volga operating illegally inside the Heard and McDonald Islands zone of the AFZ.
Both fishing vessels were brought to port, and senior crew members were charged with
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a range of offences. Fines of $100,000 were imposed, the fishing gear was forfeited and
the catch worth $A1.127m was sold.208

Subsequently, in August 2003, the Southern Supporter assisted by a British fisheries
patrol vessel and a South African tug, pursued the Viarsa from near Heard Island to a
point some 2,000nm south-west of Cape Town, a total distance of some 3,400nm.209

210

Despite the failure to gain a conviction in court, the Government believed that its
determined pursuit would deter others.

Border Protection – Immigration
The spike in irregular maritime arrivals and associated high political profile demanded
a comprehensive response. Australian officials were stationed in Indonesia; some
conducting ‘disruption’ activities to prevent boats leaving Indonesian ports. Concern
was expressed over the extent of these activities, with Senator Faulkner commenting
that, ‘It is not clear whether disruption extends to physical interference with vessels. It
is not clear what, if any, consideration is given in the planning and implementation of
disruption to questions of maritime safety, to the safety of lives at sea’.211 Although the
Government provided no clarification, the Senator articulated fears held by people
unhappy with the strict irregular maritime arrivals policy.

The decision to escort the Minasa Bone, carrying 14 irregular maritime arrivals, from
Melville Island back to Indonesian waters in November 2003, even with Indonesian
Government agreement was also controversial.212 ‘Turning the boats back’ was
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opposed then, and at the time of writing in early 2013, by Labor,213 but, remains a
policy of the Coalition, when safe to do so.214 The policy invites irregular maritime
arrivals to either jump overboard or to sabotage their boats on sighting any RAN or
Customs vessel, and is fraught with risk to the irregular maritime arrivals themselves
and those sent to deal with them.

Border Protection - Customs
Customs continued counter- drug smuggling operations and in 2002 made the biggest
haul of the drug ecstasy to that time, worth $10.8m, from a container in the port of
Melbourne.215 The best known operation was mounted against the MV Pong Su in April
2003.216 The ship offloaded 125kg of heroin by dinghy near Lorne on the south-west
coast of Victoria. Subsequently, a special operations boarding party was lowered onto
the ship from HMAS Stuart’s helicopter south-east of Newcastle, NSW,217 and the Pong
Su was diverted to Sydney where crew members were charged.

The potential terrorist threat resulted in more shipping containers being inspected and
by the end of 2003, 80,000 of the 2.1m incoming containers were examined. This still
small proportion was determined by intelligence and associated risk assessment.218
Importantly, the measures taken satisfied the US Container Security Initiative
requirements.219 Australia was one of the 11 original members of a related measure to
counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Proliferation Security
Initiative, who first met in Paris in September 2003.

All cargo entering Australia is screened and risk-assessed by Customs and Table 7-6
shows the number of containers physically inspected at the major ports for the
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financial year 2003-04. The introduction of x-ray inspection for containers at Container
Examination Facilities allowed Customs to raise inspection numbers from 4-5,000
twenty foot equivalent (TEU) containers up to 133,000 containers per year by 2004.220

Port
Melbourne
Sydney
Brisbane
Fremantle
Newcastle
Hay Point
Port Adelaide
Gladstone
Townsville
Port Hedland
Bunbury
Port Kembla
Geelong
Portland
Launceston
TOTALS

Loaded
TEU

Empty
TEU

Total
TEU

TEU
Inspected

774,752
643,112
261,884
203,760
990
0
41,531
86
3,913
8
0
57
0
24
7,281

105,560
11,725
63,309
34,731
2,412
0
29,968
243
4,464
0
0
56
0
0
12,376

880,312
654,837
325,193
238,491
3,402
0
71,499
329
8,377
8
0
113
0
24
19,657
2,202,252

31,473
29,396
18,901
6,759
57
N/A
205
0
23
0
N/A
0
N/A
0
175
86,869

Table 7-6: Container Inspection Figures for Major Australian Ports FY 2003-04221
Complementary security measures included the installation of closed circuit television
cameras in 56 ports by mid-2004.222 By the end of 2005, Maritime Security Identification
Cards and security checks, were introduced for all persons entering Australian
seaports and ports were preparing security assessments and plans.223
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221 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 273, 16 August 2005, p.
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Border Protection – Quarantine
The potential for human threats to quarantine saw staffing increased to permit
improved passenger screening at points of entry. In the 12 months to October 2003 92
per cent of all arrivals, were screened.224 By exercising heightened vigilance at points of
entry, Quarantine officers contributed to preparations associated with the possible
outbreak of avian flu in 2005.225 Quarantine officers also dealt with the implications of
foreign fishing vessels landing unauthorized on the coast or offshore islands.
Consequently, pest profiling and biosecurity risk assessments were routinely
conducted and a variety of animals seized and destroyed.226

Marine Environmental Protection
Oil-sourced marine pollution remained a major focus of environmental protection. In
2002, all 345 reported spills were investigated and 95 per cent of all ships considered to
be high risk were inspected.227 In 2006 the Government based the Pacific Responder in
Cairns as an emergency towing vessel within the Reef as well as to service navigation
aids.228

Responses to whaling in the Southern Ocean included prosecution of ships, such as the
South Seas 1 in 2004, which was found with whale meat on board.229 Growing public
and political pressure eventually resulted in the Government beginning to monitor
Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean, from February 2008.230
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THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE LAW
From 2002-2012 a lot of legislation was passed, much of it concerning asylum seekers
and the desire of the Labor Government to remove the harsher deterrence measures
imposed by its Coalition predecessor. It also encompassed the subsequent reimposition of the harsh measures as the asylum seeker numbers climbed again.
Legislation was also introduced to counter the threat of global terrorism to maritime
industries and to improve marine resources management. Overall, the approach to the
legislation appeared to be rushed, reactive and incremental and reflected quite
frequent policy changes on issues such as irregular maritime arrivals and marine
resources.

Resources Legislation
The first important fisheries legislation was the Border Protection Legislation Amendment
(Deterrence of Illegal Foreign Fishing) Act 2005, which had three primary objectives.231
Firstly it made the Torres Strait Fisheries Act consistent with the Fisheries Management
Act, so that consistent detention policies could be enacted throughout northern waters.
The Act also created a detention regime for illegal fishers that was consistent with
immigration detention policies, and increased protection for officials, in response to
increasing hostility by illegal foreign fishers.232
The Fisheries Legislation Amendment (International Obligations and Other Matters) Act 2005
enabled implementation of Australia’s obligations under the Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean (the Convention).233 By extending surveillance and enforcement provisions
within the Fisheries Management Act the International Obligations and Other Matters Act
2005 aimed to ensure Australian flagged fishing boats and nationals complied with the
Convention.234 Furthermore, the Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Cooperative Fisheries
Arrangements and Other Matters) Act 2005 made a more substantive adjustment to the
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pp. 5-7.
233 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 232, 17 March 2005, p. 9.
234 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 232, 17 March 2005, p. 9.
231

320

Fisheries Management and Administration Acts.235 The adjustment ensured that the
Offshore Constitutional Settlement fisheries jurisdictions remained aligned with
changing natural fisheries boundaries, to facilitate rational fisheries management by
the Northern Territory, States and Commonwealth Governments.236
Because neither surveillance and patrol operations nor earlier legislation stopped
foreign IUU fishing within the AFZ the Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fishing
Offences) Act 2006 was enacted. It provided custodial sentences of up to three years for
foreign fishers operating illegally in Australian waters between 3nm and 12nm.237 The
distance limitations conformed to the State responsibility to 3nm and the Law of the
Sea Convention (LOSC) prohibition of custodial sentences for fishing offences beyond
the territorial sea.238

The Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 2007 aimed to improve fisheries management,
especially for the Torres Strait, and enable the local population to continue sustainable
fishing.239 The Act also provided for more effective monitoring of fishing, to deter IUU
fishing in the AFZ, because hitherto the demand for fish had trumped the penalties for
apprehension.

Acts became more complex, and even their titles were beginning to strain
comprehension. Thus in March 2008 a Bill for the Fisheries Legislation Amendment (New
Governance Arrangements for the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and Other
Matters) Act 2008 was introduced. The Act established a Board and Chief Executive
Officer for AFMA, and limited the capacity of fishing industry representatives to be
commissioners.240 Provisions were also made for Australians to be prosecuted for
breaching international fisheries agreements to which Australia is a party, and to be
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prosecuted for IUU fishing activities on board foreign fishing vessels outside the
AFZ.241

The Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 2010 introduced electronic licensing and
clarified the nature of defensive equipment carried by fisheries officers when
investigating foreign fishing vessels.242 The Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2)
2010 further simplified regulatory demands, enabled AFMA to charge other
government agencies for services and introduced co-management arrangements with
other governments and industry, for more sustainable fish stocks management.243 The
Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2012 introduced electronic monitoring of
Australian fishing vessels and provided for the notification in writing to fishers of the
closure of any fishery.244 It was another example of an incremental and seemingly
haphazard legislative approach to fisheries management.

In 2012 the Government introduced the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation (Declared Commercial Fishing Activities) Act 2012 because of the furore
caused by the planned activities of the FV Abel Tasman (Margiris). The Act allowed the
Minister to prohibit a declared fishing activity for up to two years, while awaiting an
environmental impact study.245 Opposition counter-argument centered on the Abel
Tasman (Margiris) having been ‘invited’ into Australian waters by the Government and
on the apparently untrammeled power which the Act gave the Minister.246

Towards the end of the period, resources legislation was drafted to improve the
management of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. The first significant
Act was the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Amendment (National
Regulator) Act 2011.247 It responded to recommendations of the Productivity
Commission, the Inquiry into the Montara oil spill and implications of the Varanus
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4119.
244 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 June 2012, p. 8157.
245 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 September 2012, p. 10214.
246 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 September 2012, p. 10312.
247 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 May 2011, p. 4492.
241

322

Island gas explosion in June 2008.248 The Act established the ‘ … national offshore
regulator of safety, integrity and environmental management of petroleum and
greenhouse gas storage activities in Commonwealth waters’.249 This involved
incorporation of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority into the new
National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority.

This Act was supported by the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage
Amendment (Significant Incident Directions) Act 2011 introduced on 21 September 2011.
A direct outcome of the Inquiry into the Montara oil spill, this Act enabled the National
Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority to improve
regulation by directing petroleum titleholders in the event of serious incidents with
safety or environmental implications.250
Immigration Legislation
From 2002 immigration legislation concentrated initially on the latest wave of asylum
seekers. Legislative efforts began with the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further
Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 in June 2002. This Bill proposed extension of the
area of excised offshore places to include those islands off the north-west of Western
Australia, islands off the Northern Territory, islands off Far North Queensland, and the
Coral Sea Islands Territory.251 The Bill was introduced because regulations with the
same effect had been rejected by the Senate.252 This Bill suffered a similar fate in the
Senate and was reintroduced, unsuccessfully, in the House of Representatives as the
Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (No. 2) on
26 March 2003.253 The need for these regulations suggests that people smugglers
remained alert for inadequacies in legislation and were capable of taking advantage of
them.
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In December 2002 the Crimes Legislation Amendment (People Smuggling, Firearms
Trafficking and Other Measures) Act 2002.254 Primarily, the Act covered activities not
proscribed by the Migration Act 1958, including smuggling people from Australia, or
from somewhere other than Australia to a third country, with or without transit
through Australia. Other ‘aggravated’ people smuggling offences including
endangering the lives of irregular maritime arrivals and smuggling more than five
people at one time were included. The Act also prohibited producing, providing or
using false travel documentation to enable a person to gain unlawful entry into a
foreign country.255

The Migration Amendment Regulations 2005 (No.6) passed in August 2005, related to the
excision of islands proposed by earlier Acts but rejected in the Senate.256 This time,
government control of the Senate, achieved in the 2004 Federal election, guaranteed
success, despite Labor and Democrat opposition.257

Legislation and regulations excising offshore islands and structures determined that
irregular maritime arrivals landing there would be subject to offshore processing and
more limited recourse to the legal system. To this point no such limitation applied to
irregular maritime arrivals landing on the mainland, although there was an
unsuccessful attempt to legislate for it.258 The continual amending of immigration
legislation demonstrated a failure to anticipate the reaction of people smuggling
syndicates and perhaps the desperation of asylum seekers.

Legislation was also introduced for more effective management of people entering
Australia legally. In October 2006, the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Act 2007
foreshadowed the use of automated systems, including biometric recognition, for
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immigration clearance at the nation’s airports.259 Similarly, the Migration Amendment
(Maritime Crew) Act 2007 created a new temporary ‘maritime crew visa’, for the first
time allowing crews of non-naval ships to be security cleared before arrival in
Australia. These visas could only be used for entry by sea.260

From early 2010 more and ever harsher immigration legislation was introduced,
following the upsurge in irregular maritime arrivals and political pressure to contain it.
This began with the Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010, expanding the
range of criminal acts associated with people smuggling, to include providing material
support to the smugglers and making such activities aggravated offences when death
or injury was involved.261 The Act also allowed for interception of telecommunications
to improve intelligence and introduced a mandatory minimum sentence of eight years
for repeat offences.262

Closely related was the Combating the Financing of People Smuggling and Other Measures
Act 2011, which sought to stop money from Australia flowing through remittance
dealers to irregular maritime arrival countries of origin.263 The Act raised registration
standards for remittance dealers and imposed tough penalties for providing material
support to people smugglers, including fines of up to $110,000 and 10 year gaol
sentences.264 Reinforcement was provided by the Deterring People Smuggling Act 2011,
which clarified how persons could lawfully enter Australia, 265 while retaining the right
of individuals to seek protection or asylum in Australia. The clarification was applied
retrospectively to 1999, when the Migration Act first incorporated the words ‘ … lawful
right to come to Australia’, to ensure that legal action already taken would remain
lawful.266
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After an earlier failed attempt in 2011, the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional
Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 passed in August 2012, without the
Opposition’s amendments relating to temporary protection visas and turning back of
boats, but supported by the recommendations of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers,
led by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston.267 The Act responded to the High Court
decision limiting the countries to which asylum seekers could be transferred. It aimed
to ‘ … restore to the executive the power to set Australia's border protection policies,
specifically the power to transfer asylum seekers arriving at excised offshore places to a
range of designated third countries within the region, while ensuring protection from
refoulement, for the processing of their claims’.268 Several other immigration Bills
introduced during 2012, by private members and the Government, either failed to pass
or remained under consideration at the time of writing.
Quarantine Legislation
The disastrous foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 led to
the Quarantine Amendment Act 2002, early in 2002. It sought, ‘… to enhance Australia's
national emergency powers to ensure the Commonwealth, states and territories have
adequate legislative powers to enable them to prevent, or to act rapidly to control and
eradicate, a major national animal disease outbreak, such as foot-and-mouth disease…
’.269 The Act included substantial financial and custodial penalties.270 Problems
continued and in September 2007 the Quarantine Amendment (Commission of Inquiry) Act
2007 was introduced after the first ever outbreak of equine flu. The Act established a
comprehensive independent inquiry with the powers of a Royal Commission.271

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome which appeared in Asia during 2003, led to the
Quarantine Amendment (Health) Act 2003 and some minor adjustments to quarantine
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border protection measures.272 Later, the Quarantine Amendment (National Health
Security) Act 2008 responded to growing fears of global infectious disease pandemics.
Provisions included mandatory vaccinations for travellers subject to quarantine and
waiver of charges for vaccinations for most travellers.273

The Fisheries and Forestry Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2003 amended the
Quarantine Act 1908, to bring Christmas Island regulations into line with those
throughout Australia, including the Cocos Islands.274 It also permitted the exercise of
quarantine powers by contractors, a provision which Labor opposed strongly.275
Following the equine flu outbreak, the Horse Disease Response Levy Act 2011 introduced
a levy to support fast response from Federal and State Governments and industry, in
any future outbreaks.276 Legislative interest in plant biosecurity and the potential
impact on local primary industry of the introduction of exotic disease with fruit
imports led to two private members’ Bills which had not passed at the time of writing.

The Beale Review and new threats led the Government to introduce a new biosecurity
regime, primarily to support and protect local primary industry exports. With some
$39.3bn in annual food and fibre exports as well as 300,000 jobs involved, a new risk
management framework was essential. Consequently, the Biosecurity Bill 2012 and the
Inspector-General of Biosecurity Bill 2012 were introduced in late November 2012,277 to
reflect the nature and extent of contemporary trade and travel, while providing an
independent review and audit mechanism for the new processes.278
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Environmental Legislation
From 2002, further legislative protection was sought for the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park (GBRMP), against ship-sourced oil spills and from oil exploration on the Reef.
Several unsuccessful Opposition Bills reflected the fears that oil exploration would be
allowed on the Reef.

The new Labor Government in 2008, introduced the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and
Other Legislation Amendment Act 2008. Following a 2006 review of the Marine Park Act,
the 2008 Act produced a new legislative framework for the Park, establishing ‘ … a
robust, comprehensive, regulatory framework for the Great Barrier Reef fit for meeting
the challenges of the future.’279 The new Act also better integrated the requirements of
the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act and other relevant
legislation.280

Environmentally sensitive Antarctica benefited from legislation, with the Antarctic
Treaty (Environmental Protection) Amendment Act 2010 designed to meet obligations
under the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty281. This Act produced more stringent
provisions for species protection and the control of entry of organisms to the Antarctic
territory.282 Subsequently, the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental Protection) Amendment Act
2011 enabled Madrid Protocol obligations for seal protection, insurance and contingency
planning for Antarctic tourism and managing the landing of passengers from ships.283
Legislation designed to extend liability for marine oil spills appeared in 2002 through
the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Amendment Act 2002.284 It
provided for prosecution of any person whose reckless conduct contributed to an oil
spill, and rectified an existing anomaly by ensuring it covered offences committed in
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Australia’s EEZ.285 Having polluters, or potential polluters, pay for prevention and
damage control measures was a feature of much of the legislation and was extended
with the Protection of the Sea (Shipping Levy) Amendment Act 2005.286 This Act imposed a
levy on shipping to enable the Australian Maritime Safety Authority to control and
combat oil spills.

More regulation followed with the Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention)
Amendment Act 2006.287 It ensured clarity of rights and responsibilities for industry, the
States and Commonwealth throughout the EEZ.288 Later in 2006, the Maritime
Legislation Amendment (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 2006 implemented revised
Annexes I and II of (MARPOL).289 Annex I covered the introduction of double-hulled
tankers, while Annex II related to carriage requirements for chemicals and more
stringent limits for the discharge of some noxious liquids.290

Additionally, the

Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability For Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 provided
for compensation to anyone affected by leaking bunker oil from ships other than
tankers, which were covered separately.291 This Act required ships carrying bunker oil
to be insured adequately and required damages to be paid even after accidental
spills.292
That was still insufficient, and the Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Act 2008
implemented the 2003 protocol of the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992.293 It was precipitated
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by fears of inadequate compensation arrangements; especially for the GBRMP,294 and
provided for obtaining compensation from offending ships not calling at Australian
ports.295 Air pollution by ships was dealt with in the Protection of the Sea Legislation
Amendment Act 2010, reflecting Schedule VI of MARPOL, to reduce the level of sulphur
content in fuel oil.296

To counter oil pollution at sea the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships)
Amendment (Oil Transfers) Act 2011 reflected amendments to MARPOL Annex I and
applied to all tankers of more than 150 tonnes transferring oil at sea.297 The April 2010
grounding of the MV Shen Neng I in the Great Barrier Reef resulted in more change,
through the Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 2011, which made it an offence
negligently to operate a vessel in Australian waters and cause pollution or damage to
the marine environment.298 The Maritime Legislation Amendment Bill 2012 was
introduced to strengthen marine pollution prevention. It imposed stricter processes on
the management of ship-sourced sewage and garbage and promoted energy efficient
ship design and ship energy management plans.299 At the time of writing, the Bill was
still before the House.

Anti-fouling was addressed by the Protection of the Sea (Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems)
Act 2006, which implemented the International Convention on the Control of harmful AntiFouling Systems on Ships, 2001.300 It banned the use of organotins on all Australian ships,
because of effects on shellfish.301 Further protective measures were enacted through the
Environment and Heritage Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2006, which streamlined
administrative processes and strengthened compliance and enforcement.302
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Environmental legislation was used to manage fishing and whaling. The Environmental
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Recreational Fishing for Mako and
Porbeagle Sharks) Act 2010 lifted restrictions on recreational fishers imposed by the
Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, which discriminated
insufficiently between endangered and other fish species.303 The Greens Party
presented two Bills related to Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean, neither of
which had been passed at the time of writing.304
Customs Legislation
With drug smuggling a serious problem, the Customs Amendment Act 2004 expanded
the list of drugs for which a commercial quantity could be defined, allowing sentences
up to life imprisonment for some offences.305 In a related measure, the Customs
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2002 allowed Customs Officers to seize, without a
warrant, illegal goods on vessels travelling between Papua New Guinea and Australia
in the Torres Strait Protected Zone, thereby relieving safety and operational
problems.306 Additionally, the Border Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002 amended
customs, migration and fisheries legislation and the Evidence Act 1995 and gave
Customs officers more powers to control the movement of people and goods into and
out of Australia.307 Maritime provisions included giving ship crew and passenger lists
to Customs and Immigration before arrival, mandatory reporting of in-transit goods,
access for Customs Officers to vessel monitoring systems data collected by the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority, and simplifying application of Customs Officers
power to carry firearms.308
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Subsequently, the Customs Legislation Amendment (Airport, Port and Cargo Security) Act
2004 strengthened Customs Officers’ powers to detain offenders entering or leaving
Australia.309 It also gave Customs Officers powers to control people and goods
movements in Customs areas and it enabled consideration of port security plans in
determining whether a sea port should be appointed as such under the Customs Act.310

In 2006, the Customs Legislation Amendment (Border Compliance and Other Measures) Act
2006 generated several amendments to the Customs Act 1901, the most important
granting power to Customs Officers to restrict the entry of security identification card
holders to ships and wharves.311 This Act was another response to the heightened
awareness of the potential for maritime terrorism. The Customs Amendment
(Strengthening Border Controls) Act 2008, added to the powers of Customs Officers,
especially in dealing with illegal imports.312 For the first time, the Act enabled Customs
Officers to search persons immediately on boarding a vessel or aircraft for weapons, or
evidence of the commission of a crime.

Further amending legislation appeared late in 2008, illustrating the evolution of threats
to Customs powers. Thus, the Customs Amendment (Enhanced Border Control and Other
Measures) Act 2008 clarified boarding powers for vessels in offshore platform safety
zones, denoted the power to use reasonable force in boarding a pursued ship and
aligned Customs boarding powers with those of other Commonwealth legislation and
with the LOSC.313

The Customs Legislation Amendment (Name Change) Act 2009 changed the name of the
organization to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service,314 while the
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Customs Amendment (Serious Drugs Detection) Act 2011 introduced the trial of x-ray
scanning equipment to search people suspected of carrying illegal drugs.315 The latter
highlighted that despite earlier efforts, drug smuggling continued to be a border
protection problem.
Other Legislation
Terrorism was the catalyst for a range of new maritime security legislation. The
Maritime Transport Security Act 2003, responded to terrorist attacks against the US on 9
September 2001 and the bombing of the MV Limburg off the Yemen coast on 6 October
2002.316 The Act incorporated the International Maritime Organization (IMO) revisions
to the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and enabled Australia to implement the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.317 It provided the legislative basis
for comprehensive ship and port security, based on individual security plans for
Australian regulated ships, ports and port facilities. It also permitted punitive action
against non-compliant foreign ships.318

Amending legislation was produced in 2005 through the Maritime Transport Security
Amendment Act 2005, following the Prime Minister’s 2004 Task Force review of
maritime security for offshore oil and gas facilities.319 The Act introduced regulations
for the security of offshore resource platforms and ships and aircraft servicing them,
especially because of the potential threat of terrorism, and introduced amendments
supporting the introduction of Maritime Security Identification Cards.320

Other amending Acts acknowledged the failure to include all the necessary security
measures in the original Acts and to understand the full implications of the legislation.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 February 2011, p. 1093.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 257, 18 September 2003,
p. 20443.
317 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 257, 18 September 2003,
p. 20443
318 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 257, 18 September 2003,
p. 20443
319 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 270, 25 May 2005, p. 6,
and Maritime Transport Security Amendment Act 2005,
<www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2005A00067 > (28 February 2013).
320 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 270, 25 May 2005, p. 6.
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The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security
Guards and Other Measures) Act 2005 enhanced security provisions for ports, including
the power to request identification and to remove unauthorized people from specified
port areas. This complemented the existing power to detain.321 The Maritime Transport
and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Act 2006
later simplified the administrative demands of preparation, submission and
maintenance of security plans.322 The Opposition criticized the Government’s use of
foreign ships to carry ammonium nitrate around the coast, given the chemical’s
connection with explosives.323 The criticism focused on the security implications of the
‘careless’ use of single voyage permits for foreign ships, without crew security
checks.324

To further strengthen security, the Government introduced the Inspector of Transport
Security Act 2006, which nominated an independent inspector to investigate security
incidents throughout the transport industry in Australia.325 A ‘consequential
provisions’ Act also passed in 2006, exempted information obtained in any such
investigation from freedom of information requests. This is an example of legislation
having to be amended because of apparently inadequate or rushed drafting.326

The growth in constabulary function legislation and its increasing complexity were
reflected in the Maritime Powers Bill 2012, the result of a Government review of relevant
legislation.327 The Bill328 sought to replace 35 separate Commonwealth Acts with a

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 233, 23 June 2005, p. 7.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 279, 29 March 2006, p.
14, and Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other
Measures) Act 2006, <www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2005A00067>, (28 February 2013).
323 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 284, 4 September 2006,
p. 119.
324 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 284, 13 September 2006,
p. 167.
325 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 285, 18 October 2006, p.
6, and Inspector of Transport Security Act 2006, <www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2006A00149> (28
February 2013).
326 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 285, 18 October 2006, p.
8, and Inspector of Transport Security Act 2006,
<www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/iotspa2006682 > (28 February 2013).
327 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 May 2012, p. 6224.
328 The Bill gained assent on 27 March 2013. Maritime Powers Bill 2012, Parliament of Australia,
<www.aph.gov.au> (16 April 2013).
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single maritime enforcement law covering boarding, search, seizure and retention of
property or people. It included safeguards for appropriate use.329
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NAVY: NOT ALL PUBLICITY IS GOOD
PUBLICITY
From 2002 to 2012 the implications for the Navy of its constabulary responsibilities
became more significant. The patrol boats became more committed to constabulary
work, to the detriment of regional deployments. Most significantly for the Navy,
however the constabulary function overwhelmed the patrol boat force and at times
involved several warships. This occurred despite the introduction of the Armidale
class boats, which overcame many shortcomings of their predecessors. The often
demanding workload for the patrol boat crews became a major challenge for the Navy
and led to a new crewing structure for the Armidales. Finally, the reputation of the
Navy, and the ADF more broadly, was questioned with respect to the treatment of
irregular maritime arrivals.
Patrol Boat Tasking
Following the MV Tampa incident in August 2001, irregular maritime arrival numbers
reduced dramatically. The patrol boat force then shifted to countering IUU fishing,
with 111 foreign fishing vessels apprehended in 2002 and 135 by early October 2005.330
Even as IUU fishing remained a major task in 2009, irregular maritime arrival numbers
also began to grow.331 Tables 7-3 and 7-4 confirm the timing and scope of the new wave
of arrivals.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 May 2012, p. 6224.
See, Graham Davis, ‘Blitz on Southern Ocean Poachers’, Navy News, Vol. 46, No. 2, 27
February 2003, p. 2, and Michael Brooke, ‘Big fish freeze’, Navy News, Vol. 48, No. 18, 6
October 2005. (No page number provided in on line version).
331 Stacy Ward, ‘Border Protection catches illegal fishermen up north’, Navy News, Vol. 52, No.
15, 20 August 2009, p. 3, and ‘HMAS Glenelg intercepts vessel near Christmas Island’, Navy
News, Vol. 52, No. 18, 1 October 2009, p. 5.
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Tasks
South Pacific
deployment
Southeast Asia
deployment
Exercises domestic
SAR
Public relations
Scientific trials
TOTALS

’0203

’0304

’0405

’0506

8

13

7

7

2

2

4

’0607

’0708

’0809

’0910

’1011

’1112

2

4

1

1

1

5

2

5

1

’1213

4

9

10

11

5

2

2

5

4

7

2

2

6
2

11
5

6
6

5
8
1
19

13
13
2
42

16
16
2
41

9
2
1
19

13
1

39

1
2
1
7

17
13

29

3
1
2
26

26

42

16

Table 7-7: Number of Fremantle and Armidale Class Patrol Boat Tasked For other than the
Constabulary Function, 2002-13.332
The most evident implication of patrol boat constabulary tasking was the reduced
commitment to other tasks, especially deployments to the South Pacific and Asia and
exercises in local waters, especially from 2005-2006 onwards. This is illustrated in Table
7-7 which identifies the major employment undertaken by the patrol boat force, other
than for the constabulary function, between 2002 and 2013. The reduced deployment
program was of greater consequence for the South Pacific, where security and stability
was rated the ADF’s second tasking priority in the 2009 Defence White Paper.333
Between 1989-90 and 2001-02 the patrol boats undertook 140 regional deployments,
while from 2002-03 to 2012-13 the number of deployments dropped to 69. (See Table 63 in Chapter 6).

The patrol boats were especially suited for engagement with the limited maritime
agencies of Pacific Island Countries, because they could berth in the region’s smaller
ports and were engaged in similar work. The paucity of South Pacific patrol boat

The information in this table comes from issues of Navy News, the fortnightly RAN internal
newspaper, for the period January 2002 to December 2012, as well as from the annual series of
books, Australia’s Navy, which finished in 2008. It also includes information from Patrolling the
Line 2002 and Patrolling the Line 2003, annual summaries of patrol boat activity, regrettably
published only in those two years. For the years 2008-2012 information is also taken from the
monthly reports rendered by each patrol boat commanding officer. These reports are the most
complete records available of patrol boat activity.
333 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: FORCE 2030, Commonwealth of Australia,
2009, p. 54.
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deployments, especially from 2005-06, led to a significant reduction in the ADF’s
presence there as the patrol boats were not replaced by warships.334

Patrol boat deployments to Southeast Asia also reduced substantially, although with
less impact on Defence engagement. Major surface combatants and other warships
continued to visit Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia-Pacific, sometimes combining
these deployments with constabulary tasking. For example, HMAS Adelaide was on
Operation Relex patrol before deploying to Timor Leste in mid-2006.335

Table 7-8 illustrates constabulary activity for the Fremantle class patrol boats during
2002 and 2003, noting that the days at sea column represents the total days at sea for all
activities. Days at sea for individual patrol boats varied from 75 to 155, with major
maintenance demands the main reason for low figures. The achieved rate of effort is
commendable as the Fremantles were beyond their designed 20 year lifespan, and most
of the boats had operated consistently in challenging weather conditions. The rate of
effort is commendable also because of the impact on patrol boat crews, who were
responsible for ship husbandry and immediate maintenance when alongside.

Year of Activity

FCPB336 Days at
Sea

Boardings

Apprehensions

2002

1815

441

92

2003

1923

294

100

Ave. per patrol
boat

124

25

7

Table 7-8: Fremantle class patrol boat rates of effort for 2002 and 2003.337
The intensity of the patrol boat tasking, especially against IUU fishing, led to
cooperation with the Indonesian Navy to limit incursions by Indonesian fishers in
Australia’s EEZ. The most tangible outcome was annual coordinated patrols in

See Table 7-7 for the quite dramatic fall off in South Pacific deployments in the later years of
the decade.
335 LCDR Brian Chase, ‘Adelaide provides “visible presence”’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 12, 13
July 2006. Note that the operations involving constabulary tasks included; Relex I, and II,
Cranberry and Resolute.
336 FCPB is Fremantle Class Patrol Boat.
337 These figures have been compiled from individual patrol boat activity reports in Patrolling
the Line 2002 and Patrolling the Line 2003.
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northern waters involving RAN and Indonesian Navy patrol boats, beginning in April
2010. These deployments jointly enforce maritime boundaries and share relevant
information.338

The Fleet and the Constabulary Function
Other warships were also assigned to constabulary tasks. At different times, all six
guided missile frigates, all eight Anzac class frigates, five of the six mine warfare
vessels, all six heavy landing craft, all three major amphibious ships, two of the six
hydrographic survey vessels, both replenishment ships, one support vessel, and a Sea
King helicopter deployed to Christmas Island, conducted constabulary tasks.339 Table
7-9 indicates the number of times individual warships, other than patrol boats,
undertook constabulary tasks from 2002 to 2012.

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fleet
units

38

20

16

20

27

26

10

7

4

8

8

Table 7-9: Fleet unit involvement in constabulary tasking340
Other operational demands reduced the Fleet’s capacity for constabulary operations.
Table 7-10 below, provides a synopsis of the other major operations between 2002 and
2005.

‘Neighbours join for first time patrol exercise’, Navy News, Vol. 53, No. 8, 13 May 2010, p. 2.
These figures were provided by the Sea Power Centre – Australia and were taken from a
project which is assessing the RAN personnel commitment to the various constabulary
operations conducted since 1997.
340 This information is taken from statistics gathered by the Sea Power Centre-Australia in
support of the case developed for individual officer and sailor entitlement to the Operational
Service Medal – Border Protection. Some of the individual ship attachments were for periods as
short as 24 hours.
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Operation

Duration

Boomerang

2002

Slipper

Nov 2001 – June 2003

Bastille

January – March 2003

Falconer

March – July 2003

Anode

July 2003 – November 2004

Niue Assist

Early 2004

Catalyst

March 2004 – June 2005

Sumatra Assist

December 2004 – April
2005

Fleet Commitment
Surface combatant global
deployment – cancelled
because of other
commitments
Support for operations
against terrorism – surface
combatants and
amphibious ships
Build up to Iraq War –
surface combatants and
amphibious ship
Iraq War operations –
surface combatants and
amphibious ship
Support for Solomon
Islands peace mission –
mine warfare and
amphibious ships and
patrol boats,
Post cyclone help by
several Fleet units
Post-Iraq War operations surface combatants
Assistance after the 2004
tsunamyi – amphibious
ship

Table 7–10: RAN Contribution to ADF Operations 2002 - 2005341
As an example, in October 2002 the Government sought an additional ship for
Operation Relex. At the time, apart from the patrol boats, HMA Ships Arunta, Newcastle,
Warramunga, Manoora and Westralia were already patrolling. The Government asked
for HMAS Kanimbla, which was preparing to proceed to the Solomon Islands in
response to political unrest.342 The period August 2001 to June 2002 saw 25 RAN ships

Vanessa Bendle, David Griffin and Peter Laurence, eds., Database of Royal Australian Navy
Operations, 1990–2005, Sea Power Centre-Australia Working Paper No. 18, Canberra, 2005, pp.
44-61.
342 Marian Wilkinson, ‘Secret file: Operation Relex’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 2002,
<www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/27> (13 July 2013).
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allocated to Operation Relex.343 This combination of the constabulary function and the
demands of other emerging tasks severely strained the Fleet. One commentator noted
that, ‘ … the extent of the operational area almost totally consumed the naval assets
available; the shortage of amphibious ships, in particular, was at times a significant
constraint on the ability to move people’.344

The Navy had reservations about using surface combatants because of the ‘ …
perceived inefficiency in using highly trained individuals and expensive equipment for
what were ostensibly policing tasks’.345 These concerns were exacerbated by the
decision, after the 2003 Iraq War, to continue surface combatant deployments to the
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.346 Such was the pressure on the Fleet that, to apprehend
the suspected drug running ship MV Pong Su, HMAS Stuart was withdrawn from
maintenance in Garden Island Dockyard and made ready for sea within six hours.347

Unfortunately for the Navy, as the Senate Inquiry report into ‘a certain maritime
incident’ noted, larger and more capable surface combatants were needed for the
Christmas Island to Ashmore Island barrier against boats carrying irregular maritime
arrivals.348 Reasons for this included the capacity of surface combatants to carry
helicopters for reconnaissance, boardings and casualty transfer, and their greater
endurance and larger crews. Therefore, the Navy had to employ surface combatants in
the constabulary function, especially while the threats exceeded the capacity of the
patrol boat force.

The demands of the constabulary function resulted in the allocation of the Navy’s two
hydrographic survey ships to Operations Relex and Resolute. The application to
constabulary tasks of Australia’s only two oceangoing survey ships immediately and

David Stevens, “To disrupt, deter and deny”, in Bruce Elleman and S.C.M Paine, eds., Naval
Bloackades and Seapower: Strategies and counter-strategies, 1805–2005, Routledge, Abingdon, UK,
2006, p. 229.
344 Stevens, ‘To disrupt, deter and deny’, p. 231.
345 Stevens, ‘To disrupt, deter and deny’, p. 231.
346 LCDR Simon Bateman and Graham Davis, ‘Ridin’ shotgun in the Gulf’, Navy News, Vol. 46,
No. 17, 25 September 2003, p. 2.
347 ‘Horse Trader Seized: Drug smuggler gripped by Terror’, Navy News, Vol. 46, No. 7, 8 May
2003, pp. 1-2.
348 Senate Select Committee for an inquiry into a certain maritime incident’, Parliament of Australia,
Canberra, 2002, p. 19.
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directly affected their primary national role; contributing to the generation, publication
and distribution of nautical charts for Australian waters.349 Allocating the survey ships
to Operation Relex in 2002 and 2003 led to a 42 per cent reduction in hydrographic data
collected in 2002 and a shortfall of 35 per cent in 2003.350 This had the potential for a
significant degradation in survey activity and chart production.

The hydrographic ships had to be armed, their crews supplemented and trained for
constabulary work; including the provision of boarding and steaming parties. The two
ships embarked Squirrel helicopters and two rigid hull inflatable boats, the latter in
place of survey motor launches. The ships’ helicopters flew many hours during their
constabulary tasking, illustrating the value of embarked helicopters for this work and
highlighting the inability of the Armidales to operate them.351

The Huon class minewarfare vessels were allocated to Operation Relex as replacements
for the Armidale class, which were experiencing significant mechanical problems,
achieving only 60 per cent of their allocated available days in 2006-07.352 Preparing and
using the mine warfare vessels for constabulary operations cost an additional $95.6m
over four years.353

Two of the six Huon class were being placed in care and

maintenance and had to be reactivated for operational service.354 Much work,355
additional equipment and crew training were needed, although some of the Huon class
crews had served previously in patrol boats.356

Using the Huon class for constabulary work was not as problematic as for other
warships. Patrolling was a priority role for them and they were generally well suited to

‘About Us’, Australian Hydrographic Service,
<http://www.hydro.gov.au/aboutus/aboutus.htm> 30 July 2013.
350 Bendle, Griffin and Laurence, eds., Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990 – 2005,
pp. 45 and 47.
351 LEUT Damian Casey, ‘Hydro ship goes grey for patrol duty’, Navy News, Vol. 45. No. 4, 4
March 2002, p. 3; and LEUT Damian Casey, ‘Colourful year for White crew’, Vol. 46, No. 4, 27
March 2003, p. 7.
352 Defence Annual Report 2006-07, p. 62, <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/06-07/> (1
August 2013).
353 Michael Brooke, ‘Huons reactivated’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 9, 1 June 2006.
354 Defence Annual Report 2004-05, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2005, p. 176.
355 SBLT Tony Gleeson, ‘Joining the hunt’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 9, 1 June 2006.
356 Michael Brooke, ‘Yarra joins Resolute’, Navy News, Vol. 50, No. 6, 19 April 2006.
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it.357 Yet, in 2003, the year in which the last of the six ships was delivered, the Defence
Capability Review recommended two of the six be placed in extended readiness,
effectively taking them out of service.358 This suggests that mine warfare was not a high
priority within either the RAN or the ADF. There is a mild irony as the RAN’s first
dedicated class of patrol boats, the Attack class, emerged from the Navy’s experience
in using the previous generation of minewarfare vessels, the Ton class, for patrol duties
during Confrontation with Indonesia in the 1960s.

Allocation of the amphibious ships Tobruk, Kanimbla and Manoora to the constabulary
role was merely an extension of their primary function, as they were used to transport
irregular maritime arrivals to detention centres on Manus Island and Nauru. The main
issue for the Navy in using the amphibious ships was the increasing difficulty in
meeting all tasking demands. They were also involved in Operations Slipper, Bastille,
Falconer, Anode and Sumatra Assist. (See Table 7-10 above.) The demands on these ships
were so great that essential maintenance work was not conducted, leading to
unavailability for relief work in the wake of Cyclone Yasi and severe embarrassment
for the Navy.359 The heavy landing craft were not in as great demand for constabulary
tasking because of their slowness and limited oceangoing capability.

The Armidale Class Patrol Boats
By 2003 replacement of the Fremantles had become urgent, as they were increasingly
difficult to maintain.360 Replacements needed to have a range of 3,000nm, be capable of
conducting two boardings simultaneously, have better seaworthiness and be able to
carry 20 additional personnel in austere accommodation.361 The force of 12 larger
Armidale class patrol boats was planned to be available for 3,000 days per year,
significantly more than the Fremantles.362
Graham Davis, ‘Huons ready for any task’, Navy News, Vol. 47, No. 14, 12 August 2004, p. 3.
Defence Annual Report 2004-05, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2005, p. 176.
359 Cameron Stewart, ‘More defects found in crippled HMAS Tobruk’, The Australian, 16 June
2011, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs> (2 August 2013).
360 Leon Sykes and Commander Ken Burleigh, eds., Patrolling the Line 2003, Coleman’s Printing,
Darwin, 2004, p. 8.
361 CMDR Craig Kelly, ‘Minister announces patrol boat shortlist’, Navy News, Vol. 45, No. 15, 5
August 2002, p. 12.
362 Capt Frank Kresse, ‘RPB multi-crewing an advantage’, Navy News, Vol. 45, No. 23, 21
November 2002, p. 1.
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Table 7-11 illustrates the growth in patrol boat size and capability from the Attack class
to the current Armidales, which brought a new level of capability to the RAN from
mid-2005. Apart from the extended range and more effective stabilized 25mm gun, the
Armidales were more seaworthy, giving a smooth ride in even rough conditions, and
provided much improved comfort for their crews.363

Class

Length

Displacement

Attack

32.5m

132 tonnes

Fremantle

42.0m

220 tonnes

Armidale

56.8m

300 tonnes

Range
1188nm
at 13kts
2360nm
at 12kts
3000nm
at 12kts

Top
Speed

Crew

Draught

24kts

19

1.9m

30kts

24

1.8m

25kts

21

2.7m

Table 7-11: Comparison of Attack, Fremantle and Armidale classes characteristics364
Two additional Armidales were purchased, bringing the force to 14 boats, because of a
perceived need for greater security for oil and gas platforms on the north west shelf.
This was announced before the 2004 federal election, with a commitment to introduce
unmanned aerial vehicles for long endurance surveillance.365 Regrettably, the
Armidales would also suffer serious maintenance problems.

Their reliability problems included hull, machinery and fitted equipment. In October
2006 three of the seven boats then in service suffered water- contaminated fuel, causing
all seven to be withdrawn from service.366 In late 2007, incorrect operation of the
sewage treatment plant in HMAS Maitland caused a toxic hazard and limits were
imposed on the use of the austere accommodation.367 Amidst doubts about their
reliability, in November 2011 the Chief of the Navy publicly defended the boats and
Michael Brooke, ‘Road Test’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 18, 5 October 2006.
The information in the table comes from performance information provided on the RAN
website. <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet-ships-boats-craft/available-ship-histories> (5 August
2013).
365 David Sibley, ‘Two more boats confirmed’, Navy News, Vol. 48, No. 8, 19 May 2005. This
commitment remains unfulfilled at the time of writing in 2013.
366 Hugh McKenzie, ‘Mission ready: Boats back in action’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 19, 19
October 2006.
367 DGNCC, ‘Navy stands by Armidale boats, crews’, Navy News, Vol. 50, No. 21, 15 November
2007. Those limits still apply almost six years later.
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their crews from criticism in The Australian.368 Problems continued and another report
in The Australian in July 2013 noted ongoing maintenance problems with the boats, and
the need for more intensive maintenance schedules. The report also indicated that the
Armidales had to be supplemented by a minehunter and Anzac class frigate in ‘recent
months’.369

Like their predecessors, the Armidales cannot embark and operate helicopters and rely
for aerial surveillance on Coastwatch and RAAF maritime patrol aircraft. The value of
supplementary surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles has been acknowledged. Yet
a trial conducted with HMAS Pirie in late 2006, with a Mariner unmanned aerial
vehicle, has not yet led to acquisition.370

Embarked helicopters are a major asset, which can extend the surveillance capability of
the patrol boat and transfer personnel, especially in emergencies. Possibly the best
recent example came in the aftermath of the explosion on board SIEV 36, in which five
people died and several others were injured. Without helicopters of their own, the two
Armidales involved had to sail to the nearest gas platform and transfer the injured, to
await evacuation ashore by helicopters sent from Darwin.371

Experience with the Armidale class led to consideration of their replacements being
much larger vessels, also capable of replacing current hydrographic survey and mine
warfare ships. The 2009 Defence White Paper, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific
Century: FORCE 2030, proposed development of a common hull vessel of about 2,000
tonnes, possibly able to operate helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles.372 Earlier
consideration of a similarly sized vessel for constabulary work did not proceed and it

‘Chief of Navy corrects the record on patrol boat capability’, Navy News, Vol. 54, No. 21, 10
November 2011, p. 22.
369 Cameron Stewart, ‘Sailors forces to spend too much time at sea’, The Australian, 31 July 2013,
p. 4.
370 ‘Eye in the sky a big bonus’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 22, 30 November 2006. The Defence
Capability Plan 2012 (Public version) indicates that Project Air 7000, Phase 1B for a multimission unmanned aerial vehicle is expected to produce an operational capability between 2019
and 2022. Defence Capability Plan: Public Version 2012, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2012,
p. 62. <http;//www.defence.gov.au/public/capabilityplan/> (6 August 2013).
371 ‘Above and Beyond’, Navy News, Vol. 53, No. 6, 15 April 2010, p. 7.
372 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: FORCE 2030, Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 2009, p. 73.
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remains to be seen whether such a significant step will be made with the next iteration
of patrol vessels.373
The Patrol Boat Crews
Crewing the patrol boats has been a major challenge, as the Navy experienced
substantial personnel shortages throughout the period. A Department of Defence
answer to a Parliamentary question on notice, in June 2003, admitted that critical
shortages then included patrol boat navigators and executive officers, as well as sailors
in the technical trades and communication and information systems operators; all
categories vital to patrol boat operations.374 Personnel shortages affected the patrol boat
force more than other Navy elements because of the small number of people in each
crew; 24 for the Fremantles and 21 for the Armidales. As reported by the Patrol Boat
Force’s monograph Patrolling the Line 2003, ‘ … the critical nature of many FCPB billets
means that the loss of just one sailor can mean the patrol boat is unable to sail’.375

There were other problems, including crew structure instability in the Fremantles
during 2002 and 2003. (See table 7-12 below.) The year columns show the number of
people who served in each Fremantle for those two years, and what that represented as
a percentage of the nominal crew of 24. For both years the boats averaged crew
turnover greater than 50 per cent.

Dibb, Review of Australia’s defence capabilities, p. 129.
Senate Budget Estimates Hearing, Question on Notice, Parliament of Australia, 4-5 June 2003.
<http://www.defence.gov.au/ips/parliament/qons/> (7 August 2013).
375 Leon Sykes and Commander Ken Burleigh, eds., Patrolling the Line 2003, Coleman’s Printing,
Darwin, 2004, p. 10.
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Patrol Boat - Nominal Crew 24
Fremantle
Warrnambool
Townsville
Wollongong
Launceston
Whyalla
Ipswich
Cessnock
Bendigo
Gawler
Geraldton
Dubbo
Geelong
Gladstone
Bunbury
Averages

51
37
44
33
36
43
32
40
44
36
28
55
39
34
36
37

Crew Turnover
2002
2003
112%
41
71%
54%
41
71%
83%
49
104%
37%
37
54%
50%
57
133%
79%
65
171%
25%
39
62%
67%
43
79%
83%
42
75%
50%
45
87%
16%
44
83%
127%
47
96%
62%
43
79%
41%
32
25%
50%
58
142%
55%
41
69%

Table 7–12: Fremantle class Crew Turnover for 2002-2003376
Causes included the need to release personnel for leave and for training courses, illness
and other compassionate matters, as well as the overall personnel shortage.
Nevertheless, turnover rates of the magnitude illustrated reflect the need to move
personnel among patrol boats to fill short notice vacancies. This can lead to personnel
losing their shore ‘respite’, dissatisfaction and higher separation rates, exacerbating the
original problem.

Two major problems are evident in these figures. Firstly, they complicate the
commanding officers’ task of developing effective crews. Secondly, they create an extra
training load within the boats and for external training organizations.377 HMAS
Fremantle provides a stark illustration. About 75 per cent of the officers and sailors on
board in January 2003 were not members of the crew in December 2002.378 Before

See LEUT Elise Burnside and CMDR Ken Burleigh, eds, Patrolling the Line 2002, Coleman’s
Printing, Darwin, 2003, and Sykes and Burleigh, eds., Patrolling the Line 2003. The activities of
each patrol boat are chronicled in each edition, with crew members identified for each boat.
377 Examination of the monthly patrol boat commanding officers’ activity reports for the years
2008 to 2012 exposes an almost continuous focus on individual and collective crew training.
This reflected crew turnover and crewmembers joining without all required qualifications.
378 ‘HMAS Fremantle’, Australia’s Navy 2002-2003, Goanna Print, Fyshwick, ACT, 2003, p. 41.
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Fremantle could be ready for operations the new crew needed several days of training
alongside in Darwin, and then at sea.

Navy remedial measures included the use of Reserves in the Armidale class boats. The
Darwin Reserve pool provided 2,000 days of effort to the middle of 2008, with the
expectation of 4,000 for the full year.379 At least one Armidale had a Reserve
commanding officer in 2010.380 An effort was also made to improve conditions of
service for the crews. Most noteworthy multi-crewing was introduced for the
Armidales, involving three crews rotating between two boats and thus 21 crews for the
14 boats.

Multi-crewing took advantage of the Armidales’ greater availability and provided
more certainty and shore respite for the crews. The 14 Armidales were scheduled for
250 days availability each year; a total of 3,500 days for the force - 900 more than
provided by the 15 Fremantles.381 Crew duty was allocated in four 13 week cycles,
during which crew members were assigned to a boat for nine weeks and were
unassigned for four weeks. This arrangement provided more stable and predictable
work patterns for the crews.382 The principle was sound and initially the scheme
worked, with the Commander of the Patrol Boat Group commenting that, ‘Leave
balances have been reducing steadily, individual readiness compliance levels are
increasing and training proficiency shortfalls are reducing’.383

Over time however, the practice proved less satisfactory. Ongoing personnel shortages
meant that short-notice assignments to operational patrol boats continued to reduce
crew respite time. Also, the loss of ‘ownership’ associated with the traditional ‘one
crew to a ship’ arrangement common in most navies, together with out-sourcing

LCDR Mick Gallagher, ‘2000 days… and counting… ‘, Navy News, Vol. 51, No. 12, 10 July
2008. No breakdown was supplied to identify how many of the Reserve days were allocated to
patrol boats - some at least would have been taken up by shore support organizations in
Darwin.
380 ‘People Power–meet some of the crew of Assail 6 (Ararat)’, Navy News, Vol. 53, No. 6, 15
April 2010, p. 16.
381 CAPT Aaron Ingram and Bernard O’Connor, ‘Greater respite’, Navy News, 18 October 2007,
p. 4.
382 Ingram and O’Connor, ‘Greater respite’, Navy News, p. 4.
383 Ingram and O’Connor, ‘Greater respite’, Navy News, p. 4.
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maintenance to contractors, lessened the crews’ sense of ownership.384 The Navy also
formalized the system of ‘operational relief’, the means by which ‘off-duty’ personnel
are used, at short notice, to complete crews for boats proceeding on operations.
Operational relief had become a reality for many classes of Navy ships because of
chronic shortages.385 Rules were introduced to prevent individuals being unduly
disadvantaged.

The ongoing pressures of Operations Relex, Cranberry and Resolute resulted in other
tangible measures to improve conditions for crews. In 2003 the Government
introduced ‘boarding allowance’ of $40 per day for crew assigned to boarding parties,
steaming parties and holding parties. This acknowledged the increasing aggressiveness
of some foreign fishing vessel masters and the unpredictability associated with
irregular maritime arrival vessel boardings. The allowance would be hard earned by
many in the future.386 Later in 2012 the Government announced the introduction of a
new medal, the Operational Service Medal Border Protection, for personnel who spent
30 days in Relex, Cranberry, Resolute and similar operations.387

Because the RAN is primarily a war-fighting force, periods of peace allow training for
wartime roles and other tasks. The patrol boat force has been an especially useful
means of developing junior officers and sailors, primarily because of the additional
responsibilities exercised at relatively junior levels.388 One patrol boat commanding
officer indicated that, ‘… patrol boats had long been considered the ideal platforms for
developing all in the future Navy – for teaching skills such as command, seamanship,
watchkeeping and engineering to officers and sailors at all levels in a small crew’.389
Yet, despite the emphasis on training, the inquest into the explosion and loss of lives on
SIEV 36 in 2010, criticized some elements of Navy training. The criticism was

Evidence of these issues comes from discussions with officers who have served in the
Armidale class in the last five years. It is also evident in the monthly reports from the patrol
boats. See also, Kresse, ‘RPB multi-crewing an advantage’, Navy News, p. 5 for comment on the
maintenance arrangement.
385 ‘Operational relief rules tested’, Navy News, Vol. 49, No. 13, 27 July 2006.
386 Sykes and Burleigh, eds., Patrolling the Line 2003, p. 10.
387 ‘Australian Operational Service Medal’, <http;//www.navy.gov.au/Australian-operationalservice/> (10 August 2013).
388 ‘Operational tempo and lifestyle’, Navy News, Vol. 53, No. 5, 1 April 2010, p. 14.
389 LCDR Anthony Underwood, ‘Armidale weighs into a new era’, Navy News, Vol. 48, No. 11,
30 June 2005.
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acknowledged by one witness, who indicated that until that time, training had not
included the possibility of a vessel exploding.390 The Navy responded quickly with a
new boarding officers’ course.391

Another training task emerged with the introduction of transit security elements,
initially comprising small groups of Army and RAAF personnel, often supplemented
by a medical officer and interpreter.392 These teams helped the boarding and steaming
parties, by keeping order and caring for irregular maritime arrivals. Informal reports
indicate that these personnel integrated well, but needed specific training for their own
safety and to enable them to contribute to the daily sea routines. Testimony provided
by RAAF Corporal Sharon Jager, at the inquest into the explosion on SIEV 36,
demonstrated clearly the danger facing untrained and inexperienced transit security
element members in emergencies.393 Nevertheless, once plucked from the water,
Corporal Jager and a RAAF Medical Officer provided exceptional medical care for the
surviving irregular maritime arrivals, both receiving Chief of the Defence Force
Commendations.394 From early 2012, the transit security elements comprised only
Navy personnel.

The crews were sometimes subjected to severe stress which could impact on morale
and wellbeing. They appeared to cope well with routine constabulary operations, with
reports of stress appearing in public only in relation to disastrous incidents involving
vessels and the loss of lives. Some members of the boarding party caught in the
explosion and loss of five lives on SIEV 36, continue to suffer post-traumatic stress
disorder.395

Laurie Statham, ‘Navy admits asylum boat training not up to task’, NT News, 3 February
2010 , <http://www.ntnews.com.au > (11 August 2013).
391 Michael Brooke, ‘Patrol boats spearhead Op Resolute’, Navy News, Vol. 53, No. 5, 1 April
2010, p. 12.
392 Senate Select Committee for an inquiry into a certain maritime incident’, p. 19.
393 Lex Hall, ‘Rescuer “kicked boat people in head”, Corporal Sharon Jager’, The Australian, 28
January 2010, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au> (14 August 2013). Corporal Jager admitted
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which was her first boarding. She was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.
394 SIEV 36, ‘Corporal Sharon Louise Jager RAAF’, <http://www.defence.gov.au> (14 August
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Following the loss of SIEV 221 and over 50 lives at Christmas Island in December 2010,
the Chief of the Navy pointed out that ‘ It has left deep scars on all those involved’.396
In July 2013 he also noted that: ‘They are weary when they come off rotation and I do
care deeply about the potential impact of these activities on them’. Admitting to the
existence of stress and other mental problems, he went on to say that, ‘ … he believed
the navy (sic) had developed a good program of mental health support to look after
traumatised sailors’.397

The Navy in the Public Eye
The Navy had become used to favourable media coverage for its constabulary work,
especially with IUU fishing and until late 2001, dealing with irregular maritime
arrivals. This expectation was exemplified by Channel 9’s decision in 2006 to produce a
13 episode TV series called ‘Sea Patrol’, based on the activities of the Armidales and
filmed in several of the boats ‘acting’ as HMAS Hammersley.398

Nevertheless, as government policy for dealing with irregular maritime arrivals
became more contentious, the Navy experienced more scrutiny and criticism of its
actions. This began with the ‘children overboard’ affair in 2001. The Chief of the
Defence Force, Admiral Barrie, in evidence to the Senate Committee enquiring into the
incident, denied that the Defence Force had become politicized by the operation and
the associated controversy. Yet he also explained to Senators that Defence had to
improve its management of media issues associated with operations.399
Although that criticism was aimed at the higher command levels in the ADF, patrol
boat crews were targeted later, during a surge in irregular maritime arrivals and

Justin O’Brien, ‘Hero crew home’, NTNews, 25 December 2012, http://www.ntnews.com.au
(13 August 2013).
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several major safety of life at sea incidents; some involving loss of life. At the inquest
following the explosion of SIEV 36, Corporal Sharon Jager, a transit security element
member, claimed that a sailor had kicked irregular maritime arrivals in the head while
trying to save her.400 Patrol boat crew members were also criticized for saving crew
members before attending to the irregular maritime arrivals. While crew members
undoubtedly acted bravely,401 at least some of the criticism appeared justified.

In the case of SIEV 221, which foundered off Christmas Island in December 2009
leading to 30 irregular maritime arrival deaths, the Coroner rejected criticism by their
families of the Navy’s response.402 Nevertheless, Tony Kevin and David Marr criticized
the Navy and the Coroner’s findings relating to the Navy’s performance.403 Such
criticisms, warranted or not, generate introspection and reviews of performance by
those concerned. They also exacerbate the stress felt by crews continually engaged in
Operation Resolute.
CONCLUSIONS
From 2002 to 2012 law enforcement at sea in Australia was dominated by IUU fishing
initially, and by the arrival of irregular maritime arrivals over the last five years. New
threats to fish stocks emerged in the form of bottom trawling and the appearance in
Australian waters of a large capacity fishing vessel capable of seriously disadvantaging
local commercial fishers. An old problem emerged in the discovery of substantial
under-reporting by Japanese tuna fishers over a period of years. This highlighted the
need for constant monitoring of foreign fishing within the AFZ and the earlier failure
to provided it.

Lex Hall, ‘Rescuer “kicked boat people in head”, Corporal Sharon Jager’, The Australian, 28
January 2010, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au> (14 August 2013).
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seekers.
402 A. N. Hope, Western Australia–Record of investigation into 30 deaths…’, W.A. Coroner’s Court,
23 February 2012, p. 70.
403 Tony Kevin, ‘Little SOLAS found in the wreck of SIEV 221’, The Age, 2 March 2012,
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Although irregular maritime arrival activity was reduced after 2001, with stricter
controls and legislation, a change of government in November 2007 was followed by a
new wave of arrivals. While the Labor Government denied that the upsurge resulted
from repealing some existing harsh measures, it had to re-introduce many of the earlier
harsh measures it had strongly opposed when in opposition, leaving the impression
that only harsh measures would stem the flow.

Customs, quarantine and environmental issues did not claim government or public
attention to the extent that IUU fishing and irregular maritime arrivals did. They
emerged episodically and mostly lacked the immediate impact of issues such as loss of
lives at sea. Nevertheless, the biosecurity fears associated with potential pandemics of
avian, swine and equine flu caused great concern. Furthermore, the importation of
illegal drugs was overshadowed late in the decade by rising importation of illegal
weapons, apparently associated with a rise in gun–related crime. Consequently,
serious quarantine and customs threats did emerge but were managed primarily at air
and sea ports rather than at sea.

Although much interest in the marine environment continued to centre on the Great
Barrier Reef, accidents such as the Montara gas blowout on the North West shelf
highlighted the inadequacy of environmental regulation. Land-sourced run off and
increasing industrial activity on the Queensland coast raised fears as to the future
health of the Reef and will demand close attention by governments in the future,
noting UNESCO’s increasing interest.

Following the widespread terrorist attacks, especially in the early years of the decade,
fears grew that shipping and port infrastructure could become terrorist targets. While
the USA led with the introduction of countermeasures, countries like Australia were
forced to consider the risks and appropriate responses. These included increased
container inspection rates, exercises in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative
and the introduction of Maritime Security Identification Cards.

Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea was marked by a broad–based resort to
international cooperation, reflecting the increasingly complex interactions involved in
protection of maritime resources, boundaries and environment. The Federal
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Government developed MOUs with Indonesia for fishing rights and with Indonesia
and Iran relating to asylum seekers. Similarly, it cooperated closely with APEC to
manage flu outbreaks. The Government also acted unilaterally when necessary, with,
for example, fishing license buyouts in NSW, harsh measures to deter asylum seekers,
and the establishment of large marine parks around the coast. After much
equivocation, the Government eventually agreed to launch international court action
against Japan’s whaling in the Southern Ocean.

Until it won the 2007 federal election, Labor criticized the Coalition Government for
not establishing a coast guard for more effective management of Australia’s maritime
interests and boundaries. Labor’s inability to formulate a credible coast guard policy in
opposition, the reality that existing arrangements worked well and the potential for
massive disruption in the establishment of a coast guard, meant no real change to the
organizational arrangements once Labor regained power.

An important element of government response to law enforcement at sea challenges
was the introduction of new and more capable maritime patrol aircraft and patrol
boats. Additionally, at times, almost all the Navy’s other warships conducted
constabulary tasks, especially managing irregular maritime arrivals and countering
IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. The use of surface combatants for this latter task,
accompanied by a replenishment ship on each occasion, highlighted the Navy’s very
limited capacity for Southern Ocean operations. It also emphasized the Navy’s limited
replenishment at sea capacity, with one planned operation cancelled because of tanker
unavailability.

Much of the legislative effort reflected responses to new threats to maritime borders or
sovereign rights. In immigration, customs and resources protection, new or amending
legislation appeared frequently, as the Government reacted to the circumventing of
existing laws. This included laws excising parts of Australian territory from the
‘migration zone’ with customs legislation to provide for more control over the
movement of people in sensitive areas such as sea ports. Some customs–related
legislation including the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 related to fears of
maritime terrorism and the US reaction to the September 2001 terrorist attacks.
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Other laws reflected the growing internationalization of maritime affairs, such as
legislation to comply with the International Convention for the Protection of Highly
Migratory Fish Species in the Western and Central Pacific. Similarly, quarantine legislation
was enacted to counter the possibility of pandemics, spread more easily by
international air and sea travel. By contrast, laws were enacted to penalize more
heavily breaches of existing resources protection, environmental and customs
legislation.

A common thread in the mass of legislation was the frequent need for amendment.
There were many possible reasons for this, including political imperatives in
immigration laws, where both major political parties sought to expose flaws in each
other’s approach. The political imperative also caused legislation to be prepared
quickly, with the potential for errors or omissions. Possibly the best example of the
impact of hasty legislation to solve problems was the Maritime Powers Bill 2012,
introduced (but not passed at the time of writing) to replace 35 existing laws.

For the Navy, the constabulary function dominated operations during the decade. The
patrol boat force was able to undertake few tasks beyond domestic patrolling, for
almost the entire decade. This impacted most on Australia’s engagement in the South
Pacific, for which the Armidales were ideal. Conversely, law enforcement at sea
problems provided new opportunities to cooperate with the Indonesian Navy in the
Arafura and Timor Seas.

Essentially, the RAN became a constabulary navy during the decade, with many
warships engaged in domestic patrolling of the EEZ and adjacent waters. Additionally,
major surface combatants continued deploying to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea to
counter piracy and smuggling. Implications from this use of ‘non-patrol’ forces varied,
from a lowering of war-fighting skills in the combatants to a significant degradation in
the national hydrographic charting output with the involvement of hydrographic
ships.

The Armidale class patrol boats brought additional capability to the constabulary task
with their greater range, endurance and sea-keeping ability. Despite their manifest
advantages the boats have proved much less reliable than expected and appear
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insufficiently robust for their task. This affects morale among crews, whose operating
cycles, supposed to bring regularity, are often disturbed. This failing must be overcome
with the next generation of patrol vessels, needed from about 2020. The second
disadvantage has been the lack of a helicopter operating capability. Almost every other
class of RAN surface ship operates helicopters. For the patrol boats, the omission
results in an inability to transfer personnel quickly and the lack of the additional search
and surveillance coverage. Cost will determine if this shortcoming will be rectified in
the next generation of patrol vessels.

The patrol boat crews have been driven hard in often stressful work, especially since
2008. Notwithstanding the introduction of multi-crewing and fixed crew operating
cycles, the ongoing shortage of trained people and the unreliability of the boats have
prevented crews from enjoying their expected respite. Additionally, the high political
and media profile of the irregular maritime arrivals, together with the frequent mass
safety of life at sea situations, have put patrol boat crews under great pressure. They
have not been spared the criticism aimed at the Government and its law enforcement at
sea policies.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PROTECTING AUSTRALIA’S OFFSHORE ESTATE – THE STORY SO FAR
The Evolution of Law Enforcement at Sea and the Constabulary Function
Since Federation, the major law enforcement at sea issues have been resources
protection and management of illegal immigration, although they have manifested
themselves differently over the years. While the early focus on resource protection
concerned pearl fishing in northern waters, more recently attention has been on the
protection of fish stocks throughout Australia’s extensive exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), and protection of oil and gas facilities against the prospect of terrorist attack.
The economic importance of both industries ensures their high priority for law
enforcement activity.

The racist overtones in early immigration policy are no longer evident in Australia’s
immigration laws but the fact that many of the current wave of irregular maritime
arrivals comprise Muslims from Central or Southwest Asia has made easier the
imposition of tough measures to deter them from trying to reach Australia. Cultural
and religious differences still evoke fears of lack of integration.

The enforcement of Customs legislation has also been important since Federation,
initially because of the need to generate revenue from duties and excise associated with
traded goods. More recently, the smuggling of illicit drugs and weapons has become a
serious problem with alleged links to organized crime and continue to generate
community concern.

Although neither quarantine nor marine environmental protection received much
attention in the early years after Federation, the situation has changed dramatically.
Australia’s island status offers considerable protection from the introduction of plant,
animal and human diseases. The growth of primary industry exports has demanded
quarantine measures to ensure protection of the status of primary industry products,
not least the prevention of illegal landings on the coast with the potential to introduce
exotic diseases. Similarly, the huge growth in personal international travel has
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facilitated the rapid transfer of human diseases and while most of the quarantine
enforcement occurs at air and sea ports the potential for irregular maritime arrivals or
foreign fishers landing on Australian territory to introduce disease means that Navy
and Customs patrol forces remain on the quarantine front line.

Marine environmental protection has emerged as a major law enforcement issue in
Australia for two main reasons. Firstly, a growing appreciation of the economic and
natural importance of the Great Barrier Reef brought with it demands for its protection,
especially from the increasing amount of shipping passing through the Reef area.
Secondly, there was a growing global acceptance of the need to protect the natural
environment, and the marine environment gained from that. Accidents like the
grounding of the Torrey Canyon with the subsequent huge oil spill emphasized the
potential dangers and need for environmental legislation and protection.
The Response
Protecting Australia’s offshore estate through law enforcement at sea has become a
permanent and full-time task for Border Protection Command with its assigned Navy,
Air Force, Coastwatch and Customs aircraft and ships. It has not always been so and
progression to this situation has been slow, fragmented and often reluctant, with
governments slow to provide the resources necessary for the task.

Although the early demands of law enforcement at sea were not great, they were
added to by the feeling among the isolated communities that the north of the country
was wide open to foreign incursions of any kind. The initial responses were
inadequate, with no serious attempt to provide surface patrols in the north until the
1930s and no real aerial surveillance until after the Second World War.

Foremost among the reasons for the initial inadequate response was a lack of resources
of all kinds. The Federal government bureaucracy was limited in size and capacity and
there were many competing demands for the available government funding.
Additionally, the northern coast line, the source of most maritime law enforcement
demand, was itself sparsely populated and lacking the kind of infrastructure needed to
357

support law enforcement activities at sea. Over the years this competition for resources
was matched by a view that the cost of law enforcement activities had to be minimized.

Another significant limiting factor on Federal government law enforcement activity
was the legal system in which the States had jurisdiction over their territorial waters three miles until 1994.1 Because the Federal government exercised sovereignty only
over Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory waters and because it tended
to avoid conflict with the States over offshore sovereignty its capacity to intervene was
limited. This remained the case until the Offshore Constitutional Settlement was
agreed in 1979.

Complicating further the approach to law enforcement at sea for many decades was
the lack of an official national organization with responsibility for the function. As will
be discussed below, the Navy was poorly placed to play any significant part in its
constabulary function, because of an ongoing lack of suitable ships. At times it had
difficulty managing its military function, simply because of a lack of ships of any kind.
Customs and the Department of the Interior operated watercraft consistent with their
own responsibilities; in port ship inspections in the former case and liaison with
remote coastal communities in the latter.

Two other factors compounded the inadequacy of the early response. Firstly, there was
no widespread agreement on how best to enforce the law at sea and the dispute as to
whether it should be a civil or military responsibility is still alive, to the extent that the
Labor Party continues to champion the coast guard concept. Secondly, despite the
concerns expressed from time to time that the north was unpatrolled and that Japanese
pearling activity posed a security threat, notably in the 1930s, no government before
the late 1970s felt compelled to act seriously in support of law enforcement at sea: the
threats were not assessed as being serious enough and resources were applied
elsewhere.

Even with the appearance of large scale illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing and irregular maritime arrival activity the earlier hesitation and uncertainty
R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd. ed., Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1999, p. 474.
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continued to affect policy development. The Inter-Departmental Committees, from
1969 began the process that led eventually, over 30 years later, to the current Border
Protection Command.2 Funding and costing remained a substantial bar to progress for
some time, until a central funding model was agreed.3

That the arrangements, current at the end of 2012, remained satisfactory can be
presumed from the decision of the Labor Government, in power from 2007 to retain
them instead of their own preferred coast guard model. IUU fishing appears to have
been contained, at least for the time being and the flow of irregular maritime arrivals
has been managed – even if at the cost of involving much of the Navy’s Fleet at times.

Although the organization appears to be robust it may yet be subject to change in
future. Thus, if IUU fishing remained at low levels and the flow of irregular maritime
arrivals ceased or reduced to a trickle, there could be pressure to reduce surveillance
and patrol efforts, both for economy and to allow the forces involved to undertake
other tasks. On the other hand, were illegal activities at sea to increase, the current
organization would probably be capable of managing the response, possibly with the
assistance of additional aerial surveillance and surface response forces.
The Coast Guard Argument
Almost since Federation in 1901 there have been arguments as to whether law
enforcement at sea should be conducted by the Navy or by civilian law enforcement
agencies. The lack of resources and of government action for many years rendered the
argument moot until the 1970s. Additionally, the creation of the Royal Australian Navy
(RAN) lent weight to the argument for it to be responsible for law enforcement, given
the lack of any other capable organization. As noted in Chapter Four, however, the
RAN had very little capacity to carry out the constabulary function before 1967 and the
introduction of the Attack class patrol boats. Experience with the patrol boat Larrakia in

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements – A Review, The Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra,
1984, pp. 1-2.
3 Hugh Hudson, Northern Approaches: A report on the Administration and Management of Civil
coastal Surveillance in Northern Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service for the
Department of Transport and Communications, Canberra, 1988, p. 24.
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Darwin and the use of private watercraft in Cairns in the 1930s, also noted in Chapter
Four, showed that a more comprehensive approach to law enforcement at sea would
be necessary.

The discussion in Chapter Three demonstrated that countries have established
authorities to conduct law enforcement at sea on the basis of their own specific needs.
Accordingly, the United States of America has a very large coast guard, supported at
times by the United States Navy for law enforcement duties, while the United
Kingdom has a mix of civilian organizations backed by a more substantial input from
the Royal Navy and Ireland has a Navy which has no operational capability beyond
those needed for its constabulary function.

In determining its approach Australia had to consider its own unique circumstances;
including a very long and in places sparsely populated coast line, distant island
territories, populous island neighbours and with ratification of the Law Of the Sea
Convention, extensive offshore resource zones.4 These characteristics demanded
surveillance aircraft and surface response vessels with long range and endurance for
effective law enforcement at sea, characteristics that also matched those needed by
Australia’s military aircraft and warships.

Even as the need for a formal approach to law enforcement at sea grew and the debate
between a naval or civilian solution continued sporadically, little serious consideration
was given to establishment of a coast guard. Members of Parliament called for a coast
guard occasionally5 and in 1973 the Labor Government did examine the matter, but
without proceeding with the option.6 This remained the case during the spate of coastal
surveillance reviews conducted by governments between 1972 and 2004 and even
included rejection of a coast guard several times by both Labor and Coalition
governments, as recounted in Chapter Six.

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Report 2012-13, p. 4,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/ACBPSAnnualReport2012-13.pdf> (24 March
2014).
5 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 59, 16 May 1968, p. 1549.
6 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 56, 30 May 1973, p. 2044.
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Consequently, Labor’s decision to embrace the coast guard concept at the beginning of
the 21st century was surprising. It may have been proposed as a means of
differentiating the Party from the Coalition on an important national security matter,
but for it to gain acceptance the proposition needed to provide the equivalent of the
existing capability if not a potentially better solution. It also needed to be relatively
cheap, to avoid criticism. As has been pointed out in Chapter Seven, Labor’s proposed
coast guard forces were effectively ridiculed by the Government. There was little
consistency in the force structure options and only the barest of costing information
was provided.7

Undoubtedly the most puzzling aspect of Labor’s attraction to the coast guard concept
is the party’s failure to establish a coast guard during its six years in power from
November 2007. Reasons for its failure to do so are probably founded on the advice it
received on becoming the Government, which also resulted in Labor deciding against
establishing a Department of Homeland Security.8 Whatever the advice provided, the
only notable change made by Labor was to rename the Australian Customs Service the
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.

Labor may well have found that the organization it inherited on coming to power
functions well and had many of the characteristics of a coast guard. It is a multi-agency
organization in which Customs, Defence, Federal Police, Quarantine and Immigration
officers are embedded and which has the capacity to integrate officers from other
authorities, such as the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.9 Similarly, while it owns
no aircraft or patrol vessels it has ready access to Coastwatch surveillance aircraft, the
Customs patrol craft and assigned Navy patrol boats, with the capacity to call on other
Defence aircraft and ships as necessary.10

See Chapter Seven.
Tom Allard, ‘Labor flirts with first broken promise’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November
2007, p. 5.
9 Australian Government Directory, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service,
<http://www.directory.gov.au/directory?ea0_lf99_120.&organizationalUnit&d655dc2d-2ae848a7-b479-5bb3f09a29b7> (24 March 2014). See also Australian Government, ‘the australian
maritime security operations centre’, < http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5786.asp
> (24 March 2014).
10 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Annual Report 2012-13, pp. 41-2,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/ACBPSAnnualReport2012-13.pdf> (24 March
2014).
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Establishment of a coast guard, possibly within a Department of Homeland Security,
would be an organizationally complex exercise, requiring decisions as to which law
enforcement at sea functions would be included, what legislative and other
responsibilities would be removed from existing law enforcement authorities (Customs
and Biosecurity, for example) and what equipment would be removed from existing
law enforcement authorities for the new coast guard. Additionally, while the
reorganization took place, the law enforcement functions would still need to be carried
on effectively. Inevitably, too, there would be bureaucratic loose ends, in that for
example, the new coast guard would remain dependent on Defence for some
intelligence and would almost certainly still rely on Navy ships and Air Force
surveillance aircraft at times of high activity.
Organizational Development
For many years after Federation there was no formal organization for law enforcement
at sea. This was the result mainly of limited resources, especially at the Federal level,
together with the absence of threat levels that would have demanded more action. As a
result, there was little coherence to responses to illegal activities at sea. RAN ships
responded to calls from time to time and the Department of the Interior operated
patrol craft in the north during the 1930s. Only with the substantial increase in foreign
fishing off the Australian coast together with the establishment of the Australian
Fishing Zone and the first wave of irregular maritime arrivals was a more coherent
organizational response sought, with Air Force maritime patrol aircraft forming the
first dedicated aerial surveillance effort from early 1974.11

The response capacity began to become more formalized from April 1972, with the
establishment of the Marine Operations Centre within the then Department of
Shipping and Transport.12 This followed a meeting of relevant authorities, which
included the Departments of Shipping and Transport, Customs and Excise, Navy,
Interior, Health and Primary Industry. Initially at least the Marine Operations Centre
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 60, 15 August 1968, pp.
227-32. This debate focused on the growing need to counter foreign fishing, to establish realistic
boundaries and included a call for more patrol boats.
12 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 78, 18 May 1972, p. 2751.
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appeared to focus on search and rescue, and had no surveillance aircraft or surface
response vessels assigned to it.

Clearly the growing concern over foreign fishing vessels off the Australian coast was a
primary motivation for a more coherent and comprehensive organizational approach
to law enforcement at sea. By mid-1974 the Labor Government had established two
Inter-Departmental Committees to examine coastal surveillance.13 The first one
included several departments along with representatives of the Northern Territory
Government and made recommendations on several matters including possible
organizational models.14 The second Inter-Departmental Committee examined how to
gain the best results from the Marine Operations Centre.

Nevertheless, the composition of the first of these two Inter-departmental Committees
in particular, indicated the growing complexity of the law enforcement at sea task.
Many government authorities had an interest in the matter and several of those
involved in the Committee would be users of whatever organization evolved to
enforce laws at sea. Later, as the organization did evolve, some of the difficulties that
emerged included assigning of priority for the employment of surveillance aircraft and
payment for the provision of surveillance effort. Cost attribution became especially
difficult when aircraft conducted surveillance for more than one authority in any
flight.15 Another concern that emerged was the sense that no one department had
overall responsibility for the coastal surveillance task.16

As a result of the 1978 Coastal Surveillance Review the organization was tweaked once
again, with the Marine Operations Centre being strengthened and renamed the

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 89, 2 August 1974, p.
2713.
14 The authorities involved were the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, AttorneyGeneral, Customs and Excise, Defence, Foreign Affairs, health, Labour and Immigration,
Agriculture, Transport, Treasury, as well as the Special Minister of State, the Public Service
Board and the Northern Territory Government. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, Vol. 89, 2 August 1974, p. 1103.
15 Hudson, Northern Approaches: A report on the Administration and Management of Civil coastal
Surveillance in Northern Australia, p. 18.
16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 92, 12 November 1981, p. 1103.
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Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre.17 Simultaneously, the now Standing InterDepartmental Committee was tasked to further examine the needs of coastal
surveillance. These early organizational moves reflected a growing demand for law
enforcement at sea as well as a dawning realization that ever more comprehensive and
coordinated efforts would be needed to meet the demand, even if it was not yet clear
how best to achieve this.18

Significantly, it took almost another three decades before the present organizational
arrangements were in place. In that time civilian surveillance aircraft and patrol craft
(Customs) came to dominate the surveillance and patrol effort, along with Navy patrol
boats and some Air Force maritime patrol aircraft. Nevertheless, during the
organizational evolution, there were some noteworthy actions, including the renaming
of the

Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre as Coastwatch in 198219 and the

assumption of responsibility for coastal surveillance by the Australian Federal Police
after the 1983 Beazley Review. Given the prior lack of any maritime expertise within
the Federal Police, that arrangement was difficult to understand and did not last long.20

Even as the surveillance organization became more civilian-focused it continued to rely
on the Defence Force, for surveillance, patrol and intelligence which was becoming
more important in planning surveillance activity.21 With the increasing demands for
aerial surveillance and surface response effort from a variety of authorities
management and coordination of the effort became more important. Thus it was not
hugely surprising to find that in 1999 the head of Coastwatch became a Rear Admiral,

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance
and Protection Arrangements – A Review, The Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra,
1984, p. 1-5.
18 The need for better coordination was noted in previous reviews in 1978 and 1981. The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance and
Protection Arrangements – A Review, The Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1984,
pp. 1-5 and 6.
19 Hudson, Northern Approaches: A report on the Administration and Management of Civil coastal
Surveillance in Northern Australia, p. 3.
20 Although the move was recommended in the 1986 Footprints in the Sand Report it was not
made until after tabling of the 1988 Northern Approaches Report. Hudson, Northern Approaches: A
report on the Administration and Management of Civil coastal Surveillance in Northern Australia, p.
24.
21 The Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of
Coastwatch – Report No. 384, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 2001, pp. 43, 49
and 63.
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whose position has evolved into the Commander Border Protection Command at the
time of writing. The unusual situation of having a naval officer leading a primarily
civilian organization (outside the Defence Department) has facilitated coordination
with and cooperation from Defence in the allocation of aircraft, warships and patrol
boats, while also bringing to the organization a great deal of maritime operations
experience.22
Much of the organizational change and development over the years from the mid1970s has reflected the growing complexity of and demand for law enforcement at
sea.23 That there should have been some consideration of a coast guard as part of this is
not surprising because of the attraction of a single organization with overall
responsibility for all aspects of law enforcement at sea.24 That a coast guard did not
emerge from the organizational evolution that occurred over three decades or so
reflects the difficulty involved in creating such an organization from several existing
bodies, each with some degree of responsibility for the law enforcement at sea
function, as part of their overall responsibilities.25

Undoubtedly, the benefits of the single organization were appreciated by those
responsible for developing Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea.
Consequently, the current multi-agency Border Protection Command is staffed by
people from several law enforcement and security organizations, while also having
access to other organizations when circumstances require it. The compromise
arrangement has proven to be effective and able to deal with a range of threats of
varying intensity.

Cooperation and coordination are facilitated primarily by the fact that the Commander
responds to a directive signed jointly by the Chief of the Defence Force and by the Chief
Executive Officer of Customs. Wing Commander Kevin Downs, ‘Border Protection Command’,
United Service, Vol. 60, No. 4, December 2009, p. 13.
23 The Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of
Coastwatch – Report No. 384, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 2001, pp. 133 and
137.
24 One example of this consideration was provided in evidence to the Committee by the Centre
for Maritime Policy and the Australia Defence Association. The Parliament of Australia, Joint
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of Coastwatch – Report No. 384, Commonwealth
of Australia, Canberra, August 2001, p. 137.
25 The Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of
Coastwatch – Report No. 384, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 2001, p. 135. For
example, consideration by the Committee of Customs passing its patrol craft to Coastwatch
acknowledged that Customs would still need craft to meet its own operational meeds.
22
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The Development of Legislation
The most noteworthy aspect of Australian legislative development associated with law
enforcement at sea is that the vast majority of it has occurred since 1976. As Table 8-1
below illustrates, four times as many Acts have been passed since 1976 as in the entire
75 years to that point.26 For law enforcement at sea the paucity of legislation in the
early years can be explained by the relatively slow pace of Commonwealth
involvement in the issue before the 1970s. Similarly, the rash of legislation beginning in
1976 reflects both the growing Commonwealth involvement and the growing
complexity of law enforcement at sea.

Legislative
Category
General
Resources
Customs
Immigration
Quarantine
Environment
TOTALS

190118
2
6
3
11

191945
1
1
6
2
1
11

Time Periods
1946197675
88
7
9
12
3
13
3
4
2
5
4
21
21
62

Totals
19892001
3
6
5
16
1
23
54

200212
5
12
9
7
7
16
56

15
40
33
42
20
65
215

Table 8-1: Legislative Activity 1901-201227
The growing legal complexity was sometimes the result of laws having overlapping
responsibilities, as noted in Chapter Five in the case of the Off-shore Installations
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1982, which made installations attached to the seabed,
within the EEZ, part of Australia. The Act had implications for customs, quarantine
and immigration and required amendments to the Customs, Quarantine and
Immigration Acts. A certain amount of complexity also came from the agreement to
accede to international agreements, especially with respect to environmental law. This
was illustrated also in Chapter Five with respect to the legislation to comply with the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter
1972, The London Dumping Convention, and the International Convention for the Prevention

The total number of Acts shown in the table is taken from Chapters 4 – 7 and represents the
significant Acts related to law enforcement at sea during the nominated periods.
27 The numbers in Table 8-1 refer to the Acts identified in Chapters 4-7 above.
26

366

of Pollution from Ships of 1973-78 (MARPOL). One of the complicating factors was the
need for complementary State legislation in each case and delays in getting it passed.
This was more of an impediment before the Offshore Constitutional Settlement but
was still noted as a matter of concern in the 1984 coastal surveillance review.28

The table also illustrates another feature of the development of legislation since
Federation, that in specific areas, such as immigration and customs it has occurred in
bursts in response to significant events. Thus there was a rash of legislation in the early
1990s in response to the wave of irregular maritime arrivals explained in Chapter Six.
Environmental

legislation

provided

another

interesting

view

of

legislative

development. After no environmental legislation at all being introduced before the
1930s, marine environmental protection became the most legislated aspect of law
enforcement at sea. The significant and consistent amount of environmental legislation
passed in the periods, 1976-88, 1989-2001 and 2002-2012 relates to the constant interest
in the health of the Great Barrier Reef and in preventing pollution of the sea.
Law Enforcement at Sea and the Navy
For many years after Federation the constabulary function was an insignificant aspect
of RAN operations. In fact, for much of its peacetime existence the Navy struggled to
develop a credible force to meet its military function responsibilities, and with the
exception of the Second World War years, the RAN had no dedicated patrol craft force
before 1967.29 This meant that the organization which was often called on in Parliament
to provide law enforcement in northern waters was unable to do so. Nevertheless, only
the lack of Commonwealth government focus on law enforcement at sea for many
years enabled the RAN to avoid greater involvement in the constabulary function
before 1967. The lack of suitable ships would not have prevented those in service from
being used if the need had been great enough.30

The Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Review of
Coastwatch – Report No. 384, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 2001, pp. 6-1 and 2.
29 Ross Gillett, Warships of Australia, Rigby, Adelaide, 1977, pp. 217-27. The ‘Patrol Craft’ section
highlights the use of patrol boats during the World wars and their removal from service at
wars’ end.
30 Examples of this point include the sloop Geranium which was used for survey and patrolling
in the 1920s, a suggestion that the old ‘S’ class destroyers should be retained for northern
fishing patrols in 1936 and listing of Banks as a fisheries surveillance vessel in 1960. See,
28
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The assumption of constabulary function responsibilities by the Navy, from the late
1960s, brought many changes to the Service. One of the more significant changes has
been the permanent addition to the force structure of a patrol boat force which has
evolved from the manifestly inadequate Attack class to the far more capable, yet still
trouble-prone Armidale class. In the almost 50 years since the Navy introduced the
Attack class it has still not developed an entirely satisfactory patrol vessel. The next
iteration, due sooner than anticipated because of the Armidale problems, should be of
comparable size, but with greater durability and should have some integral aerial
surveillance capability, even if in the form of an unmanned aerial vehicle. This would
provide a significant addition to the patrol craft’s own very limited search capability as
well as a welcome supplement to the formal Coastwatch aerial surveillance effort.31

Acceptance by the Navy that the constabulary function was to become a permanent
and highly visible element of its operational profile has led to the development of a
cadre of officers and sailors with a wealth of experience of and expertise in
constabulary operations.32 This involves the application of domestic and international
law, sometimes in difficult circumstances, and often in the face of foreign fishers or
asylum seekers desperate to achieve their own objectives. Constabulary operations also
involve boarding suspect vessels, whose crews can become aggressive, which demands
that boarding parties exercise sound judgment along with great tact and discretion.33
The constabulary skills and experience gained by the relatively junior patrol boat
crews, have also become commonplace among the crews of major warships heading to

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. XCIII, 7 October 1920, p.
5428; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol. 152, 25 November 1936, p. 2225; and
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 28, 20 September 1960, p.
1125, respectively.
31 The RAN was to conduct trials with the Scan Eagle UAV in 2012. See ‘Insitu pacific to provide
ScanEagle services to Royal Australian Navy’, sUAS News, 12 July 2012,
<http://www.suasnews.com/2012/07/17522/insitu-pacific-to-provide-scaneagle-services-toroyal-australian-navy/> (28 March 2014).
32Recently retired RADM James Goldrick is a good example of this, having commanded the
patrol boat HMAS Cessnock in the early 1990s and Border Protection Command from 2006-08.
‘Rear Admiral James Vincent Purcell Goldrick’, Navy,
<https://www.navy.gov.au/biography/rear-admiral-james-vincent-purcell-goldrick> (28
March 2014).
33 The Hon Dr Brendan Nelson, Minister for Defence, Media Statement, Announcement on Illegal
fishing in Australian Waters, 5 April 2006,
<http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/52tpl.cfm?CurrentId=5521> (28 March 2014).
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the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea for interception and counter-piracy operations or
deployed for constabulary work in Operation Relex.34

The nature of the law enforcement tasks has meant that the patrol boat force has
devoted much of its effort to northern waters. In turn this has demanded the
establishment of dedicated bases in Cairns and Darwin, along with the associated
logistics infrastructure. While these new bases brought undoubted employment and
other benefits to local communities they extended the Navy’s logistics chain and with it
the operating cost to the Navy. Consequently, despite considerable pressure over many
years, the Navy has resisted establishing a separate patrol boat on the north-west coast;
preferring to rely on berthing at the region’s commercial ports.35

While the majority of the Navy’s constabulary operations took place in northern
waters, the opening up of fishing grounds in the Southern Ocean EEZ during the 1990s
created new challenges for the Navy and demonstrated certain limitations in the
Navy’s operational capability. Heard and McDonald Islands EEZs are over 2,000nm
from the nearest RAN base, HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, and the weather
conditions in the Southern Ocean can be extreme. Consequently, no RAN patrol craft
has had the range or sea-keeping capacity to operate in or near the Heard and
McDonald Island EEZs. Equally important, even though RAN major warships can cope
with the weather conditions, the distances involved require them to be accompanied
by a replenishment ship. With only two replenishment ships in the Fleet, the Navy is
limited in its capacity to provide warships for constabulary operations in the Southern
Ocean. This limitation has meant that civilian ships are operating under charter to the
Customs and Border Protection Service in the Southern Ocean and in turn playing an

Lieutenant Commander Ron Diekmann, ‘HMAS Newcastle: On Watch, in Commander
Richard Donnelly, et. al, eds., Australia’s Navy 2005, pp. 22-3 and Lieutenant Commander Philip
Ma and Lieutenant Patrick Pilbeam, ‘The Fighting 304 – 18,000 Tonnes of Law and Order Across
the Northern Border’, in Commander Carmel Barnes et. al, eds, Australia’s Navy 2006, Defence
Publishing Service, Canberra, 2006, pp. 32-3. .
35 Air Marshal M. D. Binskin, ‘CDF and Secretary Department of Defence Senate Estimates Brief,
Whole of Defence 6: Defence of Australia’s Northwest and Pilbara regions’, 24 May 2013,
<http://www.defence.gov.au/foi/docs/disclosures/071_1314_Documents.pdf> (28 March
2014).
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increasingly important part in law enforcement at sea.36 Whether the RAN will need
warships capable of operating in the Southern Ocean remains to be seen.

Navy warships having been dispatched to the Southern Ocean on constabulary
operations points to another important aspect of the RAN’s contribution to law
enforcement at sea. Especially in the last 15 years in the face of growing numbers of
irregular maritime arrivals, the whole range of RAN ships has been pressed into
constabulary service at times. As a result the constabulary function has become at
times the major Navy operational activity, as illustrated in Table 2-2 above, with some
interesting implications.

In the short term, there is an impact on Fleet readiness as other operational skills
degrade while constabulary work is conducted, and depending on priorities the
warships may not be available for other tasks.37 Additionally, complex warships with
crews of about 200 highly trained people have high operating costs and represent an
‘overkill’ for constabulary operations. Furthermore, if the diversion of warships to
constabulary work becomes a long term commitment then the force structure of the
Navy may need to be balanced with more capability for the constabulary function.
Such a shift, from to a primary maritime combat capability focus to a constabulary
operations focus, might cause the RAN to reconsider its commitment to the
constabulary function. The Royal Malaysian Navy’s decision to withdraw from
constabulary work some years ago offers a precedent.38 In any event, the RAN has
accepted that a peacetime function, carried out for the most part by patrol craft without
any maritime combat capability, is ‘core business’.

Yet, even as the Navy took on the constabulary function its contribution to law
enforcement at sea has been limited to specific aspects of the overall task. The Navy’s
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel - ACV Ocean
Protector,
<http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/SouthernOceanPatrolVesselACVOce
anProtectorFactSheet.pdf> (28 March 2014).
37 The need for continuation training for warship crews is noted at: Commodore T. N. Jones,
RAN, Warfare Officers Career Handbook, September 2006, pp. 36-7.
38 The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency was formed in 2005 partly because the Royal
Malaysian Navy had difficulty in meeting its constabulary responsibilities while maintaining
readiness for its combat roles. James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia: A
comparative study, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2013, pp. 112-13.
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primary constabulary function tasks have been border protection, especially relating to
asylum seekers and resources protection in respect to IUU fishing and safety and
security of offshore oil and gas platforms. Periodically, the Navy conducts border
protection operations in support of Customs and Quarantine authorities and
undertakes occasional marine environmental protection tasks.

The main reason for this operational focus is that most of the challenges to law
enforcement at sea have involved IUU fishing and the interception of irregular
maritime arrivals. Customs and quarantine breaches for the most part occur at the
major air and seaports of entry and Navy involvement has been limited to assisting
with Customs operations at sea and with quarantine operations incidental to IUU and
irregular maritime arrival operations. Consequently, Navy effort has been applied
where it has been most needed and where it can have greatest effect.

While law enforcement at sea has become an important security matter for Australia it
has also become a central security issue for the Pacific Island Countries, many of which
rely on revenue from foreign fishing in their EEZs for income.39 Australia continues to
assist these countries in law enforcement at sea through the allocation and support of
22 Pacific Patrol Boats to 12 of the Island Countries. The ongoing support includes the
allocation of Maritime Surveillance Advisors whose experience in Australian
constabulary operations provides the foundation for planning and conducting their
host country operations.40

Additionally, the provisions of the Niue Treaty which permit third party assistance in
the conduct of law enforcement at sea in the host country EEZ, provide another
opportunity for RAN ships and patrol craft to assist Pacific Island Countries, many of
which have extensive EEZs and very little capacity to monitor them.41 The RAN’s
AusAID, Pacific 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth, Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 2006, Annex B, pp. 137-40.
40 Navy, Semaphore: February 2005, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project,
<http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-february-2005> (28 March
2014).
41 For example, Tuvalu with a land area of 26sqkm has an EEZ of 700,000sqkm and one Pacific
Patrol Boat to patrol it. See AusAID, Pacific 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2006, Annex B, p. 140 and Pacific Institute of Public
Policy, Tuvalu, 7 February 2011, <http://pacificpolicy.org/blog/2011/02/07/tuvalu/> (28
March 2014).
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patrol craft are especially suitable for this work, having adequate range yet being small
enough to operate comfortably with the limited forces of the Pacific Island Countries.
Regrettably, as illustrated in Table 7-7 above, patrol boat deployments to the South
Pacific have reduced dramatically in the last decade or so because of the intensity of
law enforcement operations around Australia. Consequently, the demands of
constabulary operations in Australia are reducing significantly the assistance that can
be provided to Pacific Island Countries whose own resources are so limited. The
potential for this kind of assistance to be needed into the future, and the possibility that
other countries may offer it if Australia does not, may be another factor in the
allocation of resources to the RAN’s constabulary function in the future.42

Its commitment to the constabulary function has given the RAN an unprecedented
peacetime public profile, which for the most part has been positive. Only since 2001
and the application of tougher policies to deal with irregular maritime arrivals has the
RAN’s constabulary role become at all controversial, and even then there has been
much positive coverage of Navy activities. As well as providing the Navy with a
positive public profile the constabulary operations have also made patrol boats
popular posting choices for officers and sailors. Many have been attracted to ‘patrol
boat life’ in any case because of the opportunity to become part of a small close-knit
crew and a more informal approach to work. Nevertheless, having their day-to-day
work portrayed in popular TV programs and featured regularly in news bulletins all
added to the attraction.

Over the last decade or more, however, some of the lustre associated with patrol boat
life has worn off. As recounted in Chapter Six, the intensity of operations, coupled with
people shortages led to much more sea time for the patrol boat crews. Additionally, as
noted also in Chapter Six foreign fishers became less cooperative and sometime
aggressive in their response to boardings for inspection of their fishing activities. The
events that have most tarnished service in patrol boats, however, have been those
associated with the harsher irregular maritime arrivals policies and some of the

China, Japan and the USA, among other countries, are active participants in maritime and
other security activities with Pacific Island Countries. See, Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin,
Staying the course: Australia and maritime security in the South Pacific, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Canberra, May 2011, pp. 7-10.
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tragedies involving loss of life from the SIEVs. Some patrol boat crew members have
suffered from trauma as a result of these experiences.43

Most naval operations, especially combat operations, are impersonal to the extent that
adversaries rarely have personal contact with each other and engagements can take
place over long distances.44 Constabulary operations differ greatly in that they involve
close interaction with people, often in fraught circumstances in which language
differences can complicate matters. For the patrol boat boarding parties, comprising
mainly junior personnel, judgment and common sense can be vital. Consequently, the
Navy’s experience of the constabulary function has led to the development of a set of
skills which have wider utility, as in peacekeeping, and which are more usually
associated with law enforcement officials.

Over the last 30 years in particular the constabulary function has become a major
component of the RAN’s operations, and at times has been its most significant
operational activity. This has had implications for the Navy as a whole with many
warships assisting the patrol boat force in periods of high demand and some
operational tasks foregone. However the threats to Australia’s offshore estate manifest
themselves in the future, the Navy is likely to remain heavily committed to the
constabulary function, in a deterrent if not an enforcement capacity.

Cameron Stewart and Paige Taylor, ‘Border patrols at breaking point over asylum boats’, The
Australian, 18 July 2013, <http://sievx.com/articles/AUSSAR20134816/20130718StewartTaylor.html > (31 March 2014).
44 See quote by Naval Airman Frank Eyck in David Stevens, ‘The Warrior and His Foe’, in John
Reeve and David Stevens, eds, The Face of Naval Battle, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW.,
2003, p. 270.
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CHAPTER NINE – CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea from
Federation to the end of 2012. It has considered the development of illegal activities,
the policy-making and practical responses to them and has tracked the emergence of
the consequent legislative framework. With this foundation, the thesis has also
analysed the evolution of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) involvement in law
enforcement at sea – its constabulary function – and its implications for the Navy. The
examination followed an assessment of law enforcement at sea and its validity as a
function of navies.
The thesis has concluded that law enforcement at sea has been a function of navies
since ancient times with a strong focus on counter-piracy and resources protection
work. More recently, border protection (including customs and immigration) and
environmental protection have also emerged as elements of the constabulary function.
The thesis has also shown that navies have adopted different approaches to the law
enforcement task, with some, like the Irish Naval Service, being fully committed to it
and others assisting dedicated law enforcement agencies, including coast guards.
These different approaches have emerged from the way in which States have
approached maritime security, with some, like the United States of America,
establishing a Revenue Cutter Service before building a Navy.
The Nature of the Task
Fundamentally, the task of protecting Australia’s offshore estate has changed little
since Federation. In the first decades the main issues were immigration and resources
protection and while the form of the threat has changed in the intervening century, the
main focus today remains immigration and resources protection. The early focus was
on limiting non-white immigration and on regulating the pearl shell industry; in the
latter case, both for revenue generation and to guard against illegal Asian immigration.
Today, the focus is on predominantly Southwest and Central Asian asylum seekers
arriving irregularly by boat, and while the policy is no longer racist, the fear of
uncontrolled immigration remains potent in parts of Australian society. With respect to
resources protection, most attention is paid to foreign fishing in the Australian Fishing
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Zone (AFZ), to ensure sustainable yields from diminishing fish stocks. There is also a
growing sense that offshore oil and gas platforms need to be kept secure against
terrorism.
One major change in the task has been the growing emphasis on protection of the
marine environment. This is an outcome of the increasing global appreciation of the
need to protect the natural environment, manifested most notably in Australia with the
attention given to the Great Barrier Reef. The global awakening has translated into
public and thus Parliamentary pressure for action in Australia, as recounted
throughout Chapters Four to Seven.
Federal Government Responses
In examining Australia’s approach to law enforcement at sea since Federation the
thesis has shown that for almost the first seven decades, Federal Governments lacked
urgency, were very hesitant to be become involved and were driven by a desire to
minimize the cost of operations. For example, there were no regular air or sea patrols
before the 1960s. Of the several reasons for these shortcomings, funding limitations
were foremost, especially in the early years. There were many competing demands for
government funds, as the new Commonwealth worked to provide infrastructure
across the vast and sparsely populated continent. The two world wars and intervening
great depression added to the financial stresses.
Until the Offshore Constitutional Settlement in 1979 there was also uncertainty and
dispute over the limits of State and Federal offshore jurisdiction which made Federal
governments wary of intruding on potential State matters. The Settlement confirmed
States’ jurisdiction to three nautical miles, and Federal government jurisdiction beyond
to the limit of the maritime zones. This complication was probably a convenient excuse
for Federal government inactivity over the years.
The magnitude of the task was yet another reason for Federal government tardiness in
addressing law enforcement at sea Australia’s extensive coast line and sparsely settled
northern coast made establishing and sustaining patrol forces difficult. Although
coastal development over the years eased aspects of this problem, the addition of the
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AFZ out to 200nm from 1979 and subsequent continental shelf extension to 350nm in
2008 added greatly to potential surveillance and patrol areas. Especially before the
Second World War, reported sightings of illegal activity at sea or illegal aircraft
movements could rarely be confirmed. Partly the result of sparse and widely separated
population centres, this failure perversely tended to reduce confidence in such
sightings and any impetus towards action.
New Approaches to Law Enforcement at Sea
Two main factors motivated change in the Government’s approach: asylum seekers
coming to Australia by boat and the extended responsibility for resources protection
granted by the assertion of an AFZ and Exclusive economic Zone (EEZ) out to 200nm.
The first wave of so-called ‘boat people’ from Southeast Asia beginning in 1976
reignited old fears of Asian immigration and raised concerns over the potential for
serious quarantine breaches with implications for local primary industry. Both of these
fears remained with subsequent waves of irregular maritime arrivals, especially as
some involved significant numbers of people. With the extension of the resource zones,
many foreign fishers, previously operating in the high seas, became subject to
Australian laws as Australia assumed responsibility for ensuring sustainable fishing in
the AFZ.
Although Australia responded with the establishment of aerial surveillance and
surface response patrols, many years passed before the current organizational and
operational arrangements materialized. Several organizational models, recommended
in a succession of reviews through the 1970s and 1980s, were attempted under different
law enforcement authorities before the present Border Protection Service came into
being. Additionally, different mixes of military and civil contract surveillance aircraft
were tried before the current fleet of sophisticated contracted civil surveillance aircraft,
supported by Air Force maritime patrol aircraft was settled on. Similarly, although the
primary surface response patrol force continues to be provided by the Navy, each of
the three patrol boat classes introduced since 1967 has been more capable than the last,
but, as recounted in Chapter Seven, even the current Armidale class remains dogged
by unreliability.
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There are several explanations for Australia’s response to the demands of law
enforcement at sea. As identified especially in Chapter Five, prior to the establishment
of the Maritime Operations Centre there was no Federal Government organization
responsible for law enforcement at sea, which meant that responses to illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing or any other illegal activity remained ad hoc.
The establishment of a functional organization had to contend with the differing needs
of several government departments and authorities, some as providers of surveillance
and response, and others as users of the capabilities.
Throughout Chapters Four to Seven there is evidence of the uncertainty in
approaching organizational development for law enforcement at sea in Australia, with
recurring consideration as to whether it was a task for the Navy or for a coast guard.
The Navy’s role continues to be debated, but especially since the replacement of the
Attack class patrol boats with the Fremantle class in the early 1980s, the constabulary
function has become a permanent operational task for the Navy.
Organizational Challenges
The establishment of a coast guard has been considered several times over the years,
but as illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven it has been proposed as a serious option
only by the Labor Party, especially since 2001. Despite having proposed some force
structure options and funding details prior to recent Federal elections, Labor decided
against introducing a coast guard after returning to power in November 2007. This
decision lends credence to the view that its coast guard proposals were little more than
a means of differentiating the Party from the Coalition on an important national
security issue. Nevertheless, Labor may also have been dissuaded by the implications
of establishing a coast guard, which would include transfers of bureaucratic and
legislative responsibilities as well as physical equipment. The dislocation associated
with such reorganization would impact on operational performance.
The lack of prior experience of the overall task led to several ‘false starts’ such as the
assignment of operational responsibility to the Australian Federal Police in 1984, an
organization with no prior exposure to aerial surveillance and oceangoing patrol. As
noted in Chapter Five, inexperience also plagued early efforts to establish civil aerial
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surveillance contracts, with significant shortcomings in selected contractors and
aircraft.
The cost of protecting Australia’s offshore estate has always been a major factor in
determining the approach taken and as late as the 1980s there was a view that the cost
of providing the law enforcement should not exceed the potential economic loss that
was being guarded. Only at the turn of the century, when the scale of the IUU fishing
and irregular maritime arrival problem demanded deterrence and not just reactive
surveillance and patrol, was the focus on cost relaxed in favour of performance.
Additionally, there was difficulty in establishing how best to fund law enforcement
activities, with both ‘user pays’ and having the Quarantine Service, a customer, also
exercising funding responsibility proving unworkable. Ultimately, total funding was
provided within the then Department of Transport and Communications as the
surveillance provider. Although the provider has since changed, the centralized
funding model remains in place.
Legislative Developments
This thesis has also identified the developments in Commonwealth legislation to
support law enforcement at sea policy and operations. Legislative development
reflected other aspects of law enforcement at sea, so that initially there was little
relevant law, with the exception in 1901 of laws designed to prevent non-white
immigration and to generate revenue through Customs duties and tariffs. Chapter
Eight demonstrated that the major legislative effort has taken place since 1976. This has
occurred first in response to developments such as rising global interest in
environmental protection, the introduction of offshore oil and gas exploitation, the
extension of maritime resource zones enabled by the Law of the Sea Convention and
issues such as the expansion of drug smuggling.
The rapid expansion of marine environmental legislation, especially since 1976, is
noteworthy, given that the first marine environmental law was not passed until 1932.
Acknowledgement of the global status of the Great Barrier Reef and the growing
appreciation of the measures needed to protect it for its environmental – and economic
– value have contributed significantly to this. The general impact of pollution, ship and
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land-sourced, and the desire to penalize polluters has also led to legislative action,
much of it reflecting international conventions and agreements.
Legislation in support of Australian quarantine policies has been enacted through the
years and although it may not have had the political profile of immigration law it has
proven to be effective in keeping Australia free of exotic disease. This has been
especially important for primary industry and the competitive advantage associated
with guaranteed disease-free foodstuffs. Efforts to maintain the strict controls have
come under international pressure, through accusations that strict quarantine laws are
merely restrictions on free trade. Consequently, Biosecurity Australia continues to
tread a fine line between legislative strictness and openness to international trade.
Most recently, legislative action in support of law enforcement at sea has been
generated by the growth of IUU fishing and its extension into the Southern Ocean as
well as the successive waves of irregular maritime arrivals. The latter issue in
particular has generated much legislation and has proved politically divisive as ever
tougher measures were legislated for to discourage asylum seekers.
Chapter Seven also highlights another aspect of Australian law making in this field. In
recent years especially, many laws have been subject to later amending legislation.
While there were probably cases of hasty drafting of the original legislation, as the
irregular maritime arrivals problem became highly divisive, legislation had to respond
to quickly changing political demands. It also had to adapt to the constant efforts of
people smugglers to circumvent measures intended to frustrate their activities.
RAN Force Structure Challenges
The RAN’s tardiness in taking on the constabulary function in support of law
enforcement at sea reflected the reluctance of the Federal Government to address the
issue. It also reflected the manner of the Navy’s development. In its first 50 years it
was, in peacetime, a small operationally limited force, impacted by budgetary
restrictions. It also fought in the two World Wars and the Korean War, and its focus
was understandably on its military function. In peacetime the Navy was substantially
reduced in size and capacity, and concentrated primarily on maintaining its combat
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skills.

Furthermore, with the ongoing differences of view as to whether law

enforcement at sea should be a Navy responsibility, there was no compelling reason
for the Navy to become involved. It is therefore hardly surprising then that the
evolution of law enforcement at sea to becoming a permanent Navy constabulary task
was serendipitous; primarily the result of the Attack class patrol craft, purchased for
other purposes, being available as marine resources protection demands began to
grow.
The force structure implications for the Navy have been substantial. The way in which
the demands of the constabulary function have extended beyond the patrol boat force
over the decade or so to 2012 are explained in Chapters Six and Seven. At various
times, ships from all elements of the Fleet have been allocated to constabulary
operations, to the detriment of their primary tasking and at significant cost. Indeed for
the decade beginning in 2001 the RAN has engaged more in constabulary operations –
at home and internationally – than in any other kind. Although the ships and their
crews are flexible enough to manage these changes, inevitably there is a loss of
proficiency in primary skills as ships are retained in constabulary operations.
Furthermore, the extent to which the patrol boats have been committed to the
constabulary function has greatly lessened their availability for deployments,
especially into the South Pacific, an area of very high strategic priority for Australia.
The need for constabulary operations in the Southern Ocean has also exposed other
limitations in the Navy force structure, with the patrol boats unable to operate in those
waters and major warships needing to be accompanied by replenishment ships
because of the extended distances. Although civil contract vessels are now used for
Southern Ocean patrols, the Navy must consider whether its future warships should be
capable of extended Southern Ocean operations – constabulary or otherwise.
Other Implications for the RAN
Commitment to law enforcement at sea has also had major implications for the Navy’s
force disposition, with new bases to support patrol boat operations established in
Darwin and Cairns during the 1970s. This has led to the development of local industry
support in those cities and resulted in the relocation of hundreds of Navy families.
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Despite the drawbacks associated with operating from commercial ports along the
northwest coast of Western Australia the Navy has so far resisted building a dedicated
patrol boat base in the Northwest. Much of the resistance indicates a desire not to
extend already stretched logistics and personnel support functions.
Acceptance of the constabulary function as a permanent task has had other
implications for the Navy, including the need to develop a cadre of people with a
range of skills appropriate to their law enforcement duties, including a sound working
knowledge of the relevant national and international law.
Above all, however, involvement in constabulary operations has, for the first time,
given the Navy a peacetime public profile. News coverage of interceptions of illegal
fishing boats and irregular maritime arrival vessels has built a positive reputation for
the Navy within government and the public. For an organization traditionally neither
seen nor heard the media coverage has also become a useful recruiting tool.
As argued in Chapter Seven, however, not all publicity is good publicity and the
nature of the constabulary task in recent years has subjected the Navy to strong
criticism. This has been associated with some of the harsher measures put in place to
deal with irregular maritime arrivals and with the Navy response to safety of life at sea
incidents, some of which have led to loss of life. As a result, patrol boat crews find
themselves treading a narrow path, enacting tough government policies while also
continuing to meet their moral and legal obligations as seafarers.
These traumatic events and the criticism that follows them, together with the often
high intensity of operations, a shortage of crews and the need to deal with sometimes
aggressive fishers and uncooperative asylum seekers, has generated great stress and
trauma among some of the patrol boat crews. This must be managed both to ensure the
wellbeing of the crews and that they continue to conduct their operations effectively
and humanely.
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Options for Further Research
A significant issue in preparation of this thesis has been the lack of information in the
public domain on RAN constabulary operations, especially those involving the patrol
boat force. Annual Defence Reports provide only highly aggregated data relating to
warship availability and activity, from which little useful information can be gleaned.
The Navy has been more forthcoming in the past, but has ceased production of its most
informative sources. Although there were only two editions, Patrolling the Line 2002
and 2003, produced by the Patrol Boat Force, provided the most detailed account of
individual patrol boat operations available, including day to day operations and names
of personnel serving in each of the boats. The series of Navy Annuals that ended in 2008
provided insight into all RAN operations and usually listed international deployments
of all warships. Both publications were apparently victims of funding limitations. The
fortnightly RAN newspaper Navy News remains a valuable information source but it is
by no means comprehensive in its coverage, and as noted in Chapter Six, it sometimes
avoids controversy.
Furthermore, there is no formal history of RAN constabulary operations and coverage
of them in The Royal Australian Navy, the official history produced in 2001 is cursory. In
this sense, Customs is somewhat better served with David Day’s two volume history of
Customs, covering the period from 1788 to 1996. This thesis has provided a
comprehensive examination of law enforcement at sea from Federation to the end of
2012 and the way in which successive Federal Governments have responded to its
needs. Consequently, it has filled a significant gap in the literature, especially in
relation to the Navy’s role in law enforcement.
The future of law enforcement at sea and the constabulary function will depend on
several matters which have featured strongly in this thesis. The current focus on
irregular maritime arrivals will continue into the future if those factors causing people
to flee their home countries remain relevant and if Australia remains a favoured
destination, despite whatever deterrence measures are deployed. Similarly resources
protection is likely to remain important if fish stocks remain under threat and the
demand for fish remains strong, as it is at present. The already significant offshore oil
and gas industry is likely to add to the importance of resources protection, especially if
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terrorism continues to be a regionally credible threat. Finally, the extended maritime
zones made possible by the Law of the Sea Convention have greatly extended the reach
and responsibilities of law enforcement authorities at sea. Even without further
extension of any of the zones the responsibilities of navies and other constabulary
forces may well expand if marine resources and the marine environment remain under
sustained or even increasing pressure. Likewise the potential for ongoing uncontrolled
migration by sea could also continue to engage constabulary and other naval forces.
These developments would change the quality if not the quantity of Australia’s
constabulary forces and possibly the operational focus of much of the Navy.
Since Federation, Australia has slowly and hesitantly embraced its responsibilities for
law enforcement at sea. This meant establishing organizational structures and
operational forces capable of maintaining the law in the nation’s extensive offshore
zones and at the ports of entry. It has also led to the development of a substantial body
of legislation which now reflects Australia’s unique needs and commitment to
international conventions. Equally slowly, Australia’s Navy came to play a very major
part in law enforcement at sea, a part which at times demands the entire patrol boat
force as well as other ships. While it is not possible to predict the future demand for
law enforcement at sea, recent trends suggest that the RAN will need to develop larger
and more capable constabulary forces, and accept that the constabulary function could
remain central to the operations of the entire Fleet.
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